The Seoul Central District Court found Park guilty of involvement in an insurrection stemming from the short-lived martial law order issued by Yoon in December 2024, according to Yonhap News Agency.

Park’s sentence exceeded the 20-year prison term sought by prosecutors, who argued that he had abused his authority to facilitate the implementation of martial law and undermined the rule of law.

According to prosecutors, Park convened a meeting of senior Justice Ministry officials during the early hours of the martial law declaration and reviewed prison capacity in anticipation of potential arrests of political opponents and government critics.

The court ruled that, as justice minister, Park had instructed officials to cooperate with the martial law command structure on the assumption that its decrees would take effect, Yonhap reported.

The verdict marks the latest conviction arising from Yoon’s controversial declaration of martial law, which lasted approximately six hours before lawmakers entered the National Assembly and voted to overturn the measure during an emergency session.

The move triggered a political and institutional crisis that shook South Korea’s democratic system, sparked nationwide protests and rattled financial markets while drawing concern from key allies, including the United States.

Yoon has since been convicted of leading an insurrection and is appealing a life sentence. Earlier this month, he was also sentenced to 30 years in prison in a separate case after being found guilty of sending drones into North Korea in an alleged attempt to manufacture a security crisis that could justify emergency rule.

Several senior members of Yoon’s administration have also received prison terms.

Former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo is serving a 15-year sentence, while former Interior Minister Lee Sang-min was sentenced to nine years in prison. A former defense minister was jailed last week for three years after being convicted of disclosing classified military information connected to the martial law operation.

Separately, former first lady Kim Keon Hee is serving a four-year prison sentence for stock manipulation and bribery offenses unrelated to the martial law case.

The convictions represent one of the most extensive legal reckonings involving a former South Korean administration since the country’s transition to democratic rule, with prosecutors continuing to pursue accountability for officials involved in the failed attempt to impose emergency military authority.

Canadians were entitled to question India’s evidence and procedures. They were not entitled to pretend that no substantial record existed.

Canada has a remarkable ability to turn a complicated record into a clean symbol.

In June 2024, the House of Commons observed a moment of silence ‘in memory of Hardeep Singh Nijjar’, one year after he was shot dead outside the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara in Surrey.

His killing on Canadian soil demanded investigation, accountability and justice. But remembrance should not require amnesia. If Parliament chose to honour Nijjar, Canadians were entitled to know the full record, not only the version constructed after his death.

Being Canadian is more than possessing a passport. Citizenship establishes legal status; it does not erase conduct or automatically certify civic virtue.

Nijjar’s Canadian story began in February 1997 when, according to Global News, he arrived at Pearson Airport using a fraudulent passport under the name ‘Ravi Sharma’. His refugee claim was rejected after adjudicators questioned parts of his account and documentation.

Eleven days later, he married a British Columbia woman who sponsored him. Immigration authorities rejected the application as a marriage of convenience. He appealed and lost in 2001. Nijjar eventually became a Canadian citizen on May 25, 2007, a date later confirmed publicly by then-immigration minister Marc Miller.

His citizenship was valid. The path preceding it remained relevant when politicians later presented him as an uncomplicated Canadian community leader.

So did his public conduct.

On Facebook, Nijjar posted an image of a revolver described as the ‘choice of a militant Sikh’. The accompanying text referred to keeping the ‘monkey-army’, a slur aimed at Hindus and ‘enemies of religion’ under control.

Video footage also shows Nijjar and supporters blocking access to Indian diplomatic premises in Canada.

In a recorded Sikh Temple speech, he praised the assassinations of Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and former army chief General A.S. Vaidya as acts of militant martyrdom.

Celebrating political assassinations from a religious platform is not peaceful civic leadership. Displaying a firearm alongside dehumanizing language about another community is not pluralism.

When questions arose about Nijjar’s immigration history, Moninder Singh Baul of the BC Gurdwaras Council argued in a circulated video that Canadians had no standing to scrutinize his fraudulent passport or rejected refugee claim because ‘white Canadians came raping and pillaging’.

