The Seoul Central District Court found Park guilty of involvement in an insurrection stemming from the short-lived martial law order issued by Yoon in December 2024, according to Yonhap News Agency.

Park’s sentence exceeded the 20-year prison term sought by prosecutors, who argued that he had abused his authority to facilitate the implementation of martial law and undermined the rule of law.

According to prosecutors, Park convened a meeting of senior Justice Ministry officials during the early hours of the martial law declaration and reviewed prison capacity in anticipation of potential arrests of political opponents and government critics.

The court ruled that, as justice minister, Park had instructed officials to cooperate with the martial law command structure on the assumption that its decrees would take effect, Yonhap reported.

The verdict marks the latest conviction arising from Yoon’s controversial declaration of martial law, which lasted approximately six hours before lawmakers entered the National Assembly and voted to overturn the measure during an emergency session.

The move triggered a political and institutional crisis that shook South Korea’s democratic system, sparked nationwide protests and rattled financial markets while drawing concern from key allies, including the United States.

Yoon has since been convicted of leading an insurrection and is appealing a life sentence. Earlier this month, he was also sentenced to 30 years in prison in a separate case after being found guilty of sending drones into North Korea in an alleged attempt to manufacture a security crisis that could justify emergency rule.

Several senior members of Yoon’s administration have also received prison terms.

Former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo is serving a 15-year sentence, while former Interior Minister Lee Sang-min was sentenced to nine years in prison. A former defense minister was jailed last week for three years after being convicted of disclosing classified military information connected to the martial law operation.

Separately, former first lady Kim Keon Hee is serving a four-year prison sentence for stock manipulation and bribery offenses unrelated to the martial law case.

The convictions represent one of the most extensive legal reckonings involving a former South Korean administration since the country’s transition to democratic rule, with prosecutors continuing to pursue accountability for officials involved in the failed attempt to impose emergency military authority.

Canadians were entitled to question India’s evidence and procedures. They were not entitled to pretend that no substantial record existed.

Canada has a remarkable ability to turn a complicated record into a clean symbol.

In June 2024, the House of Commons observed a moment of silence ‘in memory of Hardeep Singh Nijjar’, one year after he was shot dead outside the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara in Surrey.

His killing on Canadian soil demanded investigation, accountability and justice. But remembrance should not require amnesia. If Parliament chose to honour Nijjar, Canadians were entitled to know the full record, not only the version constructed after his death.

Being Canadian is more than possessing a passport. Citizenship establishes legal status; it does not erase conduct or automatically certify civic virtue.

Nijjar’s Canadian story began in February 1997 when, according to Global News, he arrived at Pearson Airport using a fraudulent passport under the name ‘Ravi Sharma’. His refugee claim was rejected after adjudicators questioned parts of his account and documentation.

Eleven days later, he married a British Columbia woman who sponsored him. Immigration authorities rejected the application as a marriage of convenience. He appealed and lost in 2001. Nijjar eventually became a Canadian citizen on May 25, 2007, a date later confirmed publicly by then-immigration minister Marc Miller.

His citizenship was valid. The path preceding it remained relevant when politicians later presented him as an uncomplicated Canadian community leader.

So did his public conduct.

On Facebook, Nijjar posted an image of a revolver described as the ‘choice of a militant Sikh’. The accompanying text referred to keeping the ‘monkey-army’, a slur aimed at Hindus and ‘enemies of religion’ under control.

Video footage also shows Nijjar and supporters blocking access to Indian diplomatic premises in Canada.

In a recorded Sikh Temple speech, he praised the assassinations of Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and former army chief General A.S. Vaidya as acts of militant martyrdom.

Celebrating political assassinations from a religious platform is not peaceful civic leadership. Displaying a firearm alongside dehumanizing language about another community is not pluralism.

When questions arose about Nijjar’s immigration history, Moninder Singh Baul of the BC Gurdwaras Council argued in a circulated video that Canadians had no standing to scrutinize his fraudulent passport or rejected refugee claim because ‘white Canadians came raping and pillaging’.

That did not answer the record. It attempted to place it beyond discussion.

Nijjar’s admirers also situated him within a militant lineage. A May 2024 profile published by the tribute site 1984tribute described him as ‘privileged’ to have developed close relations with Gurdeep Singh Deepa and others connected to the Khalistan Commando Force. It also stated that Jagtar Singh Tara later appointed him leader of the Khalistan Tiger Force.

