ISIS relies purely on geographic terrain to plan and execute its activities…

ISIS has significantly increased its operations over the past year after a reorganization that saw it focus on creating mobile groups of fighters to conduct smaller-scale attacks. Understanding how its reconstituting itself as an insurgent force and at these early stages is critical to preventing its resurgence.

ISIS in Iraq’s urban areas appears to have reorganized its fighters in small “mobile” subgroups. The group has reformulated its fighting strategies in accordance with new realities on the ground: a decline in its ability to fight after losing first-tier leaders and thousands of fighters in its 2017 territorial defeat, U.S. sanctions on many of its financial resources, and its decreasing ability to recruit and sustain new blood. Nonetheless, ISIS  is ramping up its activities in areas in which it still has influence by exploiting Iraq’s internal problems and utilizing familiar geographical territory.

Varying Estimates of ISIS Fighters 

In August 2020, almost two years after the group’s military defeat, the U.N. estimated that more than 10,000 ISIS fighters were still operating in Iraq and Syria. This is similar to a late 2019 assessment from counter-terrorism authorities in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which estimated 10,000 ISIS members in Iraq, 4,000-5,000 of whom were fighters and the rest of whom were supporters and sleeper cells integrated into local communities in the majority-Sunni provinces of western and northwestern Iraq. 

These numbers far exceed estimates from Iraqi intelligence, which puts the number of ISIS fighters in Iraq at 2,000-3,000, including 500 fighters who infiltrated the country out of 859 fighters who escaped from the detention of the Syrian Democratic Forces in October 2019.

All these estimates may be more than the real numbers of ISIS combatants who launch attacks on selected targets, set up ambushes, plant explosive devices, kidnap and assassinate social and political leaders, and undertake other operations in keeping with the organization’s strategic priorities. ISIS has been able to revive these operations three years after its military defeat in its last stronghold in the Iraqi city of Rawa, 90 kilometers (56 miles) east of the city of Al-Qaim on the Syrian border, on Nov. 17, 2017.

A study of security operations against ISIS in Iraq shows that most do not result in the arrest or killing of large numbers of ISIS fighters. Military units from various branches of the security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces Shia militia alliance, including tribal units, from multiple provinces participate in these operations, which are supported by the air forces of the Iraqi Army and the international coalition and cover large areas of more than one province. These include, for example, the “Lions of al-Jazeera”  operation that was launched in May 2020 and encompassed the provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. These operations often uncover tunnels, which are — in addition to caves — essential places, called madafat or “guest houses,” for harboring ISIS fighters, and finding explosive belts and IEDs. 

The military operations to combat ISIS cells are disproportionate with the results. The officially announced outcome of the “Lions of al-Jazeera” campaign resulted in the arrest of two suspects, the destruction of two hideouts, the controlled detonation of four explosive devices, the deactivation of a booby-trapped house, the destruction of a tunnel, and the seizure of two motorcycles. 

In Anbar Province, according to official results announced by the Defense Ministry’s Security Media Cell, the security forces participating in “Lions of al-Jazeera” announced on Oct. 1, 2020, that three ISIS fighters had been killed in one of the tunnels in which they found projectiles of various types in modest numbers. 

In Salah al-Din province, after a series of operations to clear the Makhoul mountain range, the Security Media Cell announced in November 2020 that it had found five tunnels and some military equipment but did not arrest or kill any of the organization’s fighters. 

The press briefings about these security operations do not indicate that a significant number of ISIS fighters were killed, nor do they indicate that clashes between security forces and ISIS fighters took place except in rare cases. They do reveal the destruction of shelters, weapons, and combat equipment that the organization had stored in desert and mountainous areas once ISIS realized that defeat was inevitable.  

The security forces, including units of the Popular Mobilization Forces, attach great importance to decoupling Iraq from Syria such that it does not serve as a singular battlespace for ISIS by restricting the cross-border movement of fighters and weapons. In this way, they seek to prevent the infiltration of ISIS fighters from Syria into Iraq, as these fighters hide in the deserts of Anbar and Ninewa to prepare to move to areas that are important to the organization in terms of security, such as the Makhoul and Hamrin mountain ranges in Salah al-Din. At the same time, the Popular Mobilization Forces control the Syrian-Iraqi border to facilitate their own interests such as trade and weapons flow from and to Syria. 

The security forces succeeded in securing more than 450 kilometers (280 miles) of the 610-kilometer (379-mile) Iraqi-Syrian border by cooperating with the International Coalition to install surveillance towers, barbed wire, and thermal cameras, in addition to reconnaissance drones. 

ISIS’s Geographic Distribution 

ISIS’s increased use of “mobile groups” that carry out operations in different areas — often far from its bases or from shelters such as the madafat, which are located in rough terrains, rocky caves, or underground tunnels — means the group’s actual presence cannot be judged by its territorial claims or by announcements from Iraqi authorities. 

No longer concerned about maintaining its wilayat (province) structure, and by ignoring the federal government’s administrative divisions, ISIS relies purely on geographic terrain to plan and execute its activities. Even though the group is no longer acting as a state as it was during the caliphate years from 2014 to 2018, its communiques claiming attacks still refer to the wilayat as part of its PR strategy. 

Iraqi security officials’ statements indicate that the organization relies on remote bases deep in the desert in Anbar, Ninewa, mountain ranges, valleys, and orchards in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala to house its fighters and establish monitoring and control points to secure supply routes. It also uses these bases to establish command centers and small camps for training, digging tunnels, and exploiting caves in mountainous areas. 

ISIS fighters’ geographical distribution can be inferred by examining the operations it launches against security forces and the Popular and Tribal Mobilization Forces. These fighters are distributed mainly in overlapping “geographical sectors” in Anbar, Baghdad, Babil, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, and Diyala.

The first sector is an extension of the desert in eastern Syria. It constitutes a meeting point between ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq, who move from there to Salah al-Din, which represents the main land communication node for the organization. It links ISIS groups coming mostly from Syria through Anbar and then moving to neighboring provinces: to the south reaching the northern belt of Baghdad, east to Diyala, north to Kirkuk, and to the northwest reaching Ninewa. This sector includes Anbar and Ninewa provinces within a wide desert area interspersed with valleys, mountain ranges, and bodies of water.

One of the most important valleys in this sector that ISIS uses to house its fighters is Houran Valley, which descends 350 kilometers (217 miles) from Saudi territory and enters Iraq, ending in the Euphrates near Albaghdadi. Another is the Wadi Al-Ubayyid Valley, which passes the Saudi border and Anbar Governorate in the border region of Arar, and ends in Razzaza Lake in Karbala Governorate, south of Baghdad. 