That did not answer the record. It attempted to place it beyond discussion.

Nijjar’s admirers also situated him within a militant lineage. A May 2024 profile published by the tribute site 1984tribute described him as ‘privileged’ to have developed close relations with Gurdeep Singh Deepa and others connected to the Khalistan Commando Force. It also stated that Jagtar Singh Tara later appointed him leader of the Khalistan Tiger Force.

These were not accusations written by Nijjar’s opponents. They were claims presented approvingly by supporters.

Tara was convicted for his role in the 1995 assassination of Punjab chief minister Beant Singh, the equivalent of a provincial premier in Canada. Describing proximity to such figures as a privilege is difficult to reconcile with the peaceful community-leader portrait later promoted here.

India designated Nijjar an individual terrorist under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act in July 2020. In July 2022, India’s National Investigation Agency announced a reward for information leading to his arrest in a case alleging conspiracy connected to the attempted killing of a Hindu priest in Punjab.

These were Indian allegations and legal designations, not Canadian convictions. Canadians were entitled to question India’s evidence and procedures. They were not entitled to pretend that no substantial record existed.

That record was publicly available. Canadian and international media reported Nijjar’s immigration history, India’s terrorism designation, alleged militant associations, reported no-fly restrictions and criminal allegations. Those reports did not independently prove India’s case. They treated the background as relevant context.

Canadian politicians had access to the same record.

At least 21 MPs from the Liberals, Conservatives, NDP and Bloc Québécois sponsored or seconded Motion M-112, which cited Nijjar’s killing while addressing foreign interference, violence and intimidation.

Defending Canadian sovereignty and demanding accountability for a killing on Canadian soil were entirely proper. Neither required Parliament to empty Nijjar’s life of complexity.

When Justin Trudeau rose in the House of Commons in September 2023, he said Canadian agencies were pursuing ‘credible allegations of a potential link’ between agents of the Indian government and Nijjar’s killing. The language was qualified, but the consequences were immediate. Canada publicly accused another democracy before the underlying evidence had been disclosed or tested in court, damaging a relationship involving trade, security, immigration and millions of people connected to both countries.

Four men were later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy. Reports linked some of the accused to the Bishnoi criminal network. That connection was folded into Canada’s claim that organized crime may have been used as a proxy for foreign interference.

But another possibility has never received equal public scrutiny.

Sources familiar with the circumstances of the case have privately raised the possibility that Nijjar’s death arose from gang-related violence and criminal rivalries rather than a foreign-government operation. That account has not been established in court and cannot yet be treated as proven. But neither has the claim that the Indian government ordered his murder.

The public has not seen the evidence underlying Trudeau’s accusation. No Canadian court has determined the motive for Nijjar’s killing, and no judicial finding has established that India directed it.

That unresolved gap matters. An allegation presented by a prime minister carries enormous political and diplomatic weight, even when the evidence remains secret. Once repeated often enough, a theory can harden into accepted fact before a court has examined it.

Canada maybe eventually proves foreign-state involvement. However, it may also emerge that criminal motives, personal disputes or gang rivalries were at play. Until the evidence is tested, responsible journalism and political leadership require both possibilities to remain open.

Instead, Canada settled quickly on a simplified narrative: Nijjar as a peaceful community leader killed through foreign interference, while his immigration history, militant rhetoric, criminal-network questions and alleged associations remained outside the national conversation.

That narrative reassured a politically organized pro-Khalistan constituency but left Canadians with an incomplete account of both the victim and the investigation. It also exposed Canada to the charge that domestic political considerations shaped the story before the evidence had been tested.

None of this excuses Nijjar’s killing. His death demanded a lawful investigation, and anyone responsible should be prosecuted regardless of his politics, beliefs or history.

But justice after death does not require a politically convenient biography. Nor should undisclosed intelligence be converted into a settled national narrative while credible alternative explanations remain unresolved.

