Market sentiment was further supported by expectations of stronger fourth quarter corporate results, improving liquidity conditions, and cautious optimism around oil price stability, all of which helped lift buying interest across banking and blue chip stocks.

The benchmark Saudi index advanced for a third straight session, led by gains in major lenders such as Al Rajhi Bank, as traders reacted positively to signals of regulatory easing and the potential for increased foreign capital inflows.

Analysts noted that the anticipated market opening could improve valuation depth, broaden investor participation, and enhance Saudi Arabia’s standing among emerging markets, even as concerns remain about global volatility and regional geopolitical risks.

Oil prices also played a supportive role, rebounding sharply in recent sessions amid heightened geopolitical pressure on Iran and supply related concerns, which helped reinforce confidence in energy linked revenues across the Gulf.

Despite this support, market participants remain selective, closely watching whether crude prices can sustain their recovery and continue to provide a stable earnings backdrop for listed companies.

In contrast, Qatar’s stock market edged lower as investors opted to lock in profits, with selling pressure seen across all major constituents including leading banking stocks.

Cautious sentiment persists in the Qatari market as investors weigh earnings prospects against regional uncertainty and the broader risk environment.

Outside the Gulf, Egypt’s equity market continued its strong upward momentum, with the main index touching a new record high supported by gains in real estate and diversified conglomerates.

The rally reflects sustained domestic investor interest, improving confidence in economic reforms, and expectations of resilient corporate performance despite global headwinds.

Pakistan now stands at a critical juncture. It can continue to treat Afghanistan as a battleground, striking across the border and relying on force to push back the militants.

For over four decades, Pakistan bet its security strategy on one idea: that Afghanistan could be controlled and turned into a “strategic depth” against India. The military and political elite in Islamabad treated Kabul as a buffer and a playground — a state to be manipulated through compliant regimes and proxy jihadist groups.

Militant networks were nurtured as instruments of foreign policy, and Pakistan believed this would secure influence across the region and check India’s power. Instead, the very forces Islamabad once empowered have turned against it. In 2025, the grand doctrine of strategic depth lies in ruins — a self-inflicted disaster now driving Pakistan’s worst security crisis in years.

Rather than securing Pakistan, Afghanistan has become the epicentre of the very dangers Islamabad once believed it could manage or manipulate. What was once perceived as an asset has now become a trap. The transformation of Afghanistan from strategic depth to strategic liability has unfolded gradually, but the past two years have made the shift undeniable.

When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, Pakistan was widely seen as the external actor poised to benefit the most. Many within Islamabad believed that a Taliban government, because of historical ties, would be cooperative, deferential, and dependent. But that assumption now looks dangerously misplaced.

The Taliban’s political priorities have changed, their sources of external support have diversified, and their internal legitimacy depends on projecting a strong, independent stance — especially against Pakistan, which many ordinary Afghans still view with suspicion. Instead of shaping Afghan behaviour, Pakistan now finds itself confronting a volatile neighbour whose rulers no longer feel obliged to accommodate Pakistani interests.

Militant Blowback and a Hardening Border

Nowhere is this reversal clearer than in the surge of militant activity targeting Pakistan from Afghan soil. Over the past year, Pakistan has experienced a marked increase in terrorist attacks carried out by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and associated networks. Security reports from 2024 and 2025 indicated that many attackers either crossed over from Afghanistan or were trained and sheltered there.

Pakistani officials have repeatedly stated that a significant percentage of suicide bombers involved in major attacks were Afghan nationals. The data, while varying between sources, consistently shows a dangerous trend that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has become increasingly porous to extremist infiltration, and many of these groups feel emboldened by their close ideological ties to the Afghan Taliban.

This is the central irony of Pakistan’s predicament. The militant ecosystem that Islamabad once supported for regional leverage has now splintered in ways that work against Pakistan itself. The TTP, originally an offshoot of groups nurtured under earlier Afghan policies, now treats Pakistan as its primary enemy.

Pakistan’s own creation has turned against its creator. The militancy that Islamabad once believed could be contained beyond its borders has now penetrated deep inside — striking security convoys, police units, and civilian targets with growing regularity. The blowback is undeniable.

In response, Pakistan has increasingly resorted to military actions along — and across — the Afghan border. Throughout 2024 and into 2025, Pakistan conducted a series of cross-border artillery strikes and air raids targeting what it described as TTP safe havens. In several cases, those strikes hit areas inside Afghanistan, killing not only militants but also civilians, including women and children. These incidents have sharply escalated diplomatic tensions.

