The announcement, made Monday by the Syrian presidency, marks a breakthrough in efforts to reunite the country after more than 13 years of civil war and internal fragmentation. The deal signals the beginning of the end of parallel administrations in Syria’s north and east and reasserts central authority over critical regions long outside Damascus’ direct control.

A statement published by the presidency emphasized that “all civilian and military institutions in the northeast, including border posts, airports, and oil and gas fields, will now be integrated under the administration of the Syrian state.”

State media also released a photograph of President Sharaa shaking hands with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, underlining the significance of the agreement. The document declared that “the Kurdish community is an essential component of the Syrian state” and reaffirmed its rights to full citizenship and constitutional protections.

End of Division?

The agreement comes just days after severe violence erupted in Syria’s coastal Alawite heartland — the community from which former president Bashar al-Assad hailed. This outbreak, sparked by attacks from Assad loyalists, represented the most serious internal security challenge since Assad was ousted in December.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, over 1,000 civilians—primarily Alawites—were killed in a brutal crackdown by new government forces. Additionally, 231 security personnel and 250 pro-Assad fighters lost their lives during the clashes.

Despite the bloodshed, the government declared the operation concluded on Monday and shifted its focus to stabilizing the country through national integration. The timing of the SDF agreement suggests a strategic pivot toward unity, following the decapitation of Assad-era loyalist resistance.

SDF’s Strategic Role

The SDF, which emerged during the civil war as a U.S.-backed force, had established a de facto autonomous administration across much of northern and eastern Syria, including areas rich in oil and gas — resources critical to Syria’s post-war reconstruction.

The group, led largely by Kurdish forces, was instrumental in defeating ISIS in its final territorial stronghold in 2019. However, the SDF’s refusal to disarm had led to their exclusion from a recent national dialogue conference hosted by Syria’s new authorities.

The current agreement, however, offers a compromise: recognition and inclusion in exchange for institutional integration. The document also stresses support from the SDF in the government’s campaign against “remnants of Assad’s forces and all threats to Syria’s unity and security.”

A Reversal of History

For decades under the Assad regime, Syria’s Kurdish population was systematically marginalized. Many were denied citizenship, barred from using their language, and forbidden from celebrating their cultural identity.

The tide turned during the civil war, when the Syrian military’s withdrawal from the north enabled Kurdish groups to establish local governance. Yet, their ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU—complicated relations with regional and international powers.

Despite Ankara’s concerns, the SDF insists it operates independently of the PKK. However, its backbone—the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)—is widely considered by Turkey to be an extension of the PKK. Turkish forces have routinely targeted Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria and supported proxy militias against them.

The agreement with Syria’s new authorities, who have established close ties with Turkey since Assad’s fall, could reduce Ankara’s justification for continued military action—provided the SDF’s integration is fully realized and verified.

A Step Toward Peace?

The timing of this deal is also significant in light of a recent call from jailed PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, urging the group to disband and abandon armed struggle. If realized, the dissolution of the PKK could signal a new era of regional stability, and the SDF’s absorption into Syrian state structures may mark a move away from militia rule toward centralized governance.

While challenges remain, including Turkish military presence and latent sectarian divisions, the agreement could serve as the first genuine blueprint for Syria’s reunification — built not on military might, but on negotiation and mutual recognition.

The bombardment signals the risks of a deepening rift between two powerful regional militaries over Syria, where Islamist rebels have installed a new government after toppling former leader Bashar al-Assad in December.

The Israeli strikes on the three sites Turkey was assessing, including a heavy barrage on Wednesday night, came despite Ankara’s efforts to reassure Washington that a deeper military presence in Syria was not intended to threaten Israel.

The Islamists replacing Assad have alarmed Israel, which is wary of an Islamist presence on its border and has lobbied the United States to curb Turkey’s growing influence in the country.

Ankara, a longtime backer of opposition to Assad, is positioning to play a major role in the remade Syria, including with a possible joint defence pact that could see new Turkish bases in central Syria and use of Syria’s airspace.

In preparation, Turkish military teams in recent weeks visited the T4 and Palmyra air bases in Syria’s Homs province and the main airport in Hama province, according to a regional intelligence official, two Syrian military sources and another Syrian source familiar with the matter.

The sources spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the visits, which have not been previously reported.

Turkish teams evaluated the state of the runways, hangars and other infrastructure at the bases, the regional intelligence official said.

Another planned visit to T4 and Palmyra on March 25 was cancelled after Israel struck both bases just hours beforehand, according to the regional intelligence official and the two Syrian military sources.

Strikes at T4 “destroyed the runway, tower, hangars and the planes that were grounded. It was a tough message that Israel won’t accept the expanded Turkish presence,” said the intelligence official, who reviewed photographs of the damage.

“T4 is totally unusable now,” said a fourth Syrian source, who is close to Turkey.

When asked about the visits, a Turkish defence ministry official said: “Reports and posts regarding developments in Syria – whether real or alleged – that do not originate from official authorities should not be taken into consideration, as they lack credibility and may be misleading.”

A spokesperson for Syria’s defence ministry declined to comment.

Turkey’s foreign ministry on Thursday called Israel “the greatest threat to regional security”. On Friday, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Reuters Turkey wanted no confrontation with Israel in Syria.

Heavy Strikes

In the four months since Assad was toppled, Israel has seized ground in southwest Syria, made overtures to the Druze minority, and struck much of the Syrian military’s heavy weapons and equipment. Wednesday’s strikes were some of the most intense yet.

