The secret dealing refereed here is the recent Washington Post report that exposed that US diplomats, behind close doors, have signalled their openness to work with resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami and to ‘want to be their friends.

On 12 February Bangladesh is to participate in its 13^th national election.

In the country’s history, this election stands as unique for many reasons—a) the first election held after July Uprising that deposed Sheikh Hasina’s rule on 5 August 2024, b) In a first, this national election is not seeing participation of the country’s largest party Awami League due to the ban on its party activities, c) It is also the first time that former political allies—Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) are contesting as opponents, d) the 11-party alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami puts Islamist parties at the forefront of the electoral game, a huge boost to country’s Islamist politics.

The election campaign for 13^th national election launched on 22 January, with BNP yielding the highest number of candidates (288) and Jamaat the second (224) to compete in the country’s 300 constituencies.

The resurgence of Islamists in Bangladesh owes much to the political vacuum left by Awami League after the July Uprising. The interim government aided Jamaat-e-Islami’s comeback in mainstream politics by lifting the ban, later enabling its restoration of party registration, allowing its re-entry in the electoral game after 2013.

Moreover, the interim period witnessed many Islamists convicted for 1971 war crimes or terror activities after being acquitted of all charges, allowing their arrival in the political scenario once again. One of them is ATM Azharul Islam, now contesting from Rangpur-2 constituency as Jamaat candidate. Nevertheless, Jamaat-e-Islami attempted to rebrand itself as a progressive, moderate party that seeks to create an “Islamic welfare” state.

The comeback of Islamist political parties in post-Hasina Bangladesh alongside witnessed the revival of Islamist extremism, making their loud presence in the country’s socio-cultural life. The steep rise in violence against religious and ethnic minority communities, rise in sexual violence, and mob attacks in cultural festivals should be seen as a byproduct of Islamists resurgence.

Notwithstanding the fact that Islamists political parties occasionally displayed dissatisfaction over these developments and claims its distance from radicals, one cannot ignore that the Islamists—be it political parties or extremist factions—share the same ideological goals—to create an Islamic state in Bangladesh which would be based on Sharia-based law.

These forces are essentially against the country’s state principles (one being secularism) enshrined in the 1972 Constitution and want to replace the present constitution with a new one which would follow Islamic principles instead of what they claim as ‘man-made laws.’ Undoubtedly, if these parties come to power, one would likely see a convergence of their goals being translated into violent actions. Bangladesh’s own history 1990s-mid 2000s testifies to this. 

In the mid 2025 the Islamist coalition started taking shape when five Quami- Madrasa-based registered Islamist parties—Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Nezam-e-Islam Party, Khelafat Majlish and Islami Andolan—expressed  interest on an electoral compromise by filing a single candidate in the national election. At this stage, Jamaat attempted to forge a unity with this alliance, but it was kept out because of unity’s initial hesitation with Jamaat with respect to ideological differences as well as its controversial past.

However, in September 2025 protest called by Islami Andolan, Khelafat Majlis and Jamaat-e-Islami, alignied on five key demands which includes July Charter referendum and trial of July atrocities and introducing proportional representation in both houses. This protest was referred as ‘moving closer to forming an alliance’.

The alliance then expanded to eight ‘like-minded’ parties, this time including Jamaat-e-Islami and compromising of Islami Andolan Bangladesh, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, Khelafat Majlis, Nezame Islam Party, Bangladesh Khelafat Andolon, Bangladesh Development Party, and Jatiya Ganatantrik Party (JAGPA), declaring to contest 2026 election through a seat-sharing arrangement.

Following the official Jamaat-led coalition, Jamaat-e-Islami, resorted to aggressive historical revisionism in their speeches on the occasion on Intellectuals Martyrs Day, calling ‘India’s conspiracy’ behind the murder of intellectuals and blaming ‘Delhi loyalists’ shaping the present narrative on Liberation War.

Jamaat leaders also remarked on all government institutions to be governed only by ‘Allah’s law’, promising that if they come to power, no other man-made laws would be able to operate in the country. Indeed, the rebranding as a tolerant, moderate party was just an electoral gimmick to enter this coalition.

In December, Islamist-led alliance further expanded when National Citizen’s Party, Liberal Democratic Party and Amar Bangladesh and joined to form an 11-patry alliance. These parties earlier that month formed a separate alliance known as Democratic Reform Alliance, posing itself as an alternative to ‘old-style politics’ of Jamaat and the BNP.