Canada was right to investigate the killing.

It was not required to sanitize the person it chose to honour or ask Canadians to treat one unproven theory as a verdict.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions.

The political unrest witnessed across Pakistan administered Kashmir since 2023 and the parallel grievances emerging in Gilgit-Baltistan represent one of the most significant governance challenges confronting Pakistan in recent years. While public attention has largely focused on the immediate triggers of protests; electricity tariffs, wheat subsidies, inflation and rising costs of living, the underlying causes are far deeper and more structural.

The rise of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has transformed local economic grievances into a broader movement demanding accountability, transparency and political responsiveness. The movement has highlighted growing dissatisfaction regarding governance practices, implementation of government commitments and the perceived disconnect between decision makers and ordinary citizens.

At the same time, recurring protests in Gilgit-Baltistan regarding constitutional status, resource utilisation, development priorities and economic opportunities have exposed similar governance fault lines. Although Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain distinct political entities, both regions demonstrate increasing demands for meaningful participation in decision making and a greater share of economic benefits arising from strategic projects.

The central question confronting Pakistan government is whether existing institutions can adapt to rising public expectations regarding accountability, representation and development.

The mountains of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan have historically been viewed through the lens of geopolitics. However, political developments of the last five years suggest a gradual shift in public priorities.

Increasingly, ordinary citizens are focusing on issues that directly affect their daily lives. The cost of electricity, availability of employment, quality of infrastructure, reliability of public services and effectiveness of governance have become central concerns. These issues have generated a new form of political mobilisation that differs significantly from traditional political movements.

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents perhaps the clearest example of this transformation. Unlike conventional political organisations, JAAC derived its legitimacy not from ideological positions or constitutional debates but from its ability to articulate practical concerns affecting ordinary citizens.

The current unrest should therefore be understood not simply as a reaction to economic hardship but as part of a broader process through which citizens seek greater accountability, responsiveness and participation in governance.

 Rise of  Joint Awami Action Committee

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents one of the most significant political developments in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir in recent years. Unlike traditional political parties, JAAC emerged organically from civil society and grassroots activism. Its origins can be traced to growing public dissatisfaction regarding inflation, rising electricity tariffs and the increasing cost of essential commodities.

Initially, the movement focused on economic concerns. Citizens questioned why regions possessing significant hydropower resources continued to face high electricity costs. Many argued that local populations were not receiving adequate benefits from resources generated within their own territory.

What distinguished JAAC from previous protest movements was its ability to unite diverse segments of society. Traders, transport unions, lawyers, students, labour organisations and civil society groups increasingly coordinated their activities under a common platform.

As demonstrations expanded, the movement’s demands evolved. Economic grievances gradually merged with governance concerns. Protesters began demanding greater transparency, accountability and implementation of previous commitments. Public discourse increasingly focused on whether institutions were capable of responding effectively to citizen concerns.

The rise of JAAC reflects broader regional trends where issue-based movements centered on governance, accountability and public services increasingly challenging the traditional political structures.

Accountability and Crisis of Trust

At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions. Repeated protests indicate growing concern regarding responsiveness, transparency and implementation of commitments. Disputes over agreements reached between protest leaders and authorities have reinforced perceptions that institutions are not adequately accountable. Economic hardship has intensified these concerns, while digital connectivity has enabled citizens to compare governance outcomes across regions and just across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. The resulting crisis is therefore not merely administrative but fundamentally political, centered on legitimacy and public confidence.

POJK and Balochistan: Similar Fault Lines, Different Challenges

Although Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Balochistan differ substantially in history and political context, both reveal recurring debates regarding resource utilisation, local participation and development outcomes. In both regions, citizens frequently question whether the benefits generated from local resources are distributed equitably. Another similarity concerns perceptions of centralised decision making and limited local influence over major policy choices. However, important differences remain. The movement in POJK has largely remained civil and issue based, while Balochistan has experienced a prolonged insurgency alongside political activism. The comparison highlights how governance grievances can evolve into broader political challenges when populations feel excluded from decision making processes.