Syria’s foreign ministry said Israel struck five separate areas within a 30-minute window, resulting in the near-total destruction of the Hama base and wounding dozens of civilians and soldiers.

Israel said it hit the T4 air base and other military capabilities at air bases in Hama and Homs provinces, as well as military infrastructure in the Damascus area.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz called the air strikes a warning that “we will not allow the security of the State of Israel to be harmed”. Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accused Ankara of seeking a “Turkish protectorate” in Syria.

Noa Lazimi, a specialist in Middle East politics at Bar-Ilan University, said Israel was concerned that Turkey could establish Russian anti-aircraft systems and drones at T4.

“The base would enable Turkey to establish air superiority in this area, and this poses a serious concern for Israel because it undermines its operational freedom in the region,” she said.

Ideological Collision Course

Turkey has tried to reassure the U.S. that it wants to work towards a stable Syria.

Foreign Minister Fidan told U.S. officials in Washington last month that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa would not pose a threat to neighbours, according to a senior regional diplomat close to Turkey and a source in Washington briefed on the meetings.

Fidan and other Turkish officials had earlier told Sharaa that Ankara was carefully calibrating its moves towards a defence pact so as not to irk Washington, one of the Syrian military sources said.

“Turkey, not Israel, would pay the highest price among regional states were there to be failure or destabilization in Syria, including with refugees and security,” an official in Turkey’s ruling AK Party told Reuters.

Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute think tank, said Turkey and Israel were on an “ideological collision course” but could avoid military escalation through mediation with Washington.

World leaders, including former U.S. President Donald Trump, perceive Erdoğan’s crumbling strongman image

Nearly two million Turks have gathered in Istanbul to protest President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s decision to arrest his main political rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu, on what critics call fabricated corruption and terrorism charges. The move has ignited widespread outrage across Turkey, with demonstrators denouncing Erdoğan’s authoritarian grip on power and calling for his immediate resignation.

The arrest of İmamoğlu, who served as Istanbul’s mayor and was seen as Erdoğan’s strongest challenger in upcoming elections, has fueled speculation that the Turkish president is attempting to eliminate political competition ahead of a crucial vote. Protesters have taken to the streets chanting, “Enough is enough!” and “Turkey will not be silenced!” as security forces struggle to contain the surging crowds.

Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a Middle East expert, has been vocal about the situation. “Turks are not stupid; they see through Erdoğan’s cynicism and comment on its ironies,” Rubin stated. “Erdoğan accuses İmamoğlu of corruption, but Erdoğan not only has pending corruption cases dating to his own tenure as mayor, but he has since accumulated billions of dollars in unexplained wealth. He accuses İmamoğlu of supporting terror, but Turkish journalists photographed Erdoğan’s intelligence service transporting weaponry to an Al Qaeda affiliate in Turkey.”

The controversy deepened when Erdoğan’s government reportedly annulled İmamoğlu’s university degree, a requirement for presidential candidates. Rubin pointed out the hypocrisy in this move, noting, “Not only was Erdoğan’s own degree fraudulent, but the grounds for dismissing İmamoğlu’s degree were the illegitimacy of the university he attended in occupied northern Cyprus. As with its universities, so too is it with its entire regime.”

The international community is closely watching the unfolding crisis, with speculation growing about how world leaders, including former U.S. President Donald Trump, perceive Erdoğan’s crumbling strongman image. “Trump sees himself as a winner and despises losers,” Rubin said. “Whereas he may once have seen Erdoğan as a strongman, it is now clear that the would-be sultan wears no clothes. Trump and his team are correct: Turkey is important, but Turkey and Erdoğan are not synonymous. Simply put, Trump should dump Erdoğan.”

The massive protests, among the largest in Turkey’s modern history, highlight a growing sense of urgency among citizens determined to reclaim their democracy. The Turkish military and law enforcement agencies now face a crucial test of allegiance. “Turkey’s elite soldiers swear allegiance to the state and the people of Turkey, not one man who holds the constitution and rule of law with disdain,” Rubin emphasized.

With tensions reaching a boiling point, many analysts fear that Turkey is approaching a breaking point. Some protesters argue that peaceful demonstrations may not be enough to bring about real change in a system they see as rigged in Erdoğan’s favor.

Rubin did not mince words when outlining what may be necessary for political transformation: “The Turkish protestors now fight for the soul of their nation. Every protestor on the streets of Istanbul is as consequential for the future of modern Turkey as was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Protests might matter in democracies; however, Turkey is not a democracy. To succeed, they must march on Turkey’s palaces and prisons. If Erdoğan does not helicopter to the airport and flee the country, they should detain him, pending trial, even if passions are such that those who reach him first might simply hang him and release political prisoners, ranging from İmamoğlu to detained Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş and philanthropist Osman Kavala.”

Rubin also hinted at the possibility of internal betrayal within Erdoğan’s own ranks. “Erdoğan, like Bashar al-Assad in Syria, may be tempted to hang on. While the United States will never say directly, the White House likely would not look askance at regional states that would offer reward to any Erdoğan bodyguard who turns their guns on the would-be despot to arrest him or, if he resists, to kill him.”

The coming days will be critical for Turkey’s political future. Will the protests succeed in toppling Erdoğan’s rule, or will the regime resort to even harsher crackdowns to suppress dissent? What is clear, however, is that Turkey is at an inflection point. As Rubin put it, “The age of Erdoğan must end. Turks can either take the next step, or they will have no one but themselves to blame for Turkey’s descent into dictatorship, state failure, and eventual civil war.”