Pakistan now stands at a critical juncture. It can continue to treat Afghanistan as a battleground, striking across the border and relying on force to push back the militants.

For over four decades, Pakistan bet its security strategy on one idea: that Afghanistan could be controlled and turned into a “strategic depth” against India. The military and political elite in Islamabad treated Kabul as a buffer and a playground — a state to be manipulated through compliant regimes and proxy jihadist groups.

Militant networks were nurtured as instruments of foreign policy, and Pakistan believed this would secure influence across the region and check India’s power. Instead, the very forces Islamabad once empowered have turned against it. In 2025, the grand doctrine of strategic depth lies in ruins — a self-inflicted disaster now driving Pakistan’s worst security crisis in years.

Rather than securing Pakistan, Afghanistan has become the epicentre of the very dangers Islamabad once believed it could manage or manipulate. What was once perceived as an asset has now become a trap. The transformation of Afghanistan from strategic depth to strategic liability has unfolded gradually, but the past two years have made the shift undeniable.

When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, Pakistan was widely seen as the external actor poised to benefit the most. Many within Islamabad believed that a Taliban government, because of historical ties, would be cooperative, deferential, and dependent. But that assumption now looks dangerously misplaced.

The Taliban’s political priorities have changed, their sources of external support have diversified, and their internal legitimacy depends on projecting a strong, independent stance — especially against Pakistan, which many ordinary Afghans still view with suspicion. Instead of shaping Afghan behaviour, Pakistan now finds itself confronting a volatile neighbour whose rulers no longer feel obliged to accommodate Pakistani interests.

Militant Blowback and a Hardening Border

Nowhere is this reversal clearer than in the surge of militant activity targeting Pakistan from Afghan soil. Over the past year, Pakistan has experienced a marked increase in terrorist attacks carried out by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and associated networks. Security reports from 2024 and 2025 indicated that many attackers either crossed over from Afghanistan or were trained and sheltered there.

Pakistani officials have repeatedly stated that a significant percentage of suicide bombers involved in major attacks were Afghan nationals. The data, while varying between sources, consistently shows a dangerous trend that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has become increasingly porous to extremist infiltration, and many of these groups feel emboldened by their close ideological ties to the Afghan Taliban.

This is the central irony of Pakistan’s predicament. The militant ecosystem that Islamabad once supported for regional leverage has now splintered in ways that work against Pakistan itself. The TTP, originally an offshoot of groups nurtured under earlier Afghan policies, now treats Pakistan as its primary enemy.

Pakistan’s own creation has turned against its creator. The militancy that Islamabad once believed could be contained beyond its borders has now penetrated deep inside — striking security convoys, police units, and civilian targets with growing regularity. The blowback is undeniable.

In response, Pakistan has increasingly resorted to military actions along — and across — the Afghan border. Throughout 2024 and into 2025, Pakistan conducted a series of cross-border artillery strikes and air raids targeting what it described as TTP safe havens. In several cases, those strikes hit areas inside Afghanistan, killing not only militants but also civilians, including women and children. These incidents have sharply escalated diplomatic tensions.

Kabul has issued multiple condemnations, arguing that Pakistan is violating Afghan sovereignty and inflaming anti-Pakistan sentiment among the Afghan population. What Islamabad once framed as necessary counterterror operations are now seen by many Afghans as external aggression, deepening hostility that already runs high.

Border clashes have also intensified. In late 2024 and through out 2025, firefights between Pakistani forces and Taliban border units became frequent, sometimes lasting hours. Pakistani officials reported significant casualties on their side, and Afghan authorities claimed similar losses.

The AfPak border — once envisioned as a controllable frontier from which Pakistan could extend influence — has hardened into one of the most militarized and unstable fault lines in South Asia. Instead of projecting strength, Pakistan finds itself in a defensive posture, its troops stretched and its internal security architecture under strain.

Diminishing Diplomatic Leverage and Growing Vulnerability

Diplomacy has not eased the tensions. Attempts at negotiation, including several rounds of high-level talks in 2024 and 2025, produced only limited agreements focused on border management and intelligence sharing. These arrangements have struggled to translate into real cooperation on the ground. The Taliban government maintains that it does not control the TTP, insisting that the group operates independently.

