The Interior Ministry said the group had been planning operations aimed at undermining security and stability in Homs, according to the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), as the government intensifies efforts to reassert control across the country following the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad’s government in 2024.

Security forces confiscated anti-tank missile launchers, sniper rifles, automatic weapons, RPG launchers and large quantities of ammunition during the operation, the ministry said.

It described the raid as part of broader efforts to track and dismantle sleeper cells and eliminate what it called the remaining sources of terrorism across Syrian territory.Authorities did not identify the group involved or specify whether it had links to Daesh or other militant organizations still active in parts of Syria.

Syria has faced recurring security threats since the collapse of the Assad regime, with attacks targeting both domestic security forces and foreign military personnel operating in the country.In December, an attack on a joint patrol near Palmyra in Homs province killed two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter, while injuring three U.S. service members and two Syrian security personnel.

The incident underscored continuing instability in central Syria, where remnants of militant networks continue to operate despite years of military campaigns against insurgent groups.In November, Syria became the 90th member of the Global Coalition against Daesh, the international alliance formed in 2014 to combat the militant group after it seized large parts of Syria and northern Iraq.

Although Daesh no longer controls major territory, security officials and international observers continue to warn that the group retains the capacity to conduct insurgent attacks, particularly in remote desert areas and regions with weakened state control.

The latest operation in Homs reflects Damascus’ effort to project authority and reassure both domestic and international partners that it can contain militant threats as the country navigates a fragile post-Assad transition.

The paper, circulated among member states by the EU’s diplomatic service, proposes resuming the bloc’s 1978 cooperation agreement with Syria and initiating a High-Level Political Dialogue with transitional authorities starting May 11. The move signals a departure from years of limited engagement following the country’s prolonged conflict.

The EU also intends to “reframe and adapt” its sanctions regime to retain leverage while engaging Syria’s leadership, focusing restrictions on actors seen as obstructing the political transition. Most Western sanctions were lifted late last year as Damascus sought reintegration into the international system under interim President , who assumed power after the removal of former leader in 2024.

The document outlines plans to expand economic ties through trade and investment frameworks, including mobilising private sector funding and establishing a technical assistance hub to support regulatory and business reforms. The EU also aims to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of refugees, with more than one million Syrians currently residing in Europe, around half of them in Germany.

Brussels is additionally exploring Syria’s integration into regional connectivity initiatives such as the , positioning the country as a potential hub for transport, energy and digital links amid shifting global supply routes.

Syria has gained strategic relevance as an emerging transit corridor following disruptions linked to tensions affecting the . A tanker carrying Iraqi oil recently departed from the Syrian port of Baniyas after overland transport, highlighting evolving logistics patterns.
On security cooperation, the EU is considering support for training Syrian police forces, strengthening institutional capacity within the interior ministry, and coordinating efforts on counterterrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking.

The document also reaffirms EU backing for a political agreement between Damascus and Kurdish-led authorities aimed at integrating northeastern institutions into the state framework and expanding rights for Kurdish populations. Recent steps include the appointment of a senior Kurdish commander to a deputy defence role overseeing eastern territories.

The policy shift reflects a broader recalibration by European governments seeking stability, migration management and economic engagement following more than a decade of conflict and isolation.

Speaking at a diplomatic forum in Antalya, Sharaa said Damascus was seeking either to revive the framework of the 1974 disengagement agreement or to establish a new arrangement guaranteeing security for both sides. He added that progress on such terms could open the door to extended negotiations on the broader Golan issue.

The remarks come after Israeli forces entered a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone separating Israeli and Syrian positions on the Golan Heights following the ouster of former Syrian leader in December 2024.

Sharaa accused Israel of violating the 1974 disengagement accord and said Syria was working toward a security agreement that would ensure Israeli withdrawal to positions held under that arrangement. He reiterated that any future negotiations would depend on restoring those lines.

Israel captured most of the Golan Heights from Syria during the and later annexed the territory, a move not recognised by most of the international community.

