The announcement, made Monday by the Syrian presidency, marks a breakthrough in efforts to reunite the country after more than 13 years of civil war and internal fragmentation. The deal signals the beginning of the end of parallel administrations in Syria’s north and east and reasserts central authority over critical regions long outside Damascus’ direct control.

A statement published by the presidency emphasized that “all civilian and military institutions in the northeast, including border posts, airports, and oil and gas fields, will now be integrated under the administration of the Syrian state.”

State media also released a photograph of President Sharaa shaking hands with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, underlining the significance of the agreement. The document declared that “the Kurdish community is an essential component of the Syrian state” and reaffirmed its rights to full citizenship and constitutional protections.

End of Division?

The agreement comes just days after severe violence erupted in Syria’s coastal Alawite heartland — the community from which former president Bashar al-Assad hailed. This outbreak, sparked by attacks from Assad loyalists, represented the most serious internal security challenge since Assad was ousted in December.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, over 1,000 civilians—primarily Alawites—were killed in a brutal crackdown by new government forces. Additionally, 231 security personnel and 250 pro-Assad fighters lost their lives during the clashes.

Despite the bloodshed, the government declared the operation concluded on Monday and shifted its focus to stabilizing the country through national integration. The timing of the SDF agreement suggests a strategic pivot toward unity, following the decapitation of Assad-era loyalist resistance.

SDF’s Strategic Role

The SDF, which emerged during the civil war as a U.S.-backed force, had established a de facto autonomous administration across much of northern and eastern Syria, including areas rich in oil and gas — resources critical to Syria’s post-war reconstruction.

The group, led largely by Kurdish forces, was instrumental in defeating ISIS in its final territorial stronghold in 2019. However, the SDF’s refusal to disarm had led to their exclusion from a recent national dialogue conference hosted by Syria’s new authorities.

The current agreement, however, offers a compromise: recognition and inclusion in exchange for institutional integration. The document also stresses support from the SDF in the government’s campaign against “remnants of Assad’s forces and all threats to Syria’s unity and security.”

A Reversal of History

For decades under the Assad regime, Syria’s Kurdish population was systematically marginalized. Many were denied citizenship, barred from using their language, and forbidden from celebrating their cultural identity.

The tide turned during the civil war, when the Syrian military’s withdrawal from the north enabled Kurdish groups to establish local governance. Yet, their ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU—complicated relations with regional and international powers.

Despite Ankara’s concerns, the SDF insists it operates independently of the PKK. However, its backbone—the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)—is widely considered by Turkey to be an extension of the PKK. Turkish forces have routinely targeted Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria and supported proxy militias against them.

The agreement with Syria’s new authorities, who have established close ties with Turkey since Assad’s fall, could reduce Ankara’s justification for continued military action—provided the SDF’s integration is fully realized and verified.

A Step Toward Peace?

The timing of this deal is also significant in light of a recent call from jailed PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, urging the group to disband and abandon armed struggle. If realized, the dissolution of the PKK could signal a new era of regional stability, and the SDF’s absorption into Syrian state structures may mark a move away from militia rule toward centralized governance.

While challenges remain, including Turkish military presence and latent sectarian divisions, the agreement could serve as the first genuine blueprint for Syria’s reunification — built not on military might, but on negotiation and mutual recognition.

Syria’s recovery is not just symbolic—it’s strategic. A stable, unified Syria is essential for regional security, refugee returns, and long-term economic integration.

The war in Syria may not be over on paper, but on the ground, the tide has clearly turned. Since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, nearly 250,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey have returned home. This movement is not driven by propaganda or pressure, but by something far more powerful: the hope that Syria, at long last, is stabilizing.

That hope is grounded in real, visible change. The Damascus Stock Exchange has reopened, signaling a cautious but meaningful restart of the formal economy. Finance Minister Mohammed Yisr Barnieh called it a message to the world—that Syria is back in business.

The turning point came on May 13, when U.S. President Donald Trump, during a landmark visit to Riyadh, announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria. Ten days later, the U.S. Treasury issued General License 25, permitting transactions with Syria’s new transitional government, headed by President Ahmad Al-Sharaa. The EU swiftly followed with a coordinated suspension of its own sanctions regime. In less than two weeks, Syria went from pariah to partner in the eyes of global policymakers.

The momentum is not only diplomatic. Gulf states are stepping up. On Saturday, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, speaking from Damascus, announced a joint initiative with Qatar to help fund salaries for Syrian civil servants. These are the sorts of actions that turn ceasefires into recoveries.

And yet, despite these gains, Syria’s path forward still faces one last—and deeply entrenched—obstacle: the PKK-affiliated administration in northeast Syria, branded to the world as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and militarily represented by the PYD and SDF.

Let’s be candid. For years, Western governments, NGOs, and think tanks have celebrated the AANES as a “progressive” alternative in Syria. But the reality on the ground tells a much darker story. Despite controlling vast natural resources, receiving billions in foreign aid, and enjoying unprecedented U.S. military protection, the AANES has delivered little more than corruption, repression, and instability.

