Far from empowering Muslims, Akbaruddin’s rhetoric is downright foolish.

In the complex and often combustible landscape of Indian politics, few figures have stirred as much controversy as Akbaruddin Owaisi—the younger brother of Asaduddin Owaisi, head of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), a Muslim-centric political party with influence in southern and parts of northern India.

Akbaruddin became a national—and international—talking point in 2012 when a provocative excerpt from one of his public speeches in Nirmal, Telangana, went viral. In the clip, he is seen declaring: “If the police are removed for 15 minutes, we are 250 million and you are 1 billion. We will show you who is more powerful, who has balls.”

The statement was a blatant threat wrapped in communal arithmetic, referencing the Muslim and Hindu populations of India. The crowd erupted in applause. Shortly afterward, Owaisi was arrested on charges of hate speech, released on bail, and ultimately acquitted in 2022.

But revisiting this case solely as a legal episode misses the point. It is a revealing lens into the enduring toxicity of communal rhetoric in Indian politics—particularly within some segments of the Muslim leadership—where hate is no longer an outlier but a weaponized tool, used across the spectrum to polarize and provoke.

Hate Speech Is Not a One-Way Street

Akbaruddin’s speech stands as one of the clearest examples of hate speech by a Muslim politician in India. It was not vague or symbolic rhetoric aimed at resisting “Muslim oppression,” but a direct provocation against an entire (albeit imaginary) community—articulated through communal arithmetic: 25 crore versus 100 crore.

Ironically, the speech played right into the hands of those it ostensibly opposed. It gave the Hindu Right a moral and political tool: “If Muslim leaders can openly threaten us, why shouldn’t we respond in kind?” In that sense, Owaisi’s speech, like many instances where the idea of Muslim empowerment morphs into rabid communalism, deepened the communal fissures that the ruling dispensation now capitalizes on with its own stream of hate speeches.

Yet, here lies a deeper hypocrisy within sections of the Indian Muslim community. Many Muslims, in private conversations, while disagreeing with AIMIM’s political opportunism, tend to justify Akbaruddin’s words as a symbolic show of resistance—an assertion that “we will not take oppression lying down.” But symbolic resistance through hate speech is a double-edged sword. It only reinforces existing suspicions and increases hostility.

The Dangerous Myth of Communal Arithmetic

The core of Akbaruddin’s speech rests on a fundamentally flawed idea: that Muslims are a monolithic, homogeneous bloc of 25–30 crore standing against 100 crore Hindus.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The Muslim community in India is deeply diverse and internally fractured—across sects, castes, regions, and languages.

Sunni–Shia, Deobandi–Barelvi, and Ashraf–Ajlaf–Arzal divisions are an open secret. The imagined “25 crore Muslims” myth collapses the moment these internal differences are acknowledged—which, in the age of Hindutva, seems conveniently forgotten.

Likewise, the notion of “100 crore Hindus” is equally imaginary. Caste, regional, and linguistic divides among Hindus remain sharp and visible, only temporarily papered over by the Hindutva project. Communalism gives life to these mythical numbers because communal politics thrives on binaries—usually imaginary, always forced.

When Akbaruddin says “15 minutes without police,” he frames the state—particularly the police—as the central oppressor during pogroms. There is some truth to this. The history of riots, from Nellie (1983) to Delhi (2020), shows police complicity or selective inaction. But his imagined scenario is suicidal. If the police disappear and the battle is framed as 30 crore versus 100 crore, it effectively calls for Muslims to engage in self-annihilation.

Three Hindus for every one Muslim—Owaisi’s way of calling for suicide reminds one of the now-famous meme: “Marwana ka tareeqa thoda casual hai.”

Far from empowering Muslims, Akbaruddin’s rhetoric is downright foolish.

The Responsibility to Condemn Across the Board

Akbaruddin Owaisi has made many such remarks, including derogatory statements about Hindu gods—calling them “manhoos” (inauspicious). Imagine if any Hindu politician had used even mildly similar language for Allah or the Prophet—the reaction from Muslims and the media would have been explosive. This asymmetry in moral outrage is dangerous.