These were not accusations written by Nijjar’s opponents. They were claims presented approvingly by supporters.

Tara was convicted for his role in the 1995 assassination of Punjab chief minister Beant Singh, the equivalent of a provincial premier in Canada. Describing proximity to such figures as a privilege is difficult to reconcile with the peaceful community-leader portrait later promoted here.

India designated Nijjar an individual terrorist under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act in July 2020. In July 2022, India’s National Investigation Agency announced a reward for information leading to his arrest in a case alleging conspiracy connected to the attempted killing of a Hindu priest in Punjab.

These were Indian allegations and legal designations, not Canadian convictions. Canadians were entitled to question India’s evidence and procedures. They were not entitled to pretend that no substantial record existed.

That record was publicly available. Canadian and international media reported Nijjar’s immigration history, India’s terrorism designation, alleged militant associations, reported no-fly restrictions and criminal allegations. Those reports did not independently prove India’s case. They treated the background as relevant context.

Canadian politicians had access to the same record.

At least 21 MPs from the Liberals, Conservatives, NDP and Bloc Québécois sponsored or seconded Motion M-112, which cited Nijjar’s killing while addressing foreign interference, violence and intimidation.

Defending Canadian sovereignty and demanding accountability for a killing on Canadian soil were entirely proper. Neither required Parliament to empty Nijjar’s life of complexity.

When Justin Trudeau rose in the House of Commons in September 2023, he said Canadian agencies were pursuing ‘credible allegations of a potential link’ between agents of the Indian government and Nijjar’s killing. The language was qualified, but the consequences were immediate. Canada publicly accused another democracy before the underlying evidence had been disclosed or tested in court, damaging a relationship involving trade, security, immigration and millions of people connected to both countries.

Four men were later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy. Reports linked some of the accused to the Bishnoi criminal network. That connection was folded into Canada’s claim that organized crime may have been used as a proxy for foreign interference.

But another possibility has never received equal public scrutiny.

Sources familiar with the circumstances of the case have privately raised the possibility that Nijjar’s death arose from gang-related violence and criminal rivalries rather than a foreign-government operation. That account has not been established in court and cannot yet be treated as proven. But neither has the claim that the Indian government ordered his murder.

The public has not seen the evidence underlying Trudeau’s accusation. No Canadian court has determined the motive for Nijjar’s killing, and no judicial finding has established that India directed it.

That unresolved gap matters. An allegation presented by a prime minister carries enormous political and diplomatic weight, even when the evidence remains secret. Once repeated often enough, a theory can harden into accepted fact before a court has examined it.

Canada maybe eventually proves foreign-state involvement. However, it may also emerge that criminal motives, personal disputes or gang rivalries were at play. Until the evidence is tested, responsible journalism and political leadership require both possibilities to remain open.

Instead, Canada settled quickly on a simplified narrative: Nijjar as a peaceful community leader killed through foreign interference, while his immigration history, militant rhetoric, criminal-network questions and alleged associations remained outside the national conversation.

That narrative reassured a politically organized pro-Khalistan constituency but left Canadians with an incomplete account of both the victim and the investigation. It also exposed Canada to the charge that domestic political considerations shaped the story before the evidence had been tested.

None of this excuses Nijjar’s killing. His death demanded a lawful investigation, and anyone responsible should be prosecuted regardless of his politics, beliefs or history.

But justice after death does not require a politically convenient biography. Nor should undisclosed intelligence be converted into a settled national narrative while credible alternative explanations remain unresolved.

Canada was right to investigate the killing.

It was not required to sanitize the person it chose to honour or ask Canadians to treat one unproven theory as a verdict.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

EU foreign ministers from the 27-member bloc will begin talks with Ukraine and neighboring Moldova on the first cluster of EU legislation, opening the next stage of their accession process.

Ukraine’s progress had been delayed for nearly two years after Hungary blocked further movement under former Prime Minister Viktor Orban. The path reopened after his rival Peter Magyar won elections in April.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa said the move recognized the efforts and reforms undertaken by Ukraine and Moldova despite significant challenges.

The decision provides political support for Kyiv, which applied for EU membership after Russia’s invasion, but officials said major obstacles remain before accession can take place.

