Civilian fatalities attributed to security forces in Burkina Faso and Mali have exceeded those caused by jihadist groups, according to recent data and rights assessments, raising concerns about the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and their broader implications for regional stability.

Analysts and rights groups say the pattern reflects a troubling escalation in abuses by state forces and allied militias, particularly in areas where governments are battling insurgencies linked to al Qaeda and Islamic State. The findings come at a time when military-led governments in both countries are seeking to consolidate control following coups and recalibrate their international alliances.

Human Rights Watch researcher Ilaria Allegrozzi said Burkina Faso’s security forces and affiliated militias “appear to be more brutal and violent” than militant groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al Qaeda-linked coalition active across the Sahel. Her assessment underscores a shift in the dynamics of violence, where counterinsurgency measures themselves are increasingly contributing to civilian harm.

The data highlights a regional pattern in which government responses to insurgency are marked by alleged extrajudicial killings, collective punishment, and insufficient accountability mechanisms. Allegrozzi said such trends point to broader issues of military indiscipline that risk undermining the effectiveness of security operations.

Widespread civilian casualties linked to state forces could have significant strategic consequences, analysts said. Beyond the immediate human cost, such incidents may erode public trust in governments and create conditions that enable militant groups to strengthen their narratives and expand recruitment.

Insurgent organisations operating in the Sahel have long sought to portray themselves as alternatives to state authority, particularly in rural and marginalised regions. Reports of abuses by national armies may reinforce these narratives, complicating efforts to restore state legitimacy and control.

The situation also carries implications for international engagement in the region. The United States has signalled interest in improving relations with Sahelian governments, even as Burkina Faso and Mali have distanced themselves from traditional Western partners, including France, following their respective coups.

However, allegations of human rights violations could complicate diplomatic and security cooperation.Both Burkina Faso and Mali have undergone significant political transitions in recent years, with military juntas assuming power amid rising insecurity. These governments have prioritised aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns, often relying on local militias and volunteer forces to supplement national armies.

Rights groups have repeatedly raised concerns about the conduct of these auxiliary forces, which are frequently accused of targeting civilians suspected of supporting or collaborating with jihadist groups. Such accusations are difficult to verify independently in many cases due to restricted access to conflict zones and limited transparency from authorities.

Spokespeople for the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Similarly, neither the Burkinabe government nor the Sharia Committee of JNIM in Burkina Faso responded to inquiries from Human Rights Watch regarding the allegations.

The reported pattern of violence reflects the complexity of the conflict environment in the Sahel, where distinguishing between combatants and civilians is often challenging. Armed groups operate in remote areas with limited state presence, and local populations are frequently caught between competing forces.

Despite these challenges, analysts stress that adherence to international humanitarian law remains essential for maintaining credibility and effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations. Failure to do so, they say, risks perpetuating cycles of violence that ultimately benefit insurgent groups.

The findings add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that military-led approaches alone may be insufficient to address the root causes of instability in the region. Issues such as governance deficits, economic marginalisation, and intercommunal tensions continue to fuel conflict dynamics across the Sahel.

As Burkina Faso and Mali navigate their security challenges, the conduct of their armed forces is likely to remain under scrutiny from international observers and rights organisations.

The balance between combating insurgency and protecting civilian populations is expected to be a key factor shaping both domestic legitimacy and external partnerships.

Nairobi/Dakar (Reuters) – A decade-long United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali is set to end on June 30, diplomats said on Tuesday, ahead of a Security Council vote on a draft resolution – seen by Reuters – that will give the 13,000-strong operation six months to withdraw.

The planned end of the MINUSMA mission follows years of tensions between the U.N. and Mali’s military junta that came to a head this month when Mali Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop asked the force to leave “without delay”.

It would mean an abrupt halt to an operation that has been hobbled by government restrictions since Mali teamed up with Russia’s Wagner mercenary group in 2021. The U.N. mission is credited with playing a vital role in protecting civilians against an Islamist insurgency that has killed thousands.

Some experts fear the security situation could worsen when the mission departs, leaving Mali’s under-equipped army alone with about 1,000 Wagner fighters to combat militants who control swaths of territory in the desert north and centre.

Wagner’s operations have also been under question, after the group staged an aborted mutiny at home in Russia on Saturday. Its boss Yevgeny Prigozhin has said the group has been given permission to operate out of Belarus.

Under the draft text, MINUSMA would have until Dec. 31 to undertake an “orderly and safe” withdrawal, which the Security Council would review by Oct. 30. The council could then, if needed, “consider a revised timeline in discussion with Mali.”

Its operations would be pared down to providing security to U.N. personnel, facilities and convoys. MINUSMA would provide medical evacuations to U.N. staff.

But the draft text would also authorize MINUSMA, until the end of the year and – when and where possible – in consultation with Malian authorities, “to respond to imminent threats of violence to civilians and contribute to the safe civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance in its immediate vicinity.”

The French-drafted resolution is still being discussed by the 15 council members, but diplomats said no major changes are expected before a planned vote to adopt it on Thursday. To pass, the resolution needs at least nine votes in favour and no vetoes by Russia, China, the United States, Britain or France.