Entire Arab and Assyrian communities have been displaced under their watch. Basic services remain in disrepair. Youth conscription, political detentions, and even child recruitment are not allegations—they are documented practices. Many in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hasakah view the AANES not as a government but as an occupying structure—an extension of the PKK’s transnational project, not a legitimate representative of the Syrian people.

This is not just Syria’s internal issue. It’s a regional problem. The longer these entities maintain their grip, the harder it becomes to achieve a unified, sovereign Syrian state capable of rebuilding and reconciling.

To its credit, the transitional government in Damascus has not responded with vengeance. President Al-Sharaa has focused on restoring institutions, rebuilding national infrastructure, and pursuing a post-conflict political identity that moves beyond sectarianism. But these efforts will remain incomplete until all Syrian territories are returned to accountable, sovereign administration.

In this context, the reopening of the U.S. embassy in Damascus sends a powerful signal. Newly appointed American envoy Thomas Barrack—who also serves as the U.S. ambassador to Turkey—raised the American flag over the embassy for the first time since 2012. He praised Syria’s new leadership and openly discussed the prospect of peace between Syria and Israel—once a diplomatic impossibility. Barrack noted that the Caesar Act sanctions must now be repealed by Congress, describing President Trump as impatient with sanctions that obstruct reconstruction.

None of this should be mistaken for instant success. The Syrian state remains fragile. Public sector wages are still well below the cost of living. Corruption, while being addressed, is not yet defeated. And sectarian wounds—especially those left by clashes between pro-Assad remnants and local communities—will take time to heal.

But from my perspective as a European political analyst, this is the first time in years that Syria’s future feels negotiable rather than doomed.

To my Arab readers: Syria’s recovery is not just symbolic—it’s strategic. A stable, unified Syria is essential for regional security, refugee returns, and long-term economic integration.

To Western policymakers: the failed experiment of non-state actors ruling eastern Syria must end. It did not bring democracy. It brought dysfunction. The time has come to support a Syrian solution, not a Kurdish separatist detour funded by Western guilt and strategic confusion.

The Syrian war broke the country. But the outlines of recovery are finally emerging. The world has a choice: engage constructively—or prolong the suffering under the illusion of alternatives that have long since collapsed.

The Turkish military ramped up air strikes in northern Iraq’s PKK bases in Gara, Hakurk, Metina and Qandil, the statement said.

(This story has been corrected to change ministry to defence, not interior, in paragraph 1)

Two PKK fighters were in their vehicle in the town of Chamchamal when the drone hit them, killing one and wounding another, the counter-terrorism service said in a statement.

Another Turkish drone strike killed a PKK fighter and wounded another when it hit their vehicle near the town of Amadiya, close to the Turkish border in Dahuk province, a Kurdish security source, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Turkey regards the PKK as a terrorist group and regularly carries out air strikes in northern Iraq, which has long been outside the direct control of the Baghdad government. It has also has sent commandos to support its offensives.

In a separate incident, unknown gunmen shot dead a Kurdish Peshmerga officer in his vehicle in Erbil on Sunday, a relatively rare attack in the capital of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region.

Iraqi Kurdish security sources said the incident was under investigation without giving more details.

The strike targeted a PKK post in the town of Chamchamal, west of the city of Sulaimaniya, a security source said.

There has been a long-running Turkish campaign in Iraq against militants of the PKK, which is regarded as a terrorist group by Ankara.

Turkey regularly carries out air strikes into northern Iraq, which has long been outside the direct control of the Baghdad government, and has sent commandos to support its offensives.

The five people were in their vehicle in Sharbazher district when the drone hit them, Shaho Othman, mayor of the district said, adding that the vehicle was struck twice within 10 minutes.

There has been a long-running Turkish campaign in Iraq and Syria against militants of the PKK and the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia, which are both regarded as terrorist groups by Ankara.

Turkey regularly carries out air strikes in northern Iraq and has dozens of outposts on Iraqi territory.

Michael Arizanti

PKK distinguished itself by its radical left makeup – and they recruited people from the lower classes…

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is a militant Kurdish libertarian socialistic organization founded by Abdullah (“Apo”) Öcalan in the late 1970s. Although the group initially espoused demands for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, its stated aims were later tempered to call for socialistic autonomy – confederalism with the Iranian and the Turkish states. PYD themselves and the official sources in the U.S. admitted on many occasions that the PYD is the Syrian branch of the PKK. The U.S. then-defense minister Ashton Carter confirmed the substantial ties between PYD and PKK during a testimony before the Senate panel on 28 April 2016.

Background

The name Abdullah Öcalan may not sound familiar to most people, but is known to everybody in Turkey. Writing in KurdishAspect.com in 2007, a columnist named Sosun Welat explicitly accused Öcalan of serving as an agent for MİT and blamed him for perpetrating a “systematic betrayal and treason to [the] Kurdish cause.”