This sector also includes the desert of Al-Baaj district, southwest of Mosul and 50 kilometers (31 miles) east of the Syrian border, and the desert of Hatra district, south of Mosul. These two areas overlap geographically with the Anbar desert in the Al-Qaim region north of the Euphrates River and include the Badush mountain range, as well as the Al-Tharthar Valley and Al-Tharthar Lake, northeast of Anbar, next to Salah Al-Din province. 

The second geographical sector includes areas overlapping with the first geographical sector in the southeast of Ninewa and northwest of Salah al-Din. It includes the geographical areas between the districts of Sharqat in Salah al-Din next to the Kirkuk and Makhmur in the southeast of Ninewa near Kirkuk and Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region. 

The third geographical sector is the most important for the organization and the center of ISIS’s main activities. It includes Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala provinces, extending to the Al Kateon sector and the areas of Al-Muqdadiya, Khanaqin, Jalawla, and Qarataba. 

The sector features valleys such as Zghitoun and Shay in Kirkuk, agricultural areas with dense orchards suitable for hiding and transporting ISIS fighters, setting up ambushes, and planting explosive devices. ISIS mobile groups in this sector in Salah al-Din overlap groups in Diyala through the Makhoul and Hamrin mountain ranges. 

In addition to the three main geographical sectors, ISIS groups have a presence in the western Baghdad belt areas in Abu Ghraib and Radwaniyah and in the northern Baghdad belt in Rashidiya, Tarmiyah, and Al-Mashahidah. They also exist in the cities of Balad and Samarra, in the south of Salah al-Din, and south of Baghdad in the Jurf al-Sakhar area, located 50 kilometers to the east of Amiriyat al-Fallujah in Anbar.

ISIS cells are also present in areas that are in dispute between the Iraqi central and Kurdistan regional governments, where the lack of security coordination gives the organization some freedom of movement. This was especially true after the Kurdish peshmerga forces evacuated these areas in October 2017 following then-Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi’s decision to move Iraqi security forces and Popular Mobilization Forces to control these areas after a September 2017 independence referendum organized by the Kurds.

Other areas, however, have witnessed joint operations by security forces from several governorates to track down and hunt ISIS fighters and destroy their bases. The first phase of the operation “The Lions of Al-Jazeera II” operation, which was launched on Feb. 1, 2020, with the participation of units from the Al-Jazeera Operations Command, the West Ninewa Operations Command, the Salah al-Din Operations Command, and Popular Mobilization Forces brigades (including tribal units) is a key example of this kind of coordination. 

ISIS’s Operations on the Rise 

According to information I have obtained through monitoring official Iraqi and non-Iraqi sites and other sites close to ISIS, the organization has carried out dozens of operations in Iraq since the start of 2021. The propaganda ISIS has employed often takes advantage of highly publicized global events to carry out attacks and show the world they are still present. The election of U.S. President Joe Biden was such an event, and ISIS escalated the pace of its attacks after Biden’s inauguration.  

According to media outlets close to ISIS, such as Amaq News Agency, the group carried out 1,422 operations in 2020, an average of four per day. The organization’s main tool was explosive devices, used 485 times, followed by 334 sniping operations, in addition to 252 clashes or exchanges of fire. Another 94 execution operations were carried out against individuals affiliated with security services, the Popular Mobilization Forces, or the Kurdish peshmerga forces and against people cooperating with the government, including mayors and tribal leaders. There were an additional 257 operations that ISIS’s media outlets mention but do not classify. 

Amaq claims the organization killed or injured 2,748 people in 2020, including 724 killings in Diyala, 643 in Salah al-Din, 576 in Anbar, 474 in Kirkuk, 210 in Baghdad, 104 in Babil, and 26 in Ninewa. This indicates a 50% increase in operations compared to 2019 and 11% more deaths and injuries. 

The group also claimed to have destroyed or damaged 559 vehicles of various types, 85 houses and farms, 60 thermal cameras, 34 barracks, and 28 electrical energy transmission towers, most of which were in Diyala, Babil and Anbar. 

ISIS was limited to operations that do not require large numbers of fighters, including planting IEDs, setting up ambushes, sniping operations, assassinations, and burning homes and farms, none of which have major political or security repercussions. An exception is some limited “special operations,” such as the one in which two suicide bombers detonated in Tayaran Square in central Baghdad on Jan. 21, killing more than 30 people and wounding dozens in a “rare” security breach, nearly three years after the last operation in the capital that was claimed by the organization. 

Pandemic, Security Vacuum Provided Openings 

ISIS took advantage of the security vacuum in early 2020 after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and the tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Two days after the Jan. 2 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, coalition forces, wary of escalation, announced a brief halt in training Iraqi forces. The training resumed but was halted again on March 19 due to the spread of COVID-19 in Iraq. Coalition forces repositioned to different camps, and some countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain withdrew soldiers from Iraq. 

Soleimani’s assassination also prompted the Iraqi parliament to vote in January 2020 for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Official figures stated that before the pandemic there were about 8,000 foreign troops in Iraq, including 5,200 from the United States, while unofficial sources say the real number exceeds 16,000. The United States reduced the number of its soldiers in Iraq in September 2020 to about 2,500 soldiers in response to the Iraqi government’s request. 

This vacuum gave ISIS more freedom of movement for its mobile groups, facilitating logistical support and the restructuring and distributing these groups in a way that allowed the organization to securely cover the areas where its fighters are deployed. These deployments were in areas far from Iraqi security forces, which did not announce any military operations until April 2020. The first operation included the governorates of Diyala, Anbar, and Salah al-Din and was undertaken in response to the killing of 170 civilians and soldiers, along with 135 militants during the first quarter of 2020. 

Weakened but Still Effective 

Via its mobile groups, ISIS still possesses sufficient combat capabilities to threaten security and stability, but the group remains very weak. Currently, the organization still lacks the ability to execute major operations, and its attacks are limited to open targets that are not of strategic importance. What this means is that it is unlikely to attempt to take control of territory in Iraq or Syria due to the decline in its combat capabilities and financial resources. The group also remains vulnerable to the international coalition and Iraqi security forces if it tries to accelerate the pace of its resurgence. 

ISIS needs to recruit new fighters and rebuild its leadership system to centralize control, whether in directing orders or gathering security and intelligence information to prepare for major operations. Recruiting is more difficult, especially after its four years of control over territory led to widespread societal rejection of its authority. Local communities have been more closely cooperating with coalition and security forces to prevent ISIS from making a comeback, especially after witnessing increased stability in areas where tribes cooperated with the authorities. That said, the organization still attracts some unemployed people, outlaws, or people hunted down for social reasons, all of whom find that joining the ranks of the organization is a means of escaping from social and judicial prosecutions, in addition to ensuring minimum means of subsistence.    