Kabul has issued multiple condemnations, arguing that Pakistan is violating Afghan sovereignty and inflaming anti-Pakistan sentiment among the Afghan population. What Islamabad once framed as necessary counterterror operations are now seen by many Afghans as external aggression, deepening hostility that already runs high.

Border clashes have also intensified. In late 2024 and through out 2025, firefights between Pakistani forces and Taliban border units became frequent, sometimes lasting hours. Pakistani officials reported significant casualties on their side, and Afghan authorities claimed similar losses.

The AfPak border — once envisioned as a controllable frontier from which Pakistan could extend influence — has hardened into one of the most militarized and unstable fault lines in South Asia. Instead of projecting strength, Pakistan finds itself in a defensive posture, its troops stretched and its internal security architecture under strain.

Diminishing Diplomatic Leverage and Growing Vulnerability

Diplomacy has not eased the tensions. Attempts at negotiation, including several rounds of high-level talks in 2024 and 2025, produced only limited agreements focused on border management and intelligence sharing. These arrangements have struggled to translate into real cooperation on the ground. The Taliban government maintains that it does not control the TTP, insisting that the group operates independently.

Pakistani officials reject that claim, arguing that nothing of significance can operate in Afghanistan without at least tacit Taliban approval. The resulting stalemate has left both countries locked in a cycle of accusation and retaliation.

Pakistan’s broader regional standing has also been affected. The international community has expressed growing concern about the escalating border violence, with several countries calling for restraint and renewed dialogue. Islamabad, once positioned as a key interlocutor between the Taliban and the West, now finds its diplomatic leverage diminished.

Meanwhile, the Taliban have sought new partnerships — particularly with regional powers seeking economic or strategic opportunities in Afghanistan. This reduces Pakistan’s ability to shape events in Kabul and signals a fundamental shift in the balance of influence.

The implications for Pakistan’s internal security are profound. The resurgence of terrorism within its borders has strained provincial administrations, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Police forces remain under-equipped, despite repeated calls for better resources. Public frustration is rising, particularly as attacks occur with worrying frequency.

Many citizens question the effectiveness of Pakistan’s long-standing policies toward Afghanistan and ask whether the sacrifices of the past two decades — military operations, casualties, and massive financial costs — have led to greater safety or merely deeper vulnerability.

The broader economic situation compounds the crisis. Pakistan’s financial struggles, including high inflation, energy shortages, and slow GDP growth, make it increasingly difficult to sustain prolonged military readiness along a volatile border. The costs of counterinsurgency operations, refugees’ management, and security infrastructure rise steadily even as state revenues remain limited.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan shows no sign of curbing the groups hostile to Pakistan. This asymmetry — a costly security burden with no cooperative counterpart in Kabul — underscores how Pakistan’s strategic depth has morphed into a strategic trap.

A Strategic Concept in Collapse

Yet the most troubling dimension of this trap is conceptual. Pakistan’s Afghan policy relied on assumptions that no longer hold: that Kabul could be influenced through patronage that militant groups could be calibrated for strategic use, and that Afghanistan’s internal dynamics would remain subordinate to Pakistani interests. The reality of 2025 contradicts each of these assumptions.

The Taliban now make decisions independently. Militant groups have become ideological actors rather than controllable proxies. Afghan nationalism, sharpened by decades of conflict, rejects external interference from any quarter — especially from Pakistan. The strategic logic underpinning decades of policy has evaporated, but its consequences persist.

Pakistan now stands at a critical juncture. It can continue to treat Afghanistan as a battleground, striking across the border and relying on force to push back the militants. But this would deepen the cycle of violence, alienating Afghan society further, and entrenching hostile networks.

Alternatively, Pakistan could pursue a significant recalibration — acknowledging the limits of influence, dismantling the remnants of proxy structures, and treating Afghanistan as a sovereign neighbour rather than a proxy regime. Such a shift would require political courage and institutional consensus, both of which have historically been fragile when it comes to Pakistan. But without such a rethinking, Pakistan risks sinking deeper into the trap of its own making.

The strategic depth that Islamabad long prized has become an illusion. Afghanistan is no longer a pliable sphere of influence but a source of hostility capable of undermining Pakistan’s security from within. The militants once cultivated as assets have become liabilities. The border once seen as a shield has become a wound. Pakistan’s Afghan dilemma is no longer about losing influence; it is about preventing the fallout from a potent threat to its own stability.