Earlier this year, Syrian Foreign Minister said ongoing discussions with Israel were focused on recently occupied areas and did not extend to the broader territorial dispute over the Golan Heights.

Israeli Prime Minister has repeatedly indicated that Israel does not intend to relinquish control over the territory it holds in the Golan Heights.

Speaking to ILTV News this week, Rawan Osman, a prominent Syrian dissident and commentator, said she has consistently maintained her stance in Israeli media: “I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again—Syria will be next to normalize ties with Israel, even before Lebanon.”

Osman, who has been vocal in her opposition to the previous Assad regime, explained her reasoning by citing the speed with which anti-Assad forces dismantled the stronghold of the Ba’athist regime. “I saw how swiftly the rebels and jihadists overthrew [former President Bashar] al-Assad. That shift is irreversible,” she stated.

When asked about the credibility of the current Syrian leadership, Osman did not mince words. She expressed skepticism toward Ahmed al-Sharaa, the transitional leader and former jihadist reportedly linked to Al-Qaeda. “I do not trust Ahmed al-Sharaa,” she said. “He was part of Al-Qaeda, and many of his closest allies come from jihadist backgrounds.”

However, Osman emphasized the realpolitik of the current scenario: “At the moment, they are the best we have.”

Her remarks come amid growing speculation that more Arab states, particularly those grappling with post-conflict reconstruction, may seek normalization with Israel as a path to regional integration and economic recovery.

While critics view such diplomatic overtures as premature given Syria’s fractured political landscape, others argue that normalization might offer a lifeline to a country battered by years of war, isolation, and economic ruin.

The Abraham Accords, originally signed in 2020 between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain—and later joined by Morocco and Sudan—marked a seismic shift in regional diplomacy. Should Syria join, it would mark a historic turnabout from decades of hostility and enmity.

Despite deep-seated skepticism from the Syrian diaspora and within Israel’s security establishment, voices like Osman’s are gaining traction in policy circles exploring post-war Syrian rehabilitation.

With Syria’s future still uncertain and power centers in flux, the mere discussion of potential normalization reflects broader changes underway across the Middle East—where former enemies may soon find themselves on speaking terms in a rapidly evolving geopolitical arena.

Regimes that prioritize power over people will eventually crumble, no matter how long they hold on.

On December 8, 2024, millions of Syrians across cities and villages celebrated what many believed was an impossible dream—the end of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime. For over five decades, the Assad family ruled Syria with an iron fist. But to understand how this ruthless dynasty rose—and how it ultimately fell—we must rewind the clock to the early post-colonial years of Arab nationalism and military coups.

This analysis is based on the research of Nikolaos van Dam, former Dutch ambassador and Special Envoy for Syria, as outlined in his work for The Rights Forum. As a seasoned diplomat who served in Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, and beyond, van Dam’s insights provide a rare, first-hand account of Syria’s internal transformation over six decades.

The Birth of Ba’athist Idealism

In the late 1940s, a young Alawite military officer named Hafiz al-Assad joined the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party. The party’s platform—built on secular Arab nationalism and socialist ideals—promised equality among Arabs regardless of sect or religion. This secular vision, crafted in part by Michel ‘Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus, appealed strongly to religious minorities and economically disadvantaged rural populations.

For Alawites, Druze, Isma’ilis, and Christian Arabs—communities historically marginalized in Sunni-dominated political circles—Ba’thism offered both inclusion and upward mobility. But this idealism would soon be manipulated into a tool of power centralization and authoritarian control.

The 1963 Ba’thist Coup: From Ideals to Authoritarianism

Syria’s brief experiment with Arab unity reached its climax in 1958 when it merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). But the union quickly disillusioned many Syrians. Under Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Syrian officials were reduced to subordinate roles, sparking resentment.

By 1961, the union collapsed following a coup staged by Syrian officers, leading to the brief “Separatist Period,” a return to parliamentary governance and conservative elites. However, in the background, socialist military factions, particularly from the Ba’th Party, were organizing for a comeback.

