With its rallying cry of “death to blasphemers”, TLP has emerged as a prominent voice within the Barelvi Sunni sect, followed by the majority of Pakistan’s population of 241 million people.

Recent violent incidents targeting Christians in Pakistan have once again brought attention to Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), an outlawed Islamist political party known for its staunch defense of Pakistan’s draconian blasphemy laws. Accused of inciting mob violence against religious minorities, particularly Christians, TLP continues to operate openly despite being banned. This article aims to shed light on the group’s objectives, history, and influence within Pakistani society.

Protecting Blasphemy Laws

Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan, meaning the movement of the Prophet’s followers, is primarily focused on safeguarding Pakistan’s stringent blasphemy laws. The group has gained notoriety for its support of vigilante violence against individuals accused of blasphemy, often calling for the death penalty for those deemed guilty. With its rallying cry of “death to blasphemers”, TLP has emerged as a prominent voice within the Barelvi Sunni sect, followed by the majority of Pakistan’s population of 241 million people.

Origin and Political Ascent

The TLP first gained prominence in 2015 during a protest campaign demanding the release of Mumtaz Qadri, a police guard who assassinated Punjab province’s governor, Salman Taseer, in 2011. Taseer had advocated for reforms to the blasphemy legislation. Qadri was subsequently sentenced to death and executed in 2016. The TLP announced its entry into electoral politics at Qadri’s funeral, attracting tens of thousands of supporters. In the 2018 elections, the TLP secured over two million votes, making it the fifth largest party in terms of vote share.

Leadership and Influence

The fiery cleric Khadim Hussain Rizvi, founder of TLP, played a pivotal role in mobilizing supporters. His death in 2020 led to a massive funeral attended by tens of thousands of devotees from across Pakistan. Rizvi’s son, Saad Rizvi, has taken the reins of leadership within the party. Despite being outlawed by the government in 2021 following deadly clashes with the police during protests, TLP continues to operate openly and even supports independent election candidates who align with its ideology.

Clashes and Controversies

In 2017, TLP showcased its ability to mobilize supporters when thousands marched on Islamabad, blocking a major highway to protest against granting voting rights to the Ahmadi minority community, who believe in a different prophet than Islam’s Prophet. The standoff ended in a military-brokered deal, fulfilling most of TLP’s demands, including the resignation of the law minister at the time. The group resurfaced in 2021 during violent protests against caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed published in the French magazine Charlie Hebdo. It demanded the expulsion of the French ambassador, a boycott of French products, and the severing of trade ties with Europe.

Implications and Challenges

The continued influence of TLP, despite its outlawed status, poses significant challenges for the Pakistani government. While the group’s support base remains largely confined to a specific sect, its ability to organize large-scale protests and mobilize followers cannot be underestimated. The government’s previous concessions to TLP’s demands have raised concerns about the erosion of state authority and the appeasement of extremist elements.

Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan’s dedication to protecting Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and punishing alleged blasphemers has catapulted the group into the national spotlight. With a significant following and a history of mobilizing supporters, TLP’s influence on Pakistan’s political and social landscape cannot be ignored. Balancing the need to protect religious freedoms and maintain law and order remains a pressing challenge for Pakistani authorities as they address the growing influence of Islamist groups like TLP.

The peak of jihadist violence coming from Barelvi circles cannot fail to cause concern as the phenomenon not only appears in full swing but also at a transnational level and in an extremely fluid manner, making it more difficult to detect and interdict

On 6 June 2022, the Italian police arrested fourteen Pakistani citizens, all accused of international terrorist associations, as part of a transnational jihadist network linked to the Barelvi movement, which is active in Italy, France, Spain, and Greece. The operation originated from intelligence acquired in 2020 about the presence in Italy of some foreigners in the direct relational orbit of Hassan Zaheer Mahmood, the 27-year-old Pakistani who on 25 September 2020 in Paris, near the former headquarters of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, seriously wounded two people with a machete to “avenge” the new publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.

The network, which originated in Paris, was extensively active on Facebook and TikTok and called itself “Gabar”. On 21 July 2020, just two months before the attack, thirteen members of the group took a picture all lined up in front of the Eiffel Tower and attached the comment “be patient, we will meet on the battlefield”; at the center of the line was Hassan Zaheer Mahmood.

