It is the regime in Tehran that refuses to join any table where Israel is present. At its core, this is a grand strategy rooted—as is often the case—in identity politics.

In Western media, it’s common to describe Israel and Iran (more precisely, the current regime in Tehran) as each other’s “main enemy” or “arch-enemy.” The term echoes Cold War-era Soviet rhetoric and seems to reflect a reality of deep-rooted geopolitical rivalry. But the hostility between Israel and Iran is neither ancient nor inevitable. As regional powers, some degree of competition between them is natural—especially in an era of American retreat—but that alone doesn’t explain why the destruction of Israel has become a clear and central objective of Iran’s grand strategy since the Islamic Revolution.

This wasn’t the case under the previous regime. As many Israelis know—and sometimes remind others, though the topic has become sensitive due to long-standing legal disputes over unresolved financial issues—there’s an almost monumental “memorial” in Israel to the cooperation and once-strong friendship between the two countries. It’s about 200 kilometers long and occasionally leaks: the Eilat-Ashkelon oil pipeline was originally built to transport Iranian oil to the Mediterranean Sea, and from there to European ports. Until the Islamic Revolution and Khomeini’s rise to power, Iran was a strategic partner of Israel and a member of the “periphery alliance” that Ben-Gurion forged in the late 1950s in response to the Nasserist threat, alongside Kemalist Turkey and imperial Ethiopia (both of which have also undergone major changes since then). Israelis were involved in various projects in Iran, from security to agriculture.

So what lies at the root of this intense hostility toward Israel’s very existence, which has become—literally—one of the regime’s core ideological principles, both for Khomeini and his successor as Supreme Leader (Rahbar—“Guide,” a title whose meaning becomes especially clear if translated into German…) Ali Khamenei? Anger over the role Israel and the U.S. played in supporting the hated Shah regime is certainly part of the initial explanation. But past grievances alone don’t account for the depth and persistence of this enmity, which just recently found renewed expression in bold statements about the commitment to destroy Israel (“even if we are cut to pieces,” in the words of a senior Revolutionary Guards commander). Far more powerful forces, rooted in the very identity of the Iranian revolutionary regime, are at play here.

The Iranian revolutionary regime could have, if it had wanted to, used the arms supply from Israel—part of the problematic Iran-Contra deal in the Reagan era—as a springboard to open a new chapter. It chose not to. On the contrary, the hostility only deepened and intensified over time. It even took on the grotesque form of mocking the Holocaust—through cartoon contests that continued even after the Ahmadinejad era—and was succinctly expressed in a venomous tweet by Khamenei in November 2014 (still available online), detailing nine points explaining why and how Israel should be eliminated.

Traditional geopolitics naturally breeds competition and sometimes conflict between regional powers. But in this case, it fails to justify such an extreme stance—unparalleled in today’s international arena—where one UN member state denies the very right of another to exist. It also doesn’t justify Iran’s massive investment in arming Hezbollah to seriously threaten Israel’s civilian rear; in arming and training Palestinian terrorist groups through its cooperation with Hamas and its proxy ties with Palestinian Islamic Jihad; or in turning Assad’s Syria into a land bridge to the Mediterranean and an additional launchpad for attacks on Israel.

It’s true that Iran’s leadership today, through this “ring of fire,” also has a deterrent motive: to discourage Israel from launching a military strike on its nuclear weapons program. But Israel, for its part, would not be considering such a strike had Iran not openly marked it for destruction and forced Israel to treat the Iranian regime as a threat to its very survival. So what, then, fuels the constant chant of “Death to Israel” — “Marg bar Israel”?

There’s no territorial dispute between Israel and Iran, nor economic rivalry—aside from the unresolved question of compensation for the oil pipeline, currently under arbitration in a Swiss court. Israel does not threaten Iran’s legitimate demand to be part of the regional power balance and to sit at the diplomatic table. It is the regime in Tehran that refuses to join any table where Israel is present. At its core, this is a grand strategy rooted—as is often the case—in identity politics. In this instance, the identity of the current Iranian regime as a political embodiment of a sweeping, dramatic, modern, and revolutionary interpretation of Shiite Islamic doctrine.

It’s worth recalling: the fundamental split between Sunnis (literally “people of the tradition”) and Shiites (“the faction”) stems from a disagreement about the political history of the Muslim community—who should have succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as spiritual leader, political head, and military commander. The Shiites remained loyal to Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, and his direct descendants. The deaths of the Prophet’s grandsons, Hasan and Husayn (Ali’s sons), in their defeat against the Sunni Umayyad dynasty’s army at the Battle of Karbala (680 CE), became in Shiite theology a formative catastrophe—a triumph of injustice and the symbol of a history that went terribly wrong.

In the end times, this wrong is to be righted with the return of the “Hidden Imam.” Iranian Shiism belongs to the Twelver branch, which recognizes ten generations of Ali’s descendants until the disappearance of the last one—Muhammad, son of Hasan al-Askari—in 874 CE. Since then, Twelver Shiites await his return. When he reappears as the Mahdi—a figure somewhat comparable to the Jewish Messiah—the world will be redeemed. But according to the interpretation that Khomeini introduced in the last quarter of the 20th century, the prolonged mourning for that loss and the patient wait for redemption were replaced by a call to arms: to rally believers to active struggle, and to fix the world by force.

What Khomeini effectively did—and he was likely influenced during his exile in Paris by thinkers like Frantz Fanon and others who framed anti-colonial, anti-Western Marxist struggles in the Third World as redemption for “the wretched of the earth”—was to translate the ancient anguish and frustration of Shiism into a modern revolutionary agenda. The injustice of the 7th century thus became, in its Khomeinist reincarnation, a call to overturn the existing local, regional, and global political order.

It so happened that the Islamic Revolution’s rise to power in Iran occurred the same year that a cornerstone of secular Arab nationalism collapsed: the peace agreement signed by Egypt’s President Sadat with Israel in March 1979 on the White House lawn—just weeks after Khomeini’s return to Iran in triumph. This coincidence created another twist in Iran’s stance toward Israel, which has grown increasingly rigid and defiant over four decades. The core message: first Egypt, and later (in the 1990s) other weak and “treacherous” Sunni regimes, surrendered to Israel and laid down their arms—or, as Saddam did in 1981, turned them against Iran. Not coincidentally, Iran’s regime named a major Tehran street after Khaled al-Islambouli, Sadat’s assassin.

