It is the regime in Tehran that refuses to join any table where Israel is present. At its core, this is a grand strategy rooted—as is often the case—in identity politics.

In Western media, it’s common to describe Israel and Iran (more precisely, the current regime in Tehran) as each other’s “main enemy” or “arch-enemy.” The term echoes Cold War-era Soviet rhetoric and seems to reflect a reality of deep-rooted geopolitical rivalry. But the hostility between Israel and Iran is neither ancient nor inevitable. As regional powers, some degree of competition between them is natural—especially in an era of American retreat—but that alone doesn’t explain why the destruction of Israel has become a clear and central objective of Iran’s grand strategy since the Islamic Revolution.

This wasn’t the case under the previous regime. As many Israelis know—and sometimes remind others, though the topic has become sensitive due to long-standing legal disputes over unresolved financial issues—there’s an almost monumental “memorial” in Israel to the cooperation and once-strong friendship between the two countries. It’s about 200 kilometers long and occasionally leaks: the Eilat-Ashkelon oil pipeline was originally built to transport Iranian oil to the Mediterranean Sea, and from there to European ports. Until the Islamic Revolution and Khomeini’s rise to power, Iran was a strategic partner of Israel and a member of the “periphery alliance” that Ben-Gurion forged in the late 1950s in response to the Nasserist threat, alongside Kemalist Turkey and imperial Ethiopia (both of which have also undergone major changes since then). Israelis were involved in various projects in Iran, from security to agriculture.

So what lies at the root of this intense hostility toward Israel’s very existence, which has become—literally—one of the regime’s core ideological principles, both for Khomeini and his successor as Supreme Leader (Rahbar—“Guide,” a title whose meaning becomes especially clear if translated into German…) Ali Khamenei? Anger over the role Israel and the U.S. played in supporting the hated Shah regime is certainly part of the initial explanation. But past grievances alone don’t account for the depth and persistence of this enmity, which just recently found renewed expression in bold statements about the commitment to destroy Israel (“even if we are cut to pieces,” in the words of a senior Revolutionary Guards commander). Far more powerful forces, rooted in the very identity of the Iranian revolutionary regime, are at play here.

The Iranian revolutionary regime could have, if it had wanted to, used the arms supply from Israel—part of the problematic Iran-Contra deal in the Reagan era—as a springboard to open a new chapter. It chose not to. On the contrary, the hostility only deepened and intensified over time. It even took on the grotesque form of mocking the Holocaust—through cartoon contests that continued even after the Ahmadinejad era—and was succinctly expressed in a venomous tweet by Khamenei in November 2014 (still available online), detailing nine points explaining why and how Israel should be eliminated.

Traditional geopolitics naturally breeds competition and sometimes conflict between regional powers. But in this case, it fails to justify such an extreme stance—unparalleled in today’s international arena—where one UN member state denies the very right of another to exist. It also doesn’t justify Iran’s massive investment in arming Hezbollah to seriously threaten Israel’s civilian rear; in arming and training Palestinian terrorist groups through its cooperation with Hamas and its proxy ties with Palestinian Islamic Jihad; or in turning Assad’s Syria into a land bridge to the Mediterranean and an additional launchpad for attacks on Israel.

It’s true that Iran’s leadership today, through this “ring of fire,” also has a deterrent motive: to discourage Israel from launching a military strike on its nuclear weapons program. But Israel, for its part, would not be considering such a strike had Iran not openly marked it for destruction and forced Israel to treat the Iranian regime as a threat to its very survival. So what, then, fuels the constant chant of “Death to Israel” — “Marg bar Israel”?

There’s no territorial dispute between Israel and Iran, nor economic rivalry—aside from the unresolved question of compensation for the oil pipeline, currently under arbitration in a Swiss court. Israel does not threaten Iran’s legitimate demand to be part of the regional power balance and to sit at the diplomatic table. It is the regime in Tehran that refuses to join any table where Israel is present. At its core, this is a grand strategy rooted—as is often the case—in identity politics. In this instance, the identity of the current Iranian regime as a political embodiment of a sweeping, dramatic, modern, and revolutionary interpretation of Shiite Islamic doctrine.

It’s worth recalling: the fundamental split between Sunnis (literally “people of the tradition”) and Shiites (“the faction”) stems from a disagreement about the political history of the Muslim community—who should have succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as spiritual leader, political head, and military commander. The Shiites remained loyal to Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, and his direct descendants. The deaths of the Prophet’s grandsons, Hasan and Husayn (Ali’s sons), in their defeat against the Sunni Umayyad dynasty’s army at the Battle of Karbala (680 CE), became in Shiite theology a formative catastrophe—a triumph of injustice and the symbol of a history that went terribly wrong.

In the end times, this wrong is to be righted with the return of the “Hidden Imam.” Iranian Shiism belongs to the Twelver branch, which recognizes ten generations of Ali’s descendants until the disappearance of the last one—Muhammad, son of Hasan al-Askari—in 874 CE. Since then, Twelver Shiites await his return. When he reappears as the Mahdi—a figure somewhat comparable to the Jewish Messiah—the world will be redeemed. But according to the interpretation that Khomeini introduced in the last quarter of the 20th century, the prolonged mourning for that loss and the patient wait for redemption were replaced by a call to arms: to rally believers to active struggle, and to fix the world by force.

What Khomeini effectively did—and he was likely influenced during his exile in Paris by thinkers like Frantz Fanon and others who framed anti-colonial, anti-Western Marxist struggles in the Third World as redemption for “the wretched of the earth”—was to translate the ancient anguish and frustration of Shiism into a modern revolutionary agenda. The injustice of the 7th century thus became, in its Khomeinist reincarnation, a call to overturn the existing local, regional, and global political order.

It so happened that the Islamic Revolution’s rise to power in Iran occurred the same year that a cornerstone of secular Arab nationalism collapsed: the peace agreement signed by Egypt’s President Sadat with Israel in March 1979 on the White House lawn—just weeks after Khomeini’s return to Iran in triumph. This coincidence created another twist in Iran’s stance toward Israel, which has grown increasingly rigid and defiant over four decades. The core message: first Egypt, and later (in the 1990s) other weak and “treacherous” Sunni regimes, surrendered to Israel and laid down their arms—or, as Saddam did in 1981, turned them against Iran. Not coincidentally, Iran’s regime named a major Tehran street after Khaled al-Islambouli, Sadat’s assassin.

Now, it is supposedly the duty of “true Islam”—the Shiite version of revolutionary Islamism—to prove its worth and moral superiority by being the only one to persist in striving for Israel’s destruction. For this goal, the Iranians were willing to overcome, in the name of unity against a common enemy, the deep gulf between Shiism and radical Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Still, the Sunni-Shiite divide re-emerged in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in spring 2003. Iran sees ISIS as an existential enemy of Shiism and contributed to its defeat in Iraq and Syria, yet this shared interest with the U.S. didn’t shift Tehran’s fundamental positions.