Ukraine must complete negotiations covering 35 chapters of EU law, including areas such as environment, agriculture, justice and security, organized into six major clusters.

A European diplomat said the process would be complicated by the ongoing war, institutional reforms and challenges including organized crime.

Hungary’s new leadership has suggested that even if negotiations are completed, membership could still take many years, while some EU officials have discussed alternative arrangements.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has proposed the idea of Ukraine becoming an “associate member” without voting rights while it works toward full accession, a proposal that Kyiv has viewed with caution.

President Volodymyr Zelensky has insisted that Ukraine’s goal remains full EU membership with complete rights.

The broader debate comes as Ukraine, Moldova and other candidate countries seek closer ties with the bloc, raising questions about how the EU would function with more members.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys said the EU should prepare itself to accept Ukraine by 2030 if Kyiv completes the required reforms and negotiations.

He stressed that the timeline would depend on Ukraine’s progress and the outcome of accession talks.

Speaking at a legal conference in Eilat, Baharav-Miara said a “race has begun to eliminate democratic institutions” as parliament considers measures to split the attorney general’s authority and expand the powers of National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir.

She also criticized what she described as growing government disregard for court rulings, including delays in implementing a Supreme Court decision requiring military conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jewish men.

Prosecutors accused Estrada of receiving illicit kickbacks worth 573 million pesos ($9.3 million) from projects tied to flawed flood-control facilities. Plunder is a non-bailable offense under Philippine law.

Estrada, the son of former Philippine president Joseph Estrada, denied wrongdoing and said the case was politically motivated. He told reporters he would not seek Senate protection and was prepared to face the charges in court.

The scandal has fueled public anger over corruption and raised concerns about governance, while also affecting confidence in public infrastructure spending.

Speaking at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Guterres said violations of international law were increasingly visible at a time when the global system is under strain and power dynamics are shifting. He stressed that adherence to legal norms was “more important than ever” amid growing geopolitical tensions.

The commemorative session, attended by Willem-Alexander, highlighted both the legacy and current pressures facing the court, which adjudicates disputes between states. Guterres noted that the ICJ is currently handling a rising number of cases, reflecting both its relevance and the complexity of contemporary conflicts.

Recent high-profile proceedings include a case brought by South Africa against Israel alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza, as well as a landmark environmental advisory opinion issued last year that clarified states’ obligations on climate change and opened the possibility of reparations for non-compliance.

Despite its central role, Guterres said institutions such as the ICJ are increasingly being “questioned and challenged,” with erosion of respect for international law occurring not at the margins but “at the core” of the global system, including among states tasked with maintaining international peace and security.

He reiterated that ICJ rulings are legally binding under the UN Charter, even though the court lacks enforcement mechanisms, a limitation frequently cited by critics. He pointed to the court’s order directing Russia to halt its invasion of Ukraine, which was not followed, as an example of the gap between legal authority and political compliance.

Yuji Iwasawa echoed these concerns, warning of “troubling signs” of countries questioning multilateralism and the role of law in international relations. He said such trends place significant pressure on the global legal framework and underscore the fragility of the system.

Guterres framed the moment as a broader choice facing the international community between a rules-based order and one shaped by power politics, emphasizing that respect for international law remains a foundational obligation for all UN member states.

Kyrgyzstan has reaffirmed its commitment to abolishing the death penalty following a period of intense public debate triggered by a high-profile criminal case, with authorities and international partners emphasizing prevention and rule-of-law reforms as more effective responses to violent crime.

The debate emerged after the rape and murder of a young girl in September 2025, which prompted widespread public outrage and calls for the reinstatement of capital punishment. The issue quickly gained political traction, culminating in a formal proposal by President Sadyr Japarov to seek a constitutional review of whether the death penalty could be reintroduced.

The Constitutional Court delivered its ruling on 10 December 2025, concluding that reinstating capital punishment would violate Kyrgyzstan’s international treaty obligations, which are embedded within its constitutional framework. The decision effectively blocked any immediate return to the death penalty and reinforced the country’s legal commitments under international law.

Kyrgyzstan has maintained a moratorium on executions since 1998 and formally abolished the death penalty in 2010 following its ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The protocol obliges signatory states to take all necessary measures to prevent the reintroduction of capital punishment.