Now, it is supposedly the duty of “true Islam”—the Shiite version of revolutionary Islamism—to prove its worth and moral superiority by being the only one to persist in striving for Israel’s destruction. For this goal, the Iranians were willing to overcome, in the name of unity against a common enemy, the deep gulf between Shiism and radical Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Still, the Sunni-Shiite divide re-emerged in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in spring 2003. Iran sees ISIS as an existential enemy of Shiism and contributed to its defeat in Iraq and Syria, yet this shared interest with the U.S. didn’t shift Tehran’s fundamental positions.

In any case, even as it is entangled in multiple fronts, the ayatollahs’ regime views the struggle to destroy Israel as a central part of its historic mission. To its mind, this is definitive proof that the Shiite revolution—according to its interpretation—is the true fulfillment of Islamic commandment. Meanwhile, the “wretched” Sunni regimes have surrendered, accepted Israel’s existence, and even normalized ties. It’s important to note that Iran has very complex relations with the UAE: a territorial dispute—it controls three islands belonging to the Emirates—combined with ideological tensions, yet also diplomatic dialogue and extensive trade and financial relations.

Iran’s position toward Israel has therefore become, in the eyes of its leadership, a source of regime legitimacy—both across the Sunni Muslim world and, even more crucially, at home. After all, the revolution has failed in practice when it comes to the wellbeing of the Iranian people. A country that was three times richer than Turkey in 1979 is now four times poorer. Corruption, drugs, and prostitution have infected the social fabric. Brutal repression of dissent has become routine. Precisely because of this, the regime stakes its credibility on waving the anti-Zionist flag with fervor. It’s not at all clear that this stance enjoys broad public support, especially given public resentment over massive expenditures in Syria and Lebanon. But it does tighten the regime’s grip on its core political base—the religious establishment.

Moreover, by its very existence, Israel—as a modern nation-state with Western features, not merely a “protected community” like Iranian Jews—embodies a central pillar of the post-1945 global order. In its ideological horizon, the Shiite totalitarian revolution seeks to upend this order entirely. It defines it in terms of “hegemony” and “global arrogance” (a code name for the U.S.) and links the struggle against it to the fight against “the Great Satan” in Washington and “the Little Satan” in Jerusalem. At one point, Ahmadinejad even tried to offer his German hosts condolences for losing WWII—suggesting that, in his view, the wrong side won. In this context, the intent to destroy Israel is indeed part of a comprehensive, strategic, ideological, and historical worldview aimed at fixing what went wrong in 661 (Ali’s assassination), 680 (his sons’ deaths at Karbala), and 1945 and 1948.

Despite occasional shows of tolerance toward Iran’s relatively large remaining Jewish community, this worldview also contains unmistakable notes of classic anti-Semitism, which have seeped into Iranian discourse under the influence of Western totalitarian models.

The implication for Israel, its friends, allies, and new regional partners should be clear. Unlike “ordinary” conflicts over clashing interests, these meta-historical motivations are powerful. It’s hard to change or deter them through diplomacy—unless that diplomacy is backed by strong, effective military deterrence.

Translated in English from Jerusalem Institute of Strategic Studies.

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab

The Muslim Brotherhood’s rule—unlike that of Khomeini—was short-lived. 

In early 1979, the Iranian revolution came out victorious and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was ousted. A new regime was installed in Iran, faced with domestic and outside challenges and obstacles. However, the new regime had a magical blueprint for survival: ideology and indoctrination.

These two bases have been present in the Iranian political arena—and manifested in the practices of the new regime’s state apparatuses—from day one. An Islamic constitution was approved, and all the opponents of the Islamists—leftists and clerics embracing quietism and opposed to Velayat-e Faqih—were brutally liquidated in more of inquisitions than normal, fair trials. 

In parallel, the Muslim Brotherhood remained an underground political organization at that time, gaining some room of freedom under late Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, whom the Iranian revolution deemed a foe for hosting the shah at his last days before death. Years passed by. Sadat was assassinated and late president Hosni Mubarak succeeded him.

After a three-decade rule, he was ousted following a massive uprising whose spark started on January 25, 2011. The revolution brought change—and the Muslim Brotherhood. But the latter didn’t survive in office a single day after year one. Mohammed Morsi, who was picked by the group to run in the 2012 presidential election, was ousted in a military takeover. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule—unlike that of Khomeini—was short-lived. 

Here a question arises: Why did the Iranian revolution succeed in ruling the country for over four decades while the Muslim Brotherhood has failed miserably after just one year in office. Answers for this question, of course, abound. However, a few answers cite ideology as a reason—instead citing the Brotherhood’s political naiveness, the desire to build a clerical dictatorship, failure to build consensus with the opposition, among others. 

But ideology is the chief reason why the Muslim Brotherhood has failed to rule Egypt. The organization, founded in late 1920s by Egyptian teacher Hassan al-Banna, doesn’t possess a solid ideological ground upon which it could build a viable political project. Commentators always argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is organizationally strong—but ideologically weak. But this line of argument has long remained embedded and it’s time to shed some light on it. 

Another question arises about the Iranian ideology—purportedly the cause of the Iranian regime’s success in holding on to power for four decades despite the convulsions it has been experiencing, chiefly the war with Iraq (1980-1988) and the subsequent waves of sanctions due to the country’s nuclear program and support for terror in the Middle East and beyond. The Iranian regime’s ideology is established on the so-called Velayat-e Faqih theory. It’s the political theory coined by the revolution’s firebrand leader and the Islamic republic’s founder Ruhollah Khomeini. 

In the years leading up to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, Khomeini formulated his theory of Islamic governance while living in exile in Iraq. This theory aimed to give the Shiite ulema, or clergy, political control over the Iranian state.

The Islamic Republic of Iran was built on the original theory in this book. Shiite post-Age-of-Occultation ideology that claims that Islam grants a faqih (Islamic jurist) custodianship over people is known as the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, also known as the Governance of the Jurist. Ulama who endorse the doctrine vary on the scope of custodianship.

According to one interpretation, guardianship should only be granted for non-litigious issues (al-omour al-hesbiah), such as religious endowments (Waqf), legal issues, and property for which no one specific individual is responsible.