In any case, even as it is entangled in multiple fronts, the ayatollahs’ regime views the struggle to destroy Israel as a central part of its historic mission. To its mind, this is definitive proof that the Shiite revolution—according to its interpretation—is the true fulfillment of Islamic commandment. Meanwhile, the “wretched” Sunni regimes have surrendered, accepted Israel’s existence, and even normalized ties. It’s important to note that Iran has very complex relations with the UAE: a territorial dispute—it controls three islands belonging to the Emirates—combined with ideological tensions, yet also diplomatic dialogue and extensive trade and financial relations.

Iran’s position toward Israel has therefore become, in the eyes of its leadership, a source of regime legitimacy—both across the Sunni Muslim world and, even more crucially, at home. After all, the revolution has failed in practice when it comes to the wellbeing of the Iranian people. A country that was three times richer than Turkey in 1979 is now four times poorer. Corruption, drugs, and prostitution have infected the social fabric. Brutal repression of dissent has become routine. Precisely because of this, the regime stakes its credibility on waving the anti-Zionist flag with fervor. It’s not at all clear that this stance enjoys broad public support, especially given public resentment over massive expenditures in Syria and Lebanon. But it does tighten the regime’s grip on its core political base—the religious establishment.

Moreover, by its very existence, Israel—as a modern nation-state with Western features, not merely a “protected community” like Iranian Jews—embodies a central pillar of the post-1945 global order. In its ideological horizon, the Shiite totalitarian revolution seeks to upend this order entirely. It defines it in terms of “hegemony” and “global arrogance” (a code name for the U.S.) and links the struggle against it to the fight against “the Great Satan” in Washington and “the Little Satan” in Jerusalem. At one point, Ahmadinejad even tried to offer his German hosts condolences for losing WWII—suggesting that, in his view, the wrong side won. In this context, the intent to destroy Israel is indeed part of a comprehensive, strategic, ideological, and historical worldview aimed at fixing what went wrong in 661 (Ali’s assassination), 680 (his sons’ deaths at Karbala), and 1945 and 1948.

Despite occasional shows of tolerance toward Iran’s relatively large remaining Jewish community, this worldview also contains unmistakable notes of classic anti-Semitism, which have seeped into Iranian discourse under the influence of Western totalitarian models.

The implication for Israel, its friends, allies, and new regional partners should be clear. Unlike “ordinary” conflicts over clashing interests, these meta-historical motivations are powerful. It’s hard to change or deter them through diplomacy—unless that diplomacy is backed by strong, effective military deterrence.

Translated in English from Jerusalem Institute of Strategic Studies.

Abedin Khorram who earlier this week was appointed as Governor of East Azerbaijan Province was slapped by “a member of the armed forces” in the presence of Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi, according to Fars news agency.

IRGC commander slapped by fellow officer during his inauguration ceremony!@zahacktanvir @asfoor_jenan @Fatma_Fhd @furqanalshiekh @_AhmedQuraishi @adeelahmedazad pic.twitter.com/7v6XToTKt1

— Majid م Sirwal (@Majid_M_Sirwal) October 23, 2021

The military officer was angry with the new governor because a man administered his wife’s COVID__19 vaccine, instead of a woman.

Officials are investigating the security lapse through which the military officer entered the inauguration venue and slapped Khorram on the stage.

Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi has appointed many IRGC officers in top positions, which has led to criticism by many.

Khorram was commander of Revolutionary Guards in the same province until he became governor.

If Iran has such capabilities, then why doesn’t it deploy them in Syria to protect its forces?

On September 1, the Iranian regime’s propaganda machine, on the anniversary of the formation of its air defense force, announced another new achievement in its military industry and unveiled two new products, the so-called Borhan Air defense system, and the Alborz 3D radar.

The Iranian regime claims that the Alborz radar system can simultaneously intercept 300 targets within 450 km and the Borhan analysis system, after analyzing the information obtained, transmits the information to the command center in the shortest time so that the decision to destroy the target can be made. 

But what is the reality?

In fact, the Iranian regime is not only incapable of building such systems but cannot even make much simpler tools. It suffices to examine the events of last January to find out the truth about Iranian technical capability.  

At 6:19 a.m., shortly after takeoff from Tehran Airport, a Ukrainian passenger Jet was hit by two missiles and shot down by Tehran air defense, killing all 176 people on board, including innocent men, women, and children.  

Iran immediately denied launching any missiles at the plane, and even before the plane’s black box was obtained and analyzed, blamed the crash on the plane’s technical defect.  

The Iranian regime wanted to hide the scandal it had created. And when the news of the downing of the plane by the Tehran anti-air defense system leaked to the media, a spokesman for the Iranian Armed Forces called the claim a “mere lie” and stressed that “This is being pursued by the enemies in favor of the Americans and this is another conspiracy in the field of psychological warfare.” 

But shortly afterward the US intelligence officials said that infrared satellite imagery showed with certainty the firing of two surface-to-air missiles approaching the fuselage. 

And, of course, later the video footage of the second missile approaching and hitting the plane, by a resident of the area who witnessed the incident and was able to record it with his cell phone was shown on social networks and took away the possibility of further denial from the Iranian regime.

After three days, Ali Haji Zadeh, the IRGC’s Air defense commander was forced to confirm that the plane had been shot down by an operator of the Air defense system, who had mistaken it for a cruise missile and fired at it! 

Imagine when the Iranian Regime’s Air defense system is not even able to differentiate a passenger plane that took off a few minutes before from Tehran airport and is gaining altitude heading west with a cruise missile that is ten times smaller in size and heading toward Tehran, and a command system that is not able to analyze such a thing, then how can one expect such a baseless claim that Iran has built systems that can simultaneously intercept 300 targets at a distance of 450 kilometers?

Of course, a glance at the Iranian regime’s forces in Syria fully clarifies the bogusness of this claim.  

In Syria, we witness Israel continuously targeting bases and forces affiliated with the Iranian regime with planes and missiles, inflicting heavy casualties on them each time. But so far, the Iranian regime has not been able to take any action against these Israeli attacks. This situation is so humiliating to the Iranian Regime that they do not even publish the news of these attacks and announce the casualties in these attacks as a result of other incidents! 

The question is if Iran has such capabilities that it claims, why doesn’t it deploy them in Syria to protect its forces? Of course, the answer is obvious because it does not have such a capability.

On the other hand, one might ask why do some media outlets in other countries publish this Iranian propaganda news? And why do countries like the United States, which are fully aware of the propaganda nature of these claims, remain silent about them?  

The reason is that although they are fully aware of the capabilities of the Iranian regime and the futility of these claims, such news is useful for their arms sales to countries in the region, and as a result, they not only do not react negatively to such news but also the publication of this news is welcomed. 

The claim of a country that cannot even build a complete automobile and assembles cars that were produced with the technology of 30 years ago and are not even allowed to drive them in the European countries’ roads should not be taken seriously. These claims by the Iranian regime have no other use than to boost the morale of their unmotivated forces and are baseless propaganda. 

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the Middle East countries in general and Iran in particular.

IRGC commanders are very afraid of the people of these cities populated with an Arabic-speaking minority…

Khuzestan plain, located in southwestern Iran, is one of the oldest regions on the Iranian plateau, where the Aryan nations have lived since 2700 BC and one of the first civilizations of that era had formed. The existence of five rivers, all of which originate from The Zagros Mountains and irrigate the Khuzestan Plain and flow into the Persian Gulf after a few hundred kilometers had made this province the most water-rich province in Iran. The Karun River was the largest of these rivers and the only navigable river in Iran that ships entered from the Persian Gulf and anchored at the ports of Abadan, Khorramshahr, and Ahvaz.