Pakistani officials reject that claim, arguing that nothing of significance can operate in Afghanistan without at least tacit Taliban approval. The resulting stalemate has left both countries locked in a cycle of accusation and retaliation.

Pakistan’s broader regional standing has also been affected. The international community has expressed growing concern about the escalating border violence, with several countries calling for restraint and renewed dialogue. Islamabad, once positioned as a key interlocutor between the Taliban and the West, now finds its diplomatic leverage diminished.

Meanwhile, the Taliban have sought new partnerships — particularly with regional powers seeking economic or strategic opportunities in Afghanistan. This reduces Pakistan’s ability to shape events in Kabul and signals a fundamental shift in the balance of influence.

The implications for Pakistan’s internal security are profound. The resurgence of terrorism within its borders has strained provincial administrations, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Police forces remain under-equipped, despite repeated calls for better resources. Public frustration is rising, particularly as attacks occur with worrying frequency.

Many citizens question the effectiveness of Pakistan’s long-standing policies toward Afghanistan and ask whether the sacrifices of the past two decades — military operations, casualties, and massive financial costs — have led to greater safety or merely deeper vulnerability.

The broader economic situation compounds the crisis. Pakistan’s financial struggles, including high inflation, energy shortages, and slow GDP growth, make it increasingly difficult to sustain prolonged military readiness along a volatile border. The costs of counterinsurgency operations, refugees’ management, and security infrastructure rise steadily even as state revenues remain limited.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan shows no sign of curbing the groups hostile to Pakistan. This asymmetry — a costly security burden with no cooperative counterpart in Kabul — underscores how Pakistan’s strategic depth has morphed into a strategic trap.

A Strategic Concept in Collapse

Yet the most troubling dimension of this trap is conceptual. Pakistan’s Afghan policy relied on assumptions that no longer hold: that Kabul could be influenced through patronage that militant groups could be calibrated for strategic use, and that Afghanistan’s internal dynamics would remain subordinate to Pakistani interests. The reality of 2025 contradicts each of these assumptions.

The Taliban now make decisions independently. Militant groups have become ideological actors rather than controllable proxies. Afghan nationalism, sharpened by decades of conflict, rejects external interference from any quarter — especially from Pakistan. The strategic logic underpinning decades of policy has evaporated, but its consequences persist.

Pakistan now stands at a critical juncture. It can continue to treat Afghanistan as a battleground, striking across the border and relying on force to push back the militants. But this would deepen the cycle of violence, alienating Afghan society further, and entrenching hostile networks.

Alternatively, Pakistan could pursue a significant recalibration — acknowledging the limits of influence, dismantling the remnants of proxy structures, and treating Afghanistan as a sovereign neighbour rather than a proxy regime. Such a shift would require political courage and institutional consensus, both of which have historically been fragile when it comes to Pakistan. But without such a rethinking, Pakistan risks sinking deeper into the trap of its own making.

The strategic depth that Islamabad long prized has become an illusion. Afghanistan is no longer a pliable sphere of influence but a source of hostility capable of undermining Pakistan’s security from within. The militants once cultivated as assets have become liabilities. The border once seen as a shield has become a wound. Pakistan’s Afghan dilemma is no longer about losing influence; it is about preventing the fallout from a potent threat to its own stability.

The question facing Pakistan in 2025 is not whether Afghanistan can be controlled but whether Pakistan can escape the strategic trap created by decades of miscalculation. Whether it will recalibrate before the trap tightens further is a question that will impact the region’s future also.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

For Saudi Arabia, the pact is fundamentally about protecting its sovereignty and deterrence posture in a region fraught with volatility.

On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan formalized a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in Riyadh during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s state visit. The pact commits both nations to treat any act of aggression against one as an attack against both.

Headlines around the world quickly framed this as a significant geopolitical move. Yet a closer examination reveals a more nuanced reality: the pact is as much about perception as it is about military strategy, serving primarily Riyadh’s security interests while providing Pakistan a temporary boost on the global stage.

For Saudi Arabia, the pact is fundamentally about protecting its sovereignty and deterrence posture in a region fraught with volatility. The Kingdom has faced multiple security threats over the past two decades, from proxy conflicts in Yemen to missile and drone attacks from regional adversaries.

Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Salman underscored this perspective when he said, “Any aggressor who seeks to destabilize Saudi Arabia or Pakistan must know that their aggression will be met with a united front.”

While some observers interpret such statements as signaling offensive ambition, the context suggests otherwise. The timing coincided with an Arab-Islamic summit in Doha addressing concerns about sudden military escalations in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia’s Enduring Reliance on Western Defense Architecture

Despite its ambitions for regional leadership and vast oil wealth, Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities remain fundamentally dependent on Western powers. The United States is the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor, with over $129 billion in active arms deals under the Foreign Military Sales program.

These include advanced systems such as F-15SA fighter jets, THAAD and Patriot missile defense batteries, M1A2 Abrams tanks, and AWACS surveillance aircraft. American personnel routinely train Saudi forces in targeting protocols, civilian casualty mitigation, and operational planning.

In 2019, the U.S. deployed more than 2,700 troops to Saudi Arabia to bolster air and missile defenses amid rising threats from Iran-backed militias—a deployment that underscored Riyadh’s inability to independently deter regional adversaries.

The United Kingdom also plays a significant role, supplying Eurofighter Typhoons and providing technical training to Saudi pilots and ground forces. These Western alliances are not merely transactional; they are embedded in the Kingdom’s defense doctrine. Saudi Arabia’s military procurement, intelligence sharing, and strategic planning are deeply integrated with NATO standards and U.S. operational frameworks.

The western alignment is not diminishing. While Saudi Arabia has sought to diversify its partnerships—engaging with China, Russia, India, and other regional actors—the backbone of its defense remains Western.

The recent pact with Pakistan does not alter this reality. Instead, it supplements Riyadh’s deterrence posture with symbolic Islamic solidarity, while operational alignment on the West continues unabated.

Pakistan’s Rental-Army Service: From Jordan to Bahrain

Pakistan’s military has long served as a readily deployable force, offering manpower, training, and strategic support in exchange for financial aid and diplomatic backing.

This arrangement dates back to the 1970s, when Brigadier Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq—later Pakistan’s president—was stationed in Jordan during the Black September conflict. Zia reportedly led operations against Palestinian factions, helping King Hussein suppress internal dissent. This intervention marked Pakistan’s first major military engagement in Arab internal security.

During the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, Pakistan assured Saudi Arabia that any attack on the Kingdom would be treated as an attack on Pakistan. Though never formalized, this political assurance laid the groundwork for future cooperation.

Pakistani troops were rented in Saudi Arabia throughout the decade, providing training and advisory support. In the 1990s, Pakistan rented out thousands of its troops to Saudi Arabia and the UAE during the Gulf War, tasked primarily with internal security and logistics rather than frontline combat.

Perhaps the most recent example of Pakistan’s military outsourcing and renting occurred during the 2011 Iran-backed Shia uprising in Bahrain. As part of the Arab Spring, Bahrain’s Shia majority protested under the auspices of Iran.

In response, the Bahraini government—backed by Saudi Arabia—launched a crackdown. Pakistani media began running recruitment ads for the Bahrain National Guard, seeking former army drill instructors, anti-riot experts, and military police. Within months, over 2,500 Pakistani ex-servicemen were deployed to Manama, increasing the size of Bahrain’s riot police and National Guard by nearly 50%.

The recruitment was facilitated by the Fauji Foundation, a Pakistani conglomerate with deep ties to the military establishment. This episode starkly illustrated Pakistan’s willingness to export and rent its military labor for fellow the Muslim nations.

Strategic Desperation and Institutional Incentives

Pakistan’s willingness to serve as a deployable military partner is driven not by strategic foresight but by economic desperation and institutional self-interest. The country’s economy is in deep crisis.

In 2025 alone, multinational corporations including Microsoft, Shell, Pfizer, and Yamaha exited Pakistan due to political instability, regulatory dysfunction, and currency depreciation. Foreign reserves have plummeted, and debt obligations to the IMF exceed $13.5 billion. Amid this collapse, military outsourcing offers a revenue stream and diplomatic leverage.

The Pakistan Army operates over 50 commercial entities, with assets exceeding $39.8 billion. This military–industrial complex incentivizes external deployments that enhance institutional autonomy and profitability.