On March 8, 1963, Ba’thist officers seized power, marking the beginning of one-party rule. Political pluralism was dismantled, and only parties loyal to Ba’thist ideology were allowed under tight control. Syria’s multiparty democracy was officially dead.

The Rise of the Secret Military Committee

Ironically, many of the Ba’thist officers who masterminded the 1963 coup had been exiled to Egypt during the short-lived UAR period. There, they formed a clandestine “Military Committee” with one purpose: to take over Syria upon their return.

This committee was dominated by three Alawite officers—Muhammad ‘Umran, Salah Jadid, and Hafiz al-Assad. While other minorities such as the Druze, Isma’ilis, and Sunnis were represented, none held top leadership roles. What began as a coalition soon turned into a brutal contest for power.

Through successive purges, each rival was systematically removed until Hafiz al-Assad emerged as Syria’s uncontested ruler in 1970. The original Ba’thist vision of collective leadership was discarded in favor of personalized autocracy—ushering in what would become known as Asadism.

Asadism: The Cult of Personality

Under Hafiz al-Assad, a robust cult of personality developed. State media praised his every move, and over a hundred books were published in his honor. This phenomenon wasn’t unique to Syria; authoritarian regimes across the Arab world used leader-worship as a means to legitimize their rule.

What set Syria apart was the depth of sectarian entrenchment, particularly the favor shown to Assad’s Alawite sect. The military and civilian bureaucracy were filled with relatives and loyalists from his coastal hometown and surrounding villages.

Sectarian identity was not the regime’s stated ideology, but it became its operational strategy. Trust was reserved for those from Assad’s own background, feeding a system of clientelism, cronyism, and corruption.

A System Built on Loyalty, Not Merit

Following the 1963 coup, Assad and his allies purged the military of Sunni officers and replaced them with Alawites and other loyalists. This was not about ideology—it was about trust and control. The same pattern extended into civilian ministries, universities, and state-owned enterprises.

In his memoirs, prominent Ba’thist Sami al-Jundi described how rural villagers, many from Alawite and Druze regions, began flooding into Damascus. The linguistic marker “Qaf,” characteristic of mountain dialects, began dominating public discourse in government halls and tea shops alike.

Traditional Sunni elites, particularly urban merchants and landowners, were systematically replaced by newcomers from lower social strata. But while this shift appeared revolutionary, it merely exchanged one elite for another—this time bonded by kinship and loyalty rather than class or religious dominance.

Unequal Gains: Alawite Power, Rural Neglect

Despite Alawites’ dominance in government and military structures, the majority of Alawites in rural regions remained impoverished. This paradox highlighted the selective nature of regime patronage. Privilege was not granted on the basis of sect alone, but on one’s proximity to the power core—both geographically and personally.

This imbalance created growing resentment, not just among urban Sunnis but even among marginalized Alawite communities who felt betrayed by a system that bore their name but delivered no benefits.

The Final Years: Bashar’s Inheritance and Ruin

When Hafiz al-Assad died in 2000, his son Bashar—a British-educated ophthalmologist—was hastily installed as Syria’s president. Hopes for reform quickly evaporated. Bashar’s reign saw a doubling down on authoritarianism, culminating in a brutal crackdown on peaceful protests in 2011. What followed was a catastrophic civil war that fractured Syria into fiefdoms and killed over 500,000 people.

The war exposed the hollowness of the Ba’thist state. Military power was no longer sufficient to maintain legitimacy. Iran and Russia stepped in to preserve Assad’s grip, but at the cost of Syria’s sovereignty.

The End of the Asad Era

By late 2024, Assad’s isolation was complete. With dwindling Russian support, growing international sanctions, and internal dissent, the regime finally collapsed on December 8. What comes next remains uncertain, but Syrians have a rare opportunity to rebuild their nation from the ashes of dictatorship.

The fall of the Assad regime is more than a political event—it is the closing chapter of a failed 61-year experiment in authoritarian Arab nationalism, sectarian favoritism, and personal rule. The lesson is clear: regimes that prioritize power over people will eventually crumble, no matter how long they hold on.