The existence of this number of rivers has played a decisive role in the development of this region. The people of this region have been engaged in agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishing since ancient times, using the fertile lands around these rivers.

After the discovery of Iran’s first oil reserves in this region, it became the richest province in Iran and the largest refinery in the Middle East was built in the city of Abadan.

But due to inadequate governments both during the Pahlavi era or after the arrival of Khomeini, the people of this province throughout these years has always been deprived of this wealth. The former government ceded oil to Britain almost for free in order to maintain its rule and the latter followed so-called Islamic expansionist policies to export its so-called Islamic revolution, cause the war between Iran and Iraq, which destroyed most of the cities in this province

After Khamenei came to power, since his most important agenda was to maintain his grip on power, he gradually handed over most of the country’s affairs, including Iran’s important economic institutions, to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a military force loyal to and dependent on him.

Today 90% of Iran’s economy is under IRGC’s control. But since the commanders and officials of the IRGC are mostly people without classical education and expertise, their control over the Iranian economy destroyed Iran’s economic infrastructure. In addition to plundering Iran’s capital and wealth, they are only concerned with expanding the regime’s military, missile, and nuclear industries and financing proxy and terrorist forces in the region. Thus, they have not paid attention to the reconstruction of any other infrastructures in the country.

But since the Dam construction was one of the profitable projects for the IRGC, during the last 30 years, the IRGC has built hundreds of dams in different parts of Iran through its Khatam al-Anbia construction base. However, since the construction of these dams was without any study or research on the climatic and geographical effects and is done only for the financial interests of the IRGC (for use in industries or irrigation of agricultural lands of companies and factories affiliated to the IRGC) in most cases the construction of these dams has caused irreparable damage to environment and the villages around them.

During the last 30 years, 170 dams have been built on the Karun and Karkheh rivers, which are the most important rivers in this province and Iran. Due to the extreme heat in this region in summer, with temperatures of above 45 degrees Celsius for a few months, a large amount of water collected behind these dams evaporates due to heat and is wasted without any use.

The construction of this number of dams on these rivers have caused a shortage of running water in the lower parts of these rivers and 25% of the population of this province of five million who have been engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry in the villages are facing severe water shortage for irrigation and their livestock are dying due to severe dehydration. Last winter and spring, the amount of rainfall in Iran was almost half of the previous year, this problem was exacerbated so that now in large parts of the province there is no water even for drinking and other essential uses.

Prior to this problem, the people of this province were facing continuous power outages in the scorching heat above 50 degrees. On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused widespread deaths due to the incompetence of the regime and the lack of vaccines. These factors, in addition to unemployment and skyrocketing prices due to inflation rate above 50% and corruption in all governing institutions have exhausted the patience of the people of this province, which has resulted in the revolt of young people in different cities of the province in recent days.

The protests began on July 16, lasted for four days in a row, and still continues. In many cities of the province, young people have taken to the streets in protest of the current situation, which has made life almost unbearable, blocking various traffic routes between the cities by burning tires and clashing with police. In the city of Susangerd on July 18, the people chanted slogans calling for the overthrow of the regime.

Reports indicate that the situation is critical in the cities of Susangerd, Shousha, Mahshahr, Dasht-e Azadegan, Shadegan, Hamidiyeh, Zargan, Behbahan, and other cities of the province, and counter-insurgency forces have been deployed in all these cities. Up to now, four young men, 26-year-old Mustafa Naimavi in Shadegan, 17-year-old Qassem Kheziri in Kut Abdullah, Seyed Hossein Al-Nasser in Susangard, and Ali Mazrae in Zoyeh quarter in Ahvaz were killed by direct fire by security forces.

It is worth mentioning that the cities of this province, especially Behbahan, Mahshahr, Masjed Soleiman, Hamidiyeh in the November 2019 uprising, which took place due to the increase in gasoline prices, witnessed widespread protests against the regime, calling to overthrow Khamenei. But in the end, Khamenei, using bloodied suppression by his security forces and the Revolutionary Guards, and even helicopters and tanks, and killing dozens of people managed to regain control of these cities.

For this reason, IRGC commanders are very afraid of the people of these cities populated with an Arabic-speaking minority. Considering the dissatisfaction of people of other cities in Iran with their current situation, IRGC is afraid that the people of other cities will rise up in support of the people of Khuzestan and join them. The youth of Mashhad and Isfahan already supported the uprising of the people of Khuzestan in their protest rallies in recent days. It seems, with the heat of protests momentarily rising, repression will no longer be easily possible.

As a result, the regime is trying to prevent the uprising from spreading on the one hand by quickly suppressing the people, and on the other hand, by making promises and opening the dams and pouring some water in the rivers to temporarily calm the situation in this area.

But since the entire regime is based on corruption and incompetence, such solutions will not be able to satisfy the people who clearly demonstrated their opposition to the regime in the recent sham presidential election with massive boycotts. One will have to wait for uprisings of this kind in other parts of Iran in the near future as well.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Kazem’s widow and orphaned children have no hope of justice or even any form of compensation for this crime…

Iranian regime security forces shot and fatally injured another apparently randomly targeted young Ahwazi man on Sunday, 27 June, while he was delivering foodstuffs to his grocery store. Even more brazenly, they then arrested him for complaining at this shocking attack, ultimately leaving him to bleed to death from his injuries in a police cell. This is the twelfth such killing by regime forces targeting members of the brutalised Ahwazis in Iran since January of this year.

Kazem Hazbawi, a 27-year-old shop owner, was shot at close range and seriously injured for no apparent reason by members of a regime security patrol as he drove through a regime checkpoint in the city of Muhammarah on the way to open his grocery store. When Kazem, a married father of four young children, bleeding heavily from his wounds, got out of his car and confronted the officers responsible, demanding to know the reason for shooting him, he was arrested for daring to challenge the absolute authority of the regime’s thuggish security forces.  Rather than taking Kazem, a widely respected and popular local figure, to a hospital for treatment of his injuries, the regime personnel drove the bleeding man to a local detention centre and left him in a cell where he died soon afterwards.

As is usual in these cases, Kazem’s widow and orphaned children have no hope of justice or even any form of compensation for this crime. Instead, Iranian regime police and security forces enjoy absolute impunity, more especially in targeting Ahwazis and other minorities, who are subjected to blatant systemic racism in addition to relentless persecution.  As Arabs, Ahwazis are singled out for persecution by the regime, with ‘No Arabs’ signs being common at medical clinics and other facilities in Iran.

In this case, as in the other killings of Ahwazi civilians since the start of the year, Kazem was unarmed and had committed no offence, much less any remotely dangerous action. Any complaints about such killings are met by regime authorities with claims that the individual failed to stop at a checkpoint or other invariably false accusations, presented as justification for the wanton use of deadly force by trigger-happy regime forces.   No investigations are launched into these racist murders. On the contrary, any effort to take legal action is overwhelmingly likely to result in the complainants being persecuted, harassed and possibly facing false charges and imprisonment themselves. Similarly, victims’ families are warned that any effort to raise international awareness of these crimes and of the regime’s persecution generally by communicating with human rights organisations overseas will see them arrested and imprisoned; this is no idle threat, but standard regime policy in an effort to silence any calls for justice and conceal the regime’s crimes from the world. 