This decline in local support also gives ISIS less flexibility in attracting funding. After gaining control of Mosul in 2014, ISIS relied on diversifying its sources of financing, whether by controlling hundreds of millions of dollars (for example, more than $420 million from state banks in Mosul) or by producing and marketing oil from fields it controlled in Iraq and Syria. It also trades in hard currencies through exchange and transfer networks, using third parties such as the Al-Ard Al-Jadidah company that moved from its headquarters in the city of Al-Qaim to the Turkish city of Samsun after the defeat of ISIS in Iraq. The company is part of the Al-Rawi Network that was run by Fawaz Muhammad Jubayr al-Rawi in the Syrian city of Albu Kamal, before he was killed in a June 2017 airstrike.  

In December 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department included Fawaz Muhammad Jubayr al-Rawi and other members of the Al-Rawi Network and associated entities such as the Al-Ard Al-Jadidah company on the sanctions list for providing important financial and logistical support to ISIS. 

Most of the organization’s activities during January and February of this year were concentrated in the Iraqi governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din. ISIS took advantage of some security gaps resulting from the decline in the level of coordination between the active forces, whether the security forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces or the Kurdish peshmerga forces.  

Ending ISIS is More than Combatting Terrorism 

During more than four years of the war against ISIS, and in addition to the dozens of security operations announced by the Iraqi forces to hunt down the remaining ISIS fighters, the U.S.-led international coalition carried out more than 34,000 air and artillery strikes that contributed to a large extent in taking control of all ISIS-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq by March 2019. Yet, according to U.S. intelligence sources, , the organization was not defeated and remains a threat to the security and stability of Iraq and Syria, with evident activity in more than six provinces in western and northwestern Iraq. 

The organization focuses its operations on targeting influential figures, especially those cooperating with the government and security agencies, to remove the obstacles it believes prevent it from recruiting more young people into its ranks and to limit the security cooperation that leads to the exposure of the organization’s members and fighters’ hideouts. It also aims to secure a “friendly” environment for the activities of its members in the Sunni community. 

Ending the threat ISIS poses cannot be realized without a political settlement that reintegrates Sunni Arabs in the political process, a fair distribution of power and wealth according to the population proportions of Sunni Arabs, and rebuilding cities destroyed by the war on ISIS that lasted from 2014 to 2018. In addition, emigrants and forcibly displaced people should be allowed to return to the governorates in the west and northwestern Iraq, and the Popular Mobilization Forces’ control of most of these areas must end. 

Additionally, efforts by the government and civil society organizations are needed to accept the social impact of the return of ISIS members’ families who are still in the camps and who are taught an ideology that adopts the ideas and approach of the organization. This is especially evident in the Al Hol camp in Hasakah, Syria, which includes thousands of ISIS families and members.  

Article first published on New Line Institute For Strategy And Policy based in Washington D.C.

Raed Al-Hamid is an independent Iraqi researcher and former consultant for the International Crisis Group. He tweets under @Raedalhamid1.

Kharijites were among the most reckless, impulsive and violent Islamist factions, and they also practiced the emphasis in worship.

It began with the Kharijites a group that came out at the end of the reign of the Caliph Othman bin Affan, they called themselves “People of Faith”, and they later were called the Kharijites after leaving Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, after the Battle of Sefeen in the year 37 Hijri.

The Kharijites rejected arbitration after it was presented to them in the effort to stop the dispute between Muslim leaders, the Kharijites were linked throughout their history with extreme views and actions in their religious beliefs resorting to violence and assassinations.

The first group of Kharijites consisted of Shagath Bin Qais Al-Kindi, Mas’ar Bin Fadaki Al-Tamimi and Zaid bin Husayn Al-Ta’i, while he came out on the day of the arbitration: “Abdullah bin Al-Kawa, Etab bin Al-Awar, Abdullah bin Wahb Al-Rasbi, and Erwa bin Jarir, Yazid bin Asim Al-Muharibi, and Harqus bin Zuhair known as Dhia. And these are the court, then they separated from him and labeled Imam Ali and Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan as heathens.

Kharijites were among the most reckless, impulsive and violent Islamist factions, and they also practiced the emphasis in worship. The group’s rebellion was crushed by the Omayeds and they were forced to go into hiding until the fall of the Omayeds dynasty.

The group’s attempt to make a comeback was met with Abu AlAbas brutal and bloody campaign wiping out their military arm and putting an end to the group militant activity for nearly 200 years.

Hashashins (Assassins)

The Assassin sect or Assassins is an Nizari Ismaili sect, separated from the Fatimids in the late fifth century A.H., eleventh century C.E. to call for the leadership of Nizar Al-Mustafa to the religion of God and whoever came from his bloodline.

As the book “Zero Point” by Narik Malian states, the Assassin sect is a Nizari Ismaili sect, popularized between the fifth and seventh centuries Hijri, and their main strongholds were in Persia and in the Levant.

The foundations of the Hassan ibn al-Sabah sect, which was launched from the fortress of Alamut as a center for spreading his vocation, took from fortified castles in the mountain peaks a stronghold for spreading a militant Nizari Ismaili calling in Persia and the Levant.

The extremist methods of the group earned it intense hostility from the Abbasid and Fatimid caliphate and major sultans such as the Seljuks, the Khwarizmites, the Zangids, the Ayyubids as well as the Salayis.

Their military strategy depended on assassinations carried out by deep cover agents who believe in the teachings of the group. “Fedayeen” shocked the rulers, royals, ministers and judges who posed a threat to the group’s goals.

The group were very resorsful in infiltration techniques, they managed to assassinate some important personalities such as the Seljuk minister Nizam al-Mulk, the Abbasid caliph, the guide, the Rashid, and the King of Jerusalem, Konrad.

The group’s strong hold was destroyed by the Mongols and they were eventually destroyed by the Mamlouks and the remnants of the group went to work for the highest bidder.

Carmatians

A group tied in relation to the Carmatian state, which split from the Fatimid state, and ruled after a social revolution and took on a religious character, and the headquarters of their state in the current Al-Ahsa city in eastern Saudi Arabia.

The book “History of the Fatimid State” by Dr. Inas Muhammad al-Bahiji mentioned, the Carmatians were a religious political sect that knew that name in relation to one of its da’is: Hamdan al-Shaath, nicknamed “Qarmat”, and they were part of the Fatimid state, they were closely associated with the Fatimids at first, but they turned to a bloody rivalry, the book states that the Qarmatians were originally dissidents from the Ismaili movement, and they believed the return of Imam Muhammad bin Ismail in their (Messiah) awaited Mahdi.

The group’s blood thirsty followers thought that Imam Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi deceived them, so they turned on him, and they opposed the issue of infallibility, and the Carmatians fanatics ruthless ways led to bloodshed of their opponents.

