Pakistan was the aggressor in Kashmir. Pakistan has sabotaged Afghan sovereignty. Pakistan continues to deny Pashtuns self-determination.

As a Swedish human rights defender, I refuse to sanitize history for anyone’s geopolitical comfort. What happened in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947 was not a “dispute.” It was an invasion driven by Pakistan’s militarized ideology — an ideology that saw Hindu and Sikh communities not as citizens entitled to safety, but as obstacles to a strategic land grab.

On October 22, 1947, Pakistan launched “Operation Gulmarg,” a state-engineered campaign disguised as a tribal uprising. Rifle-wielding Pashtun militias, backed by Pakistan Army regulars, entered Kashmir with one mandate: terror.

What followed was slaughter and sexual violence on a scale that would today meet the legal threshold for crimes against humanity. Historians Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre documented the massacre of thousands in Baramulla — entire Hindu-Sikh neighborhoods erased, women kidnapped, hospitals raided.

This brutality forced Maharaja Hari Singh to sign the Instrument of Accession to India. India’s intervention was a rescue mission because Pakistan’s troops and proxies made it genocidal. Former Pakistani Brigadier Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan later admitted, “We planned, led, and financed the operation.” There is no diplomatic spin for that.

Yet for decades, Western analysts lazily labeled this catastrophe a “territorial conflict.” That intellectual cowardice granted Pakistan impunity to turn Kashmir into the world’s longest-running terror-export project. The UN demanded Pakistan withdraw all troops before any plebiscite — Pakistan instead increased them. Facts matter, even when inconvenient.

Two Paths: One Builds, One Bleeds

Let’s be blunt: India and Pakistan diverged, morally and structurally.

India, despite all internal challenges, has expanded democratic participation and invested in its part of Kashmir. After the 2019 constitutional reforms integrating Jammu & Kashmir more fully into India, investment and infrastructure improved drastically. Tourism surged beyond pre-militancy levels. New universities, hospitals, and road networks have emerged. Local elections have recorded the highest turnouts in decades — people vote when they believe their vote matters.

Contrast that with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK): rolling blackouts, disappeared activists, banned civil rights groups, and a per capita income less than half that in India-administered regions. When residents protested food shortages and electricity theft by authorities in 2024, Pakistani troops shot at civilians.

Military historian Agha Humayun Amin — a Pakistani Army veteran himself — has repeatedly documented that Pakistan’s reliance on irregular militias and non-state actors began in the 1947–48 Kashmir invasion and then became a recurring strategic model in 1965, in the Kashmir insurgency from 1988 onward, and again in the 1999 Kargil conflict.

In his work, he argues that this pattern reflects the dominance of the military establishment over civilian decision-making in Pakistan, and that it has produced repeated strategic failures rather than meaningful gains.

Let that sink in. The suffering of Kashmiris is fuel for Pakistan’s ruling establishment, not a tragedy they wish to end.

The Pakistan–Afghanistan Conflict: A Border Drawn in Arrogance

You also asked for a raw breakdown of why Pakistan and Afghanistan remain adversaries: it boils down to a colonial scar called the Durand Line. Drawn in 1893 by Britain without Afghan consent, this artificial border split Pashtun homelands in half.

Afghanistan has never recognized it. Pashtun resentment is justified — imagine Stockholm sliced down the middle and one half handed to Moscow. That’s the magnitude of the injustice.

Pakistan exploits this division to maintain strategic control. Since the 1970s, its military elite has weaponized Islamist factions inside Afghanistan to install friendly regimes and crush Pashtun nationalism.

Islamabad supported the Taliban for decades — not out of religious solidarity but territorial paranoia.

Journalist and regional expert Ahmed Rashid has consistently argued that Pakistan’s security establishment seeks to prevent the emergence of a strong and independent Afghanistan.

In works such as Pakistan on the Brink and Descent into Chaos, he explains that Islamabad has long viewed a weak, divided, and aid-dependent Afghanistan as strategically advantageous — especially for maintaining influence and countering Afghan resistance to the Durand Line.

According to Rashid, this is why Pakistan historically supported Taliban networks and other militant factions that keep Kabul unstable and reliant on Pakistan’s cooperation.

Even now, Pakistan accuses Kabul of hosting terrorists while conveniently forgetting that the Taliban leadership long lived comfortably in Quetta and Peshawar under Pakistan’s eye. It’s a toxic codependence: Pakistan keeps Afghan instability alive so it can dictate the terms of “peace.”

Durand Line: Occupation by Barbed Wire and Bulldozer

Pakistan’s treatment of Pashtun communities along the border is brutally consistent with its Kashmir playbook: militarize, suppress, erase.

In recent years, Pakistan has fenced the Durand Line and demolished centuries-old tribal crossings — without local consent. Families are divided. Trade is strangled. Pashtun protests — like the peaceful PTM movement — are met with arrests, torture, disappearances.