Lessons from East Pakistan

The history of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 remains a significant lesson in political legitimacy, representation and governance. Historians point to a combination of political exclusion, economic disparities and institutional failures as contributing factors. The contemporary relevance of this experience lies not in drawing direct parallels but in recognising the importance of responsive institutions and public trust. States derive resilience from legitimacy as much as from administrative capacity. The lesson for policymakers is that sustainable stability requires meaningful participation, accountable governance and confidence that institutions represent citizen interests.

Gilgit-Baltistan: Pakistan’s Emerging Strategic Challenge

Gilgit-Baltistan occupies a critical strategic position linking South Asia, Central Asia and China. Its importance has increased significantly with regional connectivity projects and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite this strategic significance, recurring public debates concerning constitutional status, subsidies, electricity shortages, trade restrictions and local participation in development have generated periodic protests. Many residents argue that while the region contributes substantially to national strategic objectives, local communities do not always perceive proportional economic benefits. This tension between strategic priorities and local expectations represents one of the most significant governance challenges facing policymakers.

Comparative Development Across LOC

The digital age has transformed public awareness. Citizens increasingly compare governance outcomes, infrastructure, education, healthcare and economic opportunities across regions mainly in Jammu & Kashmir. Such comparisons influence perceptions of governance effectiveness and political legitimacy. Arguably, comparative narratives has shaped the public expectations and it has placed pressure on Pakistan government to demonstrate tangible development outcomes. Infrastructure, tourism, public services and employment opportunities have become important indicators through which populations evaluate governance performance.

Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma

Pakistan faces a complex challenge in balancing security, development and political responsiveness. Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain strategically important regions. However, democratic protest movements differ fundamentally from conventional security threats. While administrative and security measures may restore temporary stability, long term legitimacy depends upon public confidence, institutional credibility and meaningful participation. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of addressing governance concerns without overt or covert use of Pakistan Army to silence the people by use force or fear of jail.

Future Outlook and Policy Implications

The government of Pakistan immediately needs to restore confidence of the people of the region by increased participation in governance and central institutions. Exploitation of the resources allowed by Pakistan Army and China needs to stop. Failure to address recurring grievances, however, risks perpetuating cycles of protest and mistrust. The broader lesson is that development and governance must progress together. Citizens increasingly expect institutions to be accountable, responsive and capable of delivering measurable improvements in quality of life. Pakistan has to accept the internal challenges first without attributing all its problems to Indian state.

Conclusion

The ongoing protests in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan highlight the growing importance of governance, accountability and public trust in contemporary politics. Economic concerns provided the initial catalyst for mobilisation, but the underlying debate increasingly concerns institutional responsiveness and legitimacy. Sustainable stability will depend not only on strategic considerations but also on the ability of institutions to address citizen expectations through transparent governance, meaningful participation and effective development policies. Pakistan needs to take cue from 1971 on how largescale suppression of homogenous communities can lead to outburst of violent protest. The country needs to look inside rather than involve itself in more that what it can chew.

The findings come two days before rapper-turned politician Balendra Shah is set to be sworn in as prime minister after securing a landslide victory in parliamentary elections triggered by the unrest.

The 970-page report held Oli, 74, responsible for not intervening during hours of firing on the first day of youth-led demonstrations, in which at least 19 Gen Z protesters were killed. Overall, 76 people died and 2,522 were injured during two days of violence, the panel said, broadly aligning with earlier government estimates.

“As the executive head Oli should be held responsible for anything good or bad,” the report stated.The panel also recommended prosecution of former home minister Ramesh Lekhak and then police chief Chandra Kuber Khapung, citing their roles in the handling of the crackdown.

None of the individuals named could be immediately reached for comment.Legal experts said the panel’s findings do not constitute formal charges and must be followed by a criminal investigation before any case is brought to court.“It is not a charge sheet and they cannot be jailed on the basis of this report,” said senior lawyer Dinesh Tripathi.