The question facing Pakistan in 2025 is not whether Afghanistan can be controlled but whether Pakistan can escape the strategic trap created by decades of miscalculation. Whether it will recalibrate before the trap tightens further is a question that will impact the region’s future also.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

A return to the zero-sum mentality that dominated earlier epochs — where Kabul was binary: allied or hostile — will not suffice.

For decades Islamabad regarded Afghanistan as a strategic depth and a zone of influence — a buffer to be shaped, not simply neighboured. That assumption has been upended. What was once a relationship of patronage and leverage has become a volatile adversarial space in which Pakistan’s ability to shape outcomes is eroding fast.

The proximate causes are familiar: the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) resurgence, the Afghan Taliban’s evolving priorities, and renewed regional manoeuvring — but the deeper story is institutional: Pakistan’s coercive and diplomatic instruments have less purchase in Kabul than they did a decade ago, and the result is a dangerous ambiguity for peace along a porous frontier.

The unraveling of influence

Pakistan’s influence was built on long-term ties with elements of the Afghan insurgency, cross-border sanctuaries for proxies and a security apparatus that assumed it could cajole Kabul.

After the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021 Islamabad briefly believed those ties would translate into control over insurgent groups that threaten Pakistan’s internal security, especially the TTP. That belief has been proven increasingly fragile.

Since 2023 and into 2024–25, the TTP has consolidated, carrying out a wave of attacks inside Pakistan and openly operating from Afghan territory, according to Pakistani officials and independent monitors — a reality Islamabad blames on Kabul’s unwillingness or inability to rein in militants.

The rhetoric has hardened into kinetic confrontation. October and November 2025 saw some of the deadliest border clashes since 2021, with both sides trading heavy accusations of cross-border strikes and of harbouring militants.

Pakistan’s military leadership framed the dispute in stark terms: peace depends on the Taliban preventing attacks originating on Afghan soil — an implicit admission that Islamabad’s old levers of influence are no longer decisive.

Kabul, for its part, denies institutional complicity while insisting it is a sovereign government contending with its own domestic pressures and complex local actors.

Analysts have been blunt. “Pakistan misread the Taliban and lost peace on the frontier,” wrote commentators after a string of confrontations, arguing Islamabad had underestimated the Afghan leadership’s need to assert independence from Islamabad and to cultivate alternative patrons and legitimacy.

The practical consequence is a loss of predictive power: Islamabad cannot reliably forecast which militant actors Kabul will tolerate or contest, and therefore cannot control the border dynamics that have long defined its security calculus.

New players, old grievances

The decline of unilateral influence does not mean Pakistan has been entirely sidelined; rather, the relationship has been recalibrated amid a broader regional realignment.

China and Turkey have moved to mediate and cajole, economic corridors and diplomatic initiatives have proliferated, and even India has quietly sought to re-engage with Kabul, reopening channels that complicate Islamabad’s calculations.

These shifts give the Afghan Taliban alternatives for diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation that do not depend on Pakistan’s patronage.

Inside Pakistan, the domestic politics of counter-terrorism and the resurging profile of the Pakistani Taliban have also altered official thinking. Policymakers face a grim choice: assertive military options across the border that risk escalation and international censure, or a patient diplomatic strategy that depends on a Kabul willing and able to act.

The ambiguity has produced episodic violence rather than a durable settlement; ceasefires have been brokered and violated, and confidence-building measures are fragile. Observers note that Islamabad’s traditional tools — patronage networks, cross-border pressure and economic inducements — are necessary but not sufficient to resolve the multi-layered conflicts now playing out.

The human cost is immediate. Civilians on both sides of the Durand Line have borne the brunt of the violence: displacement, disrupted trade and a renewal of mistrust that undercuts any long-term reconciliation.

The border is not simply a line on a map; it is a lived geography of interdependence and grievance. As violence spikes, international actors — from Qatar and Turkey to regional capitals — are scrambling to re-establish mediation channels even as the ground reality resists neat diplomatic fixes.

What comes next

If Pakistan’s grip is slipping, the strategic implication is that South Asia’s security architecture must be rethought. A return to the zero-sum mentality that dominated earlier epochs — where Kabul was binary: allied or hostile — will not suffice.