The group waged waves of acts of terror in Basra and Ahwaz during the Zinj revolution. The extremist ideology of the group remains to this day in groups like the IRGC, Extremist Iraqi Shiite components allied with Iran, the Houthis, Hezbollah and Twelvers Shiite extremist.

The Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwanul-Muslimeen

The most diverse and complex Islamist group of the twentieth century, it is considered the ideological source of extremism for most Islamist of the current and past centuries, many extremists offshoots branched out from the MB.

The Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan Al-Banna in Ismailia in 1928 its ethics and teachings are fruits of the evil doctrine of Sayed Qutb. Hassan al-Banna’s Kharijites and extreme Soufi teachings gave birth to extremist Islamist groups including ISIS, Al-Qaeda and others.

Terrorist Organization that hijack faith and engage in acts of violence must be stopped by any means necessary.

Khaled Homoud Alshareef holds PhD in Business and he earned Masters in Philosophy. He often writes about Islamism, Islamist factions and modern Terrorism. He tweets under @0khalodi0.

Since the 1960’s, Saudi has supported the legitimate government in Yemen, including the Zaidi Imams.

Upon reading Chris Murphy’s tweets, it is evident to me that much of the inaccurate information that has been presented to him has distorted the facts on the ground. As Ambassador to Yemen, I feel it is my duty to set the record straight.

1/ Okay, in a few tweets I'm going to try to explain what's going on in Yemen today, so you have some knowledge to counter this claim that America needs to bomb Iran because the Houthis bombed Saudi Arabia. It's complicated, but now you need to know.

— Chris Murphy (@ChrisMurphyCT) September 16, 2019

Since the 1960’s, Saudi has supported the legitimate government in Yemen, including the Zaidi Imams. The Kingdom consistently supported successive government since then irrespective of sect, ideology, and form of government so long as they are not militia operating out of the state’s organs.

Since the 1970’s, KSA strongly supported the Yemeni economy and implemented many development and infrastructure projects worth billions. For example, KSA installed the electric grid that powers all of northern Yemen. We donated $3.5B (50% of total donations) to the Friends of Yemen.

In the 1980’s, the Houthi movement was not yet formed. KSA did not send scholars to Yemen or build missionary schools, but rather, it built the Al-Salam Hospital in Saada in 1982, which still operates today. Also Zaidi scholars used to print Zaydi books in KSA.

The Iranian regime established the terrorist Hezbollah group in Lebanon, and found in it a useful way to advance their interests and regional terrorism.

Iran worked to copy the Hezbollah model and attracted extremist Yemeni figures, like Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his sons Hussein and Abdulmalik, later pushing Hussein to declare rebellion against the Yemeni state after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The Iranian-backed Houthi militias raise slogans that carry the same Iranian extremist thought in terms of phrases, colors/symbols. Their books include extremism, hostility to America and a call for Jihad. As AlQaeda and ISIS, their school curriculum is a preparation for Jihad.

The Kingdom has not intervened in the face of multiple Houthi rebellions against the Yemeni government in 2004-2009, but rather called for addressing the dispute and contain the Houthis, who constitute a small minority within the Zaidi minority in Yemen.

However, the Iranian regime pushed them to attack the Kingdom’s borders and kill border guards. KSA defended the southern borders while working on ending the conflict between the militias and the Yemeni government at that time.

By presenting the Gulf Initiative in 2011, which was accepted by the Yemeni government and all Yemeni political factions, the Kingdom was able to stop a civil war and enabled the peaceful transfer of power from the former President to the current President of Yemen.

The GCC Initiative was endorsed by UNSCR 2014 and the international community, leading to a national Yemeni dialogue that included all Yemeni components, including the Houthis.

Since 2012, the Kingdom has fully supported the political process in Yemen under UN auspices with more than $7 Billion, including 3.2 Billion for oil derivatives for the operation of power plants, 1 Billion for the Central Bank, and 3 Billion for development projects in multiple sectors.

After two years of support from the Gulf, the UN, and the US in ensuring the success of the political process/transitional the Houthis attacked cities in northern Yemen, in 2014, and violently took control of the Yemeni capital Sana’a.

Nevertheless, and during the Iranian-backed Houthi militia’s control of the Yemeni capital Sana’a, the UN presented the “peace and partnership agreement”. The Yemeni government, Yemeni political factions, and the Houthis signed the agreement on September 21, 2014.

The UN agreement granted six seats in the government of PM Khalid Bahah to the Iranian backed militia. Additionally, the agreement granted the Houthis a position of advisor to Yemeni President.

The international community supported the government of Khalid Bahah, which implemented the UN agreement. In January 2015, the Houthis reneged on the agreement and detained the Yemeni president and members of government, and took control of state institutions by brutal force.

In March 2015, the Houthi militia signed an agreement with the State of Iran to conduct 28 weekly flights between Sanaa and Tehran, which had been suspended since 2003. Aircrafts from Iran’s Mahan Airlines landed in the capital Sana’a.

The President fled Sana’a to Aden. He asked the Houthis to return to the dialogue table and stop the fighting, however, Iran ordered the Houthis to move south and control the Bab Al Mandab strait (Red Sea) and Aden (Arabian Sea).

On March 26, 2015, Operation Decisive Storm began. The Kingdom continued to support the efforts of the UN Special Envoy to Yemen in order to reach a political solution between Yemeni political parties in Biel and Geneva 2015.

In 2016, KSA invited the Houthis to the Saudi city of Dhahran Aljanoub on the border with Yemen, in order to establish a Truce Committee under the auspices of the United Nations and negotiated with the Houthis in Kuwait.

After more than 100 days in negotiations in Kuwait between Yemeni parties, the Houthis refused to sign and left the table.

The Houthis rejected all proposals for a political solution in 2017, including handing over the ports of Hodeidah to the United Nations, or returning to sit at the negotiating table, even shooting at the UN envoy’s car.

As a result of the military pressure by the Yemeni and Coalition forces, the Houthis agreed to return to the dialogue table and signed the Stockholm agreement in 2018.

The Iranian-backed Houthi militia refused to implement the Stockholm agreement and exploited it to continue smuggling Iranian-made weapons, missiles and drones through the Hodeidah port and abused its financial revenues to support their war effort against the Yemeni people.

Iran provided financial support and drone/missile technology to the Houthi militias and sent trainers to oversee their terrorist attacks against civilian targets in the Kingdom, including houses and schools, Riyadh and Abha airport, and a desalination plant.

Iran instructed the Houthis to reject all political solutions to the Yemeni crisis.

Since 2014 alone, the Kingdom has provided more than $14 billion in relief and development aid to Yemen and supported the Central Bank of Yemen with $2.2 billion to improve the exchange rate of the riyal.