“There has to be a criminal investigation by police … The government can file the case in the court only after that.”If prosecuted and convicted, those named could face prison terms of up to 10 years, according to the report.

Analysts say the decision on whether to act on the recommendations now rests with Shah, 35, and his Rastriya Swatantra Party, which rose to power on the back of anti-corruption sentiment following the protests.

The panel also called for action against dozens of other officials and security personnel involved in the crackdown. Families of victims have continued to demand accountability for the deaths and injuries during the demonstrations.

Officials have also pointed to comparative international examples to argue that such engagement does not necessarily compromise electoral fairness.

On 12 February 2026, Bangladeshis are scheduled to make two significant choices on the same day: electing the country’s 13th National Parliament and voting in a referendum on proposed constitutional reforms. As polling day approaches, however, a legal challenge before the High Court has raised questions about whether the conditions necessary for a credible and trusted vote are still intact.

The writ petition does not allege wrongdoing by any political party. Instead, it focuses on the conduct of state institutions during an election period — a distinction that has drawn both legal and public attention. At its core is a concern familiar to many democracies: what happens to electoral legitimacy when the boundary between neutral administration and political advocacy becomes blurred?

According to the petition, senior figures associated with the interim administration, along with other state-linked actors, have publicly expressed support for a “Yes” vote in the referendum. The petitioner argues that such actions may be inconsistent with provisions of the Election Code of Conduct and the Representation of the People Order, which are intended to ensure that those exercising executive authority do not influence voter choice during an election period.

A detailed constitutional analysis of the filing outlines these claims and the legal provisions involved (summary here).

One aspect of the case has proven particularly contentious: the alleged use of official government platforms, including a state-run website, to promote a specific referendum outcome. Critics argue that when state infrastructure is used in this way, it risks creating what constitutional lawyers describe as “structural bias” — a situation where the state itself is perceived as an interested party rather than an impartial referee.

These allegations, and the legal remedies sought in response, are outlined in reporting on the petition’s filing (details here).

The petition also places significant emphasis on the role of the Election Commission. It claims that the Commission was formally notified of alleged violations, supported by documentary evidence, but failed to take corrective or preventive measures. Under Bangladesh’s constitution, the Commission is an independent authority charged with safeguarding electoral integrity. Whether inaction in such circumstances constitutes a breach of constitutional duty is now a central question before the court.

Beyond individual actions, the case challenges the decision to hold a parliamentary election and a constitutional referendum on the same day. While not without precedent internationally, the petitioner argues that elections and referendums serve distinct democratic purposes and are governed by different legal standards. Conducting both simultaneously, it is claimed, may heighten voter confusion and complicate the requirement of a level playing field.

An overview of these arguments, as presented to the court, has been publicly reported (background here).

The interim government has rejected the suggestion that its conduct undermines democratic norms. In public statements, it has argued that expressing support for constitutional reform falls within its mandate and is consistent with democratic practice in a transitional context. Officials have also pointed to comparative international examples to argue that such engagement does not necessarily compromise electoral fairness.

The government’s position has been summarised in independent constitutional commentary (see overview here).

Procedurally, some related petitions have been returned or deferred by the courts without substantive hearings, citing workload and jurisdictional considerations. These decisions have not resolved the underlying issues, which continue to be debated both inside and outside legal circles.

What makes this moment particularly sensitive is not only the legal complexity, but the question of trust. Elections draw legitimacy not simply from compliance with procedural rules, but from public confidence that those rules apply equally to all participants — including the state itself. When that confidence weakens, even technically valid electoral processes can struggle to command broad acceptance.

Bangladesh has experienced contested elections before, and its institutions have navigated periods of intense political strain. The present challenge, however, raises broader questions about how neutrality is defined and enforced during political transitions. The court’s eventual ruling may therefore carry implications beyond the immediate electoral calendar, shaping expectations of institutional conduct in future contests.