Instead, any viable approach must accept multiplicity: a Taliban government with agency, non-state militant actors with transnational reach and regional powers willing to assert influence through economic and diplomatic means. This requires Pakistan to invest in multilateral mechanisms, to deepen intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation that respects Afghan sovereignty, and to concede that punitive cross-border strikes are not a sustainable substitute for political solutions.

The stakes transcend bilateral rivalry. A durable peace on the frontier matters to refugee flows, counter-terrorism, narcotics trafficking and the broader stability of a region that is again the focus of great-power competition.

If Islamabad wants to protect its core security interests it must adapt to an Afghan polity that no longer responds predictably to old incentives. That adaptation will be neither quick nor comfortable, but it is necessary: failing to do so will leave both countries mired in a costly oscillation of strikes, reprisals and diplomatic ruptures that benefits no one.

As one regional analyst put it, the old script for influence has been burned; the question for Pakistan is whether it can write a new, more cooperative one before the next conflagration.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

What began as a local criminal dispute has now escalated into a multi-layered confrontation involving sectarian militias, Syrian government forces, Israeli airstrikes, and competing Druze factions.

Over five days of relentless violence, more than 100 have been killed and hundreds more injured. Yet, beneath the fog of war, a clearer pattern is emerging—one that reflects the geopolitical fault lines running through Syria and the region at large.

A Spark That Ignited a Firestorm

The violence erupted on July 11, when Bedouin gunmen ambushed a vegetable truck on the Damascus–Suwayda highway, assaulting the Druze driver and stealing his goods. The following day, Druze militias retaliated by kidnapping eight Bedouins, triggering a tit-for-tat spiral of abductions that quickly deteriorated into full-blown armed clashes.

Although such conflicts between Bedouin clans and Druze militias have simmered for years—largely over control of drug trafficking routes, weapons smuggling corridors, and disputed lands—this incident unleashed an unusually brutal wave of violence.

By July 13, mediation efforts by local notables collapsed. Armed clashes intensified in western rural Suwayda and in the provincial capital. In just 24 hours, over 30 were killed and nearly 100 injured. Bedouin areas were besieged while Druze villages were shelled in retaliation.

Until this flare-up, the Syrian government had largely kept its forces out of Suwayda, honoring an uneasy power-sharing arrangement with local Druze leaders. But as lawlessness spiraled, Damascus deployed military and Interior Ministry units to reassert control.

The response from Druze militias was swift and brutal: ten government soldiers were ambushed and executed, while eight others were paraded in humiliation before reportedly being killed.

That move triggered direct Israeli involvement. On July 14, Israeli drones began striking Syrian military convoys—first armored vehicles, then Interior Ministry trucks. The strikes coincided with the Syrian army’s ground operations in Druze-dominated areas and appeared to provide air cover for anti-government Druze factions.

As fighting intensified, a ceasefire was declared by Suwayda’s Druze, Christian, and civil council leaders. But within half an hour, Hikmat al-Hijri, a powerful Druze cleric, rejected the agreement and called for renewed fighting. Almost immediately, Israeli airstrikes resumed—this time across Suwayda city and beyond.

Power Struggles, Foreign Backers, and the Drug Trade

At the heart of this crisis lies Hikmat al-Hijri, spiritual leader of the Suwayda Military Council (SMC)—a faction founded after Assad’s weakening in 2012 and composed of former regime generals. The SMC has long been suspected of controlling large segments of Syria’s Captagon, heroin, and crystal meth trade, which serves as a lucrative shadow economy for armed groups.

Hijri’s repeated rejection of ceasefire efforts has angered rival Druze leaders. Sheikh Yousef al-Jarbou accused him of seeking to monopolize Druze leadership, while Laith al-Balous condemned him for destabilizing Suwayda under the influence of “subversive elements.”

The extent of Israeli coordination with Hijri’s faction is significant. Israel has traditionally struck targets in Syria to counter Iranian and Hezbollah entrenchment near its northern borders. However, its active support of a local militia implicated in narcotics and rebellion raises questions about Tel Aviv’s evolving strategy. Rather than merely deterring Iran, Israel now appears to be empowering anti-Assad factions that could help divide and destabilize southern Syria—a dangerous gamble that risks dragging the region into deeper chaos.

By July 16, Syrian government forces managed to take control of Suwayda city and Qanawat, Hijri’s stronghold. In retaliation, Israeli airstrikes expanded to Damascus, even hitting areas near the Presidential Palace and Syria’s Defense Ministry, killing at least three.