The change in decision was justified by NCP as ‘changed political landscape’ and not an ‘ideological alliance’. Nevertheless, NCP’s joining of Jamaat-led alliance proved heavy for the apparent ‘revolutionary’ party, as nearly 30 members of NCP, issued a joint letter to the party convenor, opposing this move, questioning the party’s ‘democratic ethics.’

About 16 NCP members, including 13 central leaders of the party (and 16 in total), resigned from NCP, despite efforts at reconciling. The student-led political party is now openly admitting that its sole aim is to win the upcoming election, a tight slap to those who joined the party thinking of forming ‘New Bangladesh’.

The alliance’s seat-sharing was announced at a press briefing on 16 January. Jamaat announced allocations for 253 constituencies, with Jamaat contesting for 179 seats, NCP 30, Mamunul Haque-led Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish 20, Khelafat Majlish 10, Liberal Democratic Party seven, AB Party three, and Nizame Islami Party and Bangladesh Development Party two seats each. Islami Andolan, believed to have been allocated 47 seats, however, boycotted the briefing.

Amidst this, Islami Andolan’s party spokesperson claimed that Jamaat is taking all decisions unilaterally and authoritatively, leading to mistrust and divisions within the alliance. Soon after, Islami Andolan officially left led Jamaat-led 11-party alliance and stated to file independently in 268 constituencies, and expressed to support candidates aligning with its party ideals for the remaining 32 constituencies.

The party also extended its support for Khelafat Majlis’s chief Mamunul Haque, announcing withdrawal of two seats where Haque is contesting, ‘out of respect and his contributions to Islamic politics’. After leaving the alliance, Islami Andolan chief accused Jamaat of ‘using religion (Islam) to pursue conspiratorial political goals’ and even criticised its secret dealings with Washington. The same accusation has also been raised by Jamaat’s main contender Bangladesh Nationalist Party.

The secret dealing refereed here is the recent Washington Post report that exposed that US diplomats, behind close doors, have signalled their openness to work with resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami and to ‘want to be their friends’, on the prediction that Bangladesh has ‘shifted Islamic’ and that Jamaat ‘would do better than it has ever done before.

The report also stated that Jamaat, since Hasina’s ousting, has held four meeting with US officials in Washington and several in Dhaka, signalling a possible understanding. While Washington claims this conversation to be ‘off-the record discussion’ and ‘routine gathering’, Jamaat’s Barguna2 candidate’s confirmation of ‘even America moving forward by relying on Jamaat’, and also European Union, IMF and the Work Bank’s interest for Jamaat-led government in Bangladesh eliminates any suspicion of America’s influence on Jamaat in the 2026 polls.

The February national election is witnessing Islamist political parties fielding record number of candidates (36.35 per cent of total candidates) in the upcoming polls. Besides 224 candidates contesting from Jamaat, 253 candidates are contesting from Islami Andolan Bangladesh, 34 from Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis and 32 from National Citizen Party-NCP. The 11-party alliance now remains intact with  Bangladesh Labour Party joining the Jamaat-led alliance. 

The expansion of alliance to include non-Islamist parties is to paint before the world of a democratic political alliance that seeks to make Bangladesh prosperous. It, however, hides its overtly Islamist goals from them, which has only been made evident to Bangladesh’s local audience.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Bangladesh’s interim government recently gave its final approval to the draft of ‘July Mass Uprising Protection and Liability Determination Ordinance’ that grants indemnity to those who participated in the 2024 July Uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina to end her 15-year political rule and flee the country. The ordinance, believed to be the interim government’s fulfilment of ‘earlier commitment’ to ensure ‘legal protection’ to July participants, would take the shape of a law soon.

The ordinance provides impunity to participants from ‘activities carried out with the purpose of political resistance’ during 2024 uprising in July and August. Meaning, if criminal cases are slapped any of uprising participants for carrying out ‘political resistance during uprising’, such cases will be withdrawn by the government. Moreover, the ordinance adds that ‘no new cases will be filed’ against them, from now on, for their activities during the uprising.