Ultimately, the court’s decision will not just determine the fate of one election or referendum. It will help clarify how Bangladesh defines neutrality in moments of political transition, and how resilient its constitutional guardrails remain under pressure. In democracies everywhere, trust in the process is often harder to rebuild than laws themselves — and once eroded, it can linger long after the ballots are counted.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The removal of long-time leader Nicolas Maduro marks a dramatic shift in the country’s governance and signals the beginning of a complex transition period.

For more than a decade, Venezuela navigated profound challenges under a centralized system that resisted both internal dissent and external diplomatic pressure.

Economic contraction, widespread poverty, and mass migration became defining features of daily life for millions of Venezuelans.

International pressure intensified in recent years as sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and security measures aimed to push political change.

These actions steadily reshaped the balance of power and altered the global posture toward Caracas.

The sudden intervention announced by Washington has fundamentally altered Venezuela’s political equation and ended Maduro’s extended hold on power.

The move reflects a broader recalibration of U.S. strategy toward Latin America, with governance and regional stability placed at the forefront.

Maduro’s leadership style was shaped by confrontation, ideological loyalty, and a persistent narrative of resistance against foreign influence.

Supporters viewed him as a symbol of defiance, while critics saw his rule as synonymous with repression and mismanagement.

Venezuela’s political institutions weakened over time, as trust eroded and elections faced widespread scrutiny from international observers.

Public protests were met with force, deepening social divisions and further isolating the country diplomatically.

Human rights organizations repeatedly raised concerns over detentions, restrictions on political freedoms, and the use of security forces.

These issues became central to global criticism and amplified calls for accountability and reform.

The humanitarian impact of Venezuela’s crisis has been severe, with millions leaving the country in search of stability and opportunity.

Neighboring nations absorbed waves of migrants, transforming the crisis into a regional challenge.

Maduro’s personal journey from union activism and public transport work to the presidency shaped his populist political identity.

He rose through the ranks of government under the mentorship of Hugo Chávez, inheriting a movement rooted in socialist ideology.

Yet governing proved far more difficult than mobilizing support, particularly after oil revenues declined sharply.

Economic controls and subsidies that once fueled popularity became unsustainable under changing global conditions.

Inflation, shortages, and currency instability steadily eroded public confidence and economic resilience.

Attempts to maintain control increasingly relied on security forces rather than economic reform.

International sanctions further strained state finances, limiting access to global markets and investment.

The government framed these measures as economic warfare, reinforcing a narrative of external blame.

Recent developments now place Venezuela at a crossroads, with global attention focused on the shape of its political future.

The prospect of a managed transition raises hopes for institutional rebuilding and economic recovery.

Key challenges ahead include restoring public trust, addressing humanitarian needs, and stabilizing the economy.

Reintegrating Venezuela into regional and global systems will require credible reforms and inclusive governance.

The international community is closely watching how leadership changes translate into real improvements on the ground.

For Venezuelans, the moment carries both uncertainty and cautious optimism after years of hardship.

The coming months will determine whether this shift becomes a foundation for renewal or another chapter of instability.

Venezuela’s future now depends on dialogue, accountability, and the willingness to place national recovery above political rivalry.

Announced by the government in London, the initiative reflects a broader effort to modernise democratic safeguards and ensure that political processes remain free from covert external influence.

Officials emphasised that the review is not only a response to past incidents but also a proactive measure designed to future-proof Britain’s democratic institutions in a rapidly changing global environment.

By commissioning an independent probe, the government has underlined its belief that openness and accountability are essential pillars of public trust in governance.

The review will examine how foreign funding may attempt to shape political discourse and decision-making, while recommending stronger oversight mechanisms where necessary.

Leaders across the political spectrum have noted that such scrutiny ultimately benefits all parties by ensuring a level playing field grounded in democratic values.

The move also aligns the UK with other major democracies that are strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks to counter external interference in political systems.