There’s also the Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. It maintains that Guardianship should include all issues for which Prophet of Islam and Shi’a Imam have responsibility, including governance of the country. The idea of guardianship as rule was advanced by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in a series of lectures in 1970 and now forms the basis of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The constitution of Iran calls for a faqih, or Vali-ye faqih (Guardian Jurist), to serve as the Supreme Leader of the government. In the context of Iran, Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is often referred to as “rule by the jurisprudent”, or “rule of the Islamic jurist”.

But what about the Muslim Brotherhood? What is the political theory upon which they have been basing their decades-old activism? The Muslim Brotherhood has a core ideology, which is creating an Islamic state, an objective that the organization knows under the rubric ‘Mastership of the World’. However, it seems the organization doesn’t have purpose-built manifestos or books explaining the group’s political theory.

There’s a book titled ‘Messages of the Imam’ authored by Hassan al-Banna. But its topics vary, focusing instead on religious, didactic and jurisprudential matters rather than putting an emphasis on the political theory that lays the foundation for the group’s ideology. 

This poor ideological theorization has created problems for the organization, leading to divisions and secessions at the times of political crises—which the group is accustomed to calling ‘trials’.

The Muslim Brotherhood has been suffering back-to-back setbacks, beginning with the assassination of the group’s founder in 1949 and the major crackdown the group experienced under Nasser. Ironically, the group is known for ‘incessant trials’ as well as ‘always making the same mistake foolishly twice’. 

These failures, setbacks and losses have a common denominator: Ideological weakness. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood is organizationally strong, with hundreds of thousands of followers operating within its ranks—not to mention the sympathizers.

The organization also has a strong and rigorous hierarchy. But all this monolithic structure gets easily demolished in times of crises due to the lack of a solid ideological ground on which the group could base its political project. 

An additional manifestation of this ideological weakness is the leadership crisis the Muslim Brotherhood is going through. As it’s known, the era of a single, cohesive Muslim Brotherhood is over. There are two groups (Two Muslim Brotherhoods’), with each claiming to be the sole legitimate body representing the organization’s members.

If there’s a clear, solid ideology that governs the group, there would be no such division. The group lacks ideology, and the leadership that could employ such an ideology. And this is why the group has failed to retain power in Egypt, and this is why the ayatollahs in Iran has been ruling the country since 1979. 

The bottom line: Strong and solid ideologies enable religious associations to build a sustainable political system, as is the case in Iran.

On the contrary, organization with a poor ideological underpinning fail to build such a long-term political system, suffering thunderous downfall as soon as this weakness is exposed, as seen in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the 2013 military takeover that followed massive protests demanding an end to the group’s rule.  

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab

The Iranians want the leadership to stop wasting the country’s resources on extraterritorial follies and allocate these vast resources to the Iranian people, who have long been denied a dignified living.

The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran was a watershed moment in the country’s modern political history. It signaled the end of monarchy and the beginning of republicanism in its Islamic version. The revolution was led by Ayatollah Khomeini, a jurist who established Velayat-e Faqih theory. It had both successes and failures. The successes came early and were fleeting, while the failures came later and continue to this day. Yet, the successes only benefited the clerical revolutionary elite, but the failures have caused harm to all people. 

The first success is the revolution’s own success. On January 16, 1979, Iran’s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi fled the country. Three months later, Iranians decisively voted in favor of creating an Islamic republic in a referendum. After creating the Islamic state he had long desired and for which he had laid out doctrines and written books, Khomeini launched a drive to purge opponents, which he was remarkably successful in.

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, a leftist president who was always at conflict with the clerical leadership, was the first president of the newly founded Islamic regime. Khomeini didn’t tolerate his opposition. Accordingly, Bani Sadr fled the country in 1981, only two years after the revolution’s victory.

Aside from Bani Sadr, thousands of dissenters were executed as part of Khomeini’s dissident persecution. The Iranian religious government developed a ‘death committee’, which oversaw the mass execution of thousands of dissidents. The government not only murdered dissidents, but it also closed down newspapers and abolished unions. Non-Islamists were the first to be swept out in the purge, which marked the beginning of Islamist success in consolidating power. 

The regime’s ideology was also a triumph. Velayat-e-Faqih was an ideological cornerstone upon which the Iranian system was founded from the beginning.

The Shiite Islamic concept of Velayat-e-Faqih has historically been used to justify limited clerical guardianship over a specific sector of the population: widows, orphans, and the disabled. Its current form is a relatively recent interpretation of the ideology produced in the early 1970s by the revolutionary Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

This theory is a success per se. It is the first theory in Shiite law to break with the quietist Shiite tradition that avoids political involvement. The theory has been present as the ideological governor of the political system throughout the revolution’s four decades. It was solidified within domestic state institutions and disseminated beyond borders. 

Despite these victories, primarily political and ideological, the Islamic revolution entered an era of failure, beginning with a single early but humiliating military defeat to Iraq during the eight-year war between the two neighbors in the 1980s. Iran was defeated in the war, and Khomeini was forced to drink the poisoned chalice.

This external failure has prompted further failures, including internal political and economic failures. These failings have degraded the country’s economic capacities and pulverized the political landscape under one-man, quasi-divine rule.

After the war, Iran attempted to mend fences with the outside world, allowing more moderate’ reformists to ascend to power, including Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. All of these attempts, however, have been futile because the regime split labor, with the military and intelligence institutions having the upper hand at both home and overseas. The democratic, moderate, and gestures aimed to placate the West were ineffective, resulting in a diplomatic failure.

This diplomatic failure has endured, with the country facing crushing sanctions on its economy as a result of its contentious nuclear program, ballistic missile program, and regional and global backing for terror networks.

The regime’s most recent failure has been economic in nature. Iran is a wealthy country with vast oil and gas reserves, the most of which are concentrated in the Arab region of Ahwaz. However, the Iranian people are impoverished. The reason is simple: the Iranian regime is funneling most of the country’s resources and earnings to its proxy actors abroad, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Palestine. The clerical regime is generous abroad but stingy at home. There are no adequate or sufficient expenditures in Iran’s budget for the long-suffering Iranian people, but people’s money is lavished on primarily non-Iranian fighters operating beyond boundaries to spread the regime’s ideology and achieve its expansionist ambitions. 