The Kingdom currently employs more than 2 million Yemenis. More than 600,000 Yemenis fled the Houthi militia to the Kingdom, which granted them visas that allow them to work.

Yemenis in the Kingdom transfer more than $4 billion annually to their families inside Yemen, bringing the number of beneficiaries to more than half of the Yemeni people and KSA continues to grant work visas in the tens of thousands to Yemenis from all governorates.

Saudi Arabia continues to offer its full support for the efforts of Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSE Yemen) in implementing the Stockholm agreement, and in reaching a comprehensive political solution based on the GCC initiative, the outcomes of the Yemeni national dialogue, and UNSC 2216.

Mohammed Al-Jabir is a Saudi Ambassador to Yemen. He regularly tweets under @mohdsalj

Article compiled from the series of Tweets Al-Jabir did refuting U.S. Senator from Connecticut Chris Murphy who raised dubious allegations against Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen.

Who killed Al-Hussein ibn Ali (may Allaah be pleased with him)? Lecture in video is in Arabic by Shaykh Uthman Al-Khamees may Allaah preserve him. I have taken the time to transcribe the lecture in English for all to benefit. This ends with quotes from Shiite scholars and books, the sources of those who claim to love the household of the Prophet Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him.

571 CE – Muhammad peace and blessings upon him was born in Mecca after his father died and became an orphan at 6 years old when his mother died. His grandfather Abdul-Muttalib took care of him until he died when Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him was only 8 years old. Abu Talib, his uncle, then took care of him. Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him got married to Khadijah at 25. At 40, he became the messenger of Allaah, peace and blessings be upon him.

Allah chose for him people who gave him victory and supported him during 13 difficult years in Mecca. Then migration took place to Medina and Allaah praised the Muslims in Medina who supported their brethren from Mecca.

Allaah says in Noble Qur’an 59:9 – “And [also for] those who were settled in al-Madinah and [adopted] the faith before them. They love those who emigrated to them and find not any want in their breasts of what the emigrants were given but give [them] preference over themselves, even though they are in privation. And whoever is protected from the stinginess of his soul – it is those who will be the successful.”

They loved Muhammad peace and blessings upon him more than they loved themselves. Islam reached us because of their efforts.

Allaah says in Noble Qur’an 5:3 – “…This day I have perfected for you your religion and completed My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion…”

Muhammad peace and blessings upon him passed away after he has delivered the complete message. He died in 632 CE (11 Hijri). Abu Bakr became Khalifa (Caliph) or 2 years and some months, people lived in peace. Then Umar became Caliph. The Ansar and Muhajiroon loved each other and all Muslims loved each other.

Allaah praises them in no uncertain terms in Noble Qur’an 9:100 – “And the first to embrace Islam of the Muhajirun (those who migrated from Makkah to Al-Madinah) and the Ansar (the citizens of Al-Madinah who helped and gave aid to the Muhajirun) and also those who followed them exactly (in Faith). Allah is well-pleased with them as they are well-pleased with Him. He has prepared for them Gardens under which rivers flow (Paradise), to dwell therein forever. That is the supreme success.”

This continued until Caliph Umar was killed by Abu Lu’lu’ah Persian, who stabbed him from behind during prayer. Uthman Ibn Affan was then given the pledge in the year 644 CE (23 Hijri) was given pledge of allegiance. 12 years under his rule, Islam spread and life was peaceful for Muslims.

People outside of Medina and Mecca, rather outside the Arabian Peninsula who were from Basrah, Kufah and Egypt – they did not like the peaceful conditions that the Muslims were living in. Abdullah Ibn Saba, who was originally Jewish, led this campaign of rumors and lies. Some believed these rumors and a group came of out Basrah, Kufah and Egypt – they came supposedly for the Hajj (major pilgrimage). A group of 6,000 armed men came and surrounded Uthman’s house and told him to surrender his leadership.

Uthman consulted the companions may Allaah be pleased with them, and not a single one said that he should abandon his post as Caliph. Abdullah Ibn Umar told Uthman: “What more can they do to you than killing you? Can they give you paradise or hellfire?” Uthman responded in the negative, so Abdullah said then he doesn’t see that he should leave his post as Caliph. They entered Uthman’s house and killed him as a martyr.

During the time when the Prophet peace and blessings be upon him was alive, he once climbed the mountain of Uhud with Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman. The mountain shook with them. The Prophet peace and blessings be upon him said to the mountain, “Be firm, O Uhud! For on you there are no more than a Prophet, a Siddiq (truthful one, referring to Abu Bakr and two martyrs (referring to Umar and Uthman).” [Bukhari]

Ali then became Caliph via the Muslims pledging allegiance to him.

Many Muslims felt a sense of oppression and anger. How can these people enter Medina and kill the leader of the believers yet the Muslim armies are opening the lands of Ash-Sham (in today’s terms: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan), Egypt, Persia and reached Africa and other places?! How dare these people do this? Those Muslims in Medina were small in number compared to those people because many were in armies abroad. Uthman also refused to allow them to fight them. So much so that Zaid bin Thabit said to Uthman “if you wish we can be the Ansar of Allah twice,” meaning “just like we were with Muhammad peace and blessings upon him we can be with you.” Uthman said no, let each one of you to stay in his home based on my orders and authority. This is bravery for Uthman. He did not want one drop of blood to be shed for his sake, may Allaah be pleased with him.

Talha and Az-Zubair went to Mecca to meet some Muslims because those intruders were still in Medina. They met in Mecca and decided to avenge the murder of Uthman. A group of Muslims went from Mecca to Basrah to meet those who went back from Medina to Basrah. This exit from Mecca to Basrah to avenge was faulty in that they did not get Caliph Ali’s permission first (even though he was not going to object, but they should have asked permission). But this would cause chaos; people have to go back to Ali as Khalifa. Ali was upset with them and a small battle took place between them called the minor Battle of the Camel (the first one).

Talha and Az-Zubair were victorious over the people of Basrah, but when Ali heard this he went from Medina to Kufah and this is where the Battle of the Camel took place. Ali was in fact correct because he was the leader. None of them wanted to fight. In fact, Talha and Az-Zubair did not participate in the battle; they were killed in a treacherous way. Ali did not want to fight Talha and Az-Zubair, rather, when Ali saw Talha dead he cried, he said “I wish I died before this by 20 years.” Talha and Az-Zubair used to fight alongside Muhammad peace and blessings upon him.

Later on, there was the Battle of Siffin between Mu’awiyah and Ali again due to the murder of Uthman. Both Mu’awiyah and Ali wanted to avenge the death of Uthman, but there were misunderstandings. Mu’awiyah did not want to give Ali the pledge of allegiance until Ali avenged the death of Uthman, and Ali insisted that Mu’awiyah gives him the pledge fist so that Caliph Ali would establish his authority in order to avenge the death of Uthman.