The United Nations human rights office played a consultative role throughout the process. According to Matilda Bogner, Regional Representative for Central Asia, the office engaged with both executive and judicial authorities to provide guidance on international legal standards and treaty obligations.

“It is positive to see that despite an initiative that appeared to have strong public backing but did not comply with international obligations, the rule of law approach ultimately prevailed in Kyrgyzstan,” Bogner said.The episode has also prompted broader discussions within the country about the nature of justice, particularly in cases involving serious violent crime.

While public sentiment in the aftermath of the incident favored harsher punitive measures, international human rights officials have argued that such approaches are not supported by evidence as effective deterrents.UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said that while the crimes cited by authorities were “clearly appalling” and required accountability, there is no empirical basis to conclude that capital punishment reduces the incidence of serious offenses.

He called instead for responses grounded in prevention, victim protection, and institutional strengthening.Türk emphasized the need for a “well-resourced, victim-centred approach” to tackling violence, particularly sexual and gender-based violence.

This approach, he said, should focus on improving access to justice and ensuring that systems are capable of responding effectively to early warning signs.Bogner echoed this perspective, noting that a predictable and consistent rule-of-law framework is more effective in preventing violence than reintroducing capital punishment into a system that may lack uniformity in enforcement. “A rule of law process that is predictable is a better form of prevention of egregious cases,” she said.

The focus on prevention has translated into ongoing institutional reforms. The UN human rights office is working with Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs to develop a new risk assessment system aimed at strengthening early intervention in cases of gender-based violence. The system is intended to enable law enforcement agencies to identify potential risks, monitor evolving situations, and take timely action to prevent escalation.

Authorities in Kyrgyzstan have also reiterated their commitment to upholding international legal standards following the Constitutional Court’s decision. Officials, including representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have emphasized the importance of maintaining adherence to the rule of law while addressing public concerns over safety and justice.

The case highlights the challenges faced by governments in balancing public demand for punitive measures with international legal obligations and evidence-based policy approaches. It also underscores the broader shift in international human rights discourse toward prevention-focused strategies, particularly in addressing gender-based violence.

Efforts to strengthen legal and institutional frameworks are seen as critical to improving outcomes for victims. This includes ensuring that police and judicial systems are adequately resourced, capable of responding promptly to complaints, and equipped to handle sensitive cases involving women and girls.

The UN human rights office has indicated that its engagement with Kyrgyz authorities will continue, with a focus on building systems that prioritize accountability and prevention. The approach aligns with broader international efforts to address gender-based violence through structural reforms rather than punitive escalation.

The developments in Kyrgyzstan reflect an evolving policy stance in which adherence to international obligations and evidence-based approaches are being prioritized over retributive measures, even in the face of strong public pressure following serious criminal incidents.

Speaking alongside Syrian transitional President Ahmed Al-Sharaa in Berlin, Merz said both governments were seeking to create conditions that would allow more Syrians to return voluntarily to their homeland.

Germany hosts the largest Syrian diaspora in the European Union, with more than one million Syrians, many of whom arrived during the 2015–2016 migrant influx.“We are working jointly toward more Syrians being able to return to their homeland,” Merz said at a joint press conference.

Sharaa said Damascus and Berlin were exploring a “circular” migration framework that would allow Syrians to participate in rebuilding their country while retaining the option to remain in Germany.

Such a model would enable returnees to contribute to reconstruction efforts without permanently relinquishing the economic and social stability they have established abroad, he said.

Merz said Germany intended to support Syria’s reconstruction after years of civil war, adding that a German delegation would travel to Syria in the coming days to advance cooperation.

However, he stressed that deeper bilateral engagement would depend on progress toward establishing rule-of-law institutions.

“Many joint projects in the future will depend on our finding a state governed by the rule of law,” Merz said, adding that he was confident such conditions could be achieved following discussions with Sharaa.

Officials have also pointed to comparative international examples to argue that such engagement does not necessarily compromise electoral fairness.

On 12 February 2026, Bangladeshis are scheduled to make two significant choices on the same day: electing the country’s 13th National Parliament and voting in a referendum on proposed constitutional reforms. As polling day approaches, however, a legal challenge before the High Court has raised questions about whether the conditions necessary for a credible and trusted vote are still intact.