A Sudden End

Russia and China have long been seen as sceptical of MINUSMA, while support for the mission has begun to ebb from Western countries since 2021, with Britain, Germany and Sweden announcing they would pull their troops out. France had a separate force in Mali, but withdrew it last year after disagreements with the government.

A MINUSMA spokesperson declined to comment. Malian authorities did not respond to a request for comment.

A UN peacekeeping spokesperson said: “Subject to the decision of the Security Council, the United Nations is ready to work with the Malian authorities on an exit plan for MINUSMA.”

He said that internal discussions were underway.

MINUSMA was launched in 2013 after separatist rebels and al Qaeda-linked insurgents occupied northern Mali. French troops forced the militants to retreat but they regrouped. Mali has since become the epicentre of a violent movement that has spread across West Africa and forced millions to flee.

More than 170 peacekeepers have died in fighting, making MINUSMA the U.N.’s deadliest ongoing combat mission.

The U.N. had been expected to extend its mandate for another year this month, before Mali asked it to leave.

The force has been criticised by Mali’s military leaders, who consolidated power over two coups in 2020 and 2021, and by civilians, for not doing more to stem the bloodshed.

The U.N. has repeatedly complained that restrictions on troop and aircraft movements had stopped it from fulfilling its mandate, including investigating alleged rights abuses by Wagner and Mali’s army, allegations they deny.

Still, many African nations wanted MINUSMA to stay and even increase its troop numbers, they said in discussions this year.

It has protected cities including Gao and Timbuktu that are surrounded by militants, provided medical evacuations for Malian soldiers, and flown government officials across the country to avoid driving in conflict zones.

It has coordinated talks between rival armed groups in the north following a 2015 peace agreement known as the Algiers Accords, which signatories now say could fail, and was helping arrange presidential elections scheduled for next year that some hope will see a return to civilian rule.

Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop made the request during a U.N. Security Council meeting on Friday, citing a “crisis of confidence” between Malian authorities and the decade-long U.N. mission known as MINUSMA.

“The United States regrets the transition government of Mali’s decision to revoke its consent for MINUSMA,” State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said. “MINUSMA’s drawdown must be orderly and responsible, prioritizing the safety and security of peacekeepers and Malians.”

“We are concerned about the effects this decision will have on the security and humanitarian crises impacting the Malian people,” he said in a statement.

Mali has struggled to stem an Islamist insurgency that took root following an uprising in 2012. MINUSMA was deployed by the U.N. Security Council in 2013 to support foreign and local efforts to restore stability.

Frustrations over the growing insecurity spurred two coups in 2020 and 2021, and the ruling junta has been increasingly at loggerheads with MINUSMA and other international allies, including France.

The junta has burned bridges with traditional Western allies and turned to Russia for help boosting its military capabilities.

The United States “will continue to work with our partners in West Africa to help them tackle the urgent security and governance challenges they face,” Miller said. “We welcome further consultations with regional leaders on additional steps to promote stability and prevent conflict.”

U.N. Security Council members had started to discuss a draft resolution to extend MINUSMA’s mandate, which expires on June 30. It was unclear what would happen now.

The U.N. special envoy to Mali, El-Ghassim Wane, said on Friday it would be “extremely challenging, if not impossible” to operate in a country without the government authorities’ consent.

The majority of MINUSMA’s remaining soldiers are supplied by African nations.

Mali’s unexpected demand for the departure of U.N. peacekeepers may herald a sudden end to a decade-long mission that has struggled to protect civilians and its own troops, raising fears the country could slide deeper into chaos amid an Islamist insurgency and the possible revival of a separatist uprising.

The U.N. mission, known as MINUSMA, has been hobbled by restrictions on its air and ground operations since Mali’s ruling junta joined forces with Russian military contractor Wagner Group in 2021, limiting its effectiveness against an Islamist insurgency that took root a decade ago and has since spread across West Africa.

Despite the restrictions, MINUSMA’s 13,000-strong force has held the line in northern cities including Gao and Timbuktu that are surrounded by militants. It patrols camps for displaced people, which come under frequent attack, and provides medical evacuations for Mali’s under-equipped army.

And it has also helped to placate Tuareg-led rebels in northern Mali, who halted their separatist uprising with the 2015 Algiers Accord.

It is unclear how quickly U.N. troops could leave following Mali’s request on Friday. But, if and when they do, Bamako will be alone with about 1,000 Wagner soldiers to battle the militants linked to Islamic State and al Qaeda, who have killed thousands of civilians and soldiers and control large swathes of the country’s desert north and centre.

“If you leave, you have anarchy and civil war, especially against civilians and the weak,” Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, a former Mauritanian foreign minister who served as a top U.N. official in West Africa and now runs a regional think-tank, said on Friday. “If you stay, you are almost discredited.”

A spokesman for the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), the Tuareg-led northern rebel alliance, said a UN withdrawal would be premature because the peace deal had not been fully implemented and would threaten stability across the Sahel. He said, however, the CMA had not yet reached an official position.

Relations between the U.N. and Mali’s junta, which consolidated power in two coups in 2020 and 2021, have frayed for years. Bamako wanted MINUSMA to become a more active fighting force to counter the Islamist threat, which the U.N. said was not part of its mission. U.N. officials, meanwhile, pushed for greater freedoms to protect civilians and investigate rights abuses by militants, the army and, more recently, Wagner.