One of the Ahwazi human rights activists working with DUSC has been talking with witnesses, as well as family and friends in an effort to document the events surrounding Kazem’s murder. He told us on condition of anonymity: “Kazem owned a grocery store and every week he’d travel to Abadan to purchase foodstuffs like dairy products, fruits and vegetables but when he was driving back to his home town in Muhammarah he was always stopped by the security soldiers at checkpoints. Several times they forced him to give some of his products to them for no reason. On the last occasion, Kazem was upset and said the security forces were stopping his vehicle and many other cars forcing them to pay a bribe or give some amount of whatever goods they had in their vehicles to let them go. These officers weren’t stopping Kazem and others for speeding or any traffic-related issues, but instead, they’re operating in reality as bandits disguised in security uniforms to extort bribes from poor Ahwazi civilians.”

The activist added, “We are sure they killed Kazem just because he, like many other Ahwazi drivers and motorcyclists who were shot and killed, got fed up with extortion and the theft of his goods and risked not stopping, and they killed him.”

Following Kazem’s death, regime officials added insult to injury by spreading false claims that he was suspected of carrying contraband goods. This excuse is refuted by local people who were at the scene, who said Kazem car was carrying nothing but foodstuffs like yoghurt, fruit and bottled water.

Similar checkpoint shootings are routine, with regime forces shooting 31-year-old Hassan Nasari dead in the town of Jarahi near Ma’shour city on the night of 22 May. Again, he was unarmed and had committed no offence, with regime authorities claiming he had failed to stop at checkpoints.

Similarly, on 6 May, 32-year-old Latif Alboghobeish, also from Ma’shour city, was shot dead while driving home from a funeral; again regime security forces claimed they had shot him after failing to stop at a checkpoint.

Three months ago, on 26 March, two young Ahwazi men from the city of Susa (also known as Shush) in the Ahwaz region were fatally injured after being shot by Basij militia (non-uniformed regime-controlled militia infamous for their violence) affiliated with the regime’s so-called Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While they were not imprisoned, both died shortly after their arrival at the hospital. Witnesses reported that both men were murdered in cold blood without warning or provocation. The murdered youths were identified as 17-year-old Ebrahim Atshani and 24-year-old Mostafa Hargani. Both were unarmed and had committed no discernible crime; their families reported that they were tortured in the ambulance on the way to the hospital, for which their relatives were arrested themselves and threatened into silence for fear of their own lives.

Even if the regime’s claims that their victims had failed to stop at checkpoints were true, regime forces have never explained why they automatically adopt a shoot-to-kill policy rather than, for instance, forcing their victims to pull over or shooting at their car or motorcycle tires to disable the vehicle, as is the case elsewhere in the world.

Activists who have painstakingly documented these extrajudicial killings note that the regime security forces have never presented any evidence to substantiate their claims that their victims are carrying contraband or had failed to stop when ordered to do so. Furthermore, the activists emphasise that in none of these cases have the victims been armed, been guilty of criminal offences or presented any threat to the regime security forces. In the end, as one activist told DUSC, the regime’s checkpoints are simply devices for extortion and persecution, and those who do refuse to stop are simply registering their anger at this blatant criminality. 

Aaron Eitan Meyer, an American attorney and researcher, condemned the latest round of killings. “This is an ongoing flagrant violation of international law, of human rights, and of even the most basic concept of morality. Calling Iran a vicious gangster state feels horribly inadequate. The regime is not incidentally racist, but fundamentally – pointedly – so, and should have long since been relegated to the dustbin of history where other tyrannical oligarchies disappear once they are finally called to account. This goes beyond mere extrajudicial killings, which are themselves flatly proscribed under international law. The regime is free to continue this campaign openly and without any real consequences is a blight on us all.

“Every aspect of this is no less than an affront to the rule of law itself. Every time a young Ahwazi is gunned down in the streets. Every time Ahwazis are kidnapped by regime security, whether in the dead of night or in broad daylight. For every Ahwazi who is tortured in the hellish unmonitored regime prisons, for those whose bodies are hidden so that the horrors of the brutality they have suffered cannot be seen by their loved ones, and for those who manage to survive and flee the medievalist nightmare bearing the scars neither their bodies nor minds can hide, for all of them and more, the rule of law is nothing more than a twisted joke, perverted and weaponised by a cynical and vicious regime. And if that does not enrage us seeing it from the outside, then it should shame us for not acting.”

Decades after the infamous 1988 massacre, international human rights organisations are finally calling for an investigation into it after Ibrahim Raisi parleyed his bloody hands into high office. So longs as young Ahwazis like Kazem are being openly gunned down in the streets, condemnation of massacres past is not going to be nearly enough.

Article first published on Dur Untash Studies Center.

Rahim Hamid is an Ahwazi author, freelance journalist and human rights advocate. He tweets under @Samireza42.

The city of Zahedan has transformed into a ghost town.

Iran has faced a new wave of the COVID-19 epidemic with the mutated virus known as the Delta, killing at an alarming rate, especially in Sistan Baluchestan province.

Most countries worldwide have managed to control the spread of the virus with widespread vaccination and have decreased the number of deaths to a minimum. The news worldwide also suggests the easing of the restrictions and gradual return to everyday life.

According to reliable sources, the death toll from the COVID-19 in Iran has reached 323,000 so far, but the government, covering the actual death toll, has announced that less than a quarter of this number, i.e. about 85,000 people.

However, in an interview with Arman Melli newspaper on June 28, Mohammad Reza Mahboubfar, one of the regime’s health experts, admitted that more than 300,000 people have died of the virus so far.

Moinuddin Saeedi, a member of Iran’s parliament from the city of Chahar Bahar in Sistan Baluchestan province (one of the poorest and under-developed provinces in Iran), told ILNA (State–run media) that a catastrophe would be felt in every sense of the word if measures were not taken to curb the virus in the province.

He said there was only one 196-bed hospital in the region for a population of more than 800,000. The hospital lacks the requirements to fight the disease.

Malek Fazeli, a representative of the city of Saravan in the parliament, also said that Saravan, with a population of 480,000, has only one hospital and no ward for COVID-19 patients.

He added, “The city has only one infectious disease specialist, who is also the head of the hospital”.

According to the Sunni Friday Imam of Saravan, “the city’s hospital does not have an infectious disease doctor. The Nurses are visiting the Coronavirus patients. The hospital is not ventilated, and 8 out of 10 Corona tests are positive”.

10 cities of this province do not have hospitals at all. Due to the far distances between cities, it is very difficult to transfer patients to even the nearest hospital.

Although there are many suspected cases of Coronavirus in this province, the government does not reveal the real numbers and the numbers announced are unrealistic, because many patients in rural areas die from this disease without being included in the statistics.