As indicated by the Italian investigators, after the 25 September 2020 attack, all references to the Gabar group were removed from social media, obviously to avoid leaving traces. However, on 27 January 2021, a new Gabar group named “United Group Paris France” was activated and the individual in the profile photo was soon identified as Yaseen Tahir, the ring leader of the cell active on Italian soil, who also appeared in some photographs holding a machete very similar to the one used by Mahmood in the attack. As investigations continued, it emerged that Tahir was coordinating a cell that was active in various Italian cities, with its hub in Fabbrico, a town of fewer than 7,000 people near Reggio Emilia, where members of the Gabar network met on several occasions. Tahir coordinated the activities of the “Italian” cell; he recruited associates for the group, looked for possible hideouts, purchased weapons, and maintained relations with the network’s top leaders abroad.

It is also important to recall that on 29 September 2021, the Italian police arrested near the city of Lodi (not far from Fabbrico) 19-year-old Pakistani citizen Hamza Ali. French authorities indicate he was also involved in the September 2020 attack. As a matter of fact, Mahmood had sent him the video where he claimed responsibility for the attack, asking Ali to spread the video in case he was unable to do it.

The Gabar Transnational Network

In February 2022 the Spanish police, in coordination with the National High Court, arrested five Pakistani citizens in Barcelona, ​​Gerona, Ubeda and Granada, all accused of being followers of the Pakistani Islamist group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). According to Spanish investigators, Mahmood belonged to this same group and its members were all accused of jihadist propaganda and incitement to commit terrorist acts, more precisely murder, against those who insult Islam and its Prophet. They also praised the actions of terrorists who had carried out attacks in Europe and Pakistan against people considered blasphemous. The group had formed a propaganda apparatus to maintain a cohesive ideological structure and attract new followers.

Among the five arrested, there is 31-year-old Ullah Shoaib. In addition to Shoaib’s publications on social networks, the Spanish police retrieved from his cell phone several photographs where he held machetes, images of small weapons and assault rifles, as well as a snapshot of the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, next to the English word “headshot”.

As it later emerged, at least three of the individuals arrested in Spain were in touch with members of the Gabar network taken down by the Italian authorities. It is also interesting to notice how, in November 2020, just two months after the attack against the former headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, the Spanish police stopped Yaseen Tahir and Hassan Raza while they were trying to cross into France. The latter was arrested (and he is currently serving a 21-month sentence in Barcelona for crimes against public health), while Tahir managed to avoid arrest and escape to Paris, where he was arrested three months later, on 22 February 2021, at the Sainte Lazare train station, where he was found in possession of a machete almost identical to the one used by Mahmood. In April 2021, French authorities released Tahir and flew him back to Italy, where he resided. The phone interceptions later conducted by the Italian authorities revealed that Tahir and his accomplices were also planning to form a group in the Barcelona area and Raza himself was very active on the web with propaganda activity.

The Gabar network, active in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece, had a precise hierarchical structure, with a founding leader, a president, a vice-president, a secretary, and several other defined positions. At the top of the network was Nadeem Raan, also known as “Peer” (master), constantly consulted by Tahir via phone, despite the fact that Raan was being detained in a French prison. On 11 August 2021, during a phone conversation between the two, Raan told Tahir that as soon as he will be released from prison, he would travel to Italy where he will do “all kinds of things”.

During the same conversation, Raan also added, “I am a brave man in difficult times and now that my brothers are out and I will be out shortly, you will see what we do out there. All groups will hear Gabar’s name and all will get down on their knees. You must know that I am an important person in Pakistan; I know people that you can only imagine, tomorrow I will send you a video so you will realize”.

In other phone conversations, the two discussed the possibility of purchasing weapons, finding at least ten members in every city, and forming Gabar cells in Italy and Spain. The group also attracted the attention of Pakistani authorities, as revealed in a phone conversation between Tahir and an individual using a French phone number who claimed, after his arrest in France, that his family in Pakistan was searched and that for Pakistani authorities he is now a suspect. However, Tahir advises him not to worry because “in Pakistan if you pay you are acquitted”.

It is interesting to notice how the members of the Gabar network had no hesitation in showing themselves in photographs and videos while wielding knives, machetes, and sticks, even though they were aware of being monitored by law enforcers, as emerged in various phone calls between the group’s members and by the removal of all references to Gabar immediately after the September 2020 attack against the former Charlie Hebdo headquarters.

As explained in the detention order, by the preliminary investigation judge, Dr. Silvia Carpanini: “There are numerous videos published on social media that praise violence and show without hesitation the members of the Gabar group armed with deadly instruments of death, typically used in Islamic attacks, obtaining the approval of associates and countless other individuals who share the message, expressing themselves with likes, comments and other expressions of appreciation”.

And again: “The presence of multiple publications on social media, especially group meetings, should not surprise us as, although imprudent conduct, it is nevertheless functional to the propaganda needs of the group and represents its main recruitment channel”.