Pakistan occupies Afghan territory the same way it occupies PoK: through deliberate underdevelopment, demographic manipulation, and violent intimidation.

According to Christine Fair, Pakistan’s strategic culture is rooted in the belief that it is “an insecure and incomplete state,” which has helped the Pakistan Army dominate national decision-making and pursue policies that rely on ideological tools, proxy actors, and regional influence rather than democratic governance and coherent national identity.

That’s exactly right. If Pakistan ever accepted freely expressed self-determination — whether in Kashmir or among Pashtuns — its own internal fissures would explode. So instead, it smothers those voices.

Human Rights Are Not a Geopolitical Bargaining Chip

Pakistan’s propaganda frames every criticism as an attack on Muslims. That’s cheap. Muslims in India vote, study, protest, and participate in governance. Muslims in Pakistan-controlled areas cannot even criticize the army without vanishing.

Kashmiri Muslims deserve dignity. Kashmiri Hindus who endured ethnic cleansing in 1990 deserve justice. Pashtuns deserve self-determination. Afghanistan deserves sovereignty. None of these rights are negotiable simply because Pakistan’s generals consider geography a military asset.

And Western institutions must stop indulging Pakistan’s narratives just because they fit Cold-War nostalgia or “Muslim victimhood” stereotypes. Victimhood ends the moment you become the perpetrator.

Accountability or Regression

Seventy-eight years after Pakistan’s armed invasion of Jammu & Kashmir on October 22, 1947 — an invasion marked by mass rape, targeted killings, and the destruction of non-Muslim communities — the structural logic behind that aggression has not changed.

Pakistan’s military establishment still treats territory as a trophy, civilians as expendable, and jihad as a policy tool. The same mindset that unleashed tribal Lashkars to butcher Kashmiris in Baramulla and Mirpur is what later produced Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and every other “proxy” weaponized to destabilize the region.

Export terror. Deny responsibility. Perform victimhood. Silence dissent. Pakistan perfected this sequence starting in October 1947 and has repeated it in every decade since.

Meanwhile, the human cost is borne entirely by those under the shadow of Pakistani control and interference — Kashmiris who lost their land and cultural identity in Pakistan-occupied territories; Pashtuns split by the Durand Line and punished for demanding basic civil rights; Afghans whose country was turned into a battlefield to serve Pakistan’s paranoia about strategic depth.

If the international community claims to value human rights, then moral clarity is non-negotiable: Pakistan was the aggressor in Kashmir. Pakistan has sabotaged Afghan sovereignty. Pakistan continues to deny Pashtuns self-determination. These are not “regional sensitivities.” They are ongoing violations rooted in the original crime of 1947.

Peace begins with truth. And the truth is simple: Dignity does not grow where an army stands guard over stolen land.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The decision to dispatch Muttaqi to New Delhi is therefore not just about outreach to India — it is also a stinging rebuke to Pakistan.

In a significant turn that could recalibrate South Asian geopolitics, Afghan-Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi will travel to New Delhi on October 9 — his first official visit since the Taliban regained power in 2021. The United Nations Security Council has granted him a temporary waiver from international travel sanctions, allowing the trip to proceed until October 16.

The visit marks more than a symbolic breakthrough. It reflects months of quiet backchannel diplomacy between Indian officials and Taliban leaders in neutral venues such as Dubai, and culminated earlier this year in a direct conversation between India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Muttaqi.

In June this year, India handed over control of the Afghan consulate in Hyderabad to a Taliban appointee, Mohammad Rahman as the consular representative.

That call came soon after the Taliban condemned the Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir — an extraordinary moment, considering the Taliban’s long association with Pakistan’s security establishment.

India has simultaneously expanded its humanitarian footprint in Afghanistan, delivering wheat, medicines, earthquake relief tents, and medical supplies. Since the Taliban’s takeover, New Delhi has sent nearly 50,000 tonnes of wheat, over 330 tonnes of medicines, and substantial food and shelter assistance.

Following the devastating September earthquake, India was among the first responders, dispatching relief material within days. For Kabul, Delhi is emerging as a partner willing to engage pragmatically and without the overbearing demands that have characterized Pakistan’s approach.

The decision to dispatch Muttaqi to New Delhi is therefore not just about outreach to India — it is also a stinging rebuke to Pakistan. For decades, Islamabad claimed the Taliban as its creation and asset. Yet today, that influence has eroded so sharply that the Taliban are actively seeking to diversify away from Pakistan’s orbit.

From Patron to Pariah: Pakistan’s Broken Bond

Pakistan’s role in nurturing the Taliban is well documented. Seminaries like Darul Uloom Haqqaniyah produced many of the movement’s cadres, and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies offered sanctuary, arms, and financing.

For Islamabad, the Taliban were a tool to secure “strategic depth” against India. But influence is not permanent, and Pakistan has squandered it through hubris, duplicity, and coercion.

