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	<title>Iraq US relations &#8211; The Milli Chronicle</title>
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	<title>Iraq US relations &#8211; The Milli Chronicle</title>
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		<title>US Envoy Role for Iraq Under Review as Diplomatic Focus Shifts</title>
		<link>https://www.millichronicle.com/2026/02/62768.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[NewsDesk Milli Chronicle]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 01 Feb 2026 18:03:54 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Washington &#8211; Developments in Washington indicate that the role of the United States special envoy for Iraq is undergoing a]]></description>
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<p><strong>Washington</strong> &#8211; Developments in Washington indicate that the role of the United States special envoy for Iraq is undergoing a transition, reflecting evolving diplomatic priorities and administrative adjustments within the US foreign policy framework. Sources familiar with the matter say the position, announced late last year, is no longer being actively held in its previous form.</p>



<p>The change comes at a time when the United States continues to assess its engagement strategy with Iraq, a key partner in the Middle East. Officials have emphasized that Washington remains committed to supporting Iraq’s stability, sovereignty, and long-term development through diplomatic channels and strategic cooperation.</p>



<p>The individual appointed to the envoy role had been expected to contribute to strengthening bilateral dialogue and facilitating communication between Washington and Baghdad. However, recent indications suggest that the responsibilities linked to Iraq policy may now be managed through existing diplomatic structures rather than a standalone envoy position.</p>



<p>US officials have not publicly detailed the reasons behind the adjustment, and no formal announcement has been made regarding a successor. Observers note that such changes are not uncommon as administrations refine their approaches based on regional developments and internal coordination needs.</p>



<p>Diplomatic sources suggest that oversight of Iraq-related matters may be integrated into a broader regional portfolio handled by senior officials already engaged in Middle East affairs. This approach is seen as a way to ensure continuity while aligning Iraq policy with wider regional objectives.</p>



<p>Iraq remains an important partner for the United States in areas such as energy, security cooperation, and economic engagement. American officials have repeatedly stated that their goal is to work with Iraqi institutions in a manner that respects national decision-making processes and promotes inclusive governance.</p>



<p>The recent personnel developments coincide with active diplomatic engagement across the region, including consultations with allies and partners on security, economic resilience, and regional stability. Analysts say these discussions underscore Washington’s intent to maintain constructive relations with Baghdad while addressing broader strategic considerations.</p>



<p>While the envoy role itself appears to be in transition, US diplomatic activity related to Iraq continues through the State Department and other official channels. Embassies, regional envoys, and senior diplomats are expected to carry forward dialogue on key bilateral and regional issues.</p>



<p>Iraqi officials, for their part, have continued routine engagement with US counterparts, focusing on cooperation frameworks that have been in place for several years. These include economic partnerships, educational exchanges, and coordination on shared security interests.</p>



<p>The absence of a dedicated envoy has not altered official commitments on either side, according to observers. Instead, it reflects a recalibration of how diplomatic resources are deployed to best serve policy goals amid a complex regional landscape.</p>



<p>As Washington reviews its diplomatic structures, attention remains on sustaining steady communication and collaboration with Iraq. Both sides have expressed interest in maintaining a balanced and forward-looking relationship that contributes to regional stability and mutual benefit.</p>



<p>Further clarity on the handling of the Iraq portfolio is expected in due course as administrative processes conclude. Until then, existing diplomatic mechanisms are set to continue guiding engagement between the United States and Iraq.</p>
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		<title>US Slows Transfers of Islamic State Detainees to Iraq Amid Repatriation Concerns</title>
		<link>https://www.millichronicle.com/2026/01/62694.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[NewsDesk Milli Chronicle]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2026 19:45:20 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Baghdad &#8211; The transfer of Islamic State detainees from Syria to Iraq by the United States has slowed significantly this]]></description>
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<p><strong>Baghdad</strong> &#8211; The transfer of Islamic State detainees from Syria to Iraq by the United States has slowed significantly this week, according to multiple sources familiar with the process.</p>