The writ petition does not allege wrongdoing by any political party. Instead, it focuses on the conduct of state institutions during an election period — a distinction that has drawn both legal and public attention. At its core is a concern familiar to many democracies: what happens to electoral legitimacy when the boundary between neutral administration and political advocacy becomes blurred?

According to the petition, senior figures associated with the interim administration, along with other state-linked actors, have publicly expressed support for a “Yes” vote in the referendum. The petitioner argues that such actions may be inconsistent with provisions of the Election Code of Conduct and the Representation of the People Order, which are intended to ensure that those exercising executive authority do not influence voter choice during an election period.

A detailed constitutional analysis of the filing outlines these claims and the legal provisions involved (summary here).

One aspect of the case has proven particularly contentious: the alleged use of official government platforms, including a state-run website, to promote a specific referendum outcome. Critics argue that when state infrastructure is used in this way, it risks creating what constitutional lawyers describe as “structural bias” — a situation where the state itself is perceived as an interested party rather than an impartial referee.

These allegations, and the legal remedies sought in response, are outlined in reporting on the petition’s filing (details here).

The petition also places significant emphasis on the role of the Election Commission. It claims that the Commission was formally notified of alleged violations, supported by documentary evidence, but failed to take corrective or preventive measures. Under Bangladesh’s constitution, the Commission is an independent authority charged with safeguarding electoral integrity. Whether inaction in such circumstances constitutes a breach of constitutional duty is now a central question before the court.

Beyond individual actions, the case challenges the decision to hold a parliamentary election and a constitutional referendum on the same day. While not without precedent internationally, the petitioner argues that elections and referendums serve distinct democratic purposes and are governed by different legal standards. Conducting both simultaneously, it is claimed, may heighten voter confusion and complicate the requirement of a level playing field.

An overview of these arguments, as presented to the court, has been publicly reported (background here).

The interim government has rejected the suggestion that its conduct undermines democratic norms. In public statements, it has argued that expressing support for constitutional reform falls within its mandate and is consistent with democratic practice in a transitional context. Officials have also pointed to comparative international examples to argue that such engagement does not necessarily compromise electoral fairness.

The government’s position has been summarised in independent constitutional commentary (see overview here).

Procedurally, some related petitions have been returned or deferred by the courts without substantive hearings, citing workload and jurisdictional considerations. These decisions have not resolved the underlying issues, which continue to be debated both inside and outside legal circles.

What makes this moment particularly sensitive is not only the legal complexity, but the question of trust. Elections draw legitimacy not simply from compliance with procedural rules, but from public confidence that those rules apply equally to all participants — including the state itself. When that confidence weakens, even technically valid electoral processes can struggle to command broad acceptance.

Bangladesh has experienced contested elections before, and its institutions have navigated periods of intense political strain. The present challenge, however, raises broader questions about how neutrality is defined and enforced during political transitions. The court’s eventual ruling may therefore carry implications beyond the immediate electoral calendar, shaping expectations of institutional conduct in future contests.

Ultimately, the court’s decision will not just determine the fate of one election or referendum. It will help clarify how Bangladesh defines neutrality in moments of political transition, and how resilient its constitutional guardrails remain under pressure. In democracies everywhere, trust in the process is often harder to rebuild than laws themselves — and once eroded, it can linger long after the ballots are counted.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Co-Author SM Faiyaz Hossain

Under the current interim regime, extrajudicial violence has not merely been tolerated; it has been routinized.

Once lionized as the “banker to the poor,” Mohammad Yunus the microcredit mythologist now presides—directly or symbolically—over a Bangladesh in slow-motion disintegration. Over the past fourteen months, the mounting crises—economic, legal, social and political—no longer speak of mere instability; they shout systemic collapse and kleptocracy. Yunus’s promise of reform now rings hollow amid daily horrors.

The promise reflects his longstanding fictitious tales of donor friendly rhetoric and fundraising manuals pertaining to three zeros; and sending poverty to museums. 

Economic Stagnation and Social Collapse

Bangladesh’s long-praised growth trajectory has lost traction. In FY 2024–25, growth fell to 4.1 %, the weakest since the COVID era, per World Bank assessment. If the investment drought deepens, projections suggest a drop toward 3.3 % in 2025.