Ties reached breaking point last month when U.N investigators released a report accusing the army and “armed white men” of massacring 500 people in the town of Moura in March 2022. Mali, Russia and Wagner deny wrongdoing in Moura or targeting civilians anywhere in Mali.

The U.N. has repeatedly said that the constraints imposed by the junta have stopped it from fulfilling its mission. Mali frequently denied or delayed permission for MINUSMA to move in combat zones, it said, making it less able to respond to civilians under attack or swiftly probe abuses.

Mali’s government and army did not respond to requests for comment.

Frustrated by the restrictions, Western and African diplomats called for change this year. However, following a review of the mission in January, U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres last week rejected a proposal for a surge of up to 3,600 more troops, which Mali’s African neighbours had pushed for, as well as an alternative proposal that would have shrunk MINUSMA to a political mission in Bamako.

Instead, he proposed extending the mandate for the force with only a few tweaks, including closing some small northern bases.

On June 14, the Malian government issued a statement rejecting all the proposals. Then on Friday, Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop told a U.N. security council meeting that there had been “a crisis of confidence between Malian authorities and MINUSMA” and the force should leave “right away”.

The 15-member U.N. Security Council was scheduled to renew MINUSMA’s mandate before it expires on June 30. Reuters could not immediately determine whether the council – where Russia has a veto as one of the 5 permanent members – will now vote for a renewal, or how long it would take to conclude an orderly withdrawal of the mission if there was no extension.

On Friday, in response to Mali’s announcement, MINUSMA’s head El-Ghassim Wane told reporters that peacekeepers can only operate with consent from the host country: without that, the mission is “impossible,” he said.

MINUSMA spokesperson Fatoumata Sinkoun Kaba declined to comment on the logistics of any withdrawal and said the mission would follow Security Council mandates.

Restrictions

MINUSMA launched in 2013 after the separatist rebels and al Qaeda-linked insurgents occupied northern Mali. French troops forced the militants to retreat but they bounced back. More than 170 peacekeepers have died in fighting, making MINUSMA the U.N.’s deadliest combat mission.

Violence has spread into neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, creating one of the world’s fastest-growing humanitarian crises.

Mali’s junta promised stability when it snatched power; it took an anti-French stance and deepened ties with Russia. By the end of 2021, Wagner had deployed.

Within weeks, Mali imposed the flight restrictions. Reuters was unable to determine whether the move was linked to Wagner’s presence. It mirrors past U.N. flight restrictions in Central African Republic, where Wagner also operates.

Bamako and the Kremlin say Russian troops, not Wagner mercenaries, are present in Mali but only to train the army and supply equipment.

Mali’s army spokesman, Colonel Souleymane Dembelé, told Reuters this year that restrictions on MINUSMA were retaliation for a no-fly zone imposed by French forces last year. Paris denies this.

By mid-2022, restrictions prevented the U.N. from operating unscheduled flights over 70,000 square kilometres of Mali, according to an internal U.N. report from the middle of last year reviewed by Reuters. Nearly 500 U.N. flight requests – one in four – have been denied this year, according to Security Council figures.

“MINUSMA is another peacekeeping lame duck. The mission couldn’t fulfil the expectations of the population,” said Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel programme at the Konrad Adenauer foundation.

Frustrated, countries including the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden, which provided some of the best trained soldiers, have announced troop withdrawals amounting to more than 20 percent of the mission. France, which had a separate task force in Mali, withdrew its remaining 2,400 troops in 2022, including the air support it gave the U.N.

The majority of MINUSMA’s remaining soldiers are supplied by African nations.

Three of four units of MINUSMA’s elite mobile task force are not operational, the Security Council said in a March 30 report. In July, Egypt suspended its MINUSMA activities because of attacks on its troops. For nearly a year, its 1,072 soldiers have been stuck in base.

A document prepared in April by the U.N. Department of Peace Operations detailed a string of units – from armed helicopters and airfield support to infantry and intelligence – that MINUSMA lacked.

Heart And Minds

MINUSMA still plays a significant role in Mali. Its $1 billion budget has created thousands of jobs and provided local support by erecting streets lights or police stations in a country whose economy has been crippled by coup-related sanctions imposed by its neighbours.

It helped organise a constitutional referendum on Sunday meant to pave the way to presidential elections next year.

Crucially, it has coordinated peace talks between rival armed groups in the north, the U.N. and security officials said.

A senior U.N. official, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the situation, said Tuareg leaders had indicated that the withdrawal of the UN mission could lead to the collapse of the Algiers Accord, which marked the official end of a four-year armed uprising that seized large parts of northern Mali – with repercussions felt across the region.

Ould Mohamed Ramdane, spokesperson for CMA rebel alliance, said that in addition to its role in ongoing talks, MINUSMA had brought “calm and security” to areas where it was deployed and had dispensed a lot of humanitarian aid in northern Mali.

“We all think that its withdrawal will have a major impact on the northern localities but also on stability throughout the Sahel,” Ramdane said.

“The threat of resumption of violence with the former separatists is looming again,” said Yvan Guichaoua, senior lecturer at the Brussels school of international studies, referring to the fallout from MINUSMA’s expected departure. In addition to the loss of its security forces, the withdrawal of U.N. investigative teams would increase the risk of impunity for human rights abuses during the conflict, he said.