The Delgan city hospital does not have a CT scan machine. If someone wants to have a lung CT, they have to travel about 150 kilometres to the city of Iranshahr, which is very difficult considering the conditions of this province and the cost involved.

The people of this province are advised not to leave their homes, and the banks and offices have been closed. However, the people of many areas, such as Chabahar and even the capital of Zahedan province, have to buy water and other essential food items from the market and have to leave their homes.

About 25% of the people of Zahedan do not have access to clean water. More than 400 villages in Chabahar do not have drinking water. In the whole province, more than 2500 villages do not have a water supply network at all.

The city of Zahedan has transformed into a ghost town.

Murad Ghasemi, an employee of a medical center in Zahedan, lost his wife some time ago due to the pandemic. “There are no vacant hospital beds in the city of Takht. Everyone is confused and frustrated. There is a severe shortage of equipment, from latex gloves to injectable serums. For example, in Imam Ali (AS) Hospital in Zahedan, there are no latex gloves and 5 cc sampling and injection syringes. Surgical gloves are sold for 15,000 Tomans (Iran’s currency) in pharmacies. Remedicor medicine could not be found at all, and hospitals have no access to any medicine. My wife’s symptoms started with fever and diarrhea.

“At first, we thought she had heat exhaustion, but her symptoms got worse. By the day when she arrived at the hospital, a CT scan revealed that more than 80 percent of her lungs were infected. Now I am left with a 40-day-old baby”.

Brahui, another resident of Zahedan, says that provincial officials have not paid the slightest attention to the working class. Whether they go to work or not, the government officials are paid a fixed salary per month. Still, they never think about what I and others like me should do, waiting for a full day in the heat and returning home empty-handed and embarrassed from the family at the end of the day.

“The main custodian and responsible for controlling COVID-19 in Iran is the government”, said Naji, a member of the COVID-19 scientific committee.

During these 16 months, the Khamenei government and the Ministry of Health failed in their duties and did not succeed in controlling the disease. In my opinion, with the continuation of such behaviors, it seems this has been intentional. So far, no proper quarantine has been applied in the country.

Lack of follow-up and control of the epidemic in the country has taken a deliberate form. The people cannot wait for the mass production of domestic vaccines, and the government must provide a reliable and trustworthy vaccine as soon as possible. “Otherwise, we will lose many people”.

It should be noted that while most of the Gulf States have vaccinated more than 60% of their population and Turkey, which has a population equivalent to Iran, has vaccinated more than 55% of its population.

Due to the widespread corruption of the ruling regime, which only cares about its own survival and does not care about the lives of the people, Khamenei banned import of Moderna and Pfizer vaccines into Iran, and now only about 5% of the population has been vaccinated (most of them have received only the first dose). Meanwhile, the Iranian regime claims that two types of Iranian vaccines have passed the testing phase and entered mass production, and will soon be exported to other countries.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Many Iranians have not tasted meat and fruit for months and have not been able to make ends meet.

The first year of the Iranian calendar starts with the year the Prophet Mohammad migrated from Mecca to Medina.  The first day though, coincides with the first day of spring, celebrated by Iranians as “Nowruz” or New Day.

Iranians celebrate Nowruz with traditional festivals, and it has been a national holiday since the rule of Cyrus the Great (538 BC). Historically, the celebration was to mark the victory of the Zoroastrian God, Ahura Mazda over the evil spirit, Ahriman.

Nowruz celebrations include many customs, including spring cleaning, buying new garments and household items, visiting family members and neighbors, as well as setting up a table called “Haftsin” or the table with seven items beginning with the letter ‘S’ in Farsi.

The Haftsin table includes hyacinths called ‘sonbol’ in Farsi, wheat, barley or lentin sprouts or ‘sabzeh’, sweet pudding made from wheat germ called ‘samanu’, vinegar or ‘serke’, jujube berries or ‘senjed’, garlic or ‘sir’, apple or ‘sib’ in Persian, and sumac.

It also includes a goldfish, a mirror, the holy book, painted eggs, and candles.

This year, Iranians are bearing the brunt of a collapsed economy, some paying for bread in installments and standing in long lines for basic food items. However, they will still arrange their Haftsins in hope of a bright future.

The holiday custom of spring cleaning usually starts a few days before the New Year.

Iranians hope to “spring clean” their country this year by getting rid of the corrupt regime, a clerical rule that has lasted 42 long years.

Iran has historically been invaded and occupied in the past 3,000 years by different ethnicities and cultures, but still, the Nowruz celebrations never faded, and the tradition lived on.

Another Nowruz custom is the fire festival. The fire festival or ‘Chaharshanbeh Suri’ is held on the last Tuesday of the year, when Iranians jump over small bonfires. The symbolic gesture is meant to purify against evil and misery.

Due to the explosive state of the society, the clerical regime fears the traditional fire festival will get out of hand and discourages the celebration. Many are arrested for selling or buying firecrackers. In 2019, Tehran’s Chief of Police announced 280 arrests of “troublemakers” and threatened the public against actions that he deemed as “destructive” in the festival.

The first five days of the New Year are considered official holidays. This is when Iranians visit friends and family members by reinstating friendly relations and letting go of past grudges. Iranians welcome their guests and serve them with a variety of traditional Persian sweets, a mixture of nuts and fruit.

However, ordinary Iranians have lost most of their purchasing power this year and many say they cannot provide the traditional snacks for Nowruz. They are angry at the damaged economy and systematic corruption of the regime. Due to the high inflation rate in Iran’s crumbling economy, the prices of basic foods have increased and Iranians have to spend up to 40% or more on goods.

Another custom of Nowruz includes elders giving gifts or money to the young members of the family. The spirit of Nowruz includes spreading joy, love, and hope, and driving out grief and misery.

After the anti-Shah revolution in 1979, Rohullah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic came to power. Khomeini and his clerical rule discouraged Nowruz celebrations, saying it was affiliated with Zoroastrianism, and that it was pagan and anti-Islamic.   

However, knowing how much most Iranians loved the traditional Nowruz celebrations and rituals, they feared opposition and did not officially prohibit it. Instead, the clerics try to diminish it by encouraging Islamic holidays.  

After 42 years of theocratic rule, the regime has brought about nothing but misery, poverty, corruption, and death. Over 60 million Iranians live under the poverty line, which accounts for 70% of the population. Many Iranians have not tasted meat and fruit for months and have not been able to make ends meet.

A report published by the Statistical Center of Iran in November 2020 said Iranians were not able to buy basic groceries. Average Iranians eat 52% less red meat, while those with lower incomes eat 65% less red meat compared to last year, the report said.  Iranians are also eating 34% less rice, the country’s staple food.  

Workers across the country have not received their wages for months, and there are protests held in several cities by teachers, nurses, and pensioners on a weekly basis.

The COVID-19 pandemic aggravated Iran’s economic problems. In addition to the battle with the deadly virus, many workers have lost their jobs, or have not received wages for many months.

While Mullah regime elites thrive in their luxurious lives, the result of corruption and embezzlement, Iranians can barely afford food for Nowruz.

Still, Iranians are determined to celebrate Nowruz and replace the current sorrow and oppression with happiness and hope.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

IRGC has been very active in producing and making movies and TV shows and has made its presence known in most of Iran’s TV channels.