Over 100 garment factories have shuttered over the past year, costing tens of thousands of jobs (Daily Industry BD). Official unemployment hovers at 4.6 %, but a deeper reckoning of underemployment, youth joblessness, and hidden labor markets suggests far higher human cost (Daily Observer). Nearly 85 % of workers remain informal—no contracts, no social protection (Dhaka Tribune).

In industrial belts like Gazipur, police acknowledge many arrested for petty theft or street mugging are recently laid-off factory workers (New Age). When the state fails to provide, survival becomes the only logic, and crime swells to fill the void.

Theories of Yunus delivered to convince his Western philanthropists have failed to make financial relevance with Global investors. Yunus doesn’t just lack political acumen, he was too naïve to begin his step in the game. 

Lawlessness, State Terror, and Mob Carnage

Justice no longer exists as a concept, only as a performative façade masking systemic brutality and institutional collapse. Under the current interim regime, extrajudicial violence has not merely been tolerated; it has been routinized. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, at least 8 extrajudicial killings and 19 deaths in custody were documented.

Between August 2024 and March 2025, human rights monitors recorded 20 such killings, involving torture, beatings, and summary executions. Mob lynchings have surged with terrifying ferocity: between mid-2024 and mid-2025, at least 637 people were lynched—representing a twelvefold increase from the 51 deaths recorded in 2023.

This wave of vigilante violence has been met with state indifference—if not tacit encouragement. Simultaneously, religious minorities have been subjected to a coordinated campaign of persecution: between August 2024 and June 2025, 2,442 hate crimes—including arson, sexual assaults, desecration of temples and churches, and targeted killings—were recorded, underscoring a culture of impunity that has metastasized into open terror.

These are not isolated incidents but symptoms of a regime where law is weaponized, justice is ornamental, and human life is expendable.

Since Muhammad Yunus assumed office, there has been a disturbing rise in alleged political persecution through the legal system: arrests, false lawsuits, and invented murder charges serving as tools of harassment rather than justice. Beyond the courts, thousands have been detained under Operation Devil Hunt, with over 11,300 arrests reported by late February 2025, many allegedly including people with only tenuous or no links to criminal acts. 

Yunus never had, never tried for public mandate. Employed by the protesters of July uprising is far from being a democratic mandate. Yunus never had the courage to face a public referendum to justify his throne. He preferred to enjoy the authority, ban political parties without referendum and promote divisive rhetoric among the masses. 

Women, Children, and the Machinery of Cruelty

The sexual violence statistics are a national disgrace. In the first half of 2025, 481 rape cases were reported—nearing the total for all of 2024 (The Daily Star). Child rape cases, in just one seven-month span, rose by 75 % (The Daily Star).

Protests led by women or students are met with torture, rape threats, solitary confinement (Human Rights Watch). Ibtedayi teachers demanding job recognition were beaten, tear-gassed, and dispersed in January 2025 (JMBF).

Prisons continue to serve as killing grounds. Deaths in custody are frequent; euphemisms like “heart attacks” or “natural causes” mask systematic violence.

Corpses in Rivers: the Floating Dead

A macabre trend haunts Bangladesh’s waterways. River police data show that in 2025, an average of 43 bodies each month have been pulled from rivers, up from 36 per month in 2024. From January to July 2025 alone, 301 bodies were recovered; 92 remain unidentified. Narayanganj recorded 34 recoveries, Dhaka 32 (Daily Star).

In one case, a woman and a child were found floating in the Buriganga River, both strangled before being dumped, according to autopsy (Financial Post BD). In late August, a headless body was recovered from the Shitalakkhya River in Narayanganj; the victim was later identified as a 27-year-old man (Financial Post BD).

In Keraniganj, the bodies of a man and woman were discovered tied with a 50-kg rice sack, and another victim in a burqa drifted nearby (Financial Post BD).

In Netrokona District (March 2025), the bodies of three fish poachers were found in the Dhanu River after clashes involving community groups (bdnews24). In Chandpur, two older men were retrieved from the Dakatia River—one with visible stab wounds and a severed leg vein (Dhaka Tribune)¹⁷.

In Khulna, over 50 bodies were pulled from various rivers between August 2024 and September 2025; 20 remain unidentified (Khulna naval police). In Chandpur’s Meghna River, seven bodies from an Al Bakhira cargo vessel murder were handed over to families—and a probe committee was formed (BD Pratidin).