The events of July-August have various connotations—uprising, revolution, political coup and political resistance. Those who participated in the uprising called it a ‘revolution’ that paved the way for ‘New Bangladesh’ or ‘Second Republic’. This group, composed mostly of student leaders who led the uprising and some later formed the National Citizen’s Party (NCP), has not only framed the uprising as ‘second liberation’ but also introduced a new political discussion where 1971 Liberation was brought back, reinterpreted and even compared with the 2024 uprising.

The 2024 ‘revolution’ has been portrayed by this group as fulfilling what 1971 could not, a liberation that gave Bangladesh its ‘true independence’. The same narrative is also echoed by another faction—the Islamists—for whom 2024 Uprising rolled the red carpet for their resurgence in the political field and now forms the main contending group against Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the February 2026 national election.

Collectively, the Awami League is now branded as a ‘fascist’, a justification used by the interim government for banning Awami League’s political activities in May, closing the League’s door to participate in the February 2026 national election. 

The interim government, in its official capacity, recognised the July participants as ‘july warriors’ (July Joddha), similar to ‘war heroes’ (Mukti Joddha) of Liberation War. On the first anniversary of the uprising, the interim government unveiled the July Declaration on 5 August 2025, following pressures from Student Against Discrimination (SAD), the main force behind the July Uprising and NCP to give 2024 events a constitutional recognition.

The Declaration, declared to be given a constitutional status, was supposed to be a statement to recognise the July Uprising and its ambitions for ‘Second Republic’. Rather, it became a political fatwa against Awami League and its political past since 1971 (as interpreted by its opponents), an obituary of the 1972 Constitution that is now labelled as ‘Mujibist Constitution’, and legitimising the ‘unconstitutionally’ formed interim government. 

There is little doubt about the interim government’s biases towards leaders of the July Uprising. Indeed, it was the student leaders of SAD that invited Muhammad Yunus to come back to Bangladesh and take the role of the chief advisor of the interim government on 8 August 2024.

In return, three of the advisors in the interim government were student leaders of July Uprising. Many in the political circle believe that the interim government that helped the formation of National Citizen’s Party (NCP), a King’s Party, by intentionally delaying the announcement of an election roadmap. The neutrality became exposed when one of the advisors resigned to become the convenor of the NCP, while another resigned only recently to become the NCP’s spokesperson.

Since NCP’s establishment, the interim government displayed its soft corner for the student party, echoing the same political narrative as that of NCP, and even actively taking measures of historical revisionism to erase Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy.

The recognition of July warriors has not been without controversy either. The gazetted list of about 1,402 warriors declared as ‘national heroes’ are promised tax benefits, welfare and rehabilitation, and now legal protection as per the 14 January ordinance. However, the gazetted lists were accused of including fake claimants, irregularities and political misuse, ironically the accusations slapped against Sheikh Hasina during the early phase of July Uprising when it was in the stage of anti-quota protest.

The ‘July warriors’ also violently clashed with police on the day of signing of the July Charter in October demanding for state recognition of martyr status, in addition to compensation and legal immunity—demands that were ultimately added as Clause 5 of the July Charter.

The latest move to this shenanigan—the July Mass Uprising Protection ordinance—justifies all kinds of acts that happened in July-August, especially violence against minorities and looting of arms from security forces, by indirectly branding these acts as ‘political resistance’. The wave of communal violence witnessed during this time, and continues even today were dismissed by the interim government as ‘political’.

Despite international reports, the interim government insists on these being ‘non-communal’ attacks. With only less than three weeks before 13^th national election, over one-third of the polling booths are also marked as ‘risky’, while about 1,3331 of the 5,763 firearms and explosive looted during July Uprising remain missing, posing an alarming risk to security during the election time.

The protection ordinance potentially shields all human rights abuses. Although the interim government clarified that only ‘political resistance’ is to be given legal protection, the tweaking of human rights abuses as ‘political reaction’ leaves little room to comprehend that all these criminal acts will also be treated as ‘political resistance’.

The shameful attempt to equate 2024 July with the 1971 Liberation War, by providing equal status, benefits, memorials, and now legal protection not only downplays Bangladesh’s painful history but also changes the whole political trajectory of the country where political violence will get state protection.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

In an exclusive email interview, former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina speaks to The Milli Chronicle about the violent turn of the 2024 protests that led to her departure, failure of Yunus-led interim government, and her concerns over extremism, democratic legitimacy, and Bangladesh’s political and strategic future.

