Five police personnel were killed when their vehicle was ambushed in a coordinated assault, underscoring the persistent failure to contain militant violence despite years of counterterrorism operations.

The attack took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Karak district, an area previously considered relatively insulated from frequent militant strikes.

According to provincial authorities, the police van was first hit by an improvised explosive device before attackers opened fire at close range.

Four police officers and the driver were killed on the spot, reflecting the intensity and precision of the assault.

The attackers managed to strike a moving security target, raising serious questions about intelligence gaps and operational preparedness.

Later, officials stated that security forces killed several militants during follow-up operations, though such claims have become routine and often fail to reassure the public.

The Pakistani Taliban, also known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the attack, reaffirming its ability to strike security forces with alarming ease.

The group has been engaged in a long-running insurgency against the Pakistani state, and its renewed activity signals a dangerous resurgence.

Despite repeated assurances from authorities, militant groups continue to operate with lethal effectiveness in multiple regions.

This latest attack reinforces concerns that counterterrorism strategies have failed to deliver lasting stability.

The killing of police personnel also reflects the heavy human cost borne by frontline security forces.

Police units, often under-resourced and overstretched, remain prime targets for militants seeking to undermine state authority.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif condemned the attack, praising the role of police in combating terrorism.

However, official condemnations have increasingly been seen as symbolic gestures rather than indicators of real policy change.

Public frustration is growing as similar attacks recur with little visible improvement in security conditions.

The Karak incident comes amid deteriorating relations between Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan.

Islamabad has accused militant groups of using Afghan territory to plan and launch attacks, an allegation that has strained diplomatic ties.

Border tensions have escalated following repeated incidents and the collapse of informal ceasefire arrangements.

Since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, Pakistan has faced a sharp increase in cross-border militancy.

Analysts argue that Pakistan’s internal security challenges are closely linked to its regional policy failures.

The inability to effectively manage border security has allowed militant networks to regroup and expand operations.

Local communities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa continue to live under the constant threat of violence, with limited state protection.

The attack has also exposed the risks faced by police officers operating in high-threat environments without adequate support.

Critics say that Pakistan’s security institutions remain reactive rather than preventive in their approach.

Repeated militant strikes damage public trust in the state’s capacity to ensure safety and rule of law.

Economic instability further compounds the problem, diverting resources away from comprehensive security reforms.

The persistence of such attacks suggests that militancy remains deeply entrenched rather than contained.

For many citizens, the loss of police lives reflects a broader governance failure rather than an isolated tragedy.

As militant violence spreads into areas once considered safe, the sense of insecurity continues to deepen.

Without meaningful reforms, improved intelligence coordination, and regional cooperation, Pakistan risks further destabilization.

The Karak attack stands as a grim reminder that the country’s security crisis is far from over.

It also highlights the urgent need for accountability, transparency, and a reassessment of long-standing counterterrorism policies.

Until concrete action replaces rhetoric, Pakistan’s law enforcement personnel will remain exposed, and civilians will continue to bear the consequences of unchecked militancy.

Pakistan now stands at a critical juncture. It can continue to treat Afghanistan as a battleground, striking across the border and relying on force to push back the militants.

For over four decades, Pakistan bet its security strategy on one idea: that Afghanistan could be controlled and turned into a “strategic depth” against India. The military and political elite in Islamabad treated Kabul as a buffer and a playground — a state to be manipulated through compliant regimes and proxy jihadist groups.

Militant networks were nurtured as instruments of foreign policy, and Pakistan believed this would secure influence across the region and check India’s power. Instead, the very forces Islamabad once empowered have turned against it. In 2025, the grand doctrine of strategic depth lies in ruins — a self-inflicted disaster now driving Pakistan’s worst security crisis in years.

Rather than securing Pakistan, Afghanistan has become the epicentre of the very dangers Islamabad once believed it could manage or manipulate. What was once perceived as an asset has now become a trap. The transformation of Afghanistan from strategic depth to strategic liability has unfolded gradually, but the past two years have made the shift undeniable.

When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, Pakistan was widely seen as the external actor poised to benefit the most. Many within Islamabad believed that a Taliban government, because of historical ties, would be cooperative, deferential, and dependent. But that assumption now looks dangerously misplaced.