It is a failure to prioritize the needs of the people. And the consequences of this failure have been catastrophic. Poverty is widespread throughout Iran. The currency has been falling to record lows. The majority of Iranians are unable to make ends meet. Iranians have staged repeated protests after sanctions were imposed, namely in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2022. The protesters’ demands are politico-economic. The Iranians want the leadership to stop wasting the country’s resources on extraterritorial follies and allocate these vast resources to the Iranian people, who have long been denied a dignified living.

Even after establishing the morality police, Iran was unable to sustain the apparatus, which was engaged in the killing of the Kurdish girl Mahsa Amini, the episode that signaled the end of the religious machinery. In this regard, the regime has failed to defend its vision for enforcing the Islamic dress code and public morals, for which it has established morality police.

To sum up, the Iranian revolution had made successes at the organizational, ideological and political levels. But it has failed to sustain these successes, with failures prevailing throughout the revolution’s course, which is a stone’s throw from downfall. The regime was successful in consolidating control and suppressing opposition both at home and abroad. However, it has failed miserably to strengthen the economy or establish a democratic political process. The regime was able to entrench its ideology by intimidation and indoctrination. Nonetheless, it has failed to persuade large segments of the population to embrace it willingly. The first anniversary of Iran’s revolution was marked by success. But on the 44th, failure reigns supreme. And if events continue on this course, the regime will collapse wholly and entirely in the end, with the people finally gaining their long-awaited triumph.

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab is the former editorial manager of the English edition of the Baghdad Post. He is focusing on Iraq, Iran and political Islam movements, with articles posted on the Herald Report, Vocal Europe, the Greater Middle East and other platforms.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

People of Iran have one unique message, “We will no longer vote!” and “our vote is the overthrow of the regime”

While not only all Iranians but also all world’s political pundits believe that the presidential election in Iran, which is scheduled to take place on June 18, is nothing more than a show and everything has been decided in advance, so that, even some factions and regime’s leaders like the former president Mahmood Ahmedinejad has announced that he will not take part in the show. 

The hollow words and promises of the seven people who have passed the filter of the Guardian Council to heat up the show and attract people’s attention to the election are so ridiculous that have been taken as jokes by the people in Iran .

The promises made by these people are so unrealistic and false that if someone does not know these people and their showmanship, may be fooled by such rhetoric and sweet talks. But the reality is that all seven of them have been part of the same corrupt and oppressive regime and share the blame for the current horrible state of living and people’s misery in Iran. 

These candidates have been instrumental in drawing more than 80% of the people of Iran under the poverty line and have created an economic downfall that has forced more than 35% of the city dwellers to move to the outskirts due to inability to pay the rent, living in shanty towns that do not have the minimum necessary facilities for a family.

These candidates are part of the same system that has created such high inflation that many of the population have not been able to taste meat and fruit for a long time and have been forced to sell their organs such as kidneys, corneas, and even their hearts for their family’s livelihood. The system is so corrupt that the youths of Iran, instead of going to school, have to look inside dumpsters in search of food and clothing or have become street vendors, selling gums, cigarettes, polishing shoes, etc. to make their ends meet.

This is a regime that even selling children due to poverty is not an uncommon occurrence there. 

Recently, the price of bread, the most basic source of food, has increased again by 50%, forcing many to pay for their purchases by installments. 

Situation is so bad that candidates instead of presenting important major economic programs and plans for the country just give empty promises geared towards attracting this major deprived segment of population to vote.

But a glance at the background of these seven candidates demonstrates their true natures.

For example, Ibrahim Raessi, who will most likely be the winner of this show, as deputy prosecutor and prosecutor was handing death sentences to the dissidents for many years. He was one of the members of the death committee responsible for the 1988 massacre of thousands of Mojahedin Khalq (MEK) members, most of whom were young people under the age of 25.

In a leaked audio tape, Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Montazeri, Khomeini’s successor, told Raessi that “history will name you as criminals because of these killings and crimes”. (Of course, because of his opposition to these executions, Montazeri was fired shortly after by Khomeini). 

After that, Raessi continued his role in oppressing people and looting their property for many years with different titles such as the head of Astan Quds Razavi in Khorsan province and finally as the head of the judiciary. Raessi’s crimes are so obvious that 4 years ago, during the presidential race, Hassan Rouhani in one of his election speeches in city of Hamedan told him that “during these years, you have done nothing for the people but issuing death and imprisonment sentences”.

But Raessi who seems to think that people have forgotten these facts now promises freedom of expression, transparency, and honesty with the people, and while he knows nothing about economics, and in a situation where inflation is now over 50% and the middle class has been eliminated, promises single-digit inflation in the first year.

Or Mohsen Rezaei, who was one of Khomeini’s personal bodyguards in the beginning of the revolution and was appointed as commander of IRGC by Khomeini in 1981 and worked in this position for 16 years, participating in the repression of the Iranian people, especially in Kurdistan province. During the eight years of the war with Iraq, he used the tactics of attacking with human waves and sending schoolchildren as disposable soldiers to clear minefields, killing tens of thousands of young Iranians youth in the war. 

After the Iran-Iraq war Khamenei appointed him as the secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. For more than two decades, he has participated in all important decisions and now, he promises to pay 450,000 Tomans a month to forty million low-income people.

His promise has made people laugh! Because presently, the regime is not even able to pay the monthly salaries of its employees, and to raise money for its current budget, it resorts to deceiving people in various ways, such as dragging them to the stock market and then devaluing stocks or establishing empty banks and financial institutions such as Caspian, Iranians, Afzal Toos and Arman Vahdat — are a few of such fake institutions. After attracting people’s capital, most of these institutions have gone bankrupt and have practically caused the loss of people’s money and life’s earnings.

Thousands of those who have lost their investments have been staging daily and weekly public gatherings and demonstrations demanding the return of their money and accountability for the last two years. 

Mohsen Rezaei who was one the main culprits in oppressing Iranians, now promises to remove censorship and filtering of the Internet.