Government representatives have framed the review as an opportunity to reinforce ethical standards rather than undermine political participation or debate.

By addressing vulnerabilities directly, policymakers aim to enhance resilience against financial manipulation without restricting legitimate international engagement.

The initiative signals a broader recognition that modern political influence can operate subtly through financial channels, requiring equally sophisticated safeguards.

Experts believe that the review could lead to clearer rules on transparency, improved reporting requirements, and stronger enforcement powers for oversight bodies.

Such reforms are expected to bolster public confidence, particularly at a time when trust in institutions is closely linked to perceptions of integrity and fairness.

The government has stressed that the review will be evidence-based and independently conducted, ensuring credibility and impartiality in its findings.

This approach reflects a wider commitment to the rule of law and democratic norms that have long underpinned the UK’s political culture.

Observers have welcomed the initiative as a constructive response that focuses on solutions rather than political blame or division.

By addressing the issue openly, the UK positions itself as a leader in democratic governance and institutional self-correction.

The review also highlights the importance of vigilance in an interconnected world where political and financial interests often cross borders.

Safeguarding democracy, officials argue, requires continuous evaluation and adaptation to new forms of influence and risk.

Civil society groups and policy analysts are expected to contribute perspectives that will enrich the review and its final recommendations.

This inclusive approach aims to ensure that reforms are practical, balanced, and respectful of democratic freedoms.

As the review progresses, it is likely to inform future legislation and regulatory guidance aimed at strengthening political finance rules.

The government has reiterated that protecting democratic integrity is a shared responsibility involving institutions, political actors, and citizens alike.

By initiating this process, the UK sends a clear message that transparency and accountability remain central to its democratic identity.

The outcome is expected to reinforce confidence at home and abroad in the robustness of Britain’s political system.

This situation also reflects a collapse of the justice system. A culture of impunity has taken root, eroding public faith in the legal system.

For the first time in Bangladesh’s history, an interim government has been formed under the leadership of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Many hoped this government would end political unrest and repression, ushering in a new era of good governance and justice. Yet, in just ten months, this government has become synonymous with suffering and disillusionment for ordinary citizens.

On July 9, 2025, in the heart of Old Dhaka, the brutal broad-daylight murder of a businessman was not merely a homicide—it was a stark, naked revelation of state failure. This failure goes beyond the cruelty of the act or the audacity of the perpetrators. It is rooted in the government’s silence, the inaction of the administration, and, above all, the arrogance of criminals operating under political protection.

The details of the incident expose extreme brutality. The victim, Lal Chand alias Sohag, aged 39, was a scrap trader. The murder took place around 6 p.m. in front of Gate No. 3 of Mitford Hospital on Rajani Ghosh Lane—at a time when the city’s bustle had not yet paused for the evening. Approximately 19 to 20 assailants arrived on seven motorcycles and surrounded him. They beat him with bricks, stones, and concrete blocks, dragged him through the street, stomped on his body, and celebrated with barbaric delight. Bystanders, terrified, dared not intervene. The killing was filmed and quickly went viral, sparking outrage across the country.

But this was not an isolated act of violence. It was a premeditated murder over extortion. According to local sources, influential leaders of the BNP’s affiliated organizations—Jubo Dal, Chhatra Dal, and Swechchhasebak Dal—had demanded five lakh takas in extortion from the victim. Upon refusal, he was murdered. The most alarming aspect is that despite political names being linked to the incident, no visible or effective administrative action has been taken. While a few arrests have been made, the masterminds remain untouched.

This single murder reflects the severe deterioration of Bangladesh’s law and order situation. But the broader statistics are even more terrifying. According to data from the Bangladesh Police Headquarters, under the interim government led by Nobel Peace Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, crime has surged at an alarming rate in just ten months (September 2024 to June 2025).