The announcement, made Monday by the Syrian presidency, marks a breakthrough in efforts to reunite the country after more than 13 years of civil war and internal fragmentation. The deal signals the beginning of the end of parallel administrations in Syria’s north and east and reasserts central authority over critical regions long outside Damascus’ direct control.

A statement published by the presidency emphasized that “all civilian and military institutions in the northeast, including border posts, airports, and oil and gas fields, will now be integrated under the administration of the Syrian state.”

State media also released a photograph of President Sharaa shaking hands with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, underlining the significance of the agreement. The document declared that “the Kurdish community is an essential component of the Syrian state” and reaffirmed its rights to full citizenship and constitutional protections.

End of Division?

The agreement comes just days after severe violence erupted in Syria’s coastal Alawite heartland — the community from which former president Bashar al-Assad hailed. This outbreak, sparked by attacks from Assad loyalists, represented the most serious internal security challenge since Assad was ousted in December.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, over 1,000 civilians—primarily Alawites—were killed in a brutal crackdown by new government forces. Additionally, 231 security personnel and 250 pro-Assad fighters lost their lives during the clashes.

Despite the bloodshed, the government declared the operation concluded on Monday and shifted its focus to stabilizing the country through national integration. The timing of the SDF agreement suggests a strategic pivot toward unity, following the decapitation of Assad-era loyalist resistance.

SDF’s Strategic Role

The SDF, which emerged during the civil war as a U.S.-backed force, had established a de facto autonomous administration across much of northern and eastern Syria, including areas rich in oil and gas — resources critical to Syria’s post-war reconstruction.

The group, led largely by Kurdish forces, was instrumental in defeating ISIS in its final territorial stronghold in 2019. However, the SDF’s refusal to disarm had led to their exclusion from a recent national dialogue conference hosted by Syria’s new authorities.

The current agreement, however, offers a compromise: recognition and inclusion in exchange for institutional integration. The document also stresses support from the SDF in the government’s campaign against “remnants of Assad’s forces and all threats to Syria’s unity and security.”

A Reversal of History

For decades under the Assad regime, Syria’s Kurdish population was systematically marginalized. Many were denied citizenship, barred from using their language, and forbidden from celebrating their cultural identity.

The tide turned during the civil war, when the Syrian military’s withdrawal from the north enabled Kurdish groups to establish local governance. Yet, their ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU—complicated relations with regional and international powers.

Despite Ankara’s concerns, the SDF insists it operates independently of the PKK. However, its backbone—the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)—is widely considered by Turkey to be an extension of the PKK. Turkish forces have routinely targeted Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria and supported proxy militias against them.

The agreement with Syria’s new authorities, who have established close ties with Turkey since Assad’s fall, could reduce Ankara’s justification for continued military action—provided the SDF’s integration is fully realized and verified.

A Step Toward Peace?

The timing of this deal is also significant in light of a recent call from jailed PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, urging the group to disband and abandon armed struggle. If realized, the dissolution of the PKK could signal a new era of regional stability, and the SDF’s absorption into Syrian state structures may mark a move away from militia rule toward centralized governance.

While challenges remain, including Turkish military presence and latent sectarian divisions, the agreement could serve as the first genuine blueprint for Syria’s reunification — built not on military might, but on negotiation and mutual recognition.

The resolution, which calls for Syria’s new government to support inquiries into crimes committed during the conflict that started in 2011, passed without opposition at the Human Rights Council in Geneva on Friday.

It indicates a shift in support by the 47 country members of the council toward Syria’s new government and its efforts to improve its rights record.

“Such international support serves as a strong incentive to continue the path of reform,” Syria’s ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva, Haydar Ali Ahmad, told the council.

Rebels led by the now president of the new transitional government, Ahmed al-Sharaa, seized the capital Damascus in December. Assad fled to Russia, following the 13 years of civil war that led to the disappearance of more than 100,000 people and the use of torture and chemical weapons by the regime.

Under pressure to show that it is turning a new page from the former regime, Syria’s new government welcomed the resolution on Friday.