The rest of the seven candidates possess the same corrupt credentials as these two. That is why the majority of the Iranian people have announced that they will not participate in this election. Via various rallies and  social media campaigns, the people of Iran have one unique message, “We will no longer vote!” and “our vote is the overthrow of the regime”. The situation is so critical that many analysts believe that this will probably be the last so called election in Iran. This understanding is echoed by regime’s authorities, including Ahmadinejad, who warned in their speeches, indicating that a change like the one in 1979 will occur.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Iranians are waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the entire regime…

Finally, after some propaganda shows, which are window dressing of the dictatorship in Iran, and after speculations about who will pass the filter of the Guardian Council, on Tuesday, May 25, at Khamenei’s behest, name of seven people who will be allowed to enter the June sham election, was announced!

In fact, Khamenei took one step closer to appoint his candidate and put an end to this show. Of course, out of the seven people who were allowed to enter the final stage of the elections, everyone knows that six of them have no chance, and Ibrahim Raessi is the one who will be selected as president, and the rest have been included so that it would not be a one man show. Because Khamenei, given the past experiences and the very critical situation in Iran, decided to finalize the issue of the next president at this stage so that what happened in 2009 does not happen again.

A few months ago, he announced the conditions for the next president, saying that the upcoming elections should not be bipolar, meaning that there should be no competition in the elections. He announced the characteristics of the person he wanted in his Nowruz message, which, of course, made it clear that the ideal person for Khamenei was Qassem Soleimani, who was killed by US forces in Iraq last year, and with Qassem Soleimani killed, Khamenei received a huge and unbearable blow, since it was very difficult to find someone like him.

But who is Ibrahim Raessi?

After Soleimani’s assassination, Khamenei’s clear choice was Ibrahim Raessi, who Khamenei had failed to appoint him as president four years ago. To this end, the Guardian Council, at Khamenei’s behest, disqualified all those who might have run as rivals for Ibrahim Raessi and polarized the election.

Even those who had repeatedly proved their allegiance to Khamenei, such as Ali Larijani, the two-term speaker of parliament, and one who was a IRGC commander for 10 years, or Ahmadinejad, who was Khamenei’s two-term president, as well as Jahangiri, who is the current deputy President of Hassan Rouhani and all others who were likely to polarize the election.

Raessi, was a young seminary student in the 1979 revolution and first worked as a deputy prosecutor in the city of Karaj in 1980 and was later appointed prosecutor of the same city. During this period, he was noticed by regime leaders for his atrocities in suppressing Khomeini’s opponents in 1981, and in 1982, while he was Karaj’s Prosecutor, he was given the responsibility of the Hamedan City Prosecutor’s Office as well, a position he held for three years. During this period, he harshly suppressed the regime’s opposition.

In 1988, Raessi was selected as a member of the death committee that massacred 30,000 political prisoners at Khomeini’s behest. The names of members of this death committee were later revealed by Ayatollah Montazeri (Khomeini’s successor, who opposed Khomeini’s order and for this reason Khomeini ousted him), and since then Raessi has been hated by most people.

However, after Khomeini’s death and Khamenei taking the power, Raessi moved up the ladder rapidly due to his allegiance to Khamenei. In 1989, he was first appointed as Tehran’s Prosecutor and after 5 years as the head of the General Inspectorate. He worked in this position for 10 years. In 2004, he was given the post of First Deputy of the Judiciary, and then in 2014 he became the Attorney General for a year, but after a year, Khamenei appointed him as the head of Astan Quds Razavi, one of the richest institutions in Iran with tens of billions of dollars of capital.

Astan Quds Razavi is one of the organs of theft and plunder of the Iranians’ wealth. At the same time, he was the Special Prosecutor General of the Clergy, and since 2006 has been the representative of South Khorasan in parliament and a member of the Presidium of the Assembly of Experts.

Khamenei wanted to make him president in 2017, but in fear of another uprising like the one in 1988, he chose not to take that risk at the time, and thus endured Hassan Rouhani for another four years. But after that election, Khamenei appointed him a member of the Expediency Council for five years, and two years later, even though Sadegh Larijani still had a few months left, Khamenei appointed him as the new head of judiciary.

In Iran, the head of judiciary holds the second spot of power right after the president. Khamenei by appointing him to this position provided him with a tool to remove all his opponents.

Now Khamenei knowing the very critical situation in Iran and while the public is opposed to his rule, is determined to appoint a new president because he thinks after his death, which, according to experts, is not far off, any rift at the head of the regime imminently will lead to the disintegration and overthrow of the regime. For this reason, he has chosen the policy of maximum contraction to eliminate any opposition by deploying IRGC and various security forces.

According to many, this sham election is the last show of this kind. Because on the one hand, 80% of the people live below the poverty line due to institutionalized corruption, and on the other hand, people want an end to dictatorship and oppression. They want regime change and establish a democratic government.

Regardless of who will be the president next month, Iranians are waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the entire regime in an uprising like what happened in November 2019. This is what Ahmadinejad acknowledged in a recent speech before being dismissed by the Guardian Council, saying that a flood would soon engulf the entire regime.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

People of Iran clearly understand that the misery and the absurd level of poverty is caused by the government…

While more than 80% of Iranians live below the poverty line and have not tasted meat or fruit for many months, are now facing a 50% increase in the price of bread. 

According to some local reports, this has forced some people to even  pay for their bread in installments. A few days ago, the main staple of poor people quietly became 50% more expensive, and soon after, the official news of this price increase was announced in the press and media.

Of course, this price increase does not end with just bread, and in recent days, news of a 35% increase in the price of cooking oil, 72% of the price of sugar, 30% of intercity bus tickets, 35% of cab fares, 30% increase in subway tickets and many other basic items of life were published throughout local Iranian publications and websites.

According to the Statistics Center of Iran, the point-to-point inflation rate has now reached more than 48%. This rate is 11 times more than what is in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the salary increase for next year is set at only 26%.
The cost of rent has reached such a level that according to Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf (Speaker of Parliament), that 35% of the population of Iran’s metropolises have been driven to the peripheries due to inability to pay rent. They are living in sheds that do not have the minimum requirements of ordinary residential units. 

The fact is that these inconceivable high prices are rooted in the widespread corruption of the regime’s system. This corruption has taken place under the supervision of Khamenei, his son Mojtaba and the Revolutionary Guards.

Their collective capital is estimated to be more than $100 billion. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) have taken control of most of the country’s capital in all areas of the economy. 