A New Kind of Organization

Looking at the Gabar network, what one sees is a hybrid organization that combines a hierarchical structure typical of traditional terrorist organizations and a specific nationality and ethnicity (Pakistani and Punjabi) combined with a modus operandi that is common to the “improvised terrorism” that took over in the second decade of the twenty-first century with the Islamic State (ISIS). It is a new type of terrorism that doesn’t require joining a traditional and secretive terrorist organization, and going to some training camp in the Middle East or South Asia. Rather, it is based on the free and spontaneous initiative of local actors in Europe. Most of the propaganda and recruitment is done through the web and the weapons generally used for the attacks are the ones that are easier to attain, which mostly means blades, rather than guns and explosives.

As far as it is known up to date, the Gabar network didn’t have any relationship with large and well-established terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS. Though the name of the organization had no overt religious reference—Gabar is a Punjabi word indicating someone brave and willing to take action—the network’s ideology is based on Barelvi Islamist extremism, as it will be seen in the next section.

Despite the Gabar network’s hierarchical structure and its strict Punjabi traits, paradoxically it seemed to lack a clear chain of command and control. As a matter of fact, Mahmood, who was a high-ranking member of the group, took action on his own and while other members of Gabar probably knew his intentions, it is very unlikely that the attacker asked for any type of permission before his attack. The network’s was fluidity also makes the use of terms such as “cell” and “network” to describe it and its component parts difficult; where such terms are unavoidable, they must be understood within a fully dynamic context. For instance, the references to “the French cell” and “the Italian cell” are misleading if they are understood as static entities with stable membership: the Gabar was a very fluid network with individuals constantly on the move, changing their domiciles and meeting areas, closing Facebook groups and quickly opening new ones, and so on.

Though to date, no conclusive proof has been discovered of foreign connections to the Gabar network, the members’ history in Pakistan remains unclear. Given the vast Islamist and jihadist presence in Pakistan, and the state’s use of these extremists and terrorists in domestic and especially foreign policy, this is an obvious line of inquiry that must be followed up. Were any of them known to Pakistani authorities? Did they have direct connections to extremist groups? Did any of them attend any terror training camps in Punjab or Kashmir?

One more point that must be made: immediately after the September 2020 attack, many European media outlets immediately began referring to Zaheer Hassan Mahmood as a “lone-wolf”, a term that has become very popular when dealing with Islamist terrorism in the last decade. A “lone-wolf” terrorist is someone who acts on his own, without any support, using a weapon that is easy to obtain. In the real world of terrorism, “lone wolves” essentially do not exist. When cases are examined, the evidence has shown that presumed “lone-wolves” usually were not as alone as expected. Mahmood’s case is a perfect example: he turned out to be an important member of a terrorist network. Mahmood might not have had external support from one of the old-style terrorist organizations, like Al-Qaeda or ISIS, but he was part of an internal organization in Europe that had a distinct structure, even if it was more fluid than these traditional terrorist organizations.

Barelvi Extremism

The Gabar network is ideologically linked to Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), an Islamist political party founded in Pakistan in 2015 by Khadim Hussein Rizvi, a Punjabi Barelvi cleric renowned for his speeches against blasphemy, who had been convicted even under Pakistan’s notoriously lax counter-terrorism laws for hate speech and anti-state activities.

The Barelvi movement, also known as Ahl al-Sunna waal-Jamaat, is a Sunni revivalist movement with strong Sufi influences that was born in India between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. They have been in constant tension with another branch of Islam, also born in India, known as Deobandism, which provided the manpower and ideological support for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. The Deobandi ideology, which is also shared by the Taliban, managed to deeply root itself in Pakistan. As pointed out by Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, the Deobandi grew in strength from the 1940s throughout the 1980s, more so with the rise of jihadist militias that were mostly aligned to the Deobandi school and backed by the military establishment for pursuing foreign and security policy agendas in Afghanistan, India, and other parts of the world. The rise of the Deobandi heightened the paranoia among the Barelvis.

In the mid-1980s, the Barelvis formed the Dawat e-Islami with the objective of having a dedicated unit for proselytizing to compete with the Deobandi Tablighi Jamaat. Soon after, other Barelvi groups emerged, such as the Sunni Tehreek, the Jamaat ahl-al-Sunnah and Tehreek Tahaffuz Namoos-e-Risalat. In Kahsmir, two Barelvi groups known as the Sunni Jihad Council and Tehreek-e-Jihad, tried to take action, but, despite their effort, they remained marginal compared to the Deobandi groups.