One turning point was Islamabad’s airstrikes inside Afghan territory. In December 2024, Pakistani aircraft struck Barmal district in Paktika province, reportedly killing civilians under the pretext of targeting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hideouts.

The Taliban reacted furiously, calling the raid a “violation of sovereignty” and warning of consequences. By repeatedly bombing Afghan soil, Pakistan crossed a line from patron to aggressor, undermining whatever goodwill remained.

Another blow came with Islamabad’s decision to expel Afghan refugees. More than 80,000 Afghans were forced to return earlier this year, many with nowhere to go. Kabul viewed this as a callous betrayal. Rather than brotherhood, Pakistan treated refugees as pawns in its strategic game.

For the Taliban, already struggling to manage humanitarian needs, the expulsions were proof that Islamabad valued leverage over solidarity.

The border dispute has deepened the rupture further. The Taliban refuse to recognize the Durand Line — the colonial-era boundary imposed by the British. Pakistan’s efforts to fence and formalize the border have sparked repeated clashes, especially at Torkham, where crossings have been closed and trade disrupted.

For Afghans, resisting the Durand Line is a matter of sovereignty; for Pakistan, enforcing it is a security imperative. The clash is zero-sum, and Pakistan underestimated the symbolic power of the issue.

But perhaps Pakistan’s most corrosive mistake has been its double game. For years, Islamabad “hunted with the hounds and ran with the hare” — selling cooperation to Washington while harboring Taliban leaders, then betraying them when convenient.

The Taliban leadership has not forgotten the arrests and handovers of commanders to the U.S. during the post-9/11 years. Those betrayals bred deep suspicion of Pakistani intentions.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s internal security crisis has spilled across the border. The TTP, inspired by the Taliban’s victory in Kabul, has intensified its insurgency inside Pakistan. Islamabad demanded that Kabul rein in the group, but the Taliban balked at turning their guns on fellow militants.

The result has been open recrimination, with Pakistan accusing the Taliban of harboring terrorists and the Taliban accusing Pakistan of exporting instability.

Underlying all of this is a question of dignity. The Taliban, now rulers of Afghanistan, refuse to be treated as clients or proxies. Pakistan’s patronizing posture — airstrikes, expulsions, fencing, and demands — has alienated a movement that now insists on equal footing.

Kabul’s outreach to India, once unthinkable, has become a declaration of independence.

Why India, and Why Now?

India’s renewed relevance in Afghanistan is not ideological but pragmatic. For Kabul, Delhi offers what Islamabad no longer can: stability, resources, and respect.

First, India has sustained its humanitarian assistance. Wheat, medicines, earthquake relief, and development projects have directly benefited millions of Afghans. This tangible aid bolsters the Taliban’s domestic credibility at a time when international recognition remains elusive.

Second, India provides historic continuity. From constructing Afghanistan’s parliament building to investing in roads, dams, and schools during the 2000s, Delhi has built goodwill across generations. Even after 2021, when most Western embassies evacuated Kabul, India cautiously maintained a presence and continued delivering aid.

Third, India offers alternatives to Pakistan’s chokehold on trade. Through the Chabahar port in Iran, Afghanistan gains a maritime outlet that bypasses Karachi. For a landlocked country, this access is transformative — and strategically liberating.

Fourth, India’s diplomatic approach is carefully calibrated. It has engaged the Taliban without formal recognition, striking a balance between protecting its interests and avoiding premature legitimization. For Kabul, this provides engagement without subordination.

Finally, embracing India signals to other powers — from Russia to the Gulf states — that the Taliban are not beholden to Islamabad. Diversification of partners enhances Kabul’s strategic autonomy.

Pakistan’s Strategic Miscalculation

At its core, Pakistan’s loss of influence over the Taliban stems from one fatal error: mistaking coercion for control. By bombing Afghan soil, expelling refugees, fencing contested borders, and treating Afghans as pawns, Islamabad alienated the very force it once nurtured. Its duplicity — supporting militants while courting Washington — has left it distrusted by all sides.

The Taliban, in turn, have chosen pragmatism. They see in India a partner who delivers aid without interference, offers trade without humiliation, and engages without betrayal.

For New Delhi, the opportunity is clear: to secure its long-term interests in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan its long-cherished “strategic depth,” and to assert itself as a stabilizing force in the region.

As Amir Khan Muttaqi steps into his meetings in New Delhi, the symbolism will be unmistakable. The Taliban — once Pakistan’s prized proxy — are now opening their doors to India, Islamabad’s arch-rival. It is more than a diplomatic engagement. It is the visible consequence of Pakistan’s failed policies, its double game, and its arrogance.

In the great chessboard of South Asia, Afghanistan is moving away from Pakistan’s shadow and toward India’s embrace. For Islamabad, the message is painful but clear: the days of monopolizing Kabul are over.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.