The Taliban’s political priorities have changed, their sources of external support have diversified, and their internal legitimacy depends on projecting a strong, independent stance — especially against Pakistan, which many ordinary Afghans still view with suspicion. Instead of shaping Afghan behaviour, Pakistan now finds itself confronting a volatile neighbour whose rulers no longer feel obliged to accommodate Pakistani interests.

Militant Blowback and a Hardening Border

Nowhere is this reversal clearer than in the surge of militant activity targeting Pakistan from Afghan soil. Over the past year, Pakistan has experienced a marked increase in terrorist attacks carried out by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and associated networks. Security reports from 2024 and 2025 indicated that many attackers either crossed over from Afghanistan or were trained and sheltered there.

Pakistani officials have repeatedly stated that a significant percentage of suicide bombers involved in major attacks were Afghan nationals. The data, while varying between sources, consistently shows a dangerous trend that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has become increasingly porous to extremist infiltration, and many of these groups feel emboldened by their close ideological ties to the Afghan Taliban.

This is the central irony of Pakistan’s predicament. The militant ecosystem that Islamabad once supported for regional leverage has now splintered in ways that work against Pakistan itself. The TTP, originally an offshoot of groups nurtured under earlier Afghan policies, now treats Pakistan as its primary enemy.

Pakistan’s own creation has turned against its creator. The militancy that Islamabad once believed could be contained beyond its borders has now penetrated deep inside — striking security convoys, police units, and civilian targets with growing regularity. The blowback is undeniable.

In response, Pakistan has increasingly resorted to military actions along — and across — the Afghan border. Throughout 2024 and into 2025, Pakistan conducted a series of cross-border artillery strikes and air raids targeting what it described as TTP safe havens. In several cases, those strikes hit areas inside Afghanistan, killing not only militants but also civilians, including women and children. These incidents have sharply escalated diplomatic tensions.

Kabul has issued multiple condemnations, arguing that Pakistan is violating Afghan sovereignty and inflaming anti-Pakistan sentiment among the Afghan population. What Islamabad once framed as necessary counterterror operations are now seen by many Afghans as external aggression, deepening hostility that already runs high.

Border clashes have also intensified. In late 2024 and through out 2025, firefights between Pakistani forces and Taliban border units became frequent, sometimes lasting hours. Pakistani officials reported significant casualties on their side, and Afghan authorities claimed similar losses.

The AfPak border — once envisioned as a controllable frontier from which Pakistan could extend influence — has hardened into one of the most militarized and unstable fault lines in South Asia. Instead of projecting strength, Pakistan finds itself in a defensive posture, its troops stretched and its internal security architecture under strain.

Diminishing Diplomatic Leverage and Growing Vulnerability

Diplomacy has not eased the tensions. Attempts at negotiation, including several rounds of high-level talks in 2024 and 2025, produced only limited agreements focused on border management and intelligence sharing. These arrangements have struggled to translate into real cooperation on the ground. The Taliban government maintains that it does not control the TTP, insisting that the group operates independently.

Pakistani officials reject that claim, arguing that nothing of significance can operate in Afghanistan without at least tacit Taliban approval. The resulting stalemate has left both countries locked in a cycle of accusation and retaliation.

Pakistan’s broader regional standing has also been affected. The international community has expressed growing concern about the escalating border violence, with several countries calling for restraint and renewed dialogue. Islamabad, once positioned as a key interlocutor between the Taliban and the West, now finds its diplomatic leverage diminished.

Meanwhile, the Taliban have sought new partnerships — particularly with regional powers seeking economic or strategic opportunities in Afghanistan. This reduces Pakistan’s ability to shape events in Kabul and signals a fundamental shift in the balance of influence.

The implications for Pakistan’s internal security are profound. The resurgence of terrorism within its borders has strained provincial administrations, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Police forces remain under-equipped, despite repeated calls for better resources. Public frustration is rising, particularly as attacks occur with worrying frequency.

Many citizens question the effectiveness of Pakistan’s long-standing policies toward Afghanistan and ask whether the sacrifices of the past two decades — military operations, casualties, and massive financial costs — have led to greater safety or merely deeper vulnerability.