After 9/11, when Pakistan was under the Western spotlight, a number of the sectarian organizations related to the Deobandi school of thought were banned. These groups shared the same ideology as the Taliban, and could no longer be presented as essential partners against the Soviets. Now, but rather their presence was embarrassing for a state that was supposedly an ally in the “War on Terror”. The Pakistani deep state and its intelligence agencies continued to use Deobandi militants, including the Taliban, for foreign policy issues, however, and even domestically many groups were able to continue operating simply by rebranding.

In the meantime, Barelvi organizations were considered moderate and continued to receive overt backing and promotion from State institutions. After all, as explained by Yaqoob-ul Hassan, a Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: “[T]he Barelvi have mostly remained an apolitical and peaceful sect, generally supportive of the State. Over the years, there was a growing political awakening within the sect as it was felt that it was losing its influence and appeal to other sects, especially to the Deobandis. In the sectarian turf wars with other sects, the Barelvis found themselves on the receiving end. Most of their top leaders were killed in a suicide attack carried out by suicide bombers allegedly from the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which ripped through a congregation of the 12th Rabiul Awwal at the Nishtar Park in April 2006”.

However, it is important to bear in mind that the Barelvi movement is not necessarily a monolithic block. The Barelvis are not new to violence in Pakistan and they are part of a well- known sectarianism that in most cases targets other Muslims through what has become a “cheval de bataille” for Barelvis, the accusation of blasphemy.

Barelvi extremism began to clearly emerge in Pakistan in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In November 2010 a court in Punjab sentenced to death a Christian girl named Asia Bibi, on charges of blasphemy against prophet Muhammad. The governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, visited the woman in prison and strongly criticized the blasphemy law, claiming that it only favored extremism. It is important to stress: Taseer did not himself blaspheme; he only criticized the blasphemy law. Yet, Islamic groups, both Deobandi and Barelvi, still reacted to Taseer’s statements and actions strongly, demanding his removal from office and even accusing him of being an apostate. On 4 January 2011, Taseer was murdered by his own bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, a Barelvi follower of Dawat-e-Islami. The killer was arrested, sentenced to death in October of 2011, and executed in February of 2016, with consequent violent protests breaking out across Pakistan, since many consider Qadri a hero.

One key player in such protests and in the current blasphemy issue was, and still is, the TLP. The party leaders are notorious for inciting violence: for instance, Pir Afzal Qadri, patron-in-chief of the TLP, declared that the Supreme Court judges who acquitted Asia Bibi in October 2018 as “wajib-ul-qatal (deserving of murder)”. Back in 2010, he had also publicly called for the murder of Salman Taseer and threatened to kill government officials supporting blasphemers. In November 2018, Qadri, Rizvi, and other TLP leaders were arrested, though they were released on bail a few months later.

Conclusion

This overview of the TLP in Pakistan is essential as it provides a clear idea of the ideology behind the Gabar group and their reference figures, especially Khadim Hussein Rizvi. Additionally, it is also important to recall that the killers of both, Asad Shah and Kanhaiya Lal (the first one murdered in Glasgow in March 2016 and the latter in June 2022 in Rajasthan, both for blasphemy accusations), were all Barelvis linked to the above-mentioned Dawat e-Islami.

The peak of jihadist violence coming from Barelvi circles cannot fail to cause concern as the phenomenon not only appears in full swing but also at a transnational level and in an extremely fluid manner, making it more difficult to detect and interdict. This is a phenomenon that goes well beyond the borders of Pakistan, as demonstrated by the recent arrests in Europe and must, therefore, be given greater attentional resources by analysts and governments.

Article first published on European Eye on Radicalization.

Giovanni Giacalone, a senior analyst for the Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies/Catholic University of Milan, and for the Britain-based think-tank Islamic Theology of Counter-Terrorism. He is the team coordinator for the “Latin America Group” of the International Institute for the Study of Security.

The purpose of the space was to dissect the evolution of Barelvi extremism, that has recently started to get noticed in the Indian counter-terrorism circles.

Investigations revealed that the two assailants Riyaz Attari and Mohammed Ghouse in the past showed their allegiance to the Pakistani Barelvi militant group Dawat-e-Islami.

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The panel comprising of counterterrorism experts discussed about the radicalization problem and how it is being imported into India.

Panelists were: Executive Director of Islamic Theology of Counter-Terrorism (ITCT) London Mr. Noor Dahri, Head Consultant of Midstone Center for International Affairs (MCIA) Mr. Faran Jaffery, PhD candidate in Digital Counter-Extremism from King’s College London Mr. Jassem Tamim, Director of Association of British Muslims (ABM) Mr. Mohammed Abbasi, and Co-Chairman of Universal Sufi Council Peer Mudassir Shah, while Director of Milli Chronicle Mr. Zahack Tanvir hosted the space.

