The secret dealing refereed here is the recent Washington Post report that exposed that US diplomats, behind close doors, have signalled their openness to work with resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami and to ‘want to be their friends.

On 12 February Bangladesh is to participate in its 13^th national election.

In the country’s history, this election stands as unique for many reasons—a) the first election held after July Uprising that deposed Sheikh Hasina’s rule on 5 August 2024, b) In a first, this national election is not seeing participation of the country’s largest party Awami League due to the ban on its party activities, c) It is also the first time that former political allies—Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) are contesting as opponents, d) the 11-party alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami puts Islamist parties at the forefront of the electoral game, a huge boost to country’s Islamist politics.

The election campaign for 13^th national election launched on 22 January, with BNP yielding the highest number of candidates (288) and Jamaat the second (224) to compete in the country’s 300 constituencies.

The resurgence of Islamists in Bangladesh owes much to the political vacuum left by Awami League after the July Uprising. The interim government aided Jamaat-e-Islami’s comeback in mainstream politics by lifting the ban, later enabling its restoration of party registration, allowing its re-entry in the electoral game after 2013.

Moreover, the interim period witnessed many Islamists convicted for 1971 war crimes or terror activities after being acquitted of all charges, allowing their arrival in the political scenario once again. One of them is ATM Azharul Islam, now contesting from Rangpur-2 constituency as Jamaat candidate. Nevertheless, Jamaat-e-Islami attempted to rebrand itself as a progressive, moderate party that seeks to create an “Islamic welfare” state.

The comeback of Islamist political parties in post-Hasina Bangladesh alongside witnessed the revival of Islamist extremism, making their loud presence in the country’s socio-cultural life. The steep rise in violence against religious and ethnic minority communities, rise in sexual violence, and mob attacks in cultural festivals should be seen as a byproduct of Islamists resurgence.

Notwithstanding the fact that Islamists political parties occasionally displayed dissatisfaction over these developments and claims its distance from radicals, one cannot ignore that the Islamists—be it political parties or extremist factions—share the same ideological goals—to create an Islamic state in Bangladesh which would be based on Sharia-based law.

These forces are essentially against the country’s state principles (one being secularism) enshrined in the 1972 Constitution and want to replace the present constitution with a new one which would follow Islamic principles instead of what they claim as ‘man-made laws.’ Undoubtedly, if these parties come to power, one would likely see a convergence of their goals being translated into violent actions. Bangladesh’s own history 1990s-mid 2000s testifies to this. 

In the mid 2025 the Islamist coalition started taking shape when five Quami- Madrasa-based registered Islamist parties—Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Nezam-e-Islam Party, Khelafat Majlish and Islami Andolan—expressed  interest on an electoral compromise by filing a single candidate in the national election. At this stage, Jamaat attempted to forge a unity with this alliance, but it was kept out because of unity’s initial hesitation with Jamaat with respect to ideological differences as well as its controversial past.

However, in September 2025 protest called by Islami Andolan, Khelafat Majlis and Jamaat-e-Islami, alignied on five key demands which includes July Charter referendum and trial of July atrocities and introducing proportional representation in both houses. This protest was referred as ‘moving closer to forming an alliance’.

The alliance then expanded to eight ‘like-minded’ parties, this time including Jamaat-e-Islami and compromising of Islami Andolan Bangladesh, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, Khelafat Majlis, Nezame Islam Party, Bangladesh Khelafat Andolon, Bangladesh Development Party, and Jatiya Ganatantrik Party (JAGPA), declaring to contest 2026 election through a seat-sharing arrangement.

Following the official Jamaat-led coalition, Jamaat-e-Islami, resorted to aggressive historical revisionism in their speeches on the occasion on Intellectuals Martyrs Day, calling ‘India’s conspiracy’ behind the murder of intellectuals and blaming ‘Delhi loyalists’ shaping the present narrative on Liberation War.

Jamaat leaders also remarked on all government institutions to be governed only by ‘Allah’s law’, promising that if they come to power, no other man-made laws would be able to operate in the country. Indeed, the rebranding as a tolerant, moderate party was just an electoral gimmick to enter this coalition.