Meanwhile, the United States began mediating what became the third ceasefire attempt in 36 hours. The framework remains largely unchanged: government forces withdraw, local Druze security handle internal policing, and the Interior Ministry maintains nominal authority. Still, Hijri rejected it again, and Israeli strikes followed almost instantly.

The timing of these airstrikes—immediately after each ceasefire rejection—points toward a troubling synergy between Hijri’s tactical decisions and Israel’s military actions, amplifying the conflict and weakening Syria’s transitional government.

Beyond Suwayda: A Microcosm of Syria’s Collapse

While the Suwayda conflict is often described as sectarian—Druze versus Bedouin, or Druze versus Sunni Arab communities—it is just as much about economics and influence. The province is located on key southern smuggling routes leading into Jordan, Iraq, and the Gulf, and control over these routes is a high-stakes game. Notably, on July 15, the Jordanian military clashed twice with drug smugglers crossing over from Suwayda, reflecting the conflict’s transnational dimensions.

At the same time, the information war around Suwayda has become as intense as the conflict itself. Social media has been flooded with sensationalist claims—massacres, organ mutilation, women and children burned alive—all of which independent monitors like SOHR and other long-standing observers have debunked. Verified casualty figures suggest that combatants make up over 75% of the dead, with 6–8% being women and children.

What could have been resolved diplomatically has instead become a case study in how local power struggles, war economies, and foreign interventions intersect. A ceasefire brokered 48 hours ago might have prevented much of the bloodshed. But Hijri’s rejectionism and Israel’s airstrikes have thrown fuel on a tinderbox.

As of now, Suwayda’s future remains uncertain. If the ceasefire holds, the province may cautiously rejoin Syria’s transitional framework. But if Hijri continues to resist and foreign powers persist in exploiting local divisions, Suwayda risks becoming a permanently destabilized zone, threatening Jordan’s security and complicating Syria’s fragile peace process.

Ultimately, Suwayda illustrates the broader tragedy of post-war Syria: a nation where governance has eroded, warlords thrive, and every local conflict becomes a proxy battlefield for regional powers. Peace here won’t be achieved by airstrikes or militias. It requires a new social contract—rooted in accountability, disarmament, and regional diplomacy—to prevent yet another province from sinking into permanent instability.

Many supporters may retreat underground, potentially leading to the radicalization of splinter factions if their political aspirations are completely suppressed.

Jordan’s political landscape witnessed a seismic shift this week as the government formally banned all activities of the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood, a move experts describe as a turning point in the kingdom’s modern history.

Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya announced the decision on Wednesday, shortly after the shocking revelation of a foiled plot involving the manufacture of rockets by individuals allegedly linked to the Brotherhood. The disclosure, which sent tremors through Jordan’s security establishment, has fundamentally reframed the national conversation around the role of political Islam within the state.

Arab News senior journalist Hani Hazaimeh captured the gravity of the moment, stating, “Jordan’s decision to formally ban all activities of the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood marks a watershed moment in the kingdom’s modern political history — a decision that could reverberate well beyond its borders.”

Brotherhood’s Complicated Legacy

Since Jordan’s establishment in 1946, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a paradoxical player in the country’s political life — both an ally and a source of friction for the Hashemite monarchy. Unlike in many neighboring countries where the Brotherhood was outlawed, Jordan allowed the group to operate relatively freely, believing it could serve as a moderating influence against leftist ideologies like communism and Arab nationalism.

Over decades, the Brotherhood grew deep roots in Jordanian society. They ran charitable organizations, contested parliamentary elections, and provided social services where the state often fell short. Their advocacy for Palestinian rights, particularly during crises like the ongoing Gaza war, further bolstered their popularity, especially among middle and lower-class Jordanians disillusioned by economic hardship and political stagnation.

However, as Hani Hazaimeh pointed out, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the state was always a delicate balancing act.

“What once served as a pressure valve for societal grievances has, in the eyes of the state, transformed into a potential vector for subversion,” he explained.

The discovery of a clandestine rocket manufacturing operation — allegedly orchestrated by the son of a senior Brotherhood figure — shattered the Brotherhood’s carefully cultivated image of peaceful activism. Despite the group’s leadership quickly disavowing any involvement and reaffirming their commitment to nonviolence, the damage to their credibility was severe and immediate.