Dahri said, “Sufism is an ideology, and it’s a non-political ideology around the world. Barelvi Sunni Tehreek started in 1990s as an armed militant group. Some of them were created by Pakistan for the conflict in Kashmir”.

He explained that, Barelvis have always weaponized the blasphemy law, and said that, Barelvi extremists have always attacked the government and civilians, and their motive is to create trouble in the name of blasphemy.

“Most of the victims of Barelvi extremism are Muslims themselves. After the creation of Pakistan, the communal hatred later converted to sectarian hatred”, he added.

“Totally 89 people have been killed since 1948 till 2021. 70 people killed only in Islamabad. Among them most of them were Sunni Muslims, and only one Hindu was killed under blasphemy”, Dahri said.

Jaffery said, “Unemployed youth in Pakistan, and who don’t have a job, take our rallies every now and then. Most of the people in rallies are from Madrasas, who are not skilled and unemployed”.

He blamed the Islamist clergymen who don’t want people to explore religion on their own.

He also said that what Nupur Sharma said has become irrelevant at this point of time.

Endorsing Dahri’s point, Jaffery also said, “It’s very rare to hear if minority was targeted under blasphemy law. A Deobandi files a case against Barelvi and a Barelvi does the vice-versa”.

He added, “Since ideology doesn’t recognize borders, the extremism is flowing from Pakistan to India”.

Jaffery said that Pakistan military in 2011, ranged the alarm bell against Barelvi extremism, to secure the military ranks from getting radicalized.

UK-based Tamim who originally belongs to Morocco, started his talk by admitting what Muslims in India did with the Hindus when they had an upper hand.

Tamim said, “When Muslims had an upper hand in India, they committed atrocities. Now Hindus have the upper hand. However, now Muslims and Hindus in India have to show maturity. Otherwise, India with a civil-war outlook is not a powerful India”.

However, he called all the Muslim sects to stand together in deradicalization, instead of washing-off hands against each-other.

He gave the example of 911, which was carried out by a specific sect, and then everyone started washing-off hands from that sect, which Tamim believes was the big mistake. He said, “It was a collective responsibility because every Muslim share same texts. No one is safe, no one is immune”.

In the end he gave a message to Hindus, “I remind my Hindu brothers, it is your time to prove that you are better than the ones who prosecuted you in the past”.

Peer Sahab said, “God has taken care of the honor of the Prophet and no one can dishonor him”, he said while talking about outrage over Nupur Sharma’s statements.

He said, “Traditionally Barelvis and Sufis believe in Islamic mysticism. But today there’s whole big difference between them. Sufis follow mysticism, while Barelvis are led by politically motivated Mullahs”.

“Sunni Sufis didn’t have political confidence from the Pakistanis. So, the Barelvi Sunnis led by clerics were politically motivated to take part in politics”, he added.

Later, an attendee named Mr. Muslim requested the mic, and added some incredible points.

Muslim said, “Salafi or Ahlul-Hadith are most apolitical people”. He said mere blaming the Salafis for the terrorism is the not the solution.

“Oliver Haneef wrote a book called Wahabi Myth. So merely blaming Wahabi-Wahabi doesn’t work”, he added.

He explained that Tamashuk means to be firm upon textual proofs, whereas Tashadud means extremism to impose them. Islam permits Tamashuk but not Tashadud.

Muslim blamed the Barelvis in India for instigating the Hindus. He said, “Who started raising flags? When you show your supremacy waving green flags during Eid Milad, and blocking roads, then others will be reactionary too”.

He also held News debate equally responsible. He said, “Let the government take it through proper means. What’s need to talk about Gyanvapi”.

Eventually he held Islamists responsible for mocking Hindu deities which led to the insensitive remarks against Prophet Mohammed.

Muslim said, “Mocking other deities is against Quran. Did anyone stop it saying others (Hindus) have sensibilities?”

Mr. Paul Salahudin Armstrong from Birmingham, who follows Sufi Naqshbandi order, had also requested the mic.

Armstrong said, “This is concerning to me, because 22 years ago when I came to Islam, this community was balanced and there were normal people, but now they have become different and intolerant”.

Armstrong said that similar incident like that of assassination of Salman Taseer happened during the Ottoman regime, when a body-guard assassinated a minister on the charges of blasphemy.

He opposed the acts of Mumtaz Qadri and Riyaz Attari, and asked the Muslims to be rational rather being dogmatic.

The space lasted for 1 hour and 54 minutes, and more than 7,800 people have tuned-in so far.