The regime’s incompetency, never-ending greed and mismanagement have resulted in the closure of many manufacturing plants and higher. Out of control importation of goods and selling them in the local markets for exponential profits, embezzlement, colossal briberies and the weakening of the local economy have brought misery and discontent to the people of Iran. The local manufacturing plants are no longer capable of competing with goods imported by the government and therefore forced to close down.

The astronomical theft and corruption of the Iranian regime’s affiliates are beyond belief. At times, the tip of the iceberg of such corruption is revealed by different factions of the regime to discredit the other faction and legitimize themselves.

Just recently, the news about the disappearance of 10% of last year’s production of Iranian steel, which amounts to 3 million tons, was published by various publications and websites. The amount of steel lost has a global value of more than 1.2 billions dollars.

The people of Iran clearly understand that the misery and the absurd level of poverty is caused by the government and its oppressive policies. Iranians have come to this realization that the only solution to any improvement in their lives is regime change. They expressed this desire on many occasions by chanting in demonstrations in Tehran and other cities.

To combat the legitimate desire for “regime change” of the people of Iran, Khamenei and his entourage have intensified their repressive measures and forcing the people to acquiesce with the status quo.

In this quest, of course, some people become disappointed and bow to pressures of the regime and instead of standing up for their rights, they either commit suicide or try to get rid of this situation by turning to drugs. Some even kill their children first and then commit suicide.

The last of these examples, which are not rare, took place on May 20, 2021 in the city of Esfarayen, when a mother first killed her 8-year-old and 2-month-old children and then committed suicide. Another unfortunate event was the self-immolation of a young man on May 16 in Tehran, who first locked himself on a park bench so that could not be saved. He then set himself on fire by pouring gasoline on himself, as a result of which he died tragically. All this is due to the poverty and despair that has spread in society. 

According to estimates made last year, 8% of the population over the age of 15 in Iran, which amounts to more than 4.4 million people, are addicted to drugs.
However, on the much brighter side, the majority of the people oppose the current situation and show their opposition to this government by holding mass rallies and protests, including protests by teachers, workers, truck drivers, retirees and farmers, that take place almost daily in all cities of Iran. 

Actually, it seems they are waiting for another situation like what happened in November 2019 to vent their anger and end this government with another uprising. In that year, Khamenei was able to suppress a popular uprising by killing 1,500 people and arresting 12,000.

But according to recent remarks by former President Ahmadinejad, repressing the next uprising will not be so easy as there is a large wave of discontent that will drown out the entire regime as Iranians have nothing left to lose.

With current chants such as “we have heard enough lies, we will not vote anymore” or “Our vote is overthrow” is indicative of this apprehension towards the forthcoming sham elections. The people of Iran only recognize one vote and that is a vote for regime change.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Khamenei is in fact, in a deadlock and deep crisis…

Finally, after much speculation, Khamenei favoured Ibrahim Raisi as his choice for the upcoming presidential election and put an end to all the ambiguities and rumours about the president he wishes to install. He had already prepared the grounds for this election on April 21.

On the one hand, a letter was sent by 220 members of the parliament, affiliated with his faction, asking Ibrahim Raisi to run for the presidency. On the other hand, he had eliminated potential rivals such as Hassan Khomeini (grandson of Ruhollah Khomeini) by advising him not to think of running for the presidency.

On several occasions in the past, Ibrahim Raisi had denied his willingness to run to play the game, but finally, on May 15, he agreed to bring this game to an end and announced his candidacy.

In reality, Khamenei’s most favourite candidate for the post would have been Qassem Soleimani, who was killed by American drones in Iraq. With Soleimani gone, Khamenei had no other choice than Ibrahim Raisi, who was appointed by himself as the head of Iran’s judiciary only about two years ago. There are still three years left of Raisi’s head of judiciary.

Putting these facts together reveals the fact that Khamenei is in fact, in a deadlock and deep crisis. According to informed observers, given Khamenei’s 82-year-old condition, he is unlikely to see the end of the next four-year presidency, and he will have to choose someone to replace him as the new Supreme Leader.

Of course, for some time now, the issue of combining the role of the supreme leader with the presidency has been raised among some of the regime’s leaders, and the election of Raisi to the presidency paves the way for this idea to materialize.

One of the reasons Khamenei is currently opposing the ongoing JCPOA talks in Vienna is that he wants these talks and agreements to occur during the next president’s time and the success of the talks go to the new president, Raisi.
But Ibrahim Raisi, who ran for president four years ago, is hated by the people for his direct involvement in the massacre of 30,000 political prisoners in the summer of 1988, most of whom were members and supporters of MEK.

Because of Raisi’s role in the 1988 massacre, he is referred to as Ayatollah Death; he could not get this seat in the last presidential election. His involvement in the crime was so obvious that even Hassan Rouhani mentioned it in his election speech 4 years ago, saying that Raisi had done nothing but issue death sentences, imprisonment and torture in the past 38 years.

But since Ibrahim Raisi was one of Khamenei’s most trusted figures, shortly after his defeat in the previous presidential election in March 2019, he was appointed as the head of the judiciary by Khamenei, one of the three main positions of power in Iran after the Supreme Leader.

Raisi’s appointment was considered as another step Khamenei had taken to bring his regime to more cohesiveness. In reality, Raisi was appointed to use his legal power and influence to eliminate any opposition of any form and shape. It is as if, in this short period of time, many dissidents who had done nothing but criticize Khamenei were sentenced to long prison terms, and a large number of political prisoners and dissidents were executed.

The dramatic increase in verdicts against political and civil activists during his tenure as head of the judiciary indicates a widespread wave of repression of civil society and critics in Iran.

It is good to note that just in the first six months of Ibrahim Raisi, as the head of the judiciary, judges have issued about 1,000 years prison terms and 1,400 lashes for civil and political activists. Raisi’s reign as the head of the judiciary has resulted in a 120 percent increase of repressive verdicts and sentences over the same period last year.

It is noteworthy that the government structure of the mullahs is similar to the structure of the Mafia, and they strengthen this structure with family ties. For example, the wife of Ibrahim Raisi is the daughter of Alam al-Huda, the Friday prayer leader of Mashhad the second-largest city in Iran. This makes Raisi, Alam-al-Hoda’s son-in-law. Alam al-Huda was elected to this position by Khamenei in 2006.