The broader economic situation compounds the crisis. Pakistan’s financial struggles, including high inflation, energy shortages, and slow GDP growth, make it increasingly difficult to sustain prolonged military readiness along a volatile border. The costs of counterinsurgency operations, refugees’ management, and security infrastructure rise steadily even as state revenues remain limited.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan shows no sign of curbing the groups hostile to Pakistan. This asymmetry — a costly security burden with no cooperative counterpart in Kabul — underscores how Pakistan’s strategic depth has morphed into a strategic trap.

A Strategic Concept in Collapse

Yet the most troubling dimension of this trap is conceptual. Pakistan’s Afghan policy relied on assumptions that no longer hold: that Kabul could be influenced through patronage that militant groups could be calibrated for strategic use, and that Afghanistan’s internal dynamics would remain subordinate to Pakistani interests. The reality of 2025 contradicts each of these assumptions.

The Taliban now make decisions independently. Militant groups have become ideological actors rather than controllable proxies. Afghan nationalism, sharpened by decades of conflict, rejects external interference from any quarter — especially from Pakistan. The strategic logic underpinning decades of policy has evaporated, but its consequences persist.

Pakistan now stands at a critical juncture. It can continue to treat Afghanistan as a battleground, striking across the border and relying on force to push back the militants. But this would deepen the cycle of violence, alienating Afghan society further, and entrenching hostile networks.

Alternatively, Pakistan could pursue a significant recalibration — acknowledging the limits of influence, dismantling the remnants of proxy structures, and treating Afghanistan as a sovereign neighbour rather than a proxy regime. Such a shift would require political courage and institutional consensus, both of which have historically been fragile when it comes to Pakistan. But without such a rethinking, Pakistan risks sinking deeper into the trap of its own making.

The strategic depth that Islamabad long prized has become an illusion. Afghanistan is no longer a pliable sphere of influence but a source of hostility capable of undermining Pakistan’s security from within. The militants once cultivated as assets have become liabilities. The border once seen as a shield has become a wound. Pakistan’s Afghan dilemma is no longer about losing influence; it is about preventing the fallout from a potent threat to its own stability.

The question facing Pakistan in 2025 is not whether Afghanistan can be controlled but whether Pakistan can escape the strategic trap created by decades of miscalculation. Whether it will recalibrate before the trap tightens further is a question that will impact the region’s future also.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

What Pakistan has surrendered in return is the institutional balance that once provided guardrails against rash escalation.

In Islamabad, history did not turn with a coup or a populist uprising — it changed quietly, with the stroke of a pen. When Pakistan passed its 27th Constitutional Amendment, there were no tanks in the streets, no suspended parliament broadcasts, no dramatic late-night speeches. The move was subtle, almost procedural. Yet, behind its legal language lies the most significant expansion of military authority in the country’s modern history.

While framed as a necessary reform to strengthen national security, the amendment fundamentally restructures Pakistan’s governance model by granting Field Marshal Asim Munir unprecedented authority over the state, the military, and—most critically—Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The legal elevation of Pakistan’s de facto ruler into a constitutionally untouchable position marks a turning point for a country whose political system has long been undermined by military dominance. Now, that dominance is not just entrenched—it is formalized.

The Amendment That Institutionalizes Military Rule

The 27th Amendment establishes a new position, the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF), which consolidates command over the Army, Navy, and Air Force under Munir’s sole leadership. In doing so, it effectively eliminates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the single institution responsible for balancing power across Pakistan’s tri-services.

Even more consequentially, the amendment grants lifetime immunity to five-star officers, placing Munir and future CDFs beyond legal accountability for both military and political decisions. Whereas past military rulers seized power through coups, Munir now commands Pakistan through the constitution itself.

Civilian leaders may occupy government buildings, but the reins of the state security, foreign policy, and strategic decision-making firmly rest with Pakistan’s most powerful general. Seizing power through the 27^th Amendment serves two purposes for Munir. He gets to be the de facto leader of Pakistan’s civil-military regime under law, a privilege previous military dictators did not have, and secondly, Munir gets to save his face, standing up to the reputation of a “legitimate” leader, with whom foreign leaders would not hesitate to engage directly. 

