Speaking at a diplomatic forum in Antalya, Sharaa said Damascus was seeking either to revive the framework of the 1974 disengagement agreement or to establish a new arrangement guaranteeing security for both sides. He added that progress on such terms could open the door to extended negotiations on the broader Golan issue.

The remarks come after Israeli forces entered a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone separating Israeli and Syrian positions on the Golan Heights following the ouster of former Syrian leader in December 2024.

Sharaa accused Israel of violating the 1974 disengagement accord and said Syria was working toward a security agreement that would ensure Israeli withdrawal to positions held under that arrangement. He reiterated that any future negotiations would depend on restoring those lines.

Israel captured most of the Golan Heights from Syria during the and later annexed the territory, a move not recognised by most of the international community.

Earlier this year, Syrian Foreign Minister said ongoing discussions with Israel were focused on recently occupied areas and did not extend to the broader territorial dispute over the Golan Heights.

Israeli Prime Minister has repeatedly indicated that Israel does not intend to relinquish control over the territory it holds in the Golan Heights.

The case centres on allegations that Lafarge, via its subsidiary Lafarge Cement Syria, paid millions of euros in 2013 and 2014 to armed groups and intermediaries to ensure continued production at its Jalabiya facility in northern Syria during the country’s civil war.

The ruling follows a 2022 case in the United States in which Lafarge pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support to designated terrorist organizations and agreed to pay a $778 million fine, marking the first time a corporation faced such charges under U.S. law.

French prosecutors allege that the company made payments totaling at least 4.7 million euros ($5.5 million) to groups including Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, in exchange for access to raw materials and safe passage for employees and goods.

The payments allegedly continued until September 2014, when Islamic State fighters seized control of the plant.Lafarge completed construction of the $680 million facility in 2010, shortly before the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, triggered by protests against then-president Bashar al-Assad.

While many multinational firms exited Syria in 2012, Lafarge maintained operations, evacuating expatriate staff but retaining local employees until the site fell under militant control.Defendants include the company, its former chief executive Bruno Lafont, several former operational and security staff, and two Syrian intermediaries.

They face charges including financing terrorism and violating international sanctions.The French national counter-terrorism prosecutor’s office has argued that Lafarge acted with “a single aim: profit,” seeking the maximum corporate fine of 1.12 million euros and confiscation of 30 million euros in assets.

Prosecutors have also requested a six-year prison sentence for Lafont, who has denied knowledge of any illicit payments.During the trial, former deputy managing director Christian Herrault said the decision to keep the plant operating was driven by concern for local employees rather than financial gain.

Lafarge was acquired by Swiss group Holcim in 2015, which has said it had no knowledge of the Syria-related dealings.A separate judicial investigation into potential complicity in crimes against humanity remains ongoing.

The case originated from a 2017 inquiry following media reports and complaints filed by the French finance ministry, non-governmental organizations, and former employees.

A British woman convicted on terrorism-related charges after traveling to Syria has described her trajectory from personal vulnerability and radicalisation to imprisonment and eventual reintegration into society, offering a detailed account of the personal, legal and social consequences of her actions.

The woman, identified as Shakil, said her early life was marked by instability, including regular visits to her father in prison. She described a determination during adolescence to pursue a different path, excelling academically and enrolling at university to study psychology.

However, at age 20, she entered into a relationship that she said quickly became controlling. Within a year, she had married and left her studies.Shakil stated that the relationship resulted in social isolation and restricted communication, including periods during which she did not have access to a phone.

She distanced herself from family members, citing fear of disclosing her circumstances. During this period, she became involved with individuals who facilitated her travel to Syria via Turkey. She later told authorities that she concealed the truth from her family out of concern that she would lose access to her child.

Following her return, Shakil was released on bail and allowed limited contact with her son. She described this period as the most difficult phase of her life, marked by severe emotional distress and close monitoring by family members concerned about her safety.