A year later, Alam al-Huda was elected as a member of the Assembly of Experts. In March 2016, he was appointed as Khamenei’s representative in Khorasan Razavi in order to have full authority in this province. And now, his son-in-law is set to take over the presidency and become the Supreme Leader in the next step.

But the fundamental question among experts is whether the appointment of Ibrahim Raisi as president can save the regime from this dangerous situation that many say is on the brink of collapse. In a situation where most people are planning to boycott the elections because of their hatred of the government, and with slogans such as “We have heard too many lies, we will not vote anymore” or “Our vote is overthrown,” the people have already expressed their views on not only the presidency but in relation to the whole system, regime change.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Khomeini’s goal was to exercise his hegemony in the Muslim countries of the region…

Some experts have called Khomeini one of the most prominent politicians of the twentieth century, who with his counter-progressive and opportunistic intuition used every opportunity to consolidate and strengthen his position and that of his regime in Iran and the region.

For example, at a time when his regime was under pressure both in Iran and internationally, he exploited the feelings of Muslims, issued a fatwa for assassination of Salman Rushdie on charge of blasphemy to Prophet Mohammad, and tried to divert attentions elsewhere to free his regime from pressure.

Another case was the designation of the last Friday of Ramadan as Quds Day, calling on Muslims around the world to demonstrate in support of the Palestinian people. This seemed to be a legitimate move in solidarity with the Palestinian people among the Muslims, and that is why, at first, when Khomeini’s identity was not known either in Iran or among the Muslims of the world, he was welcomed, and the masses responded by holding big demonstration in this day. 

But in fact, Khomeini’s goal was to exercise his hegemony in the Muslim countries of the region and establish himself as someone who defends the Palestinian people, but over the time it became clear that Khomeini does not care for the Palestinian people and not even for the Iranian people. What he wanted was to expand his influence. As a result, these demonstrations became more and more sluggish every year, both in Iran and in other Muslim countries.

It is now clear to the Palestinian people and most Muslims around the world that the policies of Khomeini and his successor Khamenei have done the most damage to the Palestinian people.

Khomeini, first sought to expand his influence by force and going to war, he insisted to continue an eight-year war with the Muslim country of Iraq that killed more than two million people in the two countries and caused hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to both.

When he failed to achieve his goal, he pursued his goal by supporting his proxy forces in region’s countries, and in opposition to Yasser Arafat, who refused to accept his hegemony he supported Hamas and by doing that, he caused division among the Palestinian people that practically led to the division of Palestine into two parts, further weakening the Palestinian state. 

The Iranian regime continues to support Hamas as the arm of the Quds Force in Palestine to advance Khamenei’s agenda, even though the majority of Iranians live below the poverty line and the regime itself is financially strapped by US sanctions. According to Mahmoud al-Zahar, a senior member of Hamas, in an interview with Al-Alam, the Iranian state television Arabic language channel, Qassem Soleimani, on one occasion, handed him $22 million in cash in four suitcases at the airport.

Now, 40 years later, the Iranian regime is still trying to portray itself as a supporter of Palestinian cause, but their claim has no buyer among the Iranian people, the Palestinian people, and the Muslims in the region, and this has become more of day rhetoric against Israel for regime’s leaders, clerics, Friday prayers and IRGC commanders. Nonsense that is repeated every year, while the Iranian regime in the region, especially the Persian Gulf is more isolated than ever and many countries in the region due to the regime’s terrorist interventions in their countries have cut off their diplomatic relations with Iran. These developments clearly indicate the regime’s nonsense about Palestine.

This year, on May 7, Khamenei used the Coronavirus pandemic as an excuse to cover up people’s disapproval of the march on this day and canceled the march, and in his speech on this occasion, he again exaggerated the destruction of Israel. His words come at a time when most Iranians live below poverty line and more than 90% of Iranians want to topple his religious dictatorship and expressed this desire in various demonstrations and rallies in their slogans such as: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran” Or “leave Syria and think about us.”

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

The Iranian regime has used the death penalty as another “tool to suppress political dissent”.

According to Amnesty International’s annual report, Iran ranked second in the world last year in terms of the highest number of executions in the world. However, proportional to its population Iran had the highest number of executions and execution of women in the world. During Rouhani’s 7 years of presidency, Iran executed more than 4,300 people, of whom 109 were women and at least 38 were juvenile. Presently, in only in 20 countries in the world, the death sentence is issued and carried out to punish the criminals, and 177 abolished death penalty.

For last year Amnesty International considering the Regime’s habit of carrying out large number of secret executions puts this figure at least 246. According to Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) in Iran, it is more than 70% of these sentences were carried out secretly. 

According to Amnesty International, Iran uses unusual methods that sometimes even violate the Islamic Republic’s law like; prohibiting the accused access to a lawyer, forced confession through torture and then televising the confession, not notifying accused’s family and relatives, and in case of execution of freestyle champion wrestler Navid Afkari not even informing the accused person of final sentence until the last moment.  Last year the execution of the defendants, who were less than eighteen years old at the time of the alleged crime, continued.

The Iranian regime has used the death penalty as another “tool to suppress political dissent”.

According to the report, in 2020, the Iranian regime, used execution as a mean to suppress ethnic minorities such as the people of Baluchistan, Kurdistan and Arabs in Khuzestan provinces, and in implementing this policy, at least 24 Baloch and 11 Kurds were executed. It is worth mentioning that these numbers of executions were on the top of 166 Kurdish Koolbar (goods transporter) and dozens of Baloch fuel transporter shot and killed by this repressive regime last year.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in its annual report released on Tuesday, April 20, ranked Iran in the World Press Freedom Index 174 out of 180 countries. Even Syria, Iraq and Tajikistan ranked better than Iran in this table, and Afghanistan is far better than Iran in terms of press freedom, ranking 122nd.

According to RSF, the Iranian regime has always been at the bottom of the table since the publication of the World Press Freedom Index (2002) due to government crackdowns on freedom of information.

According to this report, at the time of coronavirus outbreak, the Iranian regime enforced stricter control on media, increased the number of detained and sentenced journalists to heavy prison terms and tried to stop the flow of accurate and precise information about infected and death toll and provide statistics that is much lower than real one.