<p>The slowdown comes after the Iraqi government requested additional time to manage the sensitive issue of foreign fighters and to prepare its detention infrastructure.</p>



<p>The transfers began earlier this month following growing instability in northeastern Syria.</p>



<p>Security concerns intensified after the collapse of local forces responsible for guarding prisons and camps holding thousands of suspected militants.</p>



<p>Initially, U.S. officials had planned to move as many as 7,000 detainees to Iraq within a short period. However, more than a week after the process started, only around 500 detainees have been transferred so far.</p>



<p>Iraqi judicial and security officials say the current pace reflects Baghdad’s caution rather than logistical failure. The government has reportedly asked Washington to pause or slow the transfers to allow broader diplomatic discussions.</p>



<p>A key issue is the presence of hundreds of foreign nationals among the detainees. Many of them are citizens of Western countries that remain reluctant to accept their return.</p>



<p>Iraq has urged these countries to take responsibility for their own nationals. Officials argue that Iraq should not become the default holding location for foreign jihadists captured elsewhere.</p>



<p>Those transferred so far reportedly include around 130 Iraqi nationals and approximately 400 foreign fighters. They have been placed in Iraqi detention facilities under heightened security arrangements.</p>



<p>Baghdad has also cited practical challenges. Existing prisons are already under strain, and authorities need time to prepare additional secure facilities.</p>



<p>The detainees were originally held in Syria for years without trial. Their detention followed the collapse of the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate in 2019.</p>



<p>Since then, the fate of these fighters has posed a major dilemma for the international community. Legal, political, and security concerns have stalled repatriation efforts across Europe and beyond.</p>



<p>Western governments fear domestic backlash, legal complications, and potential security risks. As a result, many countries have preferred to leave their citizens in regional detention rather than bring them home.</p>



<p>The slowdown in transfers highlights the limits of unilateral solutions to a multinational problem. Without coordinated agreements, Iraq risks inheriting a long-term security burden.</p>



<p>U.S. officials have not publicly commented on the reduced pace of transfers. Silence from Washington has added to uncertainty around the future of the operation.</p>



<p>Meanwhile, instability in Syria continues to raise alarm over the safety of remaining detention centers. Any further breakdown could risk escapes or renewed militant activity.</p>



<p>Iraqi officials stress that their cooperation depends on shared responsibility. They argue that lasting security requires international participation, not just regional containment.</p>



<p>The situation underscores unresolved consequences of the fight against Islamic State. Even years after its territorial defeat, the group’s legacy continues to challenge global security systems.</p>



<p>As talks continue behind closed doors, the fate of thousands of detainees remains uncertain. For now, transfers move slowly, shaped as much by politics as by security concerns.</p>
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		<title>Iran’s Bite Weakens: How Iraq Just Chewed Up Tehran’s PMF Ambitions</title>
		<link>https://www.millichronicle.com/2025/09/55703.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2025 05:47:02 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[The PMF bill’s withdrawal reflects the interplay between military realities, domestic politics, and international pressure. The recent withdrawal of Iraq’s]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-post-author"><div class="wp-block-post-author__avatar"><img alt='' src='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/22d3eb2b1b380c246ec43035c65dd0c2?s=48&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g' srcset='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/22d3eb2b1b380c246ec43035c65dd0c2?s=96&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g 2x' class='avatar avatar-48 photo' height='48' width='48' loading='lazy' decoding='async'/></div><div class="wp-block-post-author__content"><p class="wp-block-post-author__name">Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab</p></div></div>


<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>The PMF bill’s withdrawal reflects the interplay between military realities, domestic politics, and international pressure. </p>
</blockquote>



<p>The recent withdrawal of Iraq’s draft law to restructure the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has illuminated a striking reality: Iran, once a formidable force in shaping Iraqi politics and regional militias, is showing signs of vulnerability. Intended to mirror the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in power, autonomy, and influence, the bill sought to cement Tehran’s dominance in Iraq through its Shiite allies. Yet internal Iraqi divisions, Sunni and Kurdish resistance, and external pressures from the United States revealed the limits of Iran’s reach. </p>