“We are proud of Syria’s positive and constructive participation in drafting the resolution for the first time,” Syria Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani said in a statement posted on X.

Members of the council welcomed Syria’s engagement on Friday and urged it to uphold the resolution’s commitments, including the Commission of Inquiry into serious crimes since the start of the war.

British Ambassador to the U.N. Simon Manley said the killing of hundreds of Alwaite civilians – the minority sect from which toppled leader Bashir al-Assad hails – in March was a “chilling reminder of the deep wounds” from the conflict, and the need for justice and accountability.

The bombardment signals the risks of a deepening rift between two powerful regional militaries over Syria, where Islamist rebels have installed a new government after toppling former leader Bashar al-Assad in December.

The Israeli strikes on the three sites Turkey was assessing, including a heavy barrage on Wednesday night, came despite Ankara’s efforts to reassure Washington that a deeper military presence in Syria was not intended to threaten Israel.

The Islamists replacing Assad have alarmed Israel, which is wary of an Islamist presence on its border and has lobbied the United States to curb Turkey’s growing influence in the country.

Ankara, a longtime backer of opposition to Assad, is positioning to play a major role in the remade Syria, including with a possible joint defence pact that could see new Turkish bases in central Syria and use of Syria’s airspace.

In preparation, Turkish military teams in recent weeks visited the T4 and Palmyra air bases in Syria’s Homs province and the main airport in Hama province, according to a regional intelligence official, two Syrian military sources and another Syrian source familiar with the matter.

The sources spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the visits, which have not been previously reported.

Turkish teams evaluated the state of the runways, hangars and other infrastructure at the bases, the regional intelligence official said.

Another planned visit to T4 and Palmyra on March 25 was cancelled after Israel struck both bases just hours beforehand, according to the regional intelligence official and the two Syrian military sources.

Strikes at T4 “destroyed the runway, tower, hangars and the planes that were grounded. It was a tough message that Israel won’t accept the expanded Turkish presence,” said the intelligence official, who reviewed photographs of the damage.

“T4 is totally unusable now,” said a fourth Syrian source, who is close to Turkey.

When asked about the visits, a Turkish defence ministry official said: “Reports and posts regarding developments in Syria – whether real or alleged – that do not originate from official authorities should not be taken into consideration, as they lack credibility and may be misleading.”

A spokesperson for Syria’s defence ministry declined to comment.

Turkey’s foreign ministry on Thursday called Israel “the greatest threat to regional security”. On Friday, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Reuters Turkey wanted no confrontation with Israel in Syria.

Heavy Strikes

In the four months since Assad was toppled, Israel has seized ground in southwest Syria, made overtures to the Druze minority, and struck much of the Syrian military’s heavy weapons and equipment. Wednesday’s strikes were some of the most intense yet.

Syria’s foreign ministry said Israel struck five separate areas within a 30-minute window, resulting in the near-total destruction of the Hama base and wounding dozens of civilians and soldiers.

Israel said it hit the T4 air base and other military capabilities at air bases in Hama and Homs provinces, as well as military infrastructure in the Damascus area.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz called the air strikes a warning that “we will not allow the security of the State of Israel to be harmed”. Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accused Ankara of seeking a “Turkish protectorate” in Syria.

Noa Lazimi, a specialist in Middle East politics at Bar-Ilan University, said Israel was concerned that Turkey could establish Russian anti-aircraft systems and drones at T4.

“The base would enable Turkey to establish air superiority in this area, and this poses a serious concern for Israel because it undermines its operational freedom in the region,” she said.

Ideological Collision Course

Turkey has tried to reassure the U.S. that it wants to work towards a stable Syria.

Foreign Minister Fidan told U.S. officials in Washington last month that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa would not pose a threat to neighbours, according to a senior regional diplomat close to Turkey and a source in Washington briefed on the meetings.

Fidan and other Turkish officials had earlier told Sharaa that Ankara was carefully calibrating its moves towards a defence pact so as not to irk Washington, one of the Syrian military sources said.