It is also telling that his elder brother, Asaduddin Owaisi—otherwise vocal in dissecting Hindu right-wing hate speech—has never meaningfully condemned his brother’s 2012 remarks. This selective silence undermines the moral standing of anyone claiming to fight hate.

If Muslims wish to oppose Hindutva hate speech with credibility, they must also hold their own leaders accountable. Tacit approval or silence emboldens hate-mongers from within, leaving ordinary Muslims to face the consequences of fires lit by their ‘leaders.’

Communalism Is a Two-Edged Sword

The truth is stark: speeches like Akbaruddin Owaisi’s do not protect Muslims. They further communalize Hindus, provide ammunition to the ruling party, and push India’s already fragile social fabric closer to collapse.

Muslims must therefore develop a politics rooted not in reaction, but in principled opposition to all forms of hate. That essentially means condemning both Hindu and Muslim hate speech—without excuses, without bias.

The flames of hate consume the weakest first. Those who light them rarely burn. Let us never forget: hate can never be fought with hate.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

If any country, including Pakistan, ever invades India in the name of Ghazwa-e-Hind, they will find Indian Muslims defending their homeland

Among the many ideas that have found their way into the modern Islamic revivalist narrative, few are as persistently misunderstood—or dangerously misused—as the concept of Ghazwa-e-Hind. Popularized in contemporary times by figures like the late Dr. Israr Ahmed, it has come to be viewed not as a historical episode or a symbolic metaphor, but as a yet-to-be-fulfilled call to military conquest. This interpretation, though emotionally charged, is divorced from Islamic orthodoxy, historical context, and contemporary political reality.

This misreading of Islamic eschatology has become especially potent in Pakistan, where it has been weaponized by a segment of the clergy and even military-linked media. But what the masses often don’t see is that such a vision not only contradicts Islamic legal tradition, but also threatens the harmony of the Indian subcontinent, especially the future of Indian Muslims.

A Historical View—Not a Military Manual

The hadith that mentions Ghazwa-e-Hind is reported in Sunan an-Nasa’i (Hadith 3175), Musnad Ahmad (Hadith 23804), and al-Tabarani’s al-Mu’jam al-Kabir. The narration speaks of two groups saved from Hellfire—one that fights in India and another that accompanies Jesus, the son of Mary, during his second coming. However, Islamic scholars have long disagreed about the authenticity, context, and timeline of these narrations.

Renowned Hadith scholar Shaykh Nasiruddin al-Albani graded some of the chains as weak (da’if), while others like Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani in Fath al-Bari considered them authentic but possibly fulfilled during the early Islamic conquests. Ibn Kathir, in Al-Bidaya wa’l-Nihaya, also noted that the interpretation of these ahadith was limited to earlier periods of conquest.

Classical historians like al-Baladhuri in Futuh al-Buldan detail the campaign of Muhammad bin Qasim into Sindh (712 CE) as a response to an appeal from Muslim merchants and not as a sweeping religious war. The conquest was confined to a narrow region and did not reflect any systematic plan to convert India. Furthermore, the Chachnama, a semi-legendary Persian text documenting this campaign, narrates how religious freedom was granted to local Hindus and temples remained operational under Islamic rule.

Islamic scholar Dr. Ayesha Jalal, in her book Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, asserts that Ghazwa-e-Hind has been inflated in Pakistan’s religious discourse not because of religious necessity, but due to state-sponsored ideology. She writes that this hadith has “resurfaced with renewed intensity in Pakistan’s strategic imagination, filtered through a millenarian lens.”

The Qur’anic Command: No Compulsion in Religion

The most authoritative source in Islam—the Qur’an—states unequivocally: “There is no compulsion in religion” (Qur’an 2:256). This verse, supported by the consensus (ijma’) of scholars, has been interpreted as a foundational principle of religious freedom. In Tafsir al-Qurtubi, Imam al-Qurtubi elaborates that Islam forbids coercion because belief requires conviction, not force.

The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), when inviting tribes to Islam, used persuasion, kindness, and exemplary character—not threats. As recorded in Sirat Ibn Hisham and Tabaqat Ibn Sa’d, his approach to da’wah was rooted in wisdom, not warfare.