<p>The episode follows closely on the heels of the 12-day war with Israel, which exposed strategic weaknesses in Tehran’s regional posture, making the PMF bill politically untenable.</p>



<p><strong>A Proxy Plan Stalled: The PMF Bill’s Ambitions</strong></p>



<p>The PMF draft law was designed to be transformative. Its provisions granted the organization sweeping powers: the ability to arm itself, train personnel independently, expand its logistical and construction enterprises, and establish its leadership with ministerial authority over military and administrative affairs. Essentially, it envisioned an Iraqi IRGC—an institution capable of shaping state security while consolidating Shiite political dominance.</p>



<p>The legislation included the creation of a PMF Academy, issuing degrees in military sciences, and a General Engineering and Contracting Company to manage infrastructure projects—replicating Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya model. Senior commanders would enjoy ministerial rank, effectively superseding the Defense Minister in overseeing PMF operations. Provisions allowed senior fighters past normal retirement age to remain in command, while the term “mujahid” underscored an ideological, Tehran-aligned identity. This institutionalization would have given Iran a durable foothold in Iraq’s military and political systems, potentially reshaping regional dynamics in its favor.</p>



<p>Yet the bill faced insurmountable hurdles. Sunni and Kurdish blocs united in absolute opposition, seeing the legislation as a direct threat to national balance and sovereignty. Internal Shiite divisions further complicated matters: hardliners pushed aggressively for passage, moderates opposed it, and others took a cautious, wait-and-see approach, reflecting the uncertainty following the recent conflict with Israel. The 12-day war had exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s military posture, casting doubt on Tehran’s ability to project power and coordinate its proxies effectively.</p>



<p>External pressures compounded these challenges. The United States vocally opposed the legislation, warning that it would strengthen Iran’s influence and undermine Iraq’s sovereignty. Congressional initiatives such as the “Iraq Liberation Act” threatened sanctions and curbs on trade and investment if the law passed. U.S. leverage, combined with Iran’s perceived military weakening after the Israeli confrontation, tipped the scales in favor of withdrawal. The episode demonstrates that even Tehran’s carefully orchestrated proxy strategies can be constrained by a combination of local resistance and external intervention.</p>



<p><strong>Tehran on the Back Foot: Lessons from a Toothless Moment</strong></p>



<p>The PMF bill’s withdrawal is a telling reflection of Iran’s declining influence in the region. The recent 12-day war with Israel highlighted both operational and strategic shortcomings, eroding confidence in Tehran’s ability to impose its agenda. Its proxies, previously thought reliable and dominant, proved vulnerable, and their political instruments—like the PMF draft—could no longer advance unchecked.</p>



<p>This moment underscores a broader regional recalibration. Iraq’s institutions, in resisting the PMF bill, have asserted national sovereignty and signaled that external attempts to institutionalize proxy dominance will face both internal and international pushback. Tehran’s silence during the withdrawal, despite having shaped the draft law, signals a tactical retreat rather than a strategic victory. The lesson is clear: Iran’s influence, while still significant, is increasingly subject to the realities of political contestation, military setbacks, and global scrutiny.</p>



<p>For Iraq, the episode offers both a caution and an opportunity. It demonstrates that coalition politics can check foreign-aligned ambitions, and it hints at the potential for a more balanced national security apparatus. For Tehran, it is a rare reminder that its regional maneuvers are not omnipotent: the 12-day war with Israel and the failure of the PMF bill illustrate the limitations of coercive influence, highlighting vulnerabilities in both perception and capability.</p>



<p>In sum, the PMF bill’s withdrawal reflects the interplay between military realities, domestic politics, and international pressure. It represents a moment in which Iran’s ambitions collided with structural constraints, exposing the diminishing returns of its assertive regional posture. The episode is less a permanent defeat than a stark reminder that Tehran’s influence is not immutable, and that under current circumstances, its power has limits—making it a rare instance of regional recalibration that reinforces Iraqi agency and highlights the strategic leverage of both domestic actors and international stakeholders.</p>
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