In December, Islamist-led alliance further expanded when National Citizen’s Party, Liberal Democratic Party and Amar Bangladesh and joined to form an 11-patry alliance. These parties earlier that month formed a separate alliance known as Democratic Reform Alliance, posing itself as an alternative to ‘old-style politics’ of Jamaat and the BNP.

The change in decision was justified by NCP as ‘changed political landscape’ and not an ‘ideological alliance’. Nevertheless, NCP’s joining of Jamaat-led alliance proved heavy for the apparent ‘revolutionary’ party, as nearly 30 members of NCP, issued a joint letter to the party convenor, opposing this move, questioning the party’s ‘democratic ethics.’

About 16 NCP members, including 13 central leaders of the party (and 16 in total), resigned from NCP, despite efforts at reconciling. The student-led political party is now openly admitting that its sole aim is to win the upcoming election, a tight slap to those who joined the party thinking of forming ‘New Bangladesh’.

The alliance’s seat-sharing was announced at a press briefing on 16 January. Jamaat announced allocations for 253 constituencies, with Jamaat contesting for 179 seats, NCP 30, Mamunul Haque-led Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish 20, Khelafat Majlish 10, Liberal Democratic Party seven, AB Party three, and Nizame Islami Party and Bangladesh Development Party two seats each. Islami Andolan, believed to have been allocated 47 seats, however, boycotted the briefing.

Amidst this, Islami Andolan’s party spokesperson claimed that Jamaat is taking all decisions unilaterally and authoritatively, leading to mistrust and divisions within the alliance. Soon after, Islami Andolan officially left led Jamaat-led 11-party alliance and stated to file independently in 268 constituencies, and expressed to support candidates aligning with its party ideals for the remaining 32 constituencies.

The party also extended its support for Khelafat Majlis’s chief Mamunul Haque, announcing withdrawal of two seats where Haque is contesting, ‘out of respect and his contributions to Islamic politics’. After leaving the alliance, Islami Andolan chief accused Jamaat of ‘using religion (Islam) to pursue conspiratorial political goals’ and even criticised its secret dealings with Washington. The same accusation has also been raised by Jamaat’s main contender Bangladesh Nationalist Party.

The secret dealing refereed here is the recent Washington Post report that exposed that US diplomats, behind close doors, have signalled their openness to work with resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami and to ‘want to be their friends’, on the prediction that Bangladesh has ‘shifted Islamic’ and that Jamaat ‘would do better than it has ever done before.

The report also stated that Jamaat, since Hasina’s ousting, has held four meeting with US officials in Washington and several in Dhaka, signalling a possible understanding. While Washington claims this conversation to be ‘off-the record discussion’ and ‘routine gathering’, Jamaat’s Barguna2 candidate’s confirmation of ‘even America moving forward by relying on Jamaat’, and also European Union, IMF and the Work Bank’s interest for Jamaat-led government in Bangladesh eliminates any suspicion of America’s influence on Jamaat in the 2026 polls.

The February national election is witnessing Islamist political parties fielding record number of candidates (36.35 per cent of total candidates) in the upcoming polls. Besides 224 candidates contesting from Jamaat, 253 candidates are contesting from Islami Andolan Bangladesh, 34 from Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis and 32 from National Citizen Party-NCP. The 11-party alliance now remains intact with  Bangladesh Labour Party joining the Jamaat-led alliance. 

The expansion of alliance to include non-Islamist parties is to paint before the world of a democratic political alliance that seeks to make Bangladesh prosperous. It, however, hides its overtly Islamist goals from them, which has only been made evident to Bangladesh’s local audience.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Bangladesh’s interim government recently gave its final approval to the draft of ‘July Mass Uprising Protection and Liability Determination Ordinance’ that grants indemnity to those who participated in the 2024 July Uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina to end her 15-year political rule and flee the country. The ordinance, believed to be the interim government’s fulfilment of ‘earlier commitment’ to ensure ‘legal protection’ to July participants, would take the shape of a law soon.

The ordinance provides impunity to participants from ‘activities carried out with the purpose of political resistance’ during 2024 uprising in July and August. Meaning, if criminal cases are slapped any of uprising participants for carrying out ‘political resistance during uprising’, such cases will be withdrawn by the government. Moreover, the ordinance adds that ‘no new cases will be filed’ against them, from now on, for their activities during the uprising.