RSF estimates that the death toll from coronavirus in Iran is more than double the number announced by Iranian regime officials (although the actual number has risen to more than 260,000 due to the Iranian regime’s policies; Its people have not yet been vaccinated, which has put the country in a deadly situation) and emphasizes: The officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, during this period, “In addition to restraining information in traditional and official media, as well as on the Internet, increased summoning, arresting and condemning newspapers and citizens-journalists, bloggers.”

RSF report referred to the issuance and execution of death sentences against journalists in 2020 and specified: Iran has issued and executed the largest number of death sentences against journalists in the last 50 years. Last year, for example, Regime kidnapped Ruhollah Zam from Iraq and executed him after a kangaroo court.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Khamenei is well aware of the fragile state of his regime and is doing his best to pretend that he is still in total control of Iran’s affairs…

Iran is in its worst economic situation in 42 years, and the threat of a widespread uprising that may lead to the regime’s overthrow has become more serious than ever. When Khomeini was alive, no authority dared to dispute his orders and decisions, and everyone had to obey him. In today’s Iran, Khamenei still has the final say on all internal and international matters. But unlike Khomeini, he has not been able to keep all political factions in Iran at bay.

Although Khamenei has not wasted a moment in suppressing its opponents, even those very close to him and his ideas, such as, one of Iran’s former Prime Ministers, Mir Hossein Mousavi and the ex-speaker of Iran’s parliament, Mehdi Karroubi, who have been kept under house arrest for more than 12 years for not obeying his wishes. Another example is former two terms president Mohammad Khatami, who has been banned from any political activities. Despite the above, factionalism within this regime has become more intense than ever. Many current politicians and authorities who believe in the Islamic regime have exhibited their unwillingness to obey all Khamenei orders and believe that maintaining the regime in this situation is impossible. This has resulted in the birth of two factions within the regime, the so-called reformists and those loyal to Khamenei who call themselves fundamentalists or conservatives.

The difference between the views and policies of the reformist faction and the fundamentalist faction, however, is only in the proposed solutions to maintain the same system, and not to seek a fundamental change in the system of government. That is, the power struggle between the two factions is to gain more power to advance its policies in line with its own interests. Although these differences can be seen in some domestic policies, they are mainly evident in foreign policies. Otherwise, there is no difference between the two factions in internal repression, as, during the presidency of Mohmmad Khatami, who was one of the founders and leaders of the reform faction, most repressions and crimes were committed in Iran, including against students and university professors. In an event known as the “serial killings”, more than 80 dissidents were brutally murdered, or in the 1999 attack on a Tehran university dormitory by the security forces, who had Khatami’s approval, students were thrown from the third floor of the dormitory, killing several of them and detaining and sending dozens to prison.

Regarding Iran’s foreign policy, the reformists believe establishing relations with the west and opening the doors of the country to foreign investments could bolster. This could have an effect on improving people’s lives and dissuade them from revolting. On the other hand, the fundamentalists strongly oppose any relationships with the west. They think the regime can be survived by elevating internal repression, interference in the countries of the region and extortion from them by their proxy forces. They also believe acquiring nuclear weapons could strengthen their position in the region and the world.

The government of Hassan Rouhani, which is affiliated with the reformist faction, began its negotiations with the United States in 2015. This round of negotiations resulted in the JCPOA. As a result, Iran’s economy benefited partially and in less than two years, several foreign companies returned to Iran and began investing. The government also signed some big contracts to buy planes from Airbus and Boeing to upgrade Iran’s dilapidated air fleet. Of course, in all these contracts, due to the widespread corruption that exists within the regime of Iran as a whole and in both factions of the regime, huge profits were poured into the pockets of the affiliates of the ruling faction. For example, a while later it was revealed that that Fereydoun Rouhani, President Hassan Rouhani’s brother, had profited several billion tomans (Iran’s currency) in these contracts. Freyoun Rouhani’s corruption became an issue between both faction and at the end a mutual settlement was reached. Fereydoun Rouhani was sentenced to 5 years in prison for bribery and influence in various contracts, but after a short time, and because he was the president’s brother, he only spent a short time in the prison and was released.

Khamenei is well aware of the fragile state of his regime and is doing his best to pretend that he is still in total control of Iran’s affairs. For example, he is closely watching Iran’s recent round of negotiations with western countries. Whenever necessary, he advises the Rouhani government to go ahead with the negotiations but tries to disguise his role in administering the negotiations, just in case if the negotiations were not as fruitful as he had liked. By doing so, Khamenei could deny his role in the negotiations and blame its failure on others. This position can be clearly seen in relation to the recent JCPOA talks in Vienna. Although, according to Mohammad Javad Zarif and Hassan Rouhani, Khamenei was aware of all the details of the initial talks in 2015 and the agreement was signed with his approval, when the United States withdrew from the agreement during the Trump era, Khamenei said that he had said from the beginning that America should not be trusted and has not agreed to negotiations.

The recent Vienna talks are another scene of the same factional conflict. Especially since Iran’s presidential election is scheduled to take place in June this year, and the reformist gang wants to improve its very weak position by reaching an agreement with the United States before the election. On the other hand, the fundamentalists who have the upper hand in this election are constantly creating obstacles in the recent JCPOA negotiations. The fundamentalists do not want the reformists to reach a final agreement with the western countries. In the meantime, it is clear that the only thing that neither of the two factions is considering is the interests of the Iranian people. The benefit of the people of Iran was never considered in the 25-year-old agreement signed last month with Khamenei’s proposal with China too. People of Iran think the recent Iran-China agreement is similar to the “Turkmenchay the agreement” in which large parts of Iran were ceded to Russia in the end of 19^th century. Neither of Iran’s factions opposed the Iran-China agreement.

But there are many members of the reformist faction who are aware of the discontent of the people and have repeatedly warned the rival faction that we are all in the same ship and if this ship is punctured, we will all sink together. The latest example is that of Hamid Reza Jalaeipour, a sociologist and professor at the University of Tehran, affiliated with the reformist faction. On April 16, he warned about the danger of a revolution in Iran. It is worth mentioning that during his tenure as governor of the City of Naghadeh, 59 anti-regime youths were executed in the city, some of whom were even under 18 years old, and people hold him responsible for their execution.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular. He tweets under @Iran_2019.