Question: Could you share what factors influenced your decision to leave Bangladesh, and what assurances you would need to consider returning?

Answer: What began as a genuine student movement was escalated by radicalists who led the crowds into violence, destroying state and communications infrastructure and burning down police stations. By then, this was no longer a peaceful civic movement, but a violent mob.

My instinct has always been to protect our country and our citizens, and it was not an easy decision to leave while my country erupted into lawlessness. I regret that I was compelled to leave, but it was a decision I took to minimize any further loss of life, and to ensure the safety of people around me.

For me to return, Bangladesh must restore constitutional governance and the rule of law. This means lifting the unlawful ban on the Awami League, releasing political prisoners detained on fabricated charges, and holding genuinely free elections. You cannot claim democratic legitimacy while banning the party elected nine times by the people.

Question: How do you reflect on your government’s handling of the 2024 protests, and how do you respond to the concerns raised about the use of force and the legal cases that followed?

Answer: In the initial days, we allowed students to protest freely and accepted their demands. Then extremists transformed peaceful demonstrations into a violent insurrection. We responded as any government would when faced with burning police stations and attacks on state infrastructure; we acted to restore order and to prevent further bloodshed.

I attempted to gain a full picture of the events in August 2024 by establishing a judicial inquiry commission to investigate every death. The conspiracy behind these attacks became clear only later when Yunus immediately dissolved this inquiry, released convicted terrorists, and granted blanket immunity to those he now glorifies as ‘July Warriors.’ These same actors marched on the Indian embassy last week, no doubt emboldened by the protection of the interim government.

If there were genuine concerns about excessive force or wrongful prosecutions, why destroy the very mechanism designed to investigate them? The truth is that Yunus has consistently thwarted attempts to establish what really happened in July and August 2024, because an impartial investigation would reveal the orchestrated nature of the violence.

Question: What is your assessment of the current Yunus-led regime, and how do you view Bangladesh’s future—both with the proposed February 2026 elections and in the longer term?

Answer: We cannot forget that Yunus governs without a single vote from the Bangladeshi people. He has placed extremists in cabinet positions, released convicted terrorists, and done little or nothing to stop attacks on religious minorities. The economy that quadrupled during my tenure is now stalling.

Yunus came to power promising reform yet all he has sown division and banned the country’s oldest and most popular political party, thus disenfranchising millions. These elections can never be legitimate if the Awami League is banned.

My concern is that extremists are using Yunus to project an acceptable international face while they radicalise our institutions domestically. But Bangladesh and its people have extraordinary resilience and an unwavering belief in the power of participatory democracy. I trust that democracy will prevail and that we will set our great country back on the path to recovery and growth.

Question: Looking back, how do you view the debate over democratic space during your tenure, and what reforms or new approaches would you prioritize if given another opportunity to lead?

Answer: I believe our greatest achievement as a party was the restoration of democracy in the 1990s. When I returned to Bangladesh following my father’s assassination, the biggest challenge facing our country was a lack of popular representation. Those years of military rule and unelected leadership taught us valuable lessons about the power of democracy that we never took for granted during our time in government. As a government, we encouraged political engagement and participation across the nation. Democracy thrives with healthy opposition, yet some of those parties chose to boycott previous elections, restricting the democratic choice of millions of ordinary citizens.

It is interesting that those who accused us of restricting democratic space now rule without a single vote, have forced judges to resign, and have detained journalists brave enough to critique their increasingly authoritarian grip on our nation. The question isn’t what reforms I would implement, it’s whether Bangladesh will retain any democratic institutions to reform.

We are proud of our record in government. During those 15 years, we helped to lift millions out of poverty, empowered women, and transformed Bangladesh into one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies. We consistently protected the rights of minorities and prevented radicalism from eroding our democracy. It takes a legitimate and strong government to forge our country’s place both domestically and internationally, and we did so by operating within constitutional boundaries. We were repeatedly mandated by voters at the ballot box.

Question: How do you assess the country’s current political course under the interim government, particularly in terms of national stability and long-term strategic interests?

Answer: The Yunus government took power with a wave of western support from those who confused economic success with political aptitude. Reality has now set in. International bodies condemn his actions, cabinet members have stepped down in protest, and our citizens face unprecedented danger. Hundreds of innocent people have been detained arbitrarily under Yunus and journalists have been censored.

