Until Pakistan matches words with actions, its participation in regional counterterror frameworks will remain a facade.

When Pakistan assumed the chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s permanent anti-terror body, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), last month, the optics were striking: a state sponsor of terrorism now overseeing a regional network tasked with combating it.

The irony is hard to ignore. For Islamabad’s international posture and domestic rhetoric to carry credibility, its territory must no longer serve as a safe haven for groups trained and funded to strike Indian soil. Yet, the evidence suggests this condition remains far from met.

Pakistan’s enduring militant ecosystem aligns closely with the country’s long-standing military doctrine of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts”—a strategy that leverages proxies and covert militants to impose costs on India while avoiding direct conventional conflict. Under this logic, groups like Jaishe-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) serve not merely ideological but strategic purposes. 

If Pakistan is serious about counterterrorism, the persistence of this doctrine is inexplicable. The question remains: why does Islamabad continue to nurture a system that directly contradicts its international obligations and its stated commitment to counterterrorism?

Persistent Militant Ecosystems and Digital Adaptations

Notwithstanding India’s precision strikes on select Pakistani terrorist camps in May 2025, Pakistan’s militant ecosystems remain largely intact. Take the case of Masood Azhar-led JeM, which continues to plan operations, maintain training facilities, and innovate its fundraising mechanisms. Recent investigative reporting reveals that JeM has shifted toward digital-wallet fundraising and is attempting to rebuild as many as 313 terror hubs across Pakistan.

Despite severe losses during Operation Sindoor—which killed more than a dozen members of Azhar’s family and destroyed JeM’s headquarters in Bahawalpur—he remains defiant in his terrorist drive against India.

In a recent speech at a JeM site in Bahawalpur, Azhar announced plans to establish a women’s jihad course, Jamat-ul-Mominat. The 15-day training program reportedly aims to establish female combat units within JeM. If implemented, this can be a critical operational development for JeM, reminiscent of the Islamic State and Boko Haram, both of which have deployed women as suicide bombers and assault operatives.

Further worrying is the public conduct of the sons and successors of designated terror figures. The son of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) chief Hafiz Saeed, for example, has openly defied extradition calls, using public rallies to proclaim that Pakistan will continue to shield his father while praising military operations and urging “jihad.” 

An anti-regime Pakistani journalist recently reported that Talha Saeed has assumed leadership of an LeT-linked mosque in Lahore—signaling a generational shift in the group’s command and control. These are not isolated cases but part of a broader ecosystem in which religious, militant, and political networks overlap with visible impunity. Their continued prominence underscores the depth of Pakistan’s structural complicity and the normalization of militant influence in public life.

The Digital Evolution of Terror Financing

Pakistan’s counterterrorism narrative further collapses under the scrutiny of its financial oversight. While Islamabad touts its cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), militant funding has evolved faster than its regulatory mechanisms. Groups such as JeM have reportedly shifted from traditional banking channels to fintech platforms, mobile wallets, and decentralized e-payment systems within Pakistan to sustain operations.

This digital adaptation is not evidence of militant defeat but proof of resilience. Despite a recent implicit warning from FATF President Elisa de Anda Madrazo that Pakistan’s removal from the Grey List in 2022 was not “bullet-proof” and Pakistan’s own finance minister’s admission of rampant unregulated digital transactions, terrorist financing remains largely unchecked. The shift into digital ecosystems allows militant organizations to operate under the radar, with minimal state interference or consequences.

Paradoxical Cover from the United States

Pakistan’s growing diplomatic and economic proximity to the United States may paradoxically weaken Washington’s leverage over Islamabad’s behavior. Historically, U.S. pressure has occasionally forced Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment to rein in militant proxies. But today, the strategic calculus appears to have shifted. 

As Pakistan portrays itself as a “regional counterterror partner” and a reliable economic hub, Washington remains inclined to prioritize a transactional relationship over accountability. These dynamic risks emboldening Pakistan’s military leadership, led by Field Marshal Asim Munir, to maintain its use of jihadist groups as tools of statecraft. Islamabad’s confidence that its strategic importance shields it from meaningful repercussions only deepens the challenge.

The policy risk for India and its partners is that Pakistan will use its SCO-RATS role to deflect scrutiny while continuing asymmetric operations. If training camps are allowed to be rebuilt, if digital funding networks flourish, and if terrorist rallies continue with active state approval, then Pakistan’s leadership in counterterror structures becomes an exercise in hollow symbolism rather than substantive change.

Pakistan’s claim to regional leadership in counterterrorism rests on fragile ground so long as its own territory hosts—and in many cases, protects—the very networks it purports to combat. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship, increasingly transactional and detached from shared security priorities, risks reinforcing Islamabad’s belief that it can pursue dual policies: cooperation abroad and complicity at home. 

Until Pakistan matches words with actions, its participation in regional counterterror frameworks will remain a facade. The question for the international community is not whether Pakistan can change, but whether it wants to.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The classified assessment, first reported by The New Indian in an exclusive by Emaad Makhdoomi, reveals that this nexus was formalized during a high-level rally held in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) on February 5, 2025.

The rally, provocatively titled the “Kashmir Solidarity and Hamas Operation Al-Aqsa Flood Conference”, took place at Shaheed Sabir Stadium in PoK. Sources confirm that operatives involved in planning the Pahalgam attack were present at the event.