Moreover, Tafsir al-Tabari on verse 16:125—“Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching…”—explains that this verse sets the tone for all Islamic outreach. Any idea that religious dominance can be achieved through military force runs counter to the Qur’anic message and Prophetic model.

Prophecy ≠ Policy

Yes, Islam contains eschatological prophecies—many of which describe dramatic geopolitical changes in the end times.

The Prophet (peace be upon him) never told Muslims to build strategies around ghazwaat of the future. Instead, he focused on justice, reform, and internal purification.

Consider the Ghazwa of Abwa and Ghazwa of Ushayrah—expeditions that ended without a single arrow being shot. As documented in Al-Maghazi of al-Waqidi, many ghazwaat were precautionary or diplomatic. This is supported by Imam al-Nawawi’s commentary on Sahih Muslim, where he notes that military action in Islam is conditional on ethical, legal, and political necessities—not eschatological ambitions.

The Spread of Islam: A Moral Project, Not a Military One

Historically, Islam’s most significant growth occurred in regions where armies never marched. Southeast Asia, East Africa, and large swathes of India were introduced to Islam not through conquest but through trade and spiritual invitation.

Dr. Richard Eaton, in his landmark study The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, highlights how Sufi saints and local rulers facilitated Islamization in Bengal through land reforms, spiritual guidance, and social integration—not through war. Similarly, Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi in Islam and the World emphasizes that Islamic civilization at its best was spread through service, justice, and education.

The Prophet himself said: “I was sent to perfect noble character” (Musnad Ahmad, Hadith 8595). This foundational hadith is echoed in the works of Imam al-Ghazali in Ihya Ulum al-Din, who taught that spiritual excellence—not militarism—is the soul of Islamic revival.

Pakistan’s Fantasy vs Indian Muslims’ Reality

One of the more troubling developments is the Pakistani state’s occasional use of Ghazwa-e-Hind as a symbolic justification for cross-border ambitions. In textbooks, speeches, and even TV dramas, the narrative of a future campaign to “liberate” Indian Muslims is floated as a divine responsibility.

But such narratives overlook one major truth: Indian Muslims are not waiting for salvation. They are proud citizens of India, heirs to over a thousand years of Islamic contribution to the subcontinent.

India has produced towering Islamic scholars—Shaykh Abdul Haq Muhaddith Dehlawi, Shah Waliullah al-Dihlawi, Maulana Azad, and countless others. Its institutions—from Darul Uloom Deoband to Nadwatul Ulama—have trained generations of global scholars. The Indian Muslim identity is not subordinate to any external power. It is deeply rooted in the land, language, and ethos of India.

If any country, including Pakistan, ever invades India in the name of Ghazwa-e-Hind, they will find Indian Muslims defending their homeland, not cheering from the sidelines. As the Qur’an instructs: “Stand firmly for justice…” (4:135). That includes standing against unjust aggression—even if it’s done in the name of religion.

From Brigadier Muhammad Usman, the hero of Nowshera, to Captain Haneefuddin, who laid down his life in Kargil, Indian Muslims have proven their loyalty with blood.

Let no one mistake their silence for weakness or their faith for disloyalty. The Prophet loved Makkah. The Indian Muslim loves India.

Time for Responsibility, Not Rhetoric

Dr. Israr Ahmed’s intellectual legacy is mixed. While he awakened many to the idea of Islamic revival, his fixation on militarism—untethered from contemporary fiqh and political wisdom—misguided many. Today, young Muslims must be trained not in war slogans but in the Qur’an, Hadith, ethics, law, and service.

The return of a Caliphate, if it happens, must mirror the model of the Prophet—founded on justice, consultation, and mercy. Not through firebrand nationalism or weaponized hadiths.

Ghazwa-e-Hind has become more of a political trope than a theological reality. When read responsibly, Islamic tradition offers no justification for cross-border aggression dressed in prophecy. The real ghazwa we need today is against ignorance, sectarianism, and political manipulation.

Let us turn our energies toward rebuilding our societies—through knowledge, reform, and character. That is the legacy of the Prophet. That is the path of the righteous.