After several months, she was formally charged with joining the Islamic State group and encouraging acts of terrorism, based on digital communications and social media activity during her time in Syria.In court proceedings, prosecutors presented messages in which Shakil expressed support for extremist causes and encouraged others to join her.

One message indicated a desire to die as a martyr. Additional evidence included photographs recovered from her phone, among them an image of her young child holding an assault rifle. Shakil denied the charges, arguing that she had not formally joined the group and that her actions were influenced by coercion and surveillance within Syria.

The presiding judge rejected her account, citing inconsistencies in her statements and the nature of the evidence. The court emphasized the risks posed to her child, including exposure to extremist ideology. Shakil was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to six years in prison.

Her case unfolded against the broader backdrop of the territorial defeat of Islamic State, marked by the fall of Baghouz in March 2019. Around the same time, another British national, Shamima Begum, re-emerged in a refugee camp.

Begum had left the United Kingdom as a minor and later became the subject of international attention when her citizenship was revoked by the British government on national security grounds. Authorities argued that she was eligible for citizenship elsewhere through her family, a claim that has been contested in ongoing legal proceedings.

Shakil drew a distinction between her own case and that of Begum, while acknowledging similarities in their circumstances. She expressed the view that Begum had been groomed as a minor, but argued that differences in their experiences, including the duration of time spent in Syria, shaped their respective outcomes.

Following her conviction, Shakil served approximately half of her sentence, including time spent on remand, before being released under strict probation conditions. These included geographic restrictions, limits on contact with family members, electronic monitoring, and a curfew.

Despite these constraints, she secured employment in multiple roles, including cleaning, hospitality and administrative work, often holding more than one job simultaneously.After completing her probationary period in 2021, Shakil began to speak publicly about her experiences.

She participated in a documentary and media appearances aimed at raising awareness about online grooming and radicalisation. She described her actions as the result of vulnerability and manipulation, while acknowledging public skepticism regarding such claims.

Efforts to establish a charitable initiative focused on educating young people about extremism did not materialize, which she attributed in part to a lack of public trust. She continued to receive negative reactions online but indicated that such responses did not significantly affect her.

In the years following her release, Shakil reported gradual improvements in her personal circumstances. Contact with her son was eventually restored, and she described rebuilding relationships with family and establishing a stable social network. By 2024, she indicated that she had reached a level of stability that had previously seemed unattainable.

More recently, she has used social media platforms to engage with audiences on topics including relationships, self-esteem and personal development. While she does not regularly discuss her past, she views her current lifestyle and public presence as part of a broader effort to demonstrate the possibility of rehabilitation.

Shakil remains subject to long-term monitoring requirements and continues to report regularly to law enforcement authorities, a condition that will remain in place until 2034. She stated that she accepts these measures as part of the consequences of her actions.

Her account reflects the intersection of personal vulnerability, extremist recruitment, legal accountability and reintegration challenges, illustrating the long-term implications of involvement in conflict zones and proscribed organisations.

The three men, taken to Syria by their parents at the age of 11 or 12, were allegedly forced to participate in propaganda activities, policing duties and combat roles under Islamic State, according to legal filings submitted in France.

A source familiar with the case said the detainees are seeking recognition as victims of a war crime due to their recruitment as minors.Their lawyers, Marie Dose and Matthieu Bagard, said in a joint statement that the French authorities were failing to uphold obligations under international conventions prohibiting the use of child soldiers.

They argued that the men’s transfer to Iraq and continued detention amounted to inhumane treatment rather than victim protection.The detainees are among approximately 5,700 suspected Islamic State fighters of multiple nationalities transferred from Syria to Iraqi custody earlier this year, following shifts in territorial control in northern Syria.

France has opened investigations into the three men for alleged terrorism-related offenses committed during their time in Syria.The lawyers contend that, instead of pursuing prosecution, French authorities should prioritize repatriation and rehabilitation, citing the circumstances under which the individuals were recruited and their age at the time.