Moreover, Pakistan’s strategic doctrine—rooted in Cold War geopolitics—emphasizes influence in neighboring regions, particularly Afghanistan and the Gulf. Military deployments serve this doctrine, allowing Pakistan to project power and maintain relevance in Islamic geopolitics.

The Pakistan Army remains the most powerful institution in the country, often overshadowing civilian governments. Its ability to independently negotiate defense arrangements with foreign states positions it as a transnational actor, capable of shaping foreign policy through military diplomacy.

Yet this autonomy has come at a cost: Pakistan’s military prestige is increasingly tied to mercenary service rather than strategic innovation.

Symbolism Without Substance

The Saudi–Pakistan defence pact, while dramatic in language, does not alter the fundamental asymmetry between the two nations. Saudi Arabia gains a nuclear-armed partner for symbolic deterrence, while Pakistan gains temporary validation amid domestic chaos.

The agreement institutionalizes a relationship that has existed informally for decades, offering symbolism without strategic transformation.

Saudi Arabia’s primary security concerns remain focused on Israel after the recent Qatar episode, and internal dissent—not South Asian dynamics. The pact offers Riyadh a layer of Islamic solidarity, but operational reliance continues to rest on U.S. air defense systems, intelligence networks, and strategic cover.

Pakistan’s role is supportive, symbolic, and ultimately disposable.

In essence, the pact reinforces Saudi Arabia’s broader security posture, complementing its existing defense architecture without compromising its strategic autonomy.

For Riyadh, it is a calculated move—strengthening deterrence through symbolic alignment while remaining anchored to its robust Western partnerships.

For Pakistan, however, the agreement underscores a familiar pattern: seeking relevance through external validation rather than internal reform. It reflects a deeper structural imbalance—where one state consolidates its position through strategic foresight, and the other continues to outsource its military for short-term survival

Unless Pakistan embarks on deep reforms, prioritizes rule of law, and restores investor confidence, the exits will only accelerate.

Pakistan’s economy, once hailed as an “emerging market” with vast potential, is now facing a crisis so deep that global corporations are fleeing in unprecedented numbers. The latest blow came earlier this month when Yamaha Motor Pakistan announced it would cease motorcycle production, adding its name to the growing list of multinationals abandoning the country. Far from being a matter of shifting corporate strategy, these exits signal something far more alarming: a structural collapse that has transformed Pakistan from a promising investment destination into a corporate graveyard.

Yamaha Joins the Exit Parade

On September 9, 2025, Yamaha Motor Pakistan formally shut down local motorcycle production. The company described the move as a “change in business strategy,” but few inside the industry were surprised. Rising political instability, inconsistent policies, and a suffocating business climate have made it nearly impossible for global companies to operate in Pakistan.

Yamaha’s decision came just weeks after Microsoft stunned the market by closing all its operations after a quarter of a century. In its exit statement, Microsoft cited “political chaos and regulatory risks,” a phrase that now captures the reality confronting every foreign investor in Pakistan.

The symbolic weight of Microsoft’s departure cannot be overstated. For 25 years, the technology giant had endured the turbulence of Pakistan’s markets, adjusting to shifting governments, abrupt regulatory changes, and recurring security challenges. When Microsoft finally decided to pull out, it was not just a loss of jobs or investment—it was a verdict on the country’s inability to provide a stable environment for even the most resilient investors.

Former Pakistani President Arif Alvi admitted that the nation was “swimming in a whirlpool of uncertainty.”

Microsoft’s former country head Jawwad Rehman added that if a global technology leader could no longer sustain itself, then the message to smaller investors was painfully clear: Pakistan had become toxic for business.

The Long List of Departures

The exits of Yamaha and Microsoft are only the most visible in a long procession of corporate departures. Since 2022, more than 21 multinational giants across diverse industries have either scaled down operations or left Pakistan altogether. Shell sold off its stake after years of currency depreciation made profits unsustainable.

Telenor, once a telecom leader in the country, divested its operations amid political turmoil and a shrinking market. Global pharmaceutical giants such as Pfizer, Sanofi, Bayer, Eli Lilly, and Viatris departed, citing everything from regulatory hurdles and corruption in drug approvals to currency volatility and difficulties in profit repatriation.