“Turkey, not Israel, would pay the highest price among regional states were there to be failure or destabilization in Syria, including with refugees and security,” an official in Turkey’s ruling AK Party told Reuters.

Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute think tank, said Turkey and Israel were on an “ideological collision course” but could avoid military escalation through mediation with Washington.

We Christians in Syria are with the new state, with the heroes who expelled the criminal Bashar al-Assad. We are fine and everything written on social media is a lie

Amid ongoing conflict in Syria, contradictory narratives have emerged regarding the fate of Christian communities and the broader geopolitical landscape. Recent statements from analysts and insiders challenge widely circulated claims of sectarian massacres and ethnic cleansing, instead pointing to a complex web of military operations, disinformation campaigns, and geopolitical realignments.

Syrian Christians and the New State

Syrian Christian Dr. Laila recently dispelled claims of Christian persecution in the ongoing conflict, writing, “We Christians in Syria are with the new state, with the heroes who expelled the criminal Bashar al-Assad. We are fine and everything written on social media is a lie.” This counters allegations that Christians are being systematically targeted in the conflict.

Similarly, Washington-based Capitol Institute analyst Michael Arizanti stated, “There has been no slaughter of Christians—in fact, most Christian communities stand with Damascus against Assad loyalists.” This contradicts widely shared social media reports suggesting mass atrocities against Christian minorities.

Ex-MI6 Spy Aimen Dean’s Detailed Analysis of Syria’s Geopolitical Shifts

Aimen Dean has written a detailed analysis of the ongoing conflict in Syria. This is what he believes:

1. The Role of Ahmad al-Shar’a (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani)
   • Dean argues that al-Shar’a, despite his past ties to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, has since shifted alliances, distancing himself from ISIS and collaborating with Western and Turkish intelligence in countering jihadist threats.
   • Since 2018, intelligence reports indicate that al-Shar’a provided crucial intelligence to Western agencies, including those of France and the United States, to combat ISIS.
   • Dean draws parallels between his own transformation and that of al-Shar’a, emphasizing the latter’s trajectory towards governance rather than ideological extremism.
2. The New Syrian Government vs. Assad’s Regime
   • Dean asserts that al-Shar’a’s administration offers a more viable future for Syria compared to Assad’s stagnant, socialist Arab nationalist rule.
   • Economically, regions under the new government—Idlib, Jisr al-Shughur, and Sarmada—demonstrate progress, in contrast to the economic decline of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama.
   • He dismisses claims of an orchestrated ethnic cleansing campaign on the Syrian coast, instead describing military operations aimed at neutralizing remnants of Assad’s security forces.
3. Disinformation and Propaganda in the Syrian War
   • Dean warns that Iranian and Hezbollah-backed Assad loyalists are engaging in a coordinated disinformation campaign to frame the conflict as a sectarian genocide.
   • Many widely circulated atrocity videos are either fabrications or recycled footage from past conflicts, repurposed to manipulate international perceptions.
   • He stresses that while war crimes have occurred, the situation is far more complex than social media portrayals suggest.

A Call for Rational Analysis Over Emotional Reactions

Dean underscores that the Syrian conflict should be analyzed through a geopolitical lens rather than a sectarian one. He argues that Western audiences must avoid falling into the trap of propaganda designed to push Syria further into the Iranian-Russian-Chinese sphere of influence.

Rejecting accusations of jihadist sympathies, Dean states, “How could someone who opposed both Hamas and Hezbollah—a Sunni and a Shia militant group—be labeled as a jihadist sympathizer? My approach is based purely on geopolitical logic, not religious bias.” He urges the global community to support efforts aimed at stabilizing Syria and integrating it into Mediterranean and Gulf economic frameworks rather than allowing it to remain a battleground for foreign powers.

The narratives emerging from experts and insiders like Aimen Dean challenge the dominant portrayal of a sectarian war, instead highlighting the intricate geopolitical maneuvering at play. Moving forward, objective analysis and evidence-based reporting will be crucial in shaping an accurate understanding of Syria’s future.