Only then will Muslims cease to be ruled in the name of fear—and start living as full citizens of a republic they help build every day.

Since 2014, Indian Muslims have been caught in a spiral of fear and political confusion. The Bharatiya Janata Party’s ascent to power was, for many, a moment of rupture—a decisive break from the past. The party that had once taken responsibility for the demolition of the 16th-century Babri Masjid was now ruling from the centre. The wound of 1992, which forever communalized India’s political terrain, had now translated into a permanent sense of existential siege for Muslims.

In this atmosphere, Muslim anxieties have increasingly turned toward one phrase: “leadership”. A leadership that would represent them, defend their interests, articulate their pain, and resist the Hindutva offensive. But what exactly is “Muslim leadership”? Who defines it, and on what grounds? What are its aims? These questions remain unanswered.

Muslim Leadership: A Floating Signifier

Today, to speak of Muslim leadership is to walk into a semantic maze. Does it mean clerical authority? Electoral representation? Civil society mobilisation? Each comes with its own contradictions.

Groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), and All India Masjlid Ittehad-ul-Muslieen (AIMIM) represent sharply divergent visions of Muslim politics—religiously, regionally, and ideologically. The aspirations of an AIMIM voter in Hyderabad may carry no resonance in Kerala’s IUML strongholds or in the doctrinally distinct spaces of Jamaat. There is no singular “Muslim aspiration”. The imagined unity of the ummah dissolves the moment it is brought into contact with India’s vast regional, sectarian, and linguistic diversities.

Since the demolition of Babri Masjid, a deep sense of alienation and hyper politicisation has festered among Indian Muslims. Meanwhile, the state has since encouraged a version of “Muslim politics” that is either wholly apolitical (clergy-centric), tokenistic (electing a few symbolic figures), or hyper-nationalist (Muslims defending the Constitution louder than anyone else)  leaving virtually no space for any other form of articulation.

Crisis of Representation 

India’s secular-liberal intelligentsia has also contributed to the crisis. They have internalised the logic that Muslims must only be represented by Muslims—an echo of the very communal logic that partitioned the subcontinent. This view romanticises identity but ignores class, ideology, and material politics. It reduces Muslims to religious subjects rather than complex social actors.

This has led to a strange tolerance for performative religiosity among Muslim representatives. A Muslim Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) can openly celebrate Hindu festivals or avoid raising Muslim concerns altogether, and yet face no criticism—because their mere presence is deemed sufficient. As long as someone with a Muslim name occupies a post, the job is assumed done. This is not representation—it is throwing some crumbs so one of the them could sit amongst one of them.

Moreover, if Muslims demand their own leadership, can Hindus not do the same? Can the majority not claim the same right to religious self-organisation? This contradiction is rarely acknowledged. The logic of communal representation, if applied consistently, would end secular democracy altogether. It would lead us back to the very framework that justified Partition: that Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations.

Leadership or Reaction? The Crisis of Political Imagination

Muslim leadership today is primarily reactive. It is shaped by Hindutva offensives and often exists only as their mirror image. If a bill is passed against Waqf properties, the one who tears it up in the legislature is seen as a leader. If a mosque is threatened, the one who files a PIL becomes the saviour. This reactionary instinct lacks a long-term political programme. It can mobilise anger, but rarely build anything substantive .

The truth is stark: there is no democratic, transparent, pan-Indian Muslim body that can claim to represent Indian Muslims. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board is neither elected nor accountable. Political parties like AIMIM can only claim to represent a section of the Indian Muslims .

The Danger of Aspiration Without Direction

If the current trajectory continues, Muslim political energies will either be absorbed into Hindutva’s reactive machinery or dissipate into nostalgia and despair. The call for “our own leader” will remain an emotional impulse, not a strategic position. Worse, it will obscure the actual sites of Muslim suffering—education, housing, employment, incarceration.

There is no short cut. Muslims in India must participate not as a community but as citizens—in all their class, gender, and ideological diversity. They must build secular and democratic movements for justice, not reactive fronts for identity defence. The alternative is not another “Muslim party,” but an alternative from amongst the Muslims asserting themselves as the citizens of the largest democracy—shaping the future alongside others.

Conclusion: Representation is Not Redemption

The First-Past-the-Post system has no room for religious representation, and perhaps it should not. The solution to Muslim exclusion as citizens lies not in symbolic figures, nor in communally carved parties, but in becoming masters of their own fate and self introspection themselves as citizens.

To demand Muslim leadership is not wrong—but to mistake visibility for power, or identity for programme, is dangerous. Muslim leadership must cease to be a mythological hope projected onto charismatic individuals, and become a rigorous, grassroots, multi-class democratic project rooted in the struggle for dignity.

Only then will Muslims cease to be ruled in the name of fear—and start living as full citizens of a republic they help build every day.

Beyond direct funding of ideological groups, Qatar also employs media and diplomatic channels to shape narratives.

Despite being the world’s third-largest Muslim population, India has traditionally focused its counter-radicalization efforts on neighboring Pakistan. But emerging evidence and expert analysis now suggest that India may be underestimating a more insidious threat — one stemming not from its western border, but from the Arabian Peninsula.

At the center of this growing concern is Qatar, a Gulf state with deep ties to Brotherhood-aligned Islamist movements and a history of controversial mediation with jihadist organizations.

Abhinav Pandya, founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation, an Indian foreign policy and security think tank, highlighted this threat in an article published by the Middle East Forum on April 28. According to Pandya, “Qatar takes advantage of New Delhi’s relative blind spot to its efforts to further radicalize millions of Indian Muslims,” even as Indian intelligence remains preoccupied with Pakistan’s jihadist outreach.