The people of Iraq betrayed Ali and killed him. How did this happen? The Khawarij, who rebels, those literally want out against the leadership. They are an enemy from within and opposed both sides of the Muslims, the side of Ali and the side of Mu’wiyah, and just wanted to see bloodshed between them and benefitted from the status quo. Three Khawarij, Abdul-Rahman ibn Muljim was to kill Ali, Umar Ibn Bakr At-Tamimi was to kill Amr ibn Al-Aas, and Al-Barq Ibn Abdullah At-Tamimi was to kill Mu’awiyah – their claim was that they want to rid the Muslims of three, of Ali, Mu’awiyah, and Amr ibn Al-Aas. Ironically, they wanted to get close to Allah by killing his allies.

Ali was killed he was going to pray the Fajr (dawn prayers). Mu’awiyah was stabbed but was not killed. Someone else was stabbed and killed that was mistakenly thought to be Amr ibn Al-Aas.

After the death of Caliph Ali, the pledge of allegiance was done for Al-Hassan ibn Ali and then he abandoned his post in a year called the year of the Jama’ah (group, that is, to unite the Muslims). Muhammad peace and blessings upon him did predict this. Al-Bukhari narrated that Al-Hasan said that Abu Bakrah said that the Messenger of Allah gave a speech on the Minbar (pulpit) while Al-Hasan bin Ali was with him. He was repeatedly looking at Al-Hasan and then at the people; then said, “Verily, this son of mine is a Sayyid (chief or master), and may Allah make peace between two great groups of Muslims through him.” What the Prophet said, occurred. Al-Hasan brought peace between the people of Ash-Sham and Iraq, after they fought tremendous wars and frightening battles. [Tafsir Ibn Kathir in explaining Noble Qur’an 49:9 – And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.]

Things went back to being peaceful for the 20-year duration under the reign of Caliph Mu’awiyah may Allaah be pleased with him. Islam spread during his time.

In the year 60 Hijri – Mu’awiyah felt his end was near. He wanted the successor to be his son Yazid. Many companions were against this idea and told Mu’awiyah not to do this because in Quraysh there were those who were better such as Abdullah ibn Abbas, Abdullah Ibn Umar, Al-Hussein, others. They told him not to make it from father to son so it does not become a norm. This is why Abdur-Rahman ibn Abu Bakr As-Siddiq said to Mu’awiyah “Do you want to make it like Hercules, every time a Hercules dies another one comes in his place – as in an inheritance?” Mu’awiyah did not listen and still did it. The companions gave the pledge of allegiance so as to maintain order.

Two refused to give the pledge, Al-Hussein ibn Ali and Abdullah ibn Az-Zubair. They acknowledged the Caliph but refused to give the pledge themselves. They were demanded to give the pledge but they refused. The leader of Medina told them that they have to. They both left at night from Medina to Mecca. Things were calmed down because the leader of Mecca was more mature than leader of Medina because he left them alone and did not force them to give the pledge to Yazid.

The city of Kufah (in Iraq) was the city that was inhabited and led by Ali and then Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein. Al-Hassan, as Caliph, was there for 6 months after Caliph Ali was martyred. As mentioned above, Al-Hassan left his post (and gave it to Mu’awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan in order to maintain peace and unity) and both he and Al-Hussein returned to Medina. The people of Kufah knew that Al-Hussein did not give the pledge of allegiance to Yazid, so they said that they would give the pledge to Al-Hussein – they wanted to return the chaos. They sent over 500 letters to Al-Hussein about this and claimed that in fact broke the allegiance to Yazid.

Al-Hussein sent his cousin Muslim ibn Aqeel ibn Abi Talib to check. So, he went and realized that it was true. 18,000 gave the pledge of allegiance on behalf of Al-Hussein to Muslim ibn Aqeel. So, Muslim ibn Aqeel sent a letter to Al-Hussein to come because 18,000 gave Al-Hussein the pledge.

Al-Hussein left on the day of Tarwiyah (same day are people coming to Hajj). Some companions said to Al-Hussein to stay back and perform the Hajj since there were only two more days for it to start. They suggested that he does this first and then see what he want to do afterwards. Al-Hussein responded in the negative and went. Some companions tried to stop him, such as Abdullah ibn Al-Abbas (who was blind at the time) – he said to Al-Hussein “Were it not for people seeing us I would have grabbed you by the hair so that you don’t go.” Abdullah Ibn Az-Zubair said: “Will you go to a people who killed your father and stabbed your brother? You will not see from them except treachery.” Abu Said Al-Khudri also tried to stop Al-Hussein.

Abdullah ibn Umar went after him after Al-Hussein travelled for 3 days and tried to stop him. Al-Hussein showed him the letters. Abdullah said: “Allaah gave the option to Muhammad peace and blessings upon him for this life and its splendors or what is with Allah, so Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him chose what is with Allaah. And you are a descendant of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him; you will not get it. Leave the people of Kufah, those who are treacherous.” Al-Hussein still went.

News came to the leader of Kufah, An-Nu’man ibn Bashir, that Al-Hussein was going to Kufah. An-Nu’man ibn Bashir did not give it much attention. Some went to Yazid in Ash-Sham and informed him that things are getting hot and that An-Nu’man was not doing anything and that there was a risk of a tribulation taking place. Yazid removed An-Nu’man ibn Bashir from his post and replaced him with Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad.

Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad was in Basrah, when he entered Kufah he entered it disguised, some thought he was Al-Hussein so they saluted him by saying “Welcome O son of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him’s daughter (Fatima).” Ubaydullah realized that this was serious. So, he sent his spies in Kufah to find out where this was being plotted. He came to know that it was Hani ibn Urwah. So, Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad asked Hani ibn Urwah about Muslim ibn Aqeel, he answered he did not know, even though Muslim ibn Aqeel was in his house. So Ubaydullah sent his spies to enter Hani ibn Urwah’s house and found Muslim ibn Aqeel there. Hani ibn Urwah said: “I swear, if he was under my foot I would not raise it.” He did not want to betray him.

So Ubaydullah put Hani ibn Urwah in jail. When Muslim ibn Aqeel heard of this he told those who gave him the pledge to exit in a resistance against Ubaydullah. 4,000 went out with Muslim ibn Aqeel and surrounded Ubaydullah’s house in the early afternoon. By late afternoon, only 30 remained. By sunset Muslim ibn Aqeel was by himself, he tried to escape but he was captured and killed.

Al-Hussein was on the way. When Ubaydullah realized that Al-Hussein was on the way he sent an army to meet Al-Hussein under the leadership of Al-Hurr ibn Yazid At-Tamimi. So, they met in Al-Qadissiyah (same site of the battle during Umar’s time between the Muslims and the Persians).