A Sweeping Crackdown

The government’s response was swift and uncompromising. Authorities moved to shutter Brotherhood-affiliated offices, freeze financial assets, and prosecute individuals associated with the now-outlawed group. It was made clear that political entities perceived to harbor or inspire threats to national cohesion would no longer be tolerated.

Domestically, this crackdown has reignited a fierce debate. Supporters argue that national stability must come first, especially in a region plagued by insurgencies and ideological extremism. Critics, however, caution against conflating legitimate political dissent with criminal subversion.

For many Jordanians, particularly those who once saw the Brotherhood as a voice for the marginalized, the move is bittersweet. The Brotherhood’s female-led platforms, community initiatives, and calls for social justice once filled a void left by the country’s traditional political parties. Yet the exposure of violent plots irreversibly damaged the group’s moral standing, leaving many questioning whether it can ever reclaim its former legitimacy.

A Broader Geopolitical Signal

Beyond Jordan’s borders, the decision carries significant geopolitical implications. It signals a clear alignment with regional powers such as Egypt and the UAE, both of which have taken hardline stances against Islamist movements.

“Regionally, Jordan’s decision represents more than a domestic policy shift — it is a calculated geopolitical signal,” Hazaimeh emphasized.

At a time when the Middle East is gripped by instability — with the Gaza conflict escalating tensions and Iran-backed militias gaining ground in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon — Jordan’s leadership is acutely aware of the risks of internal radicalization. The foiled rocket plot was not merely a domestic incident; it was seen as a direct challenge to the state’s monopoly on force and a potential harbinger of wider unrest.

Challenges Ahead

The path forward for Jordan is fraught with uncertainty. Simply outlawing the Brotherhood will not erase its ideological influence overnight. Many supporters may retreat underground, potentially leading to the radicalization of splinter factions if their political aspirations are completely suppressed.

The Jordanian government thus faces a delicate balancing act. It must safeguard national security while still allowing space for legitimate political expression. If all avenues for peaceful dissent are closed off, the risk of pushing frustrated citizens toward extremism only grows.

At the same time, this moment offers a rare opportunity. With the Brotherhood sidelined, there is room for new, reform-minded political movements to emerge — ones that advocate transparency, inclusivity, and genuine democratic engagement.

However, as Hazaimeh rightly cautions, true progress requires more than just removing one set of political actors and installing another.

“The end of the Brotherhood’s formal political role could open space for new, reform-minded movements that advocate transparency, inclusivity and constructive engagement. But such developments will only materialize if the state demonstrates a genuine commitment to democratic renewal, economic equity and responsive governance.”

Without addressing the deep-seated socioeconomic grievances that allowed the Brotherhood to flourish in the first place, Jordan risks repeating the cycle of political repression and radicalization.

A Defining Moment

In essence, Jordan’s decision to ban the Muslim Brotherhood is about more than just one organization. It reflects a broader recalibration of the kingdom’s political identity in an increasingly polarized region. It’s a bold statement about the kind of future Jordan wants — one rooted in stability, security, and closer alignment with regional powers that prioritize order over ideological diversity.

Yet, the ultimate success of this approach will depend on what comes next. Will Jordan open up new pathways for citizen engagement and reform, or will it double down on security-first governance at the expense of political freedoms?

As Hani Hazaimeh poignantly summed up, “Whether this move ushers in a new era of stability or sows the seeds of future discord will depend largely on what the government does next — not just in terms of repression or security, but in its ability to offer a compelling, inclusive vision for the nation’s future.”

Only time will tell whether this bold decision will mark the beginning of a new, more stable era for Jordan — or merely a temporary lull in the kingdom’s ongoing political evolution.

JP Singh is a name synonymous with diplomatic resilience and strategic acumen.

Jitender Pal Singh, commonly known as JP Singh, is a 2002-batch Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officer. His career began with probationary training at the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service. His initial postings took him across various Indian missions worldwide, including Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

While his tenure in Turkey remains less documented, it was a crucial stepping stone in his diplomatic journey. In Afghanistan, he was exposed to post-conflict diplomacy, gaining firsthand experience in handling crisis situations.

Role as Deputy High Commissioner in Pakistan

One of the most defining moments of his career came during his tenure as Deputy High Commissioner in Pakistan, particularly in 2017. He played a pivotal role in the high-profile rescue of Uzma Ahmed, an Indian woman who was tricked into a forced marriage in Pakistan.