Hundreds of French citizens joined the Islamic State after it seized large areas of Iraq and Syria in 2014 and declared a so-called caliphate. Iraqi authorities, supported by a U.S.-led coalition, declared victory over the group in 2017, while Kurdish-led forces in Syria defeated its remaining strongholds in 2019.

Since then, thousands of suspected fighters and their families have been held in detention facilities across Syria and Iraq. Kurdish authorities in Syria have repeatedly called on foreign governments to repatriate their nationals, but most Western countries, including France, have proceeded cautiously, often handling returns on a case-by-case basis.

The recent transfer of detainees to Iraq has renewed scrutiny over their legal status and future, particularly in cases involving individuals recruited as minors.

The Syrian Arab Army announced that its units launched sweeping operations south of Hasakah, focusing on securing Al-Shaddadi prison and nearby security facilities while tracking down escaped Daesh members. Military officials said the deployments were part of a broader effort to stabilise the Jazira region following recent security breaches.

According to military statements, army units have established checkpoints and cordoned off key routes around Al-Shaddadi to prevent the movement of armed elements. Security forces are conducting targeted searches in residential and rural areas believed to be sheltering Daesh detainees released during the incident.

The army said it considers the SDF fully responsible for the release of Daesh components, warning that such actions directly threaten civilian safety and regional stability. Officials stressed that any lapse in prison security could allow extremist networks to reorganise and launch attacks.

Military sources said Syrian commanders contacted mediators and SDF representatives to coordinate the immediate handover of Al-Shaddadi prison and its perimeter to government internal security forces. These requests were declined, prompting the army to proceed with unilateral security measures.

The operations command confirmed that once security operations are completed, the prison and surrounding facilities will be transferred to the Ministry of Interior. Authorities said this step is essential to ensure unified control over detention centres holding high-risk militants.

Syrian forces also began deploying across wider parts of the Jazira region under a recent agreement between the Syrian state and the SDF. The agreement aims to reduce security vacuums and prevent armed groups from exploiting gaps created by fragmented authority.

Local residents reported increased military presence and patrols as government troops entered strategic zones in and around Hasakah. While some civilians expressed concern about renewed tensions, others said stronger security measures were necessary to prevent extremist violence.

Security analysts warn that Daesh sleeper cells remain active in parts of northeastern Syria despite years of military pressure. The release of detainees, even temporarily, risks reinvigorating militant networks and undermining counterterrorism efforts.

The Syrian army said it would continue operations until all released detainees are apprehended and the area is declared fully secure. Commanders emphasised that restoring state authority over prisons and security institutions is critical to long-term stability.

Officials added that coordination with local communities would be increased to gather intelligence and prevent militants from blending into civilian populations. The army urged residents to cooperate with security forces and report suspicious activity.

The developments come amid a fragile security environment in Syria, where shifting alliances and unresolved conflicts continue to complicate efforts to defeat extremist groups. Control over detention facilities remains a key issue, particularly in regions where multiple forces operate.

Government officials reiterated that any action endangering public safety would be met with firm measures. They stressed that the state would not allow the re-emergence of Daesh under any circumstances.

As operations continue, attention remains focused on whether the arrests will succeed in neutralising remaining threats and whether negotiations over prison control can prevent similar incidents in the future.

Islamist terrorism did not rise in a vacuum. It was engineered, cultivated, and weaponized—first by colonial powers, then by Cold War strategists, and now by regional regimes.

In the aftermath of European colonialism, the world has seen many upheavals—but few have been as globally disruptive and persistently violent as the rise of Islamist terrorism. It is one of the darkest legacies of the colonial era, ironically shaped and sharpened by the very empires it now claims to oppose. Today, it stands as a transnational threat, claiming lives from Karachi to Kuala Lumpur, and from Tel Aviv to London.