Al-Hussein did not leave Mecca to fight because he had his family with him, he went to assume leadership based on the pledges of allegiance. He was surprised that things were different.

Al-Hurr ibn Yazid At-Tamimi asked Al-Hussein where he was going. AL-Hussein said that he was going to Kufah and showed him the letters of the people. Al-Hurr ibn Yazid At-Tamimi said to Al-Hussein that they betrayed him and that Muslim ibn Aqeel was killed. He told Al-Hussein to go back. Al-Hussein wanted to go back, but the children of Muslim in Aqeel told their uncle AL-Hussein: “How can we return without avenging the death of our father Muslim ibn Aqeel?” So, they went ahead. Al-Hurr ibn Yazid told them to return for he feared that Allaah will test him with Al-Hussein’s blood (meaning he feared a war to take place in these mixed events).

Al-Hussein headed for Kufah and Al-Hurr was with him but told him that he will not enter Kufah, but instead, to go anywhere else other than Kufah. Al-Hurr suggested that Al-Hussein should to go to Yazid in Ash-Sham. Al-Hussein refused.

When Yazid knew that Al-Hussein was given the pledge and that he was going to come to Kufah, he sent lines of poetry to Abdullah ibn Abbas to prevent Al-Hussein from going there. Caliph Yazid stressed that they are both from Abd Manaf – in other words, there were blood relations between them.

Al-Hussein and A-Hurr reached Karbala – Al-Hussein asked what is this land? They said Karbala – Al-Hussien said Karb (distress) and Bala (affliction and calamity). Hussein was killed here eventually.

Al-Hussein stopped in Karbala – the rest of the army that Ubaydullah sent arrived. It was an army of 4,000 over and above the army already with A-Hurr which was 1,000. Al-Hussein only had 73 people vs. 5,000 from both armies. When Al-Hussein stopped at Karbala he was told that he will not enter Kufah. Umar Ibn Sa’d, the leader of the additional army of 4,000 he said that matters are done.

Al-Hussein said that he will give them three options:

• Let Al-Hussein go back
• To allow Al-Hussein go to any place of the Muslims to fight in the way of Allaah
• Go to Yazid in As-Sham

Umar ibn Sa’d said to Al-Hussien to communicate with Yazid and Umar ibn Sa’d himself will communicate with Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad to see what will happen. Umar Ibn Sa’d communicated with Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad but Al-Hussein did not communicate with Yazid.

Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad’s response what to let Al-Hussein choose whatever he wishes but that Al-Hussein will not enter Kufah. There was some bad company with Ubaydullah who was called Shamr Ibnu Thil-Jawsha. Shamr began to spew his poison by making statements to Ubaydullah such as: “This is strange – Al-Hussein sets conditions and you are the leader?” So Ubaydullah asked what he should do. Shamr said that Ubaydullah should take Al-Hussein as a hostage then send him wherever he wants. Ubaydullah agreed. So Ubaydullah communicated with Umar ibn Sa’d to bring Al-Hussein as hostage.

Umar ibn Sa’d refused. Shamr said to Umar ibn Sa’d that if he does not listen then he would be released from his post and that Shamr will take over. Umar ibn Sa’d refused to give up his post. Due to this pressure, Umar ibn Sa’d asked Al-Hussein to come as hostage. Al-Hussein refused, he was the son of the daughter of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him, how can he be taken as hostage? Al-Hussein wanted to leave Karbala and return to Medina. Al-Hussein talked to the people in the opposing army and reminded them of the letters they originally sent him. They all denied and said things have now changed, and they were in fact from the group of Ali in the battle of Siffin and pretended to be with Al-Hussein.

Contrary to what is being propagated that Al-Hussein went out die or to show the corruption of Yazid, all such claims are lies. Rather, Al-Hussein in fact went out of Mecca to take the leadership from the pledge of allegiance. When he realized the treachery, he wanted to return. This is mentioned in books of Sunnis and Shiites.

In Kitab Al-Luhoof by Ibn Tawuus – he said: “Al-Hussein said to one of them if you are now against your pledge according to your letters then I will return where I came from.”

Al-Hussein wanted to return but he refused to be hostage. Fighting started and Al-Hussein was killed and a group of the household of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him were killed. Form the sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib: Ja’far, Al-Abbas, Abu Bakr, Muhammad (other than Muhammad Ibn Al-Hanafiyyah), and Uthman – these are five from the brothers of Al-Hussein.

Who killed Al-Hussein? An army from Ash-Sham or who? In fact, it was the army of Iraq that sent him the letters claiming the pledge, and they are the ones that killed him. In fact, there are many testimonies that the Shiites in fact killed Al-Hussein. Ali ibn Abi Talib had 39 children, 19 males and 20 females. From the sons of Al-Hassan ibn Ali: Abdullah, Al-Qasim, and Abu Bakr. And from the sons of Aqeel ibn Abi Talib, the brothers of Muslim ibn Aqeel (mentioned earlier): Jafar, Abdullah, and Abdurrahman. And from the sons of Muslim ibn Aqeel: Abdullah and Aqeel. And from the sons of Abdullah ibn Jafar: Auon and Muhammad. And from the sons of Al-Hussein himself: Abdullah and Ali (referred to Ali the older, but Ali the younger was not killed, and he is referred to as Zain-Al-Abideen).

Who killed Al-Hussein? The people of Ash-Sham or the people of Iraq?! The army that went out to fihght Al-Hussein was the army of Kufah in Iraq, the very same army that sent Al-Hussein letters of support inviting him to give him the pledge of allegiance.

There are many who admit that the Shiites killed Al-Hussein. Here are statements of the household of the Prophet Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him on the people of Kufah:

In Najul Balaghah – Ali ibn Abi Talib who lived with them for four years until he was killed there described the people of Kufah in the harshest of terms, as those who can hear yet they play deaf, those who can speak yet pretend to be dumb, and those are blind yet they are able to see. He described them as being untruthful and treacherous. He described them to be like camels that disperse when their owners leave them.

Ali ibn Al-Hussein who witnessed the massacre of his father and household in Karabala and survived it, entered Kufah after this great crime, and reprimanded its inhabitants for tricking his father and claiming to have given him the pledge and yet betrayed him in the end. He lashed at them by wishing that they perish for betraying his father and fighting him. He questioned how they will look at Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him? – This was mentioned in the Book of At-Tabrasi called Al-Ihtijaj in volume 2 on page 32

Ali ibn Al-Hussein, Zain-ul-Abideen, nay Allaah be pleased with him, passed by those who were crying and waling for Al-Hussein and his family, so Ali ibn Al-Hussein said to them: “You wail and cry for us? Who killed us! And you you wail and cry?” – This is in the book of Al-Malhoof page 86.