“Öcalan played a double agent role for years,” Welat wrote. “His rise and fall was well planned and controlled by [the] Turkish state. He and PKK provided cover for [the] Turkish state to … destroy [the] Kurdish heartland, its way of life, culture, language.”

Welat and other observers believe that prior to the forming of the PKK, in the mid-1950s, Turkish intelligence infiltrated Kurdish activist groups and helped establish their Communist credentials, thereby providing a legitimate excuse to oppress Kurds in the name of preventing the spread of Communism (which would, of course, please Turkey’s then-new allies in Western Europe and the U.S.).

Then in the 1970s, so the theory goes, Turkish intelligence facilitated the emergence of PKK, hoping to use it as a counterforce that would weaken other Kurdish insurgents. “MİT planned to split Turkish leftist groups by creating (its own) Kurdish leftist group, PKK — but apparently it got out of control,” said Emrullah Uslu, an analyst at the Jamestown Foundation and a professor of political science and international relations at Yeditepe University in Istanbul.

During the 60s and 70s Turkey was going through major social changes. This changes gave proliferation and made different kinds of Kurdish nationalist groups in Turkey very strong and popular. During this time period the PKK emerged, formally founded by Öcalan in the late 1978 as a Marxist organization, that claimed to be dedicated to the creation of an independent Kurdistan. PKK distinguished itself by its radical left makeup – and they recruited people from the lower classes. The group also distinguished itself by its radicalism and espoused violence as a central part of their cause. PKK espoused violence and demonstrated early its willingness to employ force against Kurds perceived as government collaborators and the group espoused violence as a tenet central to its cause and demonstrated early its willingness to employ force against Kurds perceived as government collaborators and against Kurdish organizations who for decades had worked for a free Kurdistan.

In 1979 Öcalan became close to the Syrian Baath party, and he departed Turkey for Syria, where PKK established connection with militant and Palestinian terrorist organizations. In the early 80s made a deal with Palestinian groups for them to provide PKK military training and support. In the early 80s, Kurdistan Democratic Party also made a huge mistake, by allowing the PKK militants to create camps in Qandil mountains, from which PKK launched an armed campaign against Turkey in 1984. This became the start of decades with terrorist acts committed by the PKK in Turkey and across the world. The PKK subsequently perpetrated frequent acts of terrorism and conducted guerrilla operations against a range of targets, including government installations and officials, Turks living in the country’s Kurdish regions, Kurds accused of collaborating with the government, foreigners, and Turkish diplomatic missions abroad.

In the 1990s, the PKK began shifting its goals away from the pursuit of independence outright toward the (in theory) attainment of autonomy and equal treatment within Turkey. Öcalan in particular began articulating a social theory that abandoned the concept of a nation-state as a solution to Kurdish issue.

According to Öcalan’s former right-hand-man, Hüseyin Yıldırım, “Öcalan controls the PKK and the ‘deep state’ controls Öcalan.” As Yıldırım sees it, “Öcalan made an agreement with the ‘deep state’ at İmralı [prison] to save his life.”. This was also indirectly confirmed by Öcalan himself On Aug. 8 2008, when Öcalan addressed the prosecutor of the Ergenekon (Turkish deepstate) trial, there it was made clear that unless the deep state in Turkey has been exhausted, the PKK will survive. It was made clear by Öcalan that the deep state supports PKK violence. As long as the deep state is alive, the PKK will not vanish. If democracy prevails in Turkey.

Assad and PYD

The PYD (Democratic Union Party) emerged as a Syrian “Kurdish” party in 2003, even though forming political parties is illegal under Ba’athist one party rule. Syrian intelligence saw in it a mere restructuring of old PKK members under a more localised leadership, and therefore decided to give them their support. In 2015 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has admitted his regime provided weapons to PYD, “The Kurds are fighting the terrorists with the Syrian army, in the same areas… [They are supported] mainly by the Syrian army, and we have the documents.
“We sent them armaments, because they are Syrian citizens, and they want to fight terrorism. We do the same with many other groups in Syria, because you cannot send the army to every part of Syria. So, it is not only the Kurds. Many other Syrians are doing the same,” Assad said at the time.

Syrians have always been integral to the PKK. Although the regime oppressed its Kurds, it also encouraged them to join the PKK to deflect their local aspirations. An estimated 7,000–10,000 did so. The regime also permitted the PKK to open a Damascus office and to establish training camps in Lebanon’s Beqa Valley under Syrian control.92 A noted Kurdish analyst contended that more than one-third of PKK members are Syrian, according to the Washington Institute.

In 2012 PKK founded the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan, a locally elected assembly to provide social services. The Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) was established as an umbrella organization incorporating the PYD, youth movements, and other PKK organizations. But its key task was to negotiate an ultimately failed powersharing agreement between the PYD and parties loyal to the kurdish cause. In reality, these organizations are PYD facades. This multitude of front organizations has confused Syrian Kurds and contributed to their political apathy. For their part, U.S. officials have noted that there is no difference between the PYD and YPG and the PKK.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.