Qatar’s foreign policy has long included diplomatic and financial engagements with Islamist groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, Al-Nusra Front, and Hamas. These relationships, Pandya warns, now intersect with growing influence campaigns and ideological funding that extend into India’s social, religious, and political spheres.

Doha’s Brotherhood-Aligned Preachers Influence Indian Muslims

The ideological influence of Qatar-based hardline clerics continues to echo across India’s Muslim landscape. The late Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Brotherhood-aligned preacher and Doha resident, remains a revered figure among Indian Islamist networks.

In India, Yusuf al-Qaradawi is venerated by influential Islamist figures such as Salman Nadwi and the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose founder, Abul A’la Maududi’s funeral prayers were led by Qaradawi—highlighting the enduring ideological affinity between Indian Islamist groups and the Brotherhood’s intellectual legacy.

Following the Indian government’s 2019 revocation of Article 370 — which ended Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status — Doha appeared to intensify its outreach toward Brotherhood-affiliated circles within the Valley.

In 2023, Qatar extended a platform to Zakir Naik, a controversial Indian Islamist televangelist, by hosting him at Expo 2023 in Doha. Naik’s enduring popularity in Kashmir is seen by security analysts as a bellwether of deepening radicalization among segments of Kashmiri youth. His sermons, authorities allege, inspired several extremists, including those behind the 2016 ISIS attack in Dhaka and a key Islamic State recruiter from Hyderabad.

Brotherhood-Linked Charity Under Scrutiny

One of the key actors in this alleged radical network is the Sheikh Eid Bin Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association, commonly known as the Eid Charity. Leaked documents and past designations by U.S. authorities shed light on its activities. In 2013, the U.S. Treasury labeled Abd al-Rahmani al-Nu’aymi — a co-founder of the Eid Charity — a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” for funding al-Qaeda affiliates across Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq.

Between 2008 and 2017, Eid Charity reportedly funneled approximately $7.82 million to eight Brotherhood-aligned organizations in India. These funds were allegedly used to construct mosques and promote conservative ideologies, including anti-secular, anti-modernist interpretations of Islam that critics link to radicalization.

Kerala: A Nexus of Radicalization

Pandya draws particular attention to Kerala, a state in southern India that has emerged as a hub for radical Islamist activities. Qatari foundations, including Sheikh Thani Ibn Abdullah for Humanitarian Services — a funder previously linked to the Nusra Front — provided $4.9 million to the Salafi Charitable Trust Narikkuni.

The Trust’s leader, Hussain Madavoor, is said to maintain close ties with Melevettil Muhammad Akbar, a controversial preacher known for recruiting vulnerable youth into extremist ideologies. Akbar’s Peace Foundation was once home to Abdul Rashid Abdullah, a Kerala native who later rose to lead the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province cell in India. Several Indian ISIS recruits had connections to this organization.

In 2018, Akbar was arrested at Hyderabad airport following a lookout notice from Kerala police for his alleged role in radicalizing schoolchildren. He was reportedly trying to flee to Qatar at the time of his arrest.

Other Brotherhood-linked institutions in Kerala receiving Qatari funds include the Philanthropic Society, the Symposium Education Charitable Society, and the Peace Educational Center.

Qatar’s Soft Power Push

Beyond direct funding of ideological groups, Qatar also employs media and diplomatic channels to shape narratives. Al Jazeera, the Doha-based news outlet, has frequently drawn criticism in India for what government officials describe as “anti-India” coverage — particularly on human rights, minority treatment, and religious freedom.

Qatari influence was also apparent during the fallout from a 2022 controversy involving Bharatiya Janata Party spokesperson Nupur Sharma, who was accused of making offensive remarks about the Prophet Muhammad on a television show. According to reports, Qatar summoned the Indian ambassador and demanded an official apology. Meanwhile, Qatari-based social media accounts were central in orchestrating the #BoycottIndia campaign online, pushing claims of a “Muslim genocide” in India.

The online campaign translated into street violence in India. Islamist protesters organized demonstrations in several cities, and multiple incidents of mob violence against Hindus were reported, particularly targeting individuals who had expressed support for Sharma on social media.

Electoral Interference and Foreign Funds

Pandya’s article also notes instances where Qatari actors allegedly attempted to interfere in Indian domestic politics.

During the 2019 state elections in West Bengal, a Qatari lawyer reportedly transferred funds to a regional political party with known Islamist sympathies and links to extremist groups. Indian authorities have yet to officially comment on these claims, but intelligence officials have expressed growing concern over external financial meddling in electoral processes.

Strategic Contradictions

Despite these serious allegations, India’s formal relations with Qatar remain strong. Qatar is India’s largest supplier of natural gas, and its sovereign wealth fund holds investments worth approximately $1.5 billion in the country. In February 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi broke protocol to personally receive the Emir of Qatar during a state visit, during which the two nations elevated their bilateral relationship to a “Strategic Partnership.”

This warm diplomatic engagement, however, has not silenced national security experts who warn that Qatar’s covert activities — particularly its ideological funding and media influence — risk deepening communal polarization in India.

“Diplomatic niceties cannot mask the fact that Qatar’s Brotherhood-linked ecosystem is actively fanning extremism in India,” Pandya concludes.

As India navigates the delicate balance between energy security, trade, and national security, analysts argue that turning a blind eye to foreign radical networks operating within its borders may come at a long-term cost — one that could deepen internal fault lines and compromise democratic stability.