During this time, 3,554 murders were committed nationwide. There were 4,105 cases of rape and 12,726 incidents of violence against women and children. Additionally, 610 armed robberies, 1,526 cases of banditry, and 97 riots occurred. There were 819 kidnappings, five acid attacks, 2,304 burglaries, and 7,310 thefts. Disturbingly, there were also 479 recorded attacks on law enforcement agencies, underscoring the gravity of the situation and the state’s loss of control.

These figures are not just numbers—they are testimony to a historic failure of governance and a complete collapse of public safety. That such horror could unfold in such a short span does not merely indicate governmental incompetence; it suggests a troubling absence of political will.

Dr. Muhammad Yunus is a globally renowned figure. He earned the Nobel Peace Prize for empowering women through microcredit. Yet, under his leadership, this interim government has utterly failed to guarantee even the most basic level of security for its citizens.

People had hoped that this administration would eliminate irregularities, corruption, and repressive politics, and establish a peaceful political climate. The reality, however, is grim: instead of confronting crime, this government appears to have surrendered to it.

Even more alarming is how senior members of the interim government, particularly the press wing of the Chief Adviser, continue to deny the surge in crime, downplaying the justice crisis with shocking indifference.

In most cases, perpetrators are shielded from the law due to their political affiliations. Political influence over police investigations is so blatant that many cases are suppressed before any inquiry begins. Even the judiciary appears to be under invisible pressure, casting serious doubt over the possibility of justice.

This is not merely a failure of the police force—it is a reflection of a profound moral and political void within the government. The interim administration came to power promising to protect human rights and uphold the rule of law. Yet, its actions suggest it has become a guardian of special interest groups, abandoning the safety of ordinary citizens. How incompetent must a government be for a businessman to be murdered so savagely in one of the capital’s busiest areas in broad daylight?

This situation also reflects a collapse of the justice system. A culture of impunity has taken root, eroding public faith in the legal system. As hope for justice fades, people either remain silent or are tempted to take the law into their own hands. This is a dangerous trend that is pushing society toward chaos.

Citizens’ basic demands are security, justice, and accountability from the state. A government that fails to provide these cannot claim to be democratic or people-oriented.

Dr. Yunus’s interim government wanted to be seen as an ethically superior body before the next elections. But now, one must ask: How ethical is this government? A businessman was killed in the street, and the government responded with token statements instead of concrete actions.

International human rights organizations, usually vocal about Bangladesh, have gone conspicuously silent. Groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, which previously condemned rights violations in the country, have offered no reaction to this alarming deterioration—as if law and order and human rights are flourishing under Dr. Yunus’s interim government.

In reality, police forces are increasingly accused of collusion with criminals, damaging Bangladesh’s image globally. And while mainstream media remains cautious due to fear of reprisals, social media is abuzz with criticism and outrage. Yet the government has offered no substantive response. Instead, it continues labeling these incidents as “isolated,” denying the depth of the crisis—an attitude that signals something even more dangerous.

What the country urgently needs now is an independent, neutral, and accountable administration—one that serves the people, not political or financial elites. Not just in Sohag’s case, but for every murder, rape, or major crime of the past ten months, there must be impartial investigations and swift justice.

The government must move beyond press briefings and acknowledge reality. It must immediately publish a clear roadmap to combat crime, ensure access to justice, and hold institutions accountable.

Bangladesh is no longer a poor, repressed nation. Its citizens are now aware, digitally connected, and demand answers. If those in power fail to act now, the people will soon hold them accountable in the court of history.

In the end, if even a Nobel Peace Prize winner cannot bring peace to the people, then that Nobel Prize becomes a cruel irony of history. And if this interim government cannot ensure even basic security, then the legitimacy of any future election or political process it oversees will be called into question. The answer must come now—not in words, but in action.

Author: Human Rights Lawyer; Laureate of the French Government’s Marianne Initiative for Human Rights Defenders 2023; Founder President of JusticeMakers Bangladesh in France (JMBF). You can reach him by email: shahanur.islam@jmbf.org; Website: www.jmbf.org