The ride-hailing sector, once a symbol of Pakistan’s digital promise, also collapsed under economic and political pressures.

Uber, after acquiring Careem, eventually consolidated its operations and then withdrew, blaming the unstable market environment. Energy and industrial players followed the same path: TotalEnergies (through its joint venture PARCO) scaled back investments due to high taxation and governance challenges, while South Korea’s Lotte Chemical left, citing energy shortages and collapsing infrastructure.

Each of these departures has stripped the Pakistani economy of jobs, capital, and credibility. More importantly, every exit has reinforced the perception that Pakistan is no longer safe, stable, or profitable for global business.

Why Are Corporations Leaving?

The causes of this exodus are not limited to cyclical downturns but stem from deep structural weaknesses. Political instability remains at the heart of the problem. Governments rise and fall with alarming frequency, while authoritarian crackdowns and abrupt policy shifts make long-term planning impossible.

Security concerns also weigh heavily, with businesses facing constant threats from terrorism, smuggling economies, and an overall climate of lawlessness. Governance failures further complicate the picture.

Multinationals routinely complain of harassment, bureaucratic red tape, and widespread demands for bribes. The tax regime is another major obstacle, changing dramatically with every budget, leaving corporations unable to predict costs or revenues with any certainty. Energy shortages compound the crisis, with chronic power cuts, fuel scarcity, and decaying logistics infrastructure making industrial production unsustainable.

These structural failures mean that corporations are not simply leaving because of temporary downturns but because they see no prospect of stability or reform.

The Domino Effect on Pakistan’s Economy

The consequences of these departures are devastating. Foreign direct investment has collapsed to record lows, and unemployment continues to rise as thousands lose jobs in the wake of each corporate exit. Capital flight has intensified, creating further pressure on Pakistan’s foreign reserves and aggravating the dollar shortage.

With private capital drying up, Islamabad has grown increasingly dependent on International Monetary Fund bailouts, which bring temporary relief but also deepen cycles of dependency and austerity.

Internationally, Pakistan is no longer seen as an “emerging market” with untapped potential but as a high-risk quagmire. Each departure sends a loud message to the world’s financial centers that the country is unsafe for business, discouraging new investors and undermining whatever confidence remains.

From Tech Hubs to Terror Hubs

The contrast with neighboring India highlights the scale of Pakistan’s decline. While India attracts record-breaking foreign investment in technology, manufacturing, and renewable energy, Pakistan has instead become synonymous with political chaos and military dominance. International investors increasingly view Pakistan as a country where economic policy is dictated not by economists but by generals, and where short-term populism routinely outweighs the need for structural reform.

The promise of Pakistan as a hub for innovation and growth has been replaced with the perception of a nation trapped in its own cycles of instability. For multinationals, the choice has become stark: invest in dynamic, rule-based economies like India or Vietnam, or risk being trapped in Pakistan’s uncertainty.

A Warning Written in Capital Flight

Among all the recent exits, Microsoft’s departure remains the most symbolic. The company’s decision after a quarter of a century served as a warning that Pakistan’s crisis is not just about economics but about governance itself. If one of the world’s most adaptive and resilient technology firms could no longer operate in Pakistan, then few others would dare to try.

For now, officials in Islamabad continue to downplay the exodus as part of “strategic business realignments,” but the evidence tells another story. Multinationals are not leaving because of shifting strategies alone—they are fleeing an environment poisoned by corruption, instability, and insecurity.

Unless Pakistan embarks on deep reforms, prioritizes rule of law, and restores investor confidence, the exits will only accelerate.

The Verdict of Multinationals

The verdict from global corporations is unequivocal. Yamaha, Microsoft, Shell, Pfizer, Sanofi, Uber, and many others did not walk away lightly. They left because Pakistan has become unlivable for multinational investment. Until the state prioritizes stability, good governance, and long-term reform over populist politics and short-term fixes, the exodus will continue unabated.

What was once a dream of economic revival now lies in ruins. For Pakistan, the sound of multinationals packing up is not just an economic story—it is the echo of a damning indictment of its governance failures. Unless the nation changes course, its vision of prosperity will remain nothing more than a mirage.