Umm Kulthoom, daughter of Ali ibn Abi Talib, sister of Al-Hussein, said: “O people of Kufah, may evil befall you, what is it with you that you betrayed Al-Hussein and killed him?” – This was mentioned in Nafas Al-Malhoof Al-Mahmoum page 363.

Zainab bint Ali, the sister of the martyr Al-Hussein – she told them to shut up when she saw them crying, she said to them “You kill our men and your women cry, Allaah is the judge between you and us” – This was mentioned in Nafas Al-Mahmoom on page 365.

Any mention of Yazid or Ash-Sham? They were all from Iraq, just as Murtdadha al-Mutahhiri said that Kufah were the Shiites of Ali without doubt. A people of treachery and betrayal.

Jawad Muhaddithi, in his book Mawso’a Ashuraa’, page 59, said that all events point to the fact that Ali ibn Abi Talib suffered at the hands of the people of Kufah, and Al-Hassan faced betrayal from them, and Muslim ibn Aqeel was killed by them oppressively, and Al-Hussein dyed in Karbala while he was thirsty close to Kufah and by the army of Kufah.

These are killers of Ahlul-Bayt (Household of Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him) yet they claim to be the ones who support Ahlul-Bayt?!

Hussein Korani said that the people of Kufah did not just stop at abandoning Imam Al-Hussein, but they went out to Karaba to fight Imam Al-Hussein – This is in the book Rihab Karbala page 60.

Hussein Korani also says that Abdullah ibn Hawza At-Tamimi stood in front of Imam Al-Hussein and yelled to the congregation “Is Hussein among you?!” Abdullah ibn Hawza was one of the group of Ali before and perhaps one of those who wrote to Al-Hussein to come to get the pledge of allegiance. He addressed Al-Hussein by telling him “O Hussein, I give you the glad tidings of the Hellfire.” – This is in the book Rihab Karbala page 61.

Kadhim Al-Ihsa’I An-Najafi in his Book titled Ashura page 89 says that: “The army that went out to fight Imam Al-Hussein was 300,000 [he exaggerated the number], all of them were form the people of Kufah, there was not amongst them anyone from Ash-Sham, Hijaz, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, African, rather, all of them are from Kufah who gathered from various tribes.

Hussein Ibn Ahmad Al-Boraqi An-Najafi in his Book “Tareekhu Kufah” page 113 says – “The people of Kufah are guilty of stabbing Al-Hassan and killing Al-Hussein after the invited him.”

Murtada Al-Muttahiri, the Shiite philosopher, in his book “Al-Malhama Al-Hussayniyyah” volume 1 page 129 says – “There is no doubt that Kufah were from the group of Ali and that those who killed Imam Al-Hussein were his own group.” He also says “The killing of Al-Hussein by the hands of the Muslims, rather, by the hands of the Shiites, only 50 years after the death of Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him. It is indeed a confusing matter and a strange paradox which gravitates attention.” – this is from the same book in volume 3 page 490.

The Shiites cry for Al-Hussein yet they are his killers. They killed 18 members of the household of the Prophet Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him. Today they cry and want revenge! Revenge on who?

Muhsin Al-Ameen, a well-known Shiite scholar, in his book “A’yan Ash-Shia” in volume page 26 – he says – “Al-Hussein gave the pledge to 20,000 of the people of Iraq, then they betrayed him and went out to fight him while the pledge to him was on their necks, and they killed him.”

These are clear admissions, what more do you want?

After the martyrdom of Al-Hussein by four years, a group of them came out calling themselves the army of those who are repenting, and some of them were good. They organized an army that actually ended up killing Ubaydullah ibn Ziad (mentioned earlier).

Today they beat themselves every year in mourning. They wish they were with those people back at the time of Al-Hussein to save him, nay, if they were alive during that time, they would have been with the army that fought Al-Hussein.

The event took place on the 10th of Muhharam in the year 61 Hijri.In an ugly ending. Shamr the evil one cut off Hussein’s head, and Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad took his head to Ash-Sham.

Three participated in the killing of Al-Hussein:

• Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad leader of Kufah – the one who ordered it
• Shamr ibnu Thul Jawshan – severed the head
• Sinan ibn Anas An-Nakha’i – the killer

Those three, ironically, those three were in Ali’s army in battle of Siffin, supporting Ali, Al-Hussein’s father. These are a people of treachery.

Ibrahim An-Nakha’i, may Allaah have mercy, him said: “If I was among those who killed Al-Hussein, then I entered Paradise, I would be shy to look at the face of Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him”.

May Allaah have mercy on Al-Hussein the martyr. He is in Paradise as in the hadith which was reported by Ahmad, At-Tirmithi, Ibn Maajah and An-Nasaa’i, it was narrated by Abu Sa’eed Al-Khudri may Allaah be pleased with him who said: “The Prophet peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him said: ”Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein are the masters of the youth of Paradise.” Shaykh Al-Albaani may Allaah have mercy upon him classified it as Saheeh [sound].

Article is taken from Prof. Wasim Ismail’s Facebook Post.

Professor Wasim Ismail is of Palestinian origin settled in Canada. He earned Masters in Islamic Studies from Islamic Online University.

Member of the Iran’s Assembly of Experts, Mohammed Mehdi Mirbagheri said, “We will never reach the age of the reappearance (of the Hidden Imam) unless we go into widespread fighting, a comprehensive clash that will escalate into fighting.”

The HIDDEN IMAM will not reappear unless the #Shittes go into "WIDESPREAD FIGHTING", says an #Iranian #Mullah Mehdi Meer Baqri—openly indicating that #Iran will keep fighting and spreading the "revolution" (aka #Terrorism) till they discover their 12th Imam. pic.twitter.com/aIwHfoadY4

— Zahack Tanvir (@zahacktanvir) August 15, 2019

He further referred to the non-Muslim countries as “infidels” with whom negotiations are certainly bad.

“But if the purpose is to cooperate with the society of the infidels, then the negotiations are certainly bad,” he emphasized.

“This conflict is not just a military conflict, but it is [also] a political, cultural, and economic one,” he added.

“If we had to go to a military war in defense of our beliefs, it would be completely moral,” said Mirbagheri.

Twelver Shittes which are popularly known as “Ithna-Ashariyya” believe in 12 Imams, among them the last one is the “Hidden Imam”. Iran considers itself as the forerunner of the Hidden Imam, whose arrival will make it rule the world.

Twelvers claim that all the Imams are infallible, and they devote many acts of worship to them such as supplication, seeking help, offering sacrifices and tawaaf (circumambulating their tombs). 

Twelvers also believe that the current copy of Quran which Muslims recite is the distorted version while the authentic Quran is with the Hidden Imam.

They believe that if Iran get into a full-fledged war with the west or America in particular, the emergence of the Hidden Imam becomes possible.