A New Nuclear Command: First country to have a military leader in command of nuclear weapons

Perhaps the most profound shift concerns nuclear oversight. The amendment introduces the position of Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), a role directly under the CDF and responsible for all operational control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Previously, the nuclear launch authority sat within the National Command Authority, where both civilian and military leadership helped maintain a system of shared judgment.

Now, Munir commands the only finger on the button that matters.

This change shortens the chain of command in nuclear decision-making—something Pakistan justifies as necessary for deterrence against India. But a faster chain of command also reduces the time available for deliberation during crises, magnifying the risk of miscalculation. Moreover, placing nuclear authority solely under the Army eliminates institutional checks that are vital in a region marked by frequent militarized crises.

Such a move makes Pakistan the only nuclear country in the world where the sole command to authorize a strike rests with a military officer. Experts have historically warned that centralizing nuclear authority to a single military office poses serious dangers of weakened political oversight and increased risk of misperception and escalation. 

Can Military Centralization Fix Domestic Instability?

Supporters argue that stronger centralized command is essential to confront Pakistan’s rapidly deteriorating internal security environment. Over 1,000 Pakistanis have been killed in terrorist incidents this year, as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), among other militant organizations, regain operational reach and recruits.

Simultaneously, Baloch separatists have intensified attacks against Chinese personnel and critical infrastructure—a trend that threatens Pakistan’s major economic partnerships. Munir’s response has focused not on reforming intelligence agencies or reforming counterinsurgency policies but on kinetic pressure: cross-border missile strikes into Afghanistan, collective punishment in tribal districts, and crackdowns on political dissent framed as counterterrorism.

These operations have failed to reduce militant capabilities. Instead, they have deepened local resentment and produced blowback in the form of increased militant recruitment.

The 27th Amendment gives Munir even more control over internal security, but it does not equip Pakistan with the governance tools needed to address the political grievances driving these insurgencies. Military rule may offer speed and force, but it cannot deliver legitimacy—or peace—on its own.

India’s Deterrence Calculus Has Already Shifted

For decades, Pakistan’s nuclear signaling deterred India from responding militarily to Pakistan-based militant attacks. That strategic reality has changed as India’s ground and air operations over the past decade demonstrate a willingness to escalate even under the shadow of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan’s low-threshold nuclear doctrine—threatening early first use if India attempts even limited operations—has therefore lost credibility in New Delhi.

Munir’s control over nuclear forces may accelerate crisis escalation rather than prevent it. With fewer voices involved in decision-making and a nuclear doctrine that encourages rapid activation, India may find itself forced to preempt or retaliate quickly in a future confrontation.

And in a region where crises often begin with terrorist attacks, Pakistan claims no responsibility for; the risk of miscalculation is not theoretical—it is imminent. As I have recently warned in my analysis for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a terror strike in New Delhi or Kashmir could rapidly transform into a conventional conflict fought under nuclear constraints, which neither state has truly tested.

Conclusion: The Strategic Cost of Militarized Stability

Pakistan’s leaders may believe that empowering the military is the only path to stability, especially amid political turbulence and economic crisis. But this amendment represents a paradox: a move justified in the name of security that may, in practice, make Pakistan—and the region—less secure.

Civilian authority is weakened, nuclear oversight is narrowed, internal grievances are unaddressed, and India’s evolving military posture further undermines Pakistan’s deterrent signaling. Munir now has the authority he has long operated with in practice. What Pakistan has surrendered in return is the institutional balance that once provided guardrails against rash escalation.

Pakistan is now a nuclear-armed country confronted by resurgent insurgencies, political instability, and hostile borders—yet governed by a security model that empowers one military commander with unchecked authority. The 27th Amendment does not strengthen Pakistan’s democracy or make nuclear war less likely. It does the opposite: it increases the speed of decision-making while decreasing the diversity of voices shaping those decisions.

As Pakistan enters this new era of legally sanctioned military supremacy, regional stability hinges on the judgment of a single leader commanding a nuclear arsenal built on a doctrine of early use. For a country defined by volatility, the future now balances on the narrowest margin imaginable.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.