JP Singh meticulously oversaw her legal representation, appointed Pakistani lawyers, and ensured the necessary documentation to assert her rights. His personal involvement, including attending court hearings, provided moral and official support. His efforts culminated in Uzma Ahmed’s safe return to India on May 24, 2017, as he personally escorted her to the Wagah Border.

Strengthening India’s Relations with Afghanistan

JP Singh was posted in Kabul between 2008 and 2012, a period marked by two major terrorist attacks on the Indian embassy. Despite the dangers, he remained on the ground, continuing to work towards India’s diplomatic and developmental goals in Afghanistan.

During his tenure, India undertook major infrastructure projects, including:

Zaranj-Delaram Highway: A 218-km road completed in 2010 to facilitate the movement of goods to the Iranian border, connecting with the Garland Highway that links Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Kunduz.

Afghan Parliament Building: Built and gifted by India as a symbol of friendship.

India-Afghanistan Friendship Dam (Salma Dam): A 42-MW hydropower and irrigation project in Herat, completed in 2016, benefiting thousands of families.

Stor Palace Restoration: India restored this historic building in Kabul under a tripartite agreement with Afghanistan and the Aga Khan Development Network.

Healthcare and Infrastructure Development: India constructed healthcare centers in border provinces like Badakhshan, Balkh, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nimruz, Nooristan, Paktia, and Paktika.

220kV Transmission Line: From Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul, improving electricity supply.

Military and Transport Aid: India provided 100s of buses for Kabul’s transportation system, 285 military vehicles for the Afghan National Army, Mi-25 and Mi-35 helicopters for the Afghan Air Force, ambulances, and Airbus aircraft for the national airline.

Role in India-Iran Relations

JP Singh played a crucial role in fostering India’s strategic ties with Iran. One of his most significant contributions was advancing the Chabahar Port Project, a joint initiative between India and Iran that provides Afghanistan with direct access to the Indian Ocean. The port has facilitated the shipment of humanitarian aid, including millions of tonnes of wheat, to Afghanistan.

Additionally, Singh was instrumental in the historic India-Iran-Afghanistan trilateral transit pact, which streamlined trade between the three nations, bolstering regional economic activities.

India-Iran-Armenia Trilateral Engagement

More recently, JP Singh has represented India in the India-Iran-Armenia trilateral dialogue, focusing on connectivity, multilateral engagement, trade, tourism, and cultural exchanges. His role has been critical in strengthening India’s strategic outreach in the region.

Leadership in PAI Division (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran)

As Joint Secretary for the PAI Division, JP Singh was responsible for shaping India’s policies toward Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. His diplomatic expertise was put to the test following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. While India feared Afghanistan aligning with Pakistan, Singh ensured continued diplomatic engagement with the Taliban regime.

He visited Afghanistan at least four times, engaging with key figures such as Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob. His efforts facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid, laying the groundwork for higher-level interactions, including Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s meeting with Taliban officials in Dubai. His swift maneuvering helped maintain Kabul’s alignment closer to New Delhi than Islamabad.

India’s Next Ambassador to Israel

As of 2025, JP Singh is set to take on one of the most crucial diplomatic postings of his career as India’s Ambassador to Israel. His appointment comes at a time when India maintains close ties with both Israel and the Arab world. This posting will allow him to engage in high-stakes negotiations and influence regional geopolitics.

Key diplomatic priorities in Israel under Singh’s leadership may include:

• Strengthening bilateral defense and technological cooperation.
• Reviving multilateral engagements such as the I2U2 (India-Israel-UAE-US) group.
• Expanding the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
• Enhancing India-Israel trade, investment, and intelligence collaboration.

The Diplomat: A Film Inspired by His Story

JP Singh’s extraordinary career has not only shaped India’s foreign policy but has also inspired cinema. The upcoming film “The Diplomat,” starring John Abraham, is based on his role in the rescue of Uzma Ahmed. His ability to navigate complex international negotiations and safeguard India’s interests in volatile regions has cemented his reputation as one of India’s most influential diplomats.

JP Singh is a name synonymous with diplomatic resilience and strategic acumen. From rescuing an Indian national in Pakistan to strengthening India’s ties with Afghanistan, Iran, and Israel, his contributions have left a lasting impact on India’s foreign policy. As he takes on his next challenge in Tel Aviv, his legacy as a skilled negotiator and a committed diplomat continues to grow. His journey serves as a testament to the power of diplomacy in shaping global relations.

The Article is curated based on the X-Thread of Tanmay Saukur.