Most executive institutions in Iran are somehow under the control and supervision of the Velayat-e Faqih, aka the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. However, town, and village council elections are the only vote in Iran that are held without the direct supervision of the Guardian Council.

Therefore, efforts have been made to control and monitor these elections in various ways. For example, on January 13, Ali Haddadi, a spokesman for the Iranian parliament’s internal affairs commission, said Parliament was considering a plan to employ the intelligence services of the IRGC in the approval process of town and village council candidates.

Ali Haddadi said the plan “aims to prevent councils from deviating, to monitor their performance and to form an efficient council”. By implementing this plan, the IRGC can approve or reject the qualifications of candidates before the elections without any legal impediments.

There have been several instances where town and village council members have drawn the ire of various ruling establishments because of their remarks, or by simply taking a stance on policies or getting involved in matters beyond their jurisdiction.

For example, Mehdi Hajati, a member of the Shiraz City Council, spoke out against the arrest of two Baha’i citizens and criticized officials’ actions regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. He was expelled from the council, under the pretext of “unjustified absence” from council meetings for two months and was arrested himself.

Another example is Mohammad Parham, a member of the Borujerd city council, who posted a video comparing the leaders of Iran and Finland last January. He was arrested and charged for insulting the leadership.

By implementing this new system of supervision on the election process of town and village councils, Khamenei can effectively eliminate those not affiliated with him through the IRGC.

Basij involved in all projects

Furthermore, changes are going to be made by the parliament to a law on the authority of the IRGC’s paramilitary branch, known as the “Basij”. The most important of these amendments is about changing the word “authorized” to “obligated” in the second article of the law.

According to this law, all ministries, government and public institutions, and companies, especially the ministries of Agricultural Jihad, Health, Treatment and Medical Education, Roads and Transportation, Cooperation, Energy, Labor and Social Affairs, Education, Welfare and Social Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Presidential Office on Deprived Areas, the Red Crescent Society, the Khomeini Relief Committee, municipalities and rural districts are “obliged, relative to the level of readiness by the Basij, to carry out part… of their relief, cultural and humanitarian activities, plans and projects with the use of Basij forces.”

Therefore, if this law is approved, the Revolutionary Guards will be involved in almost all projects throughout the country.

Movies and TV shows

Long before this, the Revolutionary Guards had established their presence and influence in Iran’s cultural affairs as a security and intelligence institution for more control and to advance Khamenei’s intentions. For this reason, the IRGC created a television network called “Ofogh Network.”

This network is entirely independent from the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, a state-controlled media corporation which holds a monopoly of domestic radio and television services in Iran.

The IRGC affiliated Owj Arts and Media Organization oversees the network’s content. In recent years, the IRGC has been very active in producing and making movies and TV shows and has made its presence known in most of Iran’s TV channels. They often broadcast their own narratives on domestic and international contemporary history and current affairs.

These programs are entirely financed and technically supported by the IRGC.

COVID-19

To extend its influence, the IRGC got itself involved in so-called Coronavirus “preventive” measures. These measures ranged from symbolically disinfecting streets with pure water, to showcasing a ludicrous “coronavirus detector” in addition to claiming to have developed a COVID-19 vaccine.

The IRGC’s “Coronavirus Detector-110″ was unveiled by the IRGC’s Commander in Chief, Hossein Salami, in the initial phases of the COVID-19 outbreak. The detector was later revealed to be the same device sold to Iraq as a fake “bomb detector” by a British company which cost the Iraqi government millions of dollars.

Three months ago, Salami once again claimed to have found a very effective solution to fight the virus. On November 10, 2020, he announced that about 54,000 Basij bases were to “attack” areas where the coronavirus had taken up residence and go door to door.

Salami claimed that this operation was intended to separate the infected from the non-infected and to refer the infected to treatment centers. Of course, this was nothing but another attempt at searching people’s homes and had nothing to do with countering COVID-19.

This plan was so ridiculous and ineffective that it was abruptly abandoned, and no further mention of it has been heard since.

In another comical statement, after the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the IRGC claimed that Fakhrizadeh, known as the “Father of Iran’s missile industry” and the “mind behind the nuclear industry”, was actually in the process of developing a coronavirus vaccine before his death.

Economy

Of course, the most essential intervention of the IRGC are its prominent footsteps in Iran’s economy through the Khatam-al Anbiya Central Headquarters, which has been the principal recipient of government contracts in most construction, road building and oil projects.

The Khatam-al Anbiya Central Headquarters has gradually turned the government’s executive branch into one of its major debtors. Now, Khatam-al Anbiya is considering confiscating several government properties that have been put up for sale to fund the government’s budget.

“Young Hezbollah government” and Iran’s 2021 elections

The volatility and hidden potential of widespread protests in Iran is very much the most significant concern of Khamenei. The rifts and conflicts of opinions, corruption and mismanagement within different government branches could trigger a regime-changing movement within Iran.

In an effort to prevent the new potential wave of protests, Khamenei is trying to unify the state for maximum control.

Many believe that the appointment of former IRGC commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, as Parliament Speaker could be considered a decision in this direction.

In a recent speech, Khamenei once again called for the establishment of a “young Hezbollah government” for the upcoming presidential election in June 2021.

He also mentioned that by young, he meant someone in the lines of dead Quds Commander Qasem Soleimani.

IRGC commanders are taking advantage of Khamenei’s remarks by gradually controlling all reigns of power and readying themselves for a military government that will quash all dissent.

However, as history has shown, when a nation stands up, no military government or dictatorship can stop their determination and desire for change.

This is an undeniable fact, given the widespread public dissatisfaction with Khamenei’s religious rule.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Throughout the alley, you can’t find a door, a wall, or even a garage without organ sellers’ phone numbers on them.

As the economy is falling apart, a lucrative business is on the rise in Iran: selling bodily organs. It might be the most unique trade in the world.

In recent years, rising living costs and poverty have greatly contributed to the booming business. It has become a systemic problem throughout the country.

Kidneys are most in-demand, but a business that started more than a decade ago is no longer limited to the kidney but includes liver, bone marrow, and cornea. The liver is the second most frequently traded organ. Blood plasma is the latest addition to the list.

Buyers and Sellers

Buyers are those in dire need of an organ transplant.

Sellers are those in dire financial need for whom the organ market is the last resort. Sellers are both male and female. Most of those willing to sell their kidney are young people between ages 22 and 34. But there are older people who want to sell their body parts too.

Most of the buyers prefer to purchase younger organs. Since organs offered by young people are not in short supply, buyers usually have no problem in finding what they want.

The chart below provides a glimpse of the range of sellers of kidneys in early September 2019.

Average Prices in Middleman market-scope of the Business

Organ Prices are not fixed but constantly change. The prices depend on a number of factors such as the sellers’ age, the seriousness of the patient’s condition, the severity of the patient’s health condition, how urgently the organ is needed and how desperate the seller is. Seller’s blood type is a factor too. For example, O- and B+ blood types are more expensive.