The data tells a haunting story. Since 1979—the year of the Shia Islamic Revolution in Iran—there have been more than 49,000 Islamist terror attacks worldwide, resulting in over 220,000 deaths. But what is often overlooked is the fact that 89.5% of these attacks occurred in Muslim-majority countries, with the vast majority of victims being Muslims themselves. Even the holiest of sites, such as Mecca, have not been spared. The carnage is indiscriminate, and the ideology behind it is far more complex than simplistic narratives often suggest.

Islamist groups would have the world believe that their violence is a response to foreign occupation or injustice. Yet the overwhelming facts betray that narrative. Most Islamist terrorism does not take place in occupied territories but in nations where Muslims are the majority. This disproportionality demands a deeper, more historically rooted investigation into how this ideology emerged and why it continues to thrive.

The Colonial Incubator of Political Islam

To understand the modern-day menace of Islamist terrorism, we must go back to the time of European imperialism—particularly British colonial rule. Colonizers, determined to suppress nationalist uprisings and maintain control over their dominions, employed a classic divide-and-rule strategy. In this context, religious identity became a tool of political manipulation.

Extremist elements were co-opted and even fostered by colonial administrators to counter secular, anti-colonial movements. It is no coincidence that key Islamist movements—such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamaat-e-Islami in India—were born during this time. These Islamist movements did not rise organically from within their societies as spiritual or theological reforms; rather, they were often sponsored or tolerated by colonial regimes as buffers against resistance.

Figures like Sir Syed Ahmed, who promoted the divisive “two-nation theory” in British India, and Sir Agha Khan, who founded the Muslim League, played pivotal roles in politicizing Islam. Their ideas—encouraged, amplified, or at least facilitated by the British—ultimately contributed to the partition of India and laid the groundwork for modern political Islam. This ideological framework would later become fertile ground for the rise of violent jihadist movements.

From West Africa to Southeast Asia, similar patterns emerged: colonial authorities empowering Islamist elements for short-term control, only to leave behind long-term instability.

Cold War Complicity and the Rise of Armed Jihad

The Cold War did not reverse this legacy—it accelerated it. In Afghanistan, for example, the United States and its allies, including Pakistan, armed and trained Islamist fighters to push back against Soviet expansion. The result was the creation of well-equipped and ideologically radicalized groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

What was once political Islam turned into militant jihadism. The West had, once again, fed the very forces it would later call its enemies.

The Twin Threats: State-Sponsored and Non-State Jihadism

In the modern context, Islamist terrorism operates under two primary umbrellas: non-state actors and state-sponsored networks.

Non-state actors are dispersed, often embedded within societies, waiting for ideological or operational cues. Their roots trace back to political Islamist thought developed during colonialism, shaped further by theological radicalism and geopolitical grievances. Their dream of a global caliphate transcends borders, and they are often motivated not by poverty or lack of opportunity—but by ideology. No amount of economic aid or deradicalization programs alone can address this; it requires ideological confrontation led by credible scholars and religious authorities.

On the other hand, state-sponsored Islamist terrorism is far more organized—and dangerous. Here, nation-states actively fund, shelter, or enable terrorist proxies to project power or destabilize rivals. Iran, since the 1979 revolution, stands out as the most prolific actor. From supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza, and from Houthi insurgents in Yemen to Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, Iran’s fingerprints are evident across some of the most devastating conflicts in the Middle East.

Turkey and Qatar, despite being close Western allies, also play significant roles. Both states have financially supported Islamist groups—including the Muslim Brotherhood and others—across North Africa and the Levant. Media outlets like TRT (Turkey) and Al Jazeera (Qatar) have become soft-power instruments, often amplifying Islamist narratives under the guise of journalistic independence.

Then there is Pakistan—arguably the most paradoxical player. Created as a result of colonial partition, Pakistan has, since its inception, used Islamist militancy as statecraft. Its long-standing doctrine of “Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts” has led to decades of cross-border terrorism. From Kashmir to Punjab, from Naxalite regions to the Northeast, India has faced relentless proxy warfare orchestrated from across the border.