On the international stage, decades of carefully cultivated economic partnerships and regional stability have also been jeopardised.

This goes beyond mere incompetence; it is the systemic destruction of a once-stable country. Thankfully, such regimes never endure, and Yunus’ treatment of Bangladesh as his personal experiment will soon end. I can only hope that the international community will do its part in ensuring free, fair and participatory elections, so that the next legitimately elected government can rebuild what Yunus and his cronies have destroyed.

Question: Since your departure, Pakistan’s outreach and influence in Bangladesh appears to have grown. How do you think Bangladesh can balance evolving regional relationships while preserving its historical commitments, security priorities, and ties with India?

Answer: Bangladesh requires stable relationships with all neighbours, including Pakistan. But Yunus’ rushed embrace of Pakistan, which has never acknowledged the genocide of 1971, reveals a desperate search for any international validation.

The fundamental issue is legitimacy: Yunus lacks any mandate to realign our foreign policy. Strategic decisions that could affect generations should not be made by an unelected administration serving ideological interests. Once Bangladeshis can vote freely and we have a legitimate government in place, I hope that our foreign policy will once again be based on sober and pragmatic assessments of the country’s national interests.

Excerpts from this interview may be reproduced or quoted, provided that The Milli Chronicle is clearly credited as the source.

Bangladeshi democracy has always been a bit of a balancing act—it’s fragile, often disputed, and shaped by deep mistrust among the parties involved.

Yunus stepped in like a hero after Sheikh Hasina’s narrow safe exit. Seriously, why Yunus though? Sure, that Nobel Prize glow—“banker to the poor,” all very inspirational. But running a whole country? That’s a bit out of his usual comfort zone, isn’t it? Critics aren’t buying his résumé for democracy. He’s got a squeaky-clean political record, yeah, but there’s the tiny problem of zero political success, too.

Did any of that bother the crowd of fired-up July protesters celebrating him? Or the business bigwigs who just wanted things to stabilize for a minute? Doubt it. People were desperate for any kind of shake-up. Someone new. Yunus just fit through the vibe—calm, politically unknown, totally untested on the big stage. Yunus on many occasions on International and National Media, claimed he or his cabinet has no plans to ban Awami League. He has gone to the extent that it is up to Awami League if they want to participate or not, yet Awami League activities were repressively banned without any referendum.

Islamists, NCP stage ‘Mist Spray’ protest in Summer to ban Awami league?

Awami League-oldest, secular, the party that led Bangladesh to freedom. But now, its legacy is questioned. Sheikh Hasina, the longest serving female Prime Minister, once stood in parliament and called Yunus the “Blood Sucker of the poor”. Now, the tables have turned. The UN’s fact-finding report blamed Hasina, her party, and security forces for the deaths of at least 1,400 people during the 2024 protests-children among the victims, crimes against humanity, said the report. Awami League pushed back: the report lacked their side, relied on unnamed witnesses and many more accusations. But who listens to the Awami League now? The UN’s word carries more weight, its credibility unshaken in the global court of opinion.

Protests went on for days, with people demanding that the Awami League be banned. The crowd was a bit of a weird mix — Islamists like Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani, Asif Adnan, Hizbut Tahrir, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Hefazot-e-Islam all shouting for the party to be shut down. Some wondered if this was a real uprising or just a show put on by the government. Some said the ultimatum to Yunus wasn’t genuine, just a way to make the ban look legit.

Yet, Yunus, now acting as the caretaker, ordered a gentle mist spray at the summer camps — basically keeping the protesters hydrated, not firing bullets. Did that cool things down or just buy some time? The protesters weren’t all in agreement about singing the National Anthem. Some felt uncomfortable with singing it because it was written by Rabindranath Tagore, many referred to him as Hindu despite him being from the Brahma Samaj. The protest interestingly wasn’t joined by BNP, other centrist, leftist parties but the newly formed student party NCP looked like they were a cover to the Islamists.

Is Banning Awami league a legitimate move?

Some argue that banning the Awami League because, as the ruling party, it ordered killings and human rights abuses—many of its members carried out these acts—seems understandable on some level. However, doing so amounts to punishing the party collectively, which is problematic. International human rights laws and criminal justice principles emphasize that responsibility should be based on individual actions, not on group membership. Punishing the entire party ignores this important rule and can lead to more harm. History shows that punishing groups doesn’t stop violence; instead, it often fuels cycles of revenge, pushes authoritarian measures, and weakens efforts for real justice and reconciliation in transitioning societies.