Average Market Prices in 2018

Below are rough prices for the body organs in 2018:

-Kidney: between 500 million to 1 billion rials ($5,000 to $10,000)

-Liver: between 1.5 billion to 5 billion rials ($15,000 to $50,000)

– Cornea: 2 billion rials ($20,000)

– Bone marrow: 1 billion rials ($10,000)

Statistics indicate that nearly 3,800 kidney transplants are performed in Iran every year. Of these, about 500 come from donors who are in a vegetative state. Some of the kidneys are donated by relatives to loved ones who are in dire need of kidney transplant.  About 3000 kidneys are provided as a trade.

Methods of Selling and Buying — The Lucrative Business of Organ Brokerage

Buying and selling organs takes place through different methods.

Direct Sales

Many sellers post their contact details and details of the organ they want to sell on the walls of buildings near hospitals. The details include the sellers’ age, blood type and the organ they want to sell. Many beg the pedestrians not to erase their announcements from the wall since they are desperate and need the money urgently.  The sellers usually prefer to contact the prospective candidate directly to avoid giving a commission to the middlemen.

Buying and Selling through Brokers

However, being a broker of bodily organs has evolved into a lucrative business for a number of people. Their job is to identify desperate people who urgently need an organ for their relative or are in dire need of the money they could obtain from selling one.

The kidney and liver markets are hot for brokers. Instagram and Telegram apps are among their preferred platforms. The middlemen have also set up websites where they ask sellers to sign up and leave their details for buyers to find.  Both sides pay the broker’s commission.

One of the sites is https://koliyecenter.mihanblog.com/.       

(Koliyeh in Farsi means kidney)

Images of the first two pages of the site in early September 2019.

Yassin: Hello, I do not want to sell my kidney. If someone is in real need, I am willing to donate, 34 years old, blood type: B+ Phone: 09351258580

Omid: Selling healthy kidney, resident of Sannandaj (west Iran), blood type: O- Phone: 09182738119. Please only send SMS.

Rouzbeh: Male, 26 years old, willing to sell a kidney due to financial problems. Blood type: O+. Price: 600 million rials ($5300). Phone: 09358543614

Omid: Hello, I am Omid. Willing to sell part of my life, my kidney and bone marrow on the agreed price. It is urgent, urgent. If it is not done quickly, I will go to jail. The respected buyer or the broker, please send an SMS first. Phone: 09267272232

Seyed Morteza: Hello. I am 27. I am healthy. I want to sell my kidney under the market price for 400 million rials ($3600). The buyer please either call or send an SMS. Phone number: 09176261905. Blood type: B+. Totally healthy.

Seyed Morteza: Hello. I am 27. I am an athlete. My kidney is completely healthy. Willing to take any test necessary. Blood type: B+. 400 million rials ($3600). It is below the market price. I am not going to sell it for any lower price. Please do not bargain. Please. I need the money urgently.

Seyed Morteza: Hello. I am 28. I run our family. For the sickness of my mother, for what I owe, want to sell my kidney. I am an athlete and totally healthy. I sell immediately. Please either send a Whatsapp message or call. Blood type: B+. Phone: 09176261905.

No name: Hello. I am willing to sell my kidney for 250 million rials ($2,200). This is the price set by the kidney association. Since I need the money urgently, I am willing to come to anywhere in Iran. Blood type: O+. Phone: 09903615617.

Sila: Urgent sale of a healthy kidney. Blood type: A+. Phone: 09917545846.

Zahra: Selling kidney. Blood type: +B. Price 500 million rials ($4400). Phone: 09306098563.

L: God would damn the owner of this site.

H: Urgent sale of Kidney. I am a 30-years old woman. Blood type: O+. Phone: 09382635890

In addition to functioning through the Internet, brokers often wander around major hospitals and approach relatives of patients who need a transplant in order to assess their financial status and make an offer an offer. Brokers often take a 50 percent commission on resulting sales.

One of the brokers who has been in the business for years explained his modus operandi in 2013: “First I began by selling and buying a kidney, near one of the hospitals in Vanak Square (a wealthy neighborhood in northern Tehran).  The area nearby the hospital is filled with advertisements for selling kidneys. I spent a whole day to find sellers. I talked to them and collected the necessary information.  The main problem was finding a customer. Most of the sellers I talked to were unable to identify them. But I had grown up in Bazar (traditional central market) and knew how to trade. The first step was to have access to the details of the people who needed a kidney transplant and were in a waiting list, waiting for someone to donate a kidney. After a month I obtained such a list.”

“Finally, after two months, I made my first deal. There was one person who had been looking for a healthy kidney for a long time. Most people who advertise organ sales are usually addicts or have other physical problems. So he didn’t trust the ads. I was able to get connected to him. By chance, I had the telephone number of a young man who needed money to fund her mother’s surgery and was ready to sell his kidney in 2008 for 60 million rials ($ 6,000 with the exchange rate at the time). To the buyer who was in a huge hurry, I offered the price of 80 million rials (equivalent to $ 8,000) and eventually, the deal went on, and 20 million rials ($ 2,000) went to my pocket. Twenty million rials was not little money at the time.”

“With the initiatives I took, I was able to thrive and since 2011 I have been trading in other transplanting organs too. After two years, I hired several people to roam around hospitals and to find clients for me. Then, I hired a few people to somehow get the reports of brain-dead patients from the hospitals for me, and after that, I went on to sell other body organs.

“Now many people know me, even some physicians refer me to their patients. That’s why my list of sellers and buyers is increasing every day.

“I currently have 20 marketers. There are also six guys who work in the office, I have to give a fee to the specialist doctors for advice that costs at least 500 million rials ($ 14,000 at the time of exchange) a month and, of course, I have to pay for the psychologist and lawyer as well. Sometimes I have to change them and in order to keep them silent, I have to give them a few hundreds of millions of rials. So the current monthly cost of the operation and the office is about 700 million ($ 23,000 at the time of exchange).” [Ref]

He estimated his income per month as 1 billion to 2 billion rials (28 to 56 thousand dollars a month at the exchange rate in 2013).

According to another dealer, “Most of those who sell their kidneys are from the lower strata of the society. I find them through friends who live in small towns or poor suburbs. Subsequently, they are satisfied and the price is set. Of course, they are introduced as the donor and the acquaintance of the patient to make the job easier.”

Alley of “Farhang Hosseini” known as “Kidney Street” in Tehran

In Tehran, Farhang Hosseini Alley (central Tehran) is known as Kidney Street. The central building of the Association of Support for Kidney patients is located in the middle of this alley.

In previous years A4 papers had filled all sides of the alley. Tags full of cell phone numbers were placed all over the walls. All the walls of this alley were full of sale advertisements. Some people had written their message on the wall or on a sheet of paper with a pen or marker. Some had painted their ads on the wall. The message of all the murals on this street’s buildings was the same: sales and purchasing ads for kidneys, livers and even corneas. The phone numbers and blood types of sellers were also mentioned in the ads.  Some ads contained dates. “Kidney A +, for sale, December 2018 …,”, “A 28-year-old, athlete, blood type O Negative… at whatever price you want “… Many insisted that they are not willing to deal with the broker and want to deal directly with the buyer.

In the last couple of years, instead of paper advertisements, the walls are filled with big, bold lines with sharp colors like red, the name of a kidney seller and his or her contact number. Throughout the alley, you can’t find a door, a wall, or even a garage without organ sellers’ phone numbers on them.