Unlike Iran, Pakistan has largely escaped Western censure or sanctions, remaining a “major non-NATO ally” and benefiting from strategic utility. Whether during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets or the post-9/11 conflict, Pakistan’s duplicity has been tolerated, if not rewarded.

A recent example was the attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, where 26 innocent civilians were killed by Pakistan-sponsored Islamist militants. It is part of a consistent pattern—not an anomaly.

Solutions Begin with Truth and Courage

Combating Islamist terrorism requires more than drones, security checkpoints, or surveillance. It demands truth—about its origins, its enablers, and its geopolitical underpinnings.

The first step must involve addressing state actors that perpetuate terrorism under ideological or strategic pretexts. In this context, resolving the “Pakistan-Iran-Turkey” triad is essential. And one of the most viable ways to do this is by supporting the self-determination of oppressed peoples within those states.

The liberation of Balochistan (currently divided between Pakistan and Iran) and Kurdistan (spanning parts of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria) is not just a moral imperative—it could be a strategic game-changer. Empowering these freedom movements would strike at the very heart of the Islamist-terror ecosystem and weaken the foundations upon which these regimes rely.

Time for a Reckoning—and a Response

India, Israel, and democratic states across the world must come together, not just to condemn terrorism, but to confront its root causes and supporters. The West, too, has an opportunity—a responsibility—to correct the historical wrongs of colonialism. This means no longer appeasing authoritarian allies who feed Islamist extremism for their own ends.

Islamist terrorism did not rise in a vacuum. It was engineered, cultivated, and weaponized—first by colonial powers, then by Cold War strategists, and now by regional regimes. To dismantle it, we must stop treating the symptoms and start confronting the disease.

And that means standing with those who fight for freedom—not those who hide behind religion to suppress it.

Aimen Dean

Iran, Hezbollah, and Assad loyalists have launched a well-coordinated disinformation campaign to portray the situation as a sectarian massacre.

In light of recent misinterpretations of my comments, I feel compelled to clarify my stance on several key issues. Some have accused me of supporting jihadist groups in Syria or endorsing acts of ethnic cleansing and massacres against the Alawite minority on the Syrian coast. These claims are entirely unfounded, and I want to set the record straight.

Consistent Principles on War and Self-Defense

From the very beginning, I have consistently supported the right of nations to defend themselves against aggression. In 2001, I fully backed the United States’ decision to retaliate against al-Qaeda and the Taliban following the 9/11 attacks because it was a justified response to an unprovoked act of war. However, I did not support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, as Iraq posed no imminent threat at the time.

Similarly, when Hamas launched its attacks on October 7, 2023, I unequivocally supported Israel’s right to defend itself, just as I supported Israel’s actions against Hezbollah in Lebanon. I recognize that war is never clean, and civilian casualties are an unfortunate and tragic reality. Anyone who believes in the possibility of a “clean war” is ignoring history and human nature. Even in the most “civilized” parts of the world, such as Europe, the 20th century bore witness to some of the worst massacres and genocides in history.

Modern warfare is fought not only on the battlefield but also in the realm of information. The manipulation of media, particularly through social media, has become a powerful tool. We saw this when Hamas claimed that Israel had bombed hospitals and killed hundreds of civilians, claims that, upon closer inspection, were exaggerated or entirely fabricated. Propaganda is an inseparable part of war, and recognizing this is crucial in understanding modern conflicts.

The Syrian Conflict and My Perspective on Ahmad al-Shar’a

Much of the controversy surrounding my recent comments stems from my discussion of Ahmad al-Shar’a, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, and the ongoing conflict in Syria. To be clear: I do not view al-Shar’a as ISIS. While he was originally part of al-Qaeda in Iraq before it became the Islamic State of Iraq, he later split from the organization when he moved to Syria.