In a declaration that shocked security circles, a Jaish operative reportedly thundered from the stage: “The fighters of Palestine and Kashmir now march as one. Blood will be spilled in Delhi, and Kashmir shall be torn from India.”

Among those in attendance were top-ranking commanders: Talha Saif, brother of JeM chief Masood Azhar; senior field commanders Asghar Khan Kashmiri and Masood Ilyas; and key Lashkar-e-Taiba figures.

Most notably, Hamas made its first known formal appearance in PoK, represented by Dr. Khalid Al-Qadoumi, its Iran-based envoy. Several Palestinian figures were also seen aligning ideologically and logistically with Pakistani terror outfits.

According to intelligence analysts, this summit marked more than just rhetoric—it established a collaborative framework for future joint operations, modeled on Hamas’s asymmetric warfare tactics in Gaza.

“Pakistan-backed terrorist outfits are now consciously emulating Hamas’s blueprint,” a senior Indian intelligence official told The New Indian. “These groups are manipulating religious ideologies to provoke violence and foster deep-seated communal discord within Jammu and Kashmir.”

A Multimedia Propaganda Surge

Days ahead of the February summit, a provocative eight-minute propaganda video was circulated by the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League, glorifying Islamist separatists such as Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yasin Malik, and Masrat Alam Bhat. The video lauded slain terrorists including Burhan Wani and Manan Wani, showing funeral footage while drawing incendiary parallels between Gaza and Kashmir.

“Pak ki Azadi, Kashmir ki Azadi” blared throughout the production, openly inciting Kashmiri youth to rebel against Indian sovereignty.

Security experts warn that this blend of emotional imagery and militant messaging represents a dangerous evolution in hybrid propaganda, designed to radicalize young minds and fuel communal tensions.

“The aim is to internationalize the Kashmir issue by tying it to the globally resonant Palestine-Israel conflict,” said a counterterrorism analyst. “It’s a strategic pivot designed to rally global sympathy while accelerating internal destabilization.”

Pahalgam Attack: Pre-Meditated and Communally Driven

On March 24, the idyllic town of Pahalgam—a hub for tourists and Hindu pilgrims—was shattered by a brutal terrorist ambush. Sources have confirmed the attack was orchestrated from across the Line of Control (LoC) by banned outfits including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jammu and Kashmir United Mujahideen (JKUM). The strike bore the hallmarks of meticulous premeditation, with execution carried out by highly trained Pakistani terrorists.

Three key individuals have been identified as the architects of the attack:

• Saifullah Kasuri (aka Saifullah Khalid), a senior LeT commander with close ties to LeT founder Hafiz Saeed. Designated by the U.S. Treasury Department, Kasuri has served as LeT’s Peshawar operations head and was instrumental in mobilizing the political front Milli Muslim League (MML), widely seen as a civilian mask for LeT’s agenda.
• Abu Musa (aka Musa Kashmiri), formerly affiliated with ISIS, is known for plotting attacks against foreign nationals in India. He was found with jihadist literature and reportedly attempted lone-wolf attacks before realigning with LeT to target non-locals and Indian security personnel.
• Rizwan Hanif, a senior JKUM operative based in Rawalakot, PoK. Intelligence sources say Hanif oversaw the logistics of the Pahalgam strike, including infiltration routes and arms procurement.

Perhaps most disturbing was the revelation that the attackers reportedly interrogated victims about their religion before executing them—pointing to a targeted communal intent. “This wasn’t just a terror attack—it was a message,” said a senior Indian intelligence official. “It signals a dangerous shift from generalized violence to targeted, faith-based executions.”

ISI and Military Involvement

The role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its military in coordinating this growing alliance is under sharp scrutiny. According to multiple sources, the ISI is driving efforts to reposition Kashmir on the global stage by deliberately echoing the Palestine narrative, hoping to energize pan-Islamist sentiments and draw international scrutiny toward India’s internal affairs.

“The ISI is effectively weaponizing the Palestinian cause to export jihad to South Asia,” said a former Indian military officer. “Their goal is twofold: to globalize the Kashmir issue and to create a new generation of radicalized youth who see themselves not just as Kashmiris, but as soldiers in a broader global jihad.”

A Cross-Continental Threat Matrix

This emerging Hamas-LeT nexus signals a dangerous cross-continental collaboration that may reshape the operational dynamics of Islamist terrorism in the region. Indian officials believe this could mark the beginning of a new era of hybrid warfare—fusing militant Islamist ideology with advanced propaganda and asymmetric guerrilla tactics.

As India grapples with the fallout of the Pahalgam massacre, and as global attention continues to focus on the Middle East, security experts are calling for a recalibration of counterterrorism strategies. “We’re witnessing the globalization of local conflicts,” said an Indian intelligence official. “And that’s a warning the world can’t afford to ignore.”

Pakistan’s interior ministry said it was part of a long-planned drive, not a response to Indian anger over what New Delhi calls Islamabad’s failure to rein in militant groups operating on Pakistani soil.

Several banned groups such as JeM run seminaries. Another banned outfit, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which runs behind the face of Islamic charities and welfare operations, is estimated to run about 300 Madrassas across the country.

Pakistan is facing pressure from global powers to act against groups carrying out attacks in India, including Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which claimed responsibility for the 14 February attack that killed at least 40 Indian paramilitary police.

Provincial governments have “taken in their control management and administration of 182 seminaries”, Pakistan’s interior ministry said in a statement, referring to religious schools.

“Law enforcement agencies have taken 121 people under preventive detention as of today,” the ministry added.