The events of July-August have various connotations—uprising, revolution, political coup and political resistance. Those who participated in the uprising called it a ‘revolution’ that paved the way for ‘New Bangladesh’ or ‘Second Republic’. This group, composed mostly of student leaders who led the uprising and some later formed the National Citizen’s Party (NCP), has not only framed the uprising as ‘second liberation’ but also introduced a new political discussion where 1971 Liberation was brought back, reinterpreted and even compared with the 2024 uprising.

The 2024 ‘revolution’ has been portrayed by this group as fulfilling what 1971 could not, a liberation that gave Bangladesh its ‘true independence’. The same narrative is also echoed by another faction—the Islamists—for whom 2024 Uprising rolled the red carpet for their resurgence in the political field and now forms the main contending group against Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the February 2026 national election.

Collectively, the Awami League is now branded as a ‘fascist’, a justification used by the interim government for banning Awami League’s political activities in May, closing the League’s door to participate in the February 2026 national election. 

The interim government, in its official capacity, recognised the July participants as ‘july warriors’ (July Joddha), similar to ‘war heroes’ (Mukti Joddha) of Liberation War. On the first anniversary of the uprising, the interim government unveiled the July Declaration on 5 August 2025, following pressures from Student Against Discrimination (SAD), the main force behind the July Uprising and NCP to give 2024 events a constitutional recognition.

The Declaration, declared to be given a constitutional status, was supposed to be a statement to recognise the July Uprising and its ambitions for ‘Second Republic’. Rather, it became a political fatwa against Awami League and its political past since 1971 (as interpreted by its opponents), an obituary of the 1972 Constitution that is now labelled as ‘Mujibist Constitution’, and legitimising the ‘unconstitutionally’ formed interim government. 

There is little doubt about the interim government’s biases towards leaders of the July Uprising. Indeed, it was the student leaders of SAD that invited Muhammad Yunus to come back to Bangladesh and take the role of the chief advisor of the interim government on 8 August 2024.

In return, three of the advisors in the interim government were student leaders of July Uprising. Many in the political circle believe that the interim government that helped the formation of National Citizen’s Party (NCP), a King’s Party, by intentionally delaying the announcement of an election roadmap. The neutrality became exposed when one of the advisors resigned to become the convenor of the NCP, while another resigned only recently to become the NCP’s spokesperson.

Since NCP’s establishment, the interim government displayed its soft corner for the student party, echoing the same political narrative as that of NCP, and even actively taking measures of historical revisionism to erase Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy.

The recognition of July warriors has not been without controversy either. The gazetted list of about 1,402 warriors declared as ‘national heroes’ are promised tax benefits, welfare and rehabilitation, and now legal protection as per the 14 January ordinance. However, the gazetted lists were accused of including fake claimants, irregularities and political misuse, ironically the accusations slapped against Sheikh Hasina during the early phase of July Uprising when it was in the stage of anti-quota protest.

The ‘July warriors’ also violently clashed with police on the day of signing of the July Charter in October demanding for state recognition of martyr status, in addition to compensation and legal immunity—demands that were ultimately added as Clause 5 of the July Charter.

The latest move to this shenanigan—the July Mass Uprising Protection ordinance—justifies all kinds of acts that happened in July-August, especially violence against minorities and looting of arms from security forces, by indirectly branding these acts as ‘political resistance’. The wave of communal violence witnessed during this time, and continues even today were dismissed by the interim government as ‘political’.

Despite international reports, the interim government insists on these being ‘non-communal’ attacks. With only less than three weeks before 13^th national election, over one-third of the polling booths are also marked as ‘risky’, while about 1,3331 of the 5,763 firearms and explosive looted during July Uprising remain missing, posing an alarming risk to security during the election time.

The protection ordinance potentially shields all human rights abuses. Although the interim government clarified that only ‘political resistance’ is to be given legal protection, the tweaking of human rights abuses as ‘political reaction’ leaves little room to comprehend that all these criminal acts will also be treated as ‘political resistance’.

The shameful attempt to equate 2024 July with the 1971 Liberation War, by providing equal status, benefits, memorials, and now legal protection not only downplays Bangladesh’s painful history but also changes the whole political trajectory of the country where political violence will get state protection.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.