Since 2018, I have spoken with multiple intelligence officials who confirmed that al-Shar’a had been cooperating with Turkish intelligence as early as 2013 and later provided valuable intelligence to Western agencies, including those of France and the United States, in the fight against ISIS. His motivation may not have been purely altruistic, he saw ISIS as a rival, but his actions nonetheless contributed to the fight against one of the most brutal jihadist groups in history.

I have publicly acknowledged that I see elements of my own journey in his transformation. I, too, was once a committed jihadist until I saw the light and shifted my perspective to focus on geopolitical strategy rather than sectarian or ideological allegiances. Today, my positions are determined by strategic interests, not religious or sectarian affiliations.

Why I Support the Current Syrian Government Over Assad

Between al-Shar’a’s government and the Assad regime, I believe the former offers a better path forward for Syria. While al-Shar’a has a controversial past, his current trajectory suggests a willingness to reform. Unlike the Assad regime, which has kept Syria trapped in a failed socialist Arab nationalist system, his administration has demonstrated a commitment to economic modernization. The most developed areas in Syria today—Idlib, Jisr al-Shughur, and Sarmada—show clear progress, in contrast to the stagnation of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama.

Critically, I reject the notion that what is happening on the Syrian coast is an organized ethnic cleansing campaign. Instead, it is a military operation aimed at dismantling remnants of the Assad regime, whose security forces have been targeting not only Sunni opposition members but also Alawites who are seen as traitors.

Reports indicate that some of the atrocities being widely shared on social media were, in fact, carried out by former regime officers—Alawites exacting revenge on their own community members for siding with the new government. Other reports suggest that Iranian and Hezbollah-backed Assad loyalists are fueling chaos to destabilize the current government. The Syrian government under al-Shar’a has deployed significant manpower to block roads and prevent large-scale sectarian revenge attacks, particularly from Sunni militants who see this as an opportunity for retaliation.

Propaganda and Disinformation in the Syrian Conflict

Iran, Hezbollah, and Assad loyalists have launched a well-coordinated disinformation campaign to portray the situation as a sectarian massacre. Many of the images and videos circulating on social media are, in reality, old footage from ISIS-era Iraq and Syria. Claims that Christians are being systematically targeted are also false, there have been no reports of Christian casualties in this conflict.

Additionally, many of the “atrocity” videos currently being used to condemn the new government are actually recycled footage of massacres committed by the Assad regime itself. The goal of this propaganda is clear: to manipulate Western audiences into believing that Syria is descending into sectarian genocide, thereby pushing Syria further into the Iranian-Russian-Chinese geopolitical axis.

A Call for Justice and a Rational Perspective on Syria’s Future

I do not deny that war crimes and atrocities have occurred in the Syrian conflict. I call upon the government of President Ahmad al-Shar’a to ensure accountability and bring those responsible to justice. However, we must recognize that this is not a case of systematic ethnic cleansing. The reality on the ground is far more complex, with various factions—Sunni and Alawite alike—engaging in revenge killings and power struggles.

Western observers must avoid falling into the trap of Iranian and Hezbollah propaganda. Syria has an opportunity to move away from the Russian-Iranian-Chinese sphere of influence and integrate into the Mediterranean and Gulf economic frameworks. It is in the best interest of Syria, the region, and the world that we support efforts to stabilize the country, promote economic recovery, and prevent it from becoming another puppet state for Tehran, Moscow, or Beijing.

A Geopolitical, Not Sectarian, Perspective

To those who accuse me of reverting to my “jihadi roots,” I ask: how could someone who opposed both Hamas and Hezbollah—a Sunni and a Shia militant group—be labeled as a jihadist sympathizer? My approach is based purely on geopolitical logic, not religious bias. I support what makes sense for the people of the Middle East, whether they are Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Sunni, or Shia, liberal or conservative.

What is happening in Syria is not a black-and-white sectarian war but a geopolitical realignment. We must approach it with rationality, not emotion, and recognize the broader stakes involved. Let us not allow misinformation and propaganda to cloud our understanding of the realities on the ground.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.