Some companies have officially placed big advertisements on the walls of this alley. For example: “Alvand Company, buying and selling kidneys without intermediaries; phone number”

 “Kidneys of all blood types: O, B, O-, O+ and etc., are sold.”

The following are Pictures of Farhang Hosseini Alley

Reaction from Regime Officials

A number of regime officials have formally and publicly backed the selling and buying of organs.

State-run newspaper Mashregh reported on February 28, 2017 that regarding the sale of kidneys by people in extreme poverty, Dr. Hossein Ali Shahriari, a member of the Health Commission of the Majlis (parliament) said: “There is nothing wrong when a person who lives in poverty, and by receiving 200 to 300 million rials ($ 2,000 to $ 3,000 at the time exchange rate) transforms his life.” The Health Commission member said: “Based on Sharia, organ transplant is not a problem and is permissible, and his holiness Imam [Khomeini] gave the authorization for and the grand clerics are not opposed to it.”

Regarding the fact that this is considered immoral and inhuman in most countries, he said: “How is it not immoral when they kill humans and children? Bombing women and old men and women is not inhumane?”

A Few Cases

A 30-year-old computer science Ph.D. student offered his kidneys for sale on July 23, 2019, by posting a written text at the bus stop. He wrote that he was doing so because he was unable to afford the cost of care for his disabled mother and had no money for rent and education.

On December 2, 2018, the state-run Salamatnews wrote: “Amir, who is about 18 years old, has auctioned his kidneys due to poverty. He doesn’t want more than 500 million Rials. (5,000 dollars). He says he can no longer cope with the landlord’s complaints. He and his brother have each decided to sell one of their kidneys and buy a small house with the help of a loan to relieve their mother of the suffering of not having a home. Amir said he had been trapped by dealers several times and was close to auctioning off his kidneys, but with the help of a friend who had a history of kidney sales, he drew a line around dealers, and is now looking for a real buyer without intermediaries.”[4]

On December 1, 2018, the state-run newspaper Shafa Online, after talking to a liver vendor who had posted an ad on a wall, wrote that the seller was a middle-aged man with a southern accent who in reply to the phone call said: “My blood group is O negative. I will sell my liver for 1.5 billion rials ($15,000). If you are a buyer, we can meet … My child has a rare disease. Specialist doctors have diagnosed the illness differently and no one knows what my child’s main problem is. There was a gland next to his neck that became more swollen day by day until the gland became infected and since then my child’s weight has been lowering and he has fever two or three nights a week. We now live in a relative’s house in Tehran around Shoosh (a poor neighborhood in south Tehran). I couldn’t come to Tehran every month with my three children and my wife and go back to Bandar Abbas (southern Iran). Last month I sold my kidney and the broker got half of the money and now I want to sell part of my liver directly to cover the cost of my child’s treatment.”

He continued: “In Bandar Abbas, I was a street vendor and I had Slamat health insurance. This insurance is not accepted by many physicians and hospitals in Tehran and we have to pay for the visit. So far I have spent 500 million rials but I have not succeeded. I am also ready to sell my heart to keep my child healthy. I used to be a street vendor on the streets in Tehran as well, but it is difficult to be a street peddler in Tehran, the authorities took away my goods several times and to be honest I’m sick of it. I know the liver operation is hard and the period of treatment is difficult and long, but with my sick child and financial problems, life is not easy at all. Maybe from selling my liver, some money remains and I can live with it as long as I live.”[5]

Shahla, who had come to Tehran from Dehdasht in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad province (west Iran) in 2017, told the Hamshahri state-run newspaper on January 14, 2109: “We have done everything you say but it is useless. Anywhere we go for work, they either want experience or references, and we have neither. So my husband decided to sell his kidney. We’ve brought our stuff here so they don’t erase our phone numbers from the wall.” She adds: “If this money comes in, it can be a huge help to our lives. I no longer have to go back to our city and live away from my wife.”[6]

Shahin wrote his name boldly on the wall next to the association in the alley of “Farhang Hosseini”. He told the Hamshahri state-run newspaper on January 14, 2019: “The financial problems and the addiction and illness of family members have made me reach to the bottom of the line and so I want to sell my kidney. Anyone who calls me requests a discount. As if they are all worse off than me, but there is no one telling them we are not bargaining over a few pounds of chicken and meat.”

He said he has been called several times from the Association to erase his number from the wall, but he has no choice: “If I can’t afford to pay for my family, the landlord will throw our belongings in the street. I have also told this to the association authorities… I am not seeking a high price. Do you think 200 million rials ($2,000) is too much for a kidney?”[7]

Conclusions, Observations:

The tragedy of Iranians, especially the youths, selling their body parts to survive or to address their own basic needs or those of their families in a country like Iran is an untold catastrophe. Iran’s population is one percent of the world’s population, yet has seven percent of the world’s natural resources; it is among the richest.

Through embezzlement, theft and astronomical pillaging of these resources, the Iranian regime’s leaders have devoted most of these resources to suppression at home and export of terrorism as well as arming, training and financing terrorist groups, fomenting proxy wars in the Middle East and working to obtain weapons of mass destruction. This is while a vast majority of the Iranian people live below the poverty line with no prospects for improvement in their daily life.

The lion’s share of the Iranian nation’s wealth has been plundered by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Khamenei’s personal wealth is reported to be around $200 billion dollars. In addition to huge sums allocated to the repressive agencies, the regime has allotted several billion dollars to prop up the Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad and roughly a billion dollars a year to the terrorist Hezbollah in Lebanon. It has also been extensively financing and helping the Houthis in Yemen and the terrorist Shia militias in Iraq.

The painful trend of selling body parts continued and even intensified following the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), which released more than 100  billion dollars and enabled the regime to sell more than two million barrels of oil on a daily basis. As the Iranian Resistance said at the time, this windfall was not spent on improving the abysmal living conditions of the Iranian people.

In the nationwide uprising in 2018, which spread to more than 160 cities, the Iranian people demanded the overthrow of the regime in its entirety. The deprived and destitute masses played a critical role in that upheaval. Keenly aware of the explosive state of society, the regime’s officials repeatedly warn of another major upheaval and have grown quite paranoid over the bleak prospects awaiting them.

Article first published on NCR Iran.

Owing to the Tehran’s continous destablizing activities in the region, Trump signed the order in the Oval Office.

“Never can Iran have a nuclear weapon,” Trump said after signing the order.

“We will continue to increase pressure on Iran,” Trump added.

According to a Reuters investigation in 2013, Khamenei has wealth exceeding the value of his oil-rich nation’s current annual petroleum exports.

“Setad” is the not-so-famous organization owned by Khameini which holds stakes in nearly every sector of Iranian industry, that even includes production of birth-control pills and even ostrich farming.

Under the dictatorship of Khamenei, the Setad has expanded to buy vareity of stakes in both private and public Iranian companies.

Since Setad is highly secret, no one in the country knows about the total worth and the total turnover it makes. Reuters estimates it to be $52 billion in real estate and $43 billion in corporate holdings, that makes approx. $95 billion.