Comparing Bangladesh’s current situation to transitional justice processes in places like South Africa after apartheid, Liberia following its conflict, or Bosnia is not quite accurate. Those scenarios involved extreme events like genocide, ethnic cleansing, or civil war. While Bangladesh faces serious challenges, it doesn’t meet the legal criteria for mass atrocities to that extent that would justify drastic measures like dissolving political parties. Even in those extreme cases, restrictions on political participation were used sparingly, temporarily, and often with international oversight or as part of negotiated agreements. So far, Bangladesh hasn’t experienced the kind of broad consensus or legal process needed to meet that high threshold. Also, frameworks like South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission were designed specifically for their contexts and weren’t meant to be general models for banning political parties in countries trying to rebuild democracy after authoritarian rule.

The UN Fact Finding report also simply mentions that elements connected to the party actively supported the repression. This makes you wonder: how much was the party involved in the violence? Recommendation 370 of the Office of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Fact Finding report into the Bangladesh July/August killings state to refrain from banning political parties that would undermine genuine return to a multi-party democracy. Although, the report doesn’t qualify as a legal verdict, yet the report was unjustly cited by the interim to oppress, torture, imprison and attack on Awami League activities. The attacks happened with both law enforcement and mobs, sometimes through a mixture of both. After the forced resignation of Chief Justice through forced anarchy inside court premises and treating Awami League activists without ‘Innocent until Proven guilty’ shows the reality. The fairness of judiciary and trials are being questioned, many believe the verdict is ready and interim is just buying time for retribution.

The Amendment to repressive Anti-Terrorism Act

The newest update to the Anti-Terrorism Act really hits hard against free speech and the right to protest. First off, now the government can ‘temporarily suspend’ any group they suspect of being involved in terrorist activities, on top of their previous power to ‘prohibit’ an organization under Section 18. These powers, which previously only applied to prohibited groups under Section 20, now extend automatically to those that are suspended.

This means they can shut down offices, freeze bank accounts and assets, stop members from leaving the country, seize belongings, and even ban any public support or displays of solidarity for the group. Basically, the government can now quickly neutralize a party or organization with just a ‘temporary suspension,’ without having to go through the more permanent ‘prohibition’ process. But here’s the catch—how long does a ‘temporary’ suspension last? The law doesn’t say so, so in practice, it could go on forever, even if they call it temporary.

On top of that, they’ve massively expanded their power to prevent people from supporting or advocating for these groups under Section 20(e). It now clearly states that publishing statements, promoting online or through social media, or organizing marches, meetings, or press events in favor of or supporting the group is strictly forbidden. It’s an alarming step up in control, with serious implications for anyone speaking out or showing support.

Why Banning without referendum?

The Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest and most influential party, was banned by the interim government without holding a referendum, even though surveys by Voice of America and others showed that most Bangladeshis didn’t support such a ban. While the interim authorities justified this move by citing the Anti-Terrorism Act and mentioning ongoing investigations into alleged crimes by Awami League leaders, they didn’t seek any direct public approval or hold a plebiscite. This has raised questions about whether the move really reflects democratic legitimacy.

Although the Awami League has faced serious accusations of electoral misconduct in the elections of 2014, 2018, and 2024, it has previously won allegedly free elections under caretaker governments, which shows it has broad support. In this case, it seems to be a victim of exclusion by an interim administration that has never gone to the electorate, not even at the local council level.

Gloomy path towards transition

Bangladeshi democracy has always been a bit of a balancing act—it’s fragile, often disputed, and shaped by deep mistrust among the parties involved. The accusations against the Awami League, whether it’s about election rigging or acting too heavy-handed, aren’t something new; they reflect a broader political culture where holding onto power sometimes seems more important than following the process.

Under the ban, millions of Awami League voter’s political rights are pretty much gone. Any kind of support for the Awami League—whether you say it out loud, write about it, or post online—could be considered a crime. Even just social meetings peacefully with other supporters might get you arrested. Prior to the ban, Bangladesh recently went multiple notches downward in the democratic index by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.