Notably, the body of journalist Bibhuranjan Sarkar—after threats and intimidation—was recovered from the Meghna River in Munshiganj in August 2025 (IFJ / BMSF).

These are not accidents or drownings; they are executions turned invisible, pollution turned weapon, rivers made into graveyards without funeral. 

Passport, Visas, and Global Shame

Bangladesh’s passport value has eroded, visa rejections are multiplying, and global watchdogs—HRW, Odhikar, UN human rights bodies—have flagged Dhaka for systemic violations.

The moral capital of the country is bankrupt. Investors and donors hesitate to engage with a government intertwined with terror, silence, and complicity.

Disasters as Symptoms, Not Anomalies

The October 13, 2025 garment-chemical factory fire in Dhaka, which killed 16 workers, was not a random accident — it was a preventable massacre. Locked rooftop escape doors and unchecked toxic gas turned the building into a sealed crematorium.

Days later, the Yunus government has failed to launch any credible investigation, identify the factory owners, or bring those responsible to justice.

No arrests have been made, no compensation schemes publicly disclosed, and no structural safety audits initiated. Instead, the administration has issued vague statements and deflected responsibility, shielding business interests at the expense of workers’ lives. This silence is not mere negligence — it is complicity. 

This is not a standalone incident, rather a pattern. The handling of the Gazi Tire Factory fire tragedy reflects a troubling pattern of negligence and institutional disregard for accountability.

Despite the devastating loss of life and clear safety failures, Yunus—under whose interim government the incident unfolded—failed to ensure a thorough, transparent investigation or meaningful compensation for victims’ families.

This inaction not only denied justice to the workers but also signaled an alarming indifference to labor rights and workplace safety. In the past 13 months, similar negligence has been observed in incidents such as the Hazaribagh factory fire (2024) and the Chittagong shipbreaking yard accidents (2024-2025), where victims were met with inadequate investigations and stalled compensation efforts.

By neglecting to pursue corporate responsibility and systemic reform, Yunus reinforced the vulnerability of industrial workers in Bangladesh, deepening mistrust between the state and its most exploited laborers. His failure to act decisively in the aftermath stands as a stark contradiction to his international image as a champion of social justice.

Over the past 13 months of the Yunus regime, Bangladesh’s labour sector has been trapped in a cycle of grand promises, fragile protections, and cynical neglect. The government’s repeated declarations of “historic reforms” amounted to little more than political theatre, as factory floors across the country continued to mirror a grim reality of wage theft, unsafe workplaces, and repressed voices.

While MoLE boasted of upcoming amendments to labour laws, millions of workers — especially in the sprawling informal sector — remained invisible to the legal system. Inspection bodies were underfunded and toothless, allowing factory owners to operate with impunity as thousands were laid off illegally, denied benefits, and silenced when they protested.

Unionization was stifled, particularly in Export Processing Zones, where rights existed only on paper, and “social audits” became nothing more than PR rituals for global brands. Worker unrest exploded repeatedly, from delayed Eid allowances to unpaid salaries and unsafe conditions, yet the government responded with empty press briefings and tokenistic committees.

The much-touted October 2025 labour law reform deadline became a symbol of inertia, tangled in corporate resistance and bureaucratic gamesmanship. The past year has laid bare a bitter truth: under Yunus’s leadership, labour rights were not defended — they were traded off, delayed, and dismissed, leaving workers to fight alone against a system designed to exploit them.

From Savior Icon to Enabler of Decay

Mohammad Yunus once embodied a hopeful alternative—microcredit, grassroots empowerment, moral leadership. Yet under his interim leadership, Bangladesh is unravelling in every direction: economic collapse, mob justice, sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, rivers flooded with corpses, and institutional impotence. From Teachers to slums, the elites to poets all have suffered under the Yunus’ reign of Terror. 

Yunus may not have physically ordered every atrocity, but he now presides over a regime that normalized them. His Nobel halo cannot conceal the inferno beneath. Rebuilding a nation demands more than symbolic leadership—it demands justice, accountability, and courage. Today, Bangladesh has none. Yunus had the opportunity to unite the nation and develop a social contract among the political parties. Instead what Yunus has contributed had cemented a pipeline for cycle of violence to multiply in the future. 

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.