Attacks on civilians surged in the year after Wagner arrived. At least 750 were killed during joint operations carried out by Wagner and Mali’s military during that period, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, a U.S.-based research group. Sixty civilians died in military operations in the year before Wagner came.

Restrictions in MINUSMA’s movements have meant the mission has become more and more focused in recent years on protecting itself. A U.S. official, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the situation, said 90% of troop operations are focused on securing its own bases and defending peacekeepers.

As a result, MINUSMA has struggled to counter a tide of anti-U.N. posts online, losing the battle for public opinion in Mali. In a recent survey of nearly 2,300 Malians conducted by German political foundation Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 72% blamed MINUSMA for not protecting civilians.

Over 90% said they had confidence in Russia to support Mali in the fight against Islamists.

All of those killed and wounded in Saturday’s blasts were civilians, Yacouba Maiga, the spokesperson, told Reuters by phone. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack.

Mali is the epicentre of a violent insurgency that took root in its arid north following a Tuareg separatist rebellion in 2012, and Sevare is home to a major Mali military base and troops from the U.N. mission in Mali.

Since the rebellion, militants with links to al Qaeda and Islamic State have spread to countries in the Sahel region south of the Sahara and more recently to coastal states, seizing territory, killing thousands and uprooting millions in the process.

Images shared on social media showed several buildings including a petrol station destroyed by the blast, as well as injured people being given assistance. Reuters could not independently verify the images.

The attack comes two days after the chief of staff of Mali’s interim president, and three others were killed in an ambush.

Earlier on Saturday, the West African country’s government said in a statement read on national television that “a terrorist attack” had been stopped by the army in Sevare.

“Three vehicles filled with explosives were destroyed by army drone fire,” the statement said, without giving further details on casualties.

Separately on Saturday, the Malian army said in a statement that a military helicopter returning from a mission had crashed in a residential neighbourhood in the capital, Bamako, and that it was assessing the crash site.

Since October 23, pro-Russian and pro-Wagner accounts on social media have been sharing a video that claims to prove France is arming jihadists in Mali.

The narrative that France supports terrorism in Mali is common among users spreading anti-Western misinformation online. We tell you more in this edition of Truth or Fake.

Under pressure from the military, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta “IBK” and Prime Minister Boubou Cissé resigned before being arrested by the military. So, is this an “institutional coup”? But how then to qualify it as “institutional”?

Some argue that overall, coups aren’t what they used to be.

The classic military coup, for instance, is abrupt, illegal, and involves an element of force.

The second type, a self-coup (autogolpe) involves a government that came to power through legitimate democratic means but increasingly erodes institutions, freedoms, and democratic safeguards to perpetuate its own power. (Venezuela, and increasingly, Turkey, are prime example of that).

Third, a post-modern coup, involves the use of behind-the-scenes pressure, political maneuvering, and leaks to the media to bring down a government.

Then there is the “hybrid coup” in which the military takes control but provides some level of legal fiction to justify these measures to the public and to the international community.

The 2012 coup in Mali followed the “classic” coup d’etat scenario, but the latest chain of events are indicative of a more complex path. The reason for that may be the perceived inherent frailty of military regimes – but that does not explain the continuity of the junta rule in Algeria. Another explanation is that due to the 24/7 media cycle there is now an expectation of some democratic formalities to avoid scrutiny and pressure from democratic watchdogs and the weaponized human rights organizations. Finally, the involvement of multiple agendas and actors behind the scenes have turned the military in this case from an independent self-interested actor into, at least in part, a tool of foreign interests. For that reason, there is a mixture of elements of all of the aforementioned scenarios.

It is the president of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) in Mali, Colonel Assimi Goita, who explains and claims that the occurrence was, in fact, a “classic coup” in his first outing and public interview. When he refused the qualifier of coup d’etat, on the basis of a constitutional analysis, to propose its reading in favor of an “institutional coup”, Colonel Assimi Goita, held the attention of media, handling both redundancy and oxymoron. He was trying to claim that this was merely a “parliamentary”/political coup, a scenario in  which the head of state is confronted by his own government, and resigns, as a result of political pressure.  In fact, the formula, as presented here, is a contradiction at odds with reality. The use of military was present and visible, and the unrest allegedly over corruption-related issues was visible to the public eye for weeks prior to the final reckoning. The coup in Mali will likely have consequences for the stability of the Sahel region in West Africa. But also security concerns for the EU, the United States and the Arab world, because of the vacuum that the Islamists will seek to exploit.

There are five main Islamist groups in Mali; they have been at the forefront of the news since the 2012 coup and operations which followed. These groups are Ansar Dine,  Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Signed-in-Blood battalion, and the Islamic Movement for Azawad (MA), which consists of the Islamist Tuareg separatists. Some are fully international, some are local, and some seek to spread Islamism across the continent. Some are focused on the idea of a Caliphate, while others claim to be liberating Mali from the yoke of the French colonialism and repression. Over time, however, new groups have added to the fray of the best-known actors, such as the 2019 attacks on the Fulani herders by radicals dressed as ethnic Dogon hunters.

The blame was placed on a Dogon self-defense group reacting to local grievances against the ethnic-majority country, but Islamists have exploited these inequalities to align with local movements and to attract them into the radical, Islamist following, which they claim would provide a solution to their local issues through the pursuit of caliphate and religiously imposed justice. As a result of these attacks, hundreds of civilians were killed including pregnant women. This absorption of local ethnic conflicts and tensions by Islamists opened yet another front in Mali, and yet another avenue for extremists to enter the mainstream and to cause internal destabilization..

France, Algeria and Morocco, more than most European and Maghrebian actors involved in anti-terrorist operations in the Sahel, have a vested interest in what is happening in Mali, as the latest events could have an effect destabilizing for the whole region and hurting their political and economic interests. Currently, more than half of Malian territory is occupied by armed Islamist groups, whose influence extends beyond the border to neighboring countries Niger and Burkina Faso.The coup is no surprise, but the culmination of contested elections, rampant government corruption and days of unrest. Worse yet, since 2012, Mali has been rocked by a succession of clashes with armed Islamist groups and in a vicious cycle of conflict after a military coup. The recent coup has many similarities with that of 2012, including unrest and popular resentment towards the government. The French military intervention since 2013, with more than 5,000 soldiers deployed on the ground in 2020, has failed to prevent either the presence of the Islamists or the coup d’etat.

And this has of course a cost, in addition to mobilizing French, German, Italian and American military resources for the stabilization of the country, the UN spends one billion euros per year to maintain 15,000 soldiers there.

Coded messages between Colonel Assimi Goita and King Mohammed VI

Upon receiving Hassan Naciri, at the Kati military camp (15 km from Bamako), Colonel Assimi Goita recalled that the Moroccan ambassador was the first diplomat to make contact, on Thursday, August 20, with the new strongman of Mali. The Russian ambassador was not far away, while the Algerian and other actors were probably in ambush. Natural resources and strategic position of Mali, oblige!

Mali is a depository of gold, bauxite, manganese, iron ore, limestone, phosphates, and uranium. Smugglers looking for revenue have been attracted to Mali for thousands of years; however, in more recent times, the interests of  armed groups and terrorist organizations in finding alternative to currency traceable by banks made Mali of particular value to these organizations and their associated criminal syndicates. Uranium, of course, is of a special interest to Iran; therefore, there is reason to believe that the Islamic Republic may benefit from the ongoing chaos and instability, and is at the very least looking to have some influence over the government or over the forces with access to the deposits. Even more concerning is the distinct possibility of Iran funding these radicalized groups and even local interests, otherwise of little direct value to the Iranian agenda, precisely for the purpose of gaining uninhibited access to these deposits, as well as sources of funding for its shadow economy, especially after the dissolution of the JCPOA, and an increasing crackdown by the United States.

A few years ago, what analysts describe as “proxy wars” between Iran and Saudi Arabia, opened yet another theater of war in the country. However, the focus has mostly been thorugh ideological outreach in schools, mosques, and cultural centers. However, since the ascent of the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has moved a great deal away from proselytization in mosques, and despite investing heavily in humanitarian and educational outreach, prefers to operate indirectly, through joint programming with local imams, and support for individual initiatives. Moreover, the war in Yemen has taken a great deal of focus away from these developments in Africa, which means Iran’s activities go virtually unchallenged. The French and others have been focused almost entirely on combat; Morocco’s educational outreach has been the primary path to combating the extremism emanating from both the Sunni and Shi’a camps. Where the Saudis have left off, the Qataris have been all too happy to take over and provide an alternative. They too have been investing into ideological outreach and humanitarian activism through Qatar Foundation International.

Qatar’s involvement in Mali goes back to the events of 2012-2013, starting with the first coup and continuing with the French operations. Though at the time, hard evidence of Qatar’s involvement in the funding, recruitment, and training of Al-Qaeda elements and Ansar Dine was hard to come by, reports that Qatar, at the very least, was playing both sides and more likely siding with these Islamist elements against France, the US, and various European allies, certainly raised that point. The French government pointed to Qatar’s vested interested in extending its influence in the region, and its use of the rebels and terrorists to advance its agenda, particularly in Northern Mali. Islamist groups capitalizied on the instability resulted from the 2012 to gain control of the territory in the North, and embedding themselves there. Qatar had expressed objections to French presence in Mali at the time, given that the French-led operations would have jeopardized the spread of fundamentalism across Africa, and would have thwarted the political victories of Doha’s local allies. 

In addition to Al Qaeda and other Islamist groups, Qatar was accused of funding Touareg separatists who had been previously weaponized against state actors in Sahara by Muammar Gaddhafi, and in the following years also embraced by Turkey’s Erdogan, who had made an alliance with Qatar and shared similar goals The Tuareg separatists are secularists; however, this strategy of supporting various groups which may otherwise have nothing to in common with each other to advance its final objective, is part for the course for Qatar (which has also funded both the right wing and left wing press in Western countries, and has lobbied with politicians on both sides of the aisle). Furthermore, Qatar contributed to the pile on of outreach efforts by establishing its own NGOs throughout Mali. Even before KSA took a step back from active engagement in soft power efforts, Qatar was at the forefront of building Islamist madrassas, schools, and various centers. Qatar at the time was already making significant strives elsewhere in the region, including with the short-lived Morsi regime in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, and as experts describe it, was “deeply entrenched” in Northern Mali. Was Qatar aiming to become a mediator among various rebel factions and Islamists, France, Algeria, and the country’s government? 

If that was the case, Qatar’s complex regional efforts did not contradict the accusations of funding terrorists, as Qatar’s actions have been consistent in that regard in other fronts, including in Yemen, Afghanistan,  Libya, with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Syria, where Qatar simultaneously was linked to various jihadist groups while also attempting to position itself as a diplomatic power broker and mediator. Far from being deterred by continuing military action, as late as 2019, Qatar was observed continuing to provide military aid to its allies – in other words, anyone who could be helpful in securing Qatar’s influencer status. For instance, at one point, Doha airlifted 24 armored vehicles to Mali. Qatar claimed that this aid would help the government fund terrorism; at the same time, however, it continued to be linked to the funding of terrorists groups. This raised questions whether Qatar, was in fact, covering all bases in the event the government would fall and one of the factions came to power, or whether it was deliberately, instigating violence and conflict that would benefits its own entrenchment in the region and help spread radical ideas and ensure consistent support. Qatar was also looking to find new markets for its economy in Africa, and to secure access to precious and rare earth metals, and rich mineral deposits.

Several things are striking concerning Qatar’s role in Mali. First, while the concern about Qatar’s threat to French interests is legitimate, the only French politicians who raised are affiliated with populist right wing parties, known to be linked to Russia, which is an economic competitor to Qatar, and itself has vested – and historic- interests of having a significant political presence, even dominion, in Africa. Second, overall despite all these countless reports of Qatar’s duplicitous and unhelpful role in Mali, not one country has provided firm public evidence of Qatar’s nefarious activity, and to the extent that reports concerning this issue were publicized, the discussion or public debate about Qatar’s role has been relatively muted and certainly has not led to more concerted and high level investigative efforts. Third, even a limited coup in Mali is beneficial to Qatar, and yet the French did nothing to stop it.

Have France and Qatar come to a temporary alliance and agreement in their joint efforts to edge Morocco’s influence out of Mali, as France seems dedicated to cementing and monopolizing its traditional influence in the region? Or is France so beholden to Qatari interests internally (as are many other European countries, and even, to some extent, the United States – even more so now than in 2012 after many billions in investments dedicated by Emir Tamim who had since displaced his father), that challenging Qatar’s self-serving alliances was not to be spoken of, even though any battle against terrorism and extremism is contingent on cutting off sources of revenue and ideological influences, of which Doha surely is at least a contributing factor?
These issues will be explored in more depth in our book, but meanwhile, the growing evidence of France’s willingness to prioritize its competition for influence with Morocco even over its security agenda is becoming more striking.

From now on, France is in competition and leading a campaign of denigration against Morocco, has a good chance of being part of the Malian problem; from that perspective, the royal coup could save the furniture – the appearances and the political infrastructure beneficial to France’s commitments – , for lack of anything better. So the royal message has been decrypted correctly. The rest of the words exchanged concern diplomacy!

However, the passage attracts attention: “The president of the CNSP informed the Moroccan diplomat of the confidence and appeasement measures taken, indicating that the political transition will be debated between the different components of Malian society”. And this too: “the Kingdom of Morocco was and remains engaged” (Communiqué published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Morocco). Case to be continued …

The game of foreign powers in the face of geopolitical realities

The mineral resources of the Sahel zone create intense competition between several actors. These resources include oil, gold, and uranium.
Two projects clash against a backdrop of energy issues: a Chinese project and a European project (France in the lead).
This competitive game could be turned upside down by the powers which have an influence in Libya (Turkey, Russia, Egypt, etc.) which could serve as a point of support for an opening up to the Mediterranean. Turkey’s interests in energy, in addition to its political and ideological interests, are some of the factors driving the spread of its influence all over North Africa, not just in Libya. 

Muslim powers and the emergence of terrorist groups

Behind this emergence, would hide the nostalgia of certain Muslim powers for the old Muslim empires of the 19th century. It is on this ethno-political reality that Islamist extremism thrives. This emergence of radical jihadist Islam in Africa and the Sahel is part of a competition and calculations of rivalry supported by the Gulf countries (increasingly more UAE and Qatar than Saudi Arabia) and Pakistan for a dual objective: Oppose Iranian Shiite influence which exploits a large diaspora, especially Lebanese; in addition to Hezbullah’s organized crime connections, smuggling activities, terrorist operations, abductions, and various active measures aimed at radicalizing or converting local populations. Counter the penetration of Europeans and neutralize the ideas conveyed by the evangelists in the region.

In addition some of the jihadist fighters in the various Sahel extremist organizations have been radicalized in Pakistan. Because of this interference, the African Muslim community has become a breeding ground for jihadists and terrorist groups likely to destabilize states and traditional Islamic societies. Under the guise of the fight against terrorism and incidentally against organized crime, the foreign powers covet, in reality, natural resources and better still, aim, in the long term, by means of a militarization of the Sahelian space to achieve the goal to control and oust rival powers (Turkey, Iran, China, Russia, India, Brazil etc.). 

For now, however, Qatar is backing Turkey in everything that it is doing, and Turkey, in turn, is willing to cut deals with Russia in Libya and elsewhere, so long as it can continue advancing its agenda. While Qatar is striving to become a gas monopoly, Turkey and Qatar have also increasingly coordinated their activities, even revolutionary religious outreach, with Iran and its proxies, to avoid clashes in the region, and in order to be more effective in ousting the Europeans. US, and UAE. Qatar, together with the United States, aims to cut Europe off from Russia (the main supplier of gas to the Europeans). It has a well-established strategy: After Libya and its important energy resources, it is manipulating Islamist groups to extend its influence in the Sahel (Mauritania and Mali). His technique: the policy of the Arab Spring as a business fund to destabilize states and the exploitation of regional natural resources.

Algerian or Moroccan leadership in the Sahelian space?

Algeria had the advantage of asserting its position through the Algiers Accord signed on March 1, 2015 by the most important players in the Malian sphere of influence, excluding the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). But this is stillborn agreement for reasons explained in our book.

Destabilizing factors

The failure of the political and economic governance of Sahelian States, corruption, the instrumentalisation of identity, ethnic and religious referents, droughts, economic and social precariousness, the lack of future prospects for young people, trafficking in all genres, drugs, weapons, Islamist terrorism, interference by external powers to control wealth (oil, gas, uranium, iron, gold, copper, tin, phosphate, etc.), environmental weaknesses fueling tensions between sedentary and nomads, finally the consequences of the Libyan conflict. These stressors are fueled by the presence and circulation of a financial windfall, held by terrorist and organized crime groups.

Sahelian G5

The Sahelian theater, part of a field of confrontation, forces stakeholders to think about a collective response: On February 16, 2014, the Sahelian G5 was created in Nouakchott, associating Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. All of these countries, however, having weak and corrupt governments and dealing with assorted sectarian issues, have come to depend heavily on European funding. This coalition has proven to be highly ineffective in combating these threats, whether separately or together. Furthermore, lack of pressure and tools to reform by the external governments propping up these regimes has exacerbated popular dissatisfaction, thereby increasing sectarianism and further weakening the political infrastructure. Perhaps in the future, those who have vested interest in keep rogue regimes and extremist groups out of power and sphere of influence, should reevaluate their approach.

The above article is the extract from the book: The Underbelly of the Moroccan Kingdom’s Diplomacy: Between Issue, Crises and Challenges in religion and security, Chapter V: Morocco and the African continent.

Irina Tsukerman is a Human Rights and National Security Attorney based in New York. She has written extensively on geopolitics and US foreign policy for a variety of American, Israeli, and other international publications. She can be followed under @irinatsukerman.

Anis El Okbani is an entrepreneur based in NY, a Morocco and National Security analyst, and a specialist in geopolitics and strategy.

Events in the Arab world, and in particular the fall of the Libyan regime of Gaddafi, have only reinforced the security vacuum in the Sahel-Saharan zone. The crisis in Mali will ease the security risks due to terrorist networks. At the same time, foreign military interventions in the region (Serval, Sangaris) demonstrate the priority that European states give to security risks in the region.

The chief among them has been France, which in 2013 launched Operation Serval to push back a terrorist incursion in the North. This was followed by other such counterterrorist and security support operations in 2014 and mid-July 2020, in the weeks leading up to the coup. Combat operations in the Sahel to repel the sprawling terrorist infrastructure continued in the years leading up to these events, with the United States joining the fray alongside France in Niger and other areas of operation.

While the Operation Barhkhane launched in 2014 continued for the years to come and the bulk of it was handled by troops, other governments such as Denmark, United Kingdom, and Estonia contributed helicopters and various air lift equipment and troops to the effort. Despite the involvement of at least ten European countries, support by various international institutions, the involvement of NATO, and US backing, however, the challenges remained great for a number of reasons.

First is the issue of the logistical integration of these forces. Quite simply, despite the dedication of the French and other troops, and the contribution of sophisticated equipment, running such operations in a hostile environment is a challenge, and even joint training exercises elsewhere are not a substitute for dealing day in and out with complex asymmetrical challenges.

Second, is the corruption of weak local government, which have spent a great deal of the money dedicated towards counterinsurgency elsewhere, to the point that European countries have decided to reallocate this funding towards direct involvement on the ground. Corrupt and weak governments are not well position to provide the logistical support, intelligence, and manpower needed to address these challenges.

Third refers to conflicting visions for the future of Sahel. European states and their US partners are not operating in an isolated environment but rather rely on the goodwill and interests of neighboring states. However, other African countries have their interests and agendas, and perhaps, have a different perspective on the security challenges and the proliferation of jihadist groups. Competing intelligence groups and defense mechanisms contribute to the proliferation of issues, and create additional political tensions. Both the financial and the human resources dedicated to  these operations, without a doubt, have been substantial and to some degree successful; hundreds of terrorists have been liquidated by France alone.

This did not prevent the coup d’etat in Mali. The reasons are known, the main one being the corruption of the regime. However, as others point, out the problems in Mali are deep-rooted; the political corruption permeates the system and the political culture, getting rid of the head of state will not change these issues overnight.

For the countries of North Africa, including Morocco (which we cite as a practical example), the developments in the Sahelo-Saharan zone (which range from banditry to jihadist Salafism, including separatism and power conflicts as well as drought, desertification and the food crisis) have become one of their toughest challenges in terms of security policy. These concerns must be tackled alongside the interests of the EU and other European countries involved in the operation and in agreement with them.

The case of Morocco
Morocco and South-South Cooperation

Morocco has made its choice: south-south cooperation.
King Mohamed VI has placed Morocco at the heart of South-South cooperation and at the service of Africa, committing both financially and politically to African development.

For their part, Moroccan entrepreneurs include an African component in their strategy in several forms: subsidiaries, partnerships, hubs, co-development, etc. All of these joint ventures are blossoming all over the continent, thanks to Morocco’s overall foreign policy direction, which also guides the focus of business efforts. Moroccans see the African pivot as an opportunity to invest into promising rising entrepreneurial hubs, evading continuous dependency on EU, which is also facing economic challenges. For some, this direction also carries the promise of leaving the yoke of colonialist baggage behind.

Expertise fueling these growing efforts has been acquired over time through Morocco’s strategic partnership with Europe. This partnership has been upgraded and boosted with cash infusions in 2019 with regards to various forms of cooperation, including on security and development.

Morocco-Africa: Royal diplomacy

The pivotal moment for Morocco’s strategic policy reorientation can be inferred from the founding speech of King Mohammed VI for South-South cooperation on February 24, 2014. Since then, Morocco has been moving away from identifying itself with the Middle East and had increasingly sought to integrate into the African Union and to realign its political and cultural priorities accordingly.

What are the Challenges?

The stakes are high: Morocco can take advantage of its geographical location and its strategic relations with its European, American, Gulf and Mediterranean trading partners to position itself as an economic and financial hub towards the African continent.

Royal diplomacy has never been at the heart of the news, due to the exceptional visibility of King Mohamed VI in Africa. In other words, the diplomats who would otherwise be carrying out various implementation task related to the strategic fulfillment of this mission relied on King Mohammed VI’s high level involvement with heads of states to put in motion high level policies which would then trickle down to be executed by officials. But the ironing out of specific diplomatic details ended up being neglected in the process.

Goals

The objective of the programs seemed clear and sufficiently beneficial: Serving as a bulwark against extremism and religious terrorism, exploring business opportunities on a promising continent, strengthening Moroccan regional leadership. However, as a result of diplomatic non-involvement and failure to negotiate good deals on a practical level beyond high level agreements, which were supposed to serve as a lodestar, not a substitute for professional diplomacy. Morocco has paid dearly for this competition at the level of the former colonies of France. The return on these diplomatic efforts has been at the risk of cancellation through foreign backed meddling, such as the recent coup in Mali. This could partly explain the media campaign led by Paris against Rabat.

Religious cooperation: A competition between Morocco and Mali

Moroccan Islam described as “Islam of the golden mean”

Former Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and King Mohammed VI signed a Memorandum of Understanding on September 20, 2013 on the training of imams which enabled the establishment of a training program for 500 imams over a period of two years. This training, carried out in 2 years, devoted mainly to the study of the Malikite rite and the moral doctrine which rejects any form of excommunication. We have had an opportunity to visit the imam training center in Morocco and to witness in person the type of curriculum such imams would be exposed to and take back to their countries. It is a diverse and enriching program, which also teaches about other religions, and gives the trainees access to obtaining practical skills in addition to theological grounding.

Between Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar and Mali (and also the region)

Saudi Arabia and Iran: Both countries had funded religious missions and charitable activities to spread their Salafist and Shiite beliefs respectively and exert ideological and religious influence in the region. This was particular concerning before 2017, when Saudi Arabia had moved to enforce the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood influence over Islam in the Kingdom and curtailed any activities which could be perceived as extremist. Much of its humanitarian and theological outreach in Africa is now being handled through the Muslim World League (MWL), which has dedicated its mission to promoting tolerance in its own manner.

However, Qatar (Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood), and its counterpart in African outreach, Turkey, have not undergone any form of reform or liberalization, and on the country had doubled down on investing into Islamist institutions and ideology in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, they are pandering to certain constituencies by critiquing the Moroccan programming and Saudi reforms as forms of heresy.

Failure of Moroccan intelligence services in Mali

Like other countries, including mainly France, Morocco has done everything to strengthen its importance as a state capable of contributing to the securing, stabilization and development of the Sahelo-Saharan region. These contributions would develop in an exceptional way on the basis of its intelligence services, deemed competent according to a certain Moroccan press and the testimonies of certain officers. But this effort failed, for reasons which remain an enigma. Our sources murmur one of the reasons: a certain purge at the level of foreign affairs, in particular. Some diplomats, who dream of taking the place of the technocrat Nasser Bourita (the Foreign Minister), whom they deem “non-political and …”, spend more time publishing “Tribunes” (and other outlets of that sort) than performing the more challenging and less visibly rewarding tasks of that profession. Other services are made conspicuous by their absence.

But King Mohamed VI has a winning card

According to our sources, this card demonstrated, despite its bitterness and its problems with the Makhzen (the Moroccan system), its availability, through nationalism to use its moral authority and its networks in Mali and elsewhere, in the service of Morocco.
We cannot disclose the identity of this personality at his request. “Security obliges”. However, we can share that this individual is the most influential and respected leader still alive since Youssoufi.

Irina Tsukerman is a New-York based Human Rights Lawyer, and National Security Analyst. She tweets under @irinatsukerman.

D. Blumann is a New York based international serial entrepreneur